EUROPEANS AND THE
GLOBALIZATION CHALLENGE

International Survey
Comparative qualitative analysis

Kairos Future-Fondation pour l’innovation politique

Directed by Elvire FABRY
Director Europe-International
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INTRODUCTION

Although the 50th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome, on 25 March 2007, is an occasion to celebrate an unprecedented policy innovation initiative between European partners that has made it possible to restore peace on the continent, create a single market and a single currency, and establish democratic supranational institutions, how are Europeans dealing with globalization, which will undoubtedly be the most formative challenge for the future of the Union?

“When I use a word, it means just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less.” Humpty Dumpty’s comment to Alice in the work by Lewis Carroll finds an obvious corollary in the debate on globalization. Martin Wolf, Chief Economics Commentator at the Financial Times and author of the much-acclaimed book Why Globalization Works, also observes that “globalization is a hideous word of obscure meaning, coined in the 1960s, that came into ever-greater vogue in the 1990s.”

Obviously, the concept eludes any uniform definition and at best suggests the fact that some changes are underway in our modern societies. Each country, and each culture has its own definition. Globalization therefore refers to a process which makes it possible for the financial and stock markets to internationalize their activities owing to deregulation and improved communications (HarperCollins Dictionary, United States); the fact that different cultures and economic systems around the world are becoming connected and similar to each other because of the influence of large multinational companies and of improved communication (Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary, United Kingdom); the tendencies of multinationals to devise strategies on a planetary scale leading to the creation of a unified global market (Le Petit Larousse illustré, Paris); the dissemination on a worldwide scale of social, political and economic problems whose solutions call for joint problem-solving (Dizionario De Mauro, Italy); or extending markets and businesses beyond national borders in order to attain a worldwide dimension (Clave Diccionario, Madrid).

If, like Stendhal, we believe that “a good dictionary is a matter of reason and discussion,” what reasonings and debates have induced us to choose such distinctive approaches for one and the same word?

The ratification campaign of the constitutional Treaty was the occasion for widespread public debate on the current and future challenges threatening citizens, Member States, and the Union, and the roles to be played by each level of governance in order to prepare for the future. In France, the debates have focused primarily upon “globalization.”

French citizens—particularly young people—have expressed on this subject some anxiety not readily discernable in other Member States of the European Union.

Recent events in France have once again placed globalization and the role of political institutions as regulatory authorities on the centre stage of the political debate: the decision made by the European aerospace manufacturer, Airbus, to relocate a large part of its subcontracting operations outside of the EU is being highly criticized. There is a growing call for the implementation of protectionist policies for French and European industry … but any such idea has been mentioned beyond French borders. Does this mean that the French perceive globalization very differently from their European partners?

This perception, a very revealing indicator of the impact globalization is having on our societies, has not yet been the subject of much study. The purpose of most of the studies on globalization over the last two decades has been to examine businesses that were adopting a global strategy, the internationalization of finance, and, in broader terms, the phenomenon of deregulation associated with this process. More recent contributions have sought to examine the social and cultural consequences of globalization and the capacity of governments to pursue independent policies. Others focus to a greater degree on showing how supranational entities such as the European Union act as intermediaries between individual nations and the international economy. However, few studies have analyzed how globalization is perceived (its significance, influence of political and economic actors, etc.) by the populations of the various European and foreign countries.

It is this gap which the study *Europeans and the globalization challenge* is intended to fill. A few of the issues addressed include: “In dealing with globalization, will Europe manage to win acceptance for a certain regional distinctiveness? Are Europeans planning to pursue a common strategy together? What do they expect from the European Union? Are the two processes of European integration and globalization perceived to be complementary or partially opposite? What are the areas of commonality or of divergences in the public opinion of various European countries? Are they plagued by strong differences of opinion, or is the emergence of a European society conceivable when the European debates are once again placed in an international context?

The purpose of this study is to outline a framework for the level and type of allegiance that citizens of the various Member States have to the Union. It should make it possible, first of all, to shed greater light on Europeans’ expectations and fears with respect to the Union’s enlargement, and also to pinpoint any difficulties in terms of compatibility and co-ordination between the two national and European allegiance levels.

Furthermore, this work is part of a much broader discussion by the Fondation pour
l’innovation politique on the development of European civil societies. Globalization is giving rise to new socio-economic balances both within, and between, the States. And civil society, as an emerging actor in community governance, plans to be consulted and involved in European negotiations, including those dealing with the process of transforming our societies, constituted by globalization.

Eight Member States (Germany, Estonia, Spain, France, Italy, Poland, United Kingdom and Sweden) have been selected regarding their representativeness of the European Union’s economic and political diversity.

The analysis relies in part on the opinion survey, *European Youth in a Global Context 2007*, conducted in the fall of 2006 by Kairos Future International, a Swedish polling organization, in partnership with the Fondation pour l’innovation politique. The primary aim of the survey was to observe the existence of perception trends according to the generations of Europeans studied by identifying the characteristics of two age groups: individuals aged 16 to 29 and those aged 30 to 50 ans. In addition, the survey was simultaneously carried out in the United States, Japan and Russia, in order to determine whether there is a specific way in which Europeans deal with globalization.

Moreover, eight experts from the European countries studied were invited to comment upon these results on the basis of their own data and to describe the trends reflected in the public debate on globalization. These country studies—which also rely on numerous sources (political discourse and opinion surveys, academic work)—report a great many different positions in the debate on globalization, which describe how the latter is perceived, the actors involved in the debate, and the expectations expressed as to how globalization should be regulated.

These two analysis levels are contributing unprecedented new data to the debate because of how little comparative work has been done on the perceptions of globalization. This work, which includes the eight country studies completed for this project, thus serves as an introduction to the key findings of the study by Kairos Future-Foundations for Political Innovations, compiled by Frédéric Allemand and a cross-analysis of the qualitative studies realized by Laura Dagg, Elvire Fabry and Ivo Sokatchev.
PART I

CROSS PERSPECTIVES ON GLOBALIZATION
A. DO EUROPEANS HAVE A SPECIFIC APPROACH TO GLOBALIZATION?

SUMMARY OF THE KAIROS FUTURE – FONDATION POUR L’INNOVATION POLITIQUE SURVEY

1. DETAILED METHODOLOGY

The ratification campaign for the Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe has been the subject of a widespread public debate on the current and future challenges confronting citizens, the European Union’s Member States and on the role to be played by each level of governance in order to prepare for the future. In France, the debates have focused primarily on “globalization.” French citizens—particularly the country’s youth—have expressed some anxiety on this subject that has not been readily discernable in other Member States of the European Union1. All other things being equal, do the French perceive globalization differently than their European counterparts?

The purpose of this opinion survey, “European Youth in a Global Perspective 2007,” conducted by the Swedish polling organization Kairos Future on behalf of the Foundation for Political Innovation, was to answer these various questions. The survey was conducted from October to November 2006 in 17 countries on two panels representing the total population. In each country, the first panel consisted of 1,000 persons born between 1977 and 1990 (young people), and a second panel of 300 persons born between 1956 and 1976 (the older respondents): the latter category constituted the reference group that formed the basis for interpreting the young respondents’ results. The survey questionnaire was submitted electronically to the panel members and translated into each of their native languages. For each question2, the respondents were asked to indicate how they perceived the subject discussed on a scale of 1 (disagree/not very important/uninfluential/etc.) to 7 (totally agree/very important/very influential/etc.). A deviation of three-tenths of a point between two categories was considered significant.

This contribution shall be limited to presenting the results of this study. It refers to the “country surveys” for a detailed quantitative and qualitative analysis.

Moreover, the analysis deals only with the results of the surveys conducted in Germany, Estonia, Spain, France, Italy, Poland, Sweden and the United Kingdom (also indicated as the “Union” or the “eight”). Limiting the scope of the analysis to these States is justified by

2. The text of each question is presented in the Annex.
the fact that they are deemed to sufficiently represent European diversity (former and new Member States, small and large states, less and more economically developed countries, etc.). However, the data provided by the Japanese, Russian and North American panels were also utilized when that proved necessary.

Our attention will be focused on three series of questions: the first strives to measure the extent to which respondents felt European; the second concerns how the respondents perceive their society, and lastly, the third deals with how the populations perceive globalization, and its actors.

2. THE EUROPEAN UNION COMPARED TO OTHER GLOBAL AREAS

The globalization of all kinds of trade between the various global areas does not lead to a harmonization of how the various national panel of respondents perceive this process. Each one retains its own distinctive characteristics.

Building individual identities: sense of cultural proximity

In these various countries, the panels’ highest sense of proximity was with their own compatriots, while Americans indicated that they had a stronger sense of cultural proximity to the North American continent as a whole than they did to the United States alone (4.75 points as opposed to 4.47 points). The Russians believed that they shared European values. The Japanese, to the contrary, thought that they had a great deal in common at the national level and very little in common with their Asian neighbours, or with Western (European and North American) populations.
Do Europeans have a specific approach to globalization?

Figure 1. Sense of Cultural Proximity in the European Union, Russia, United States and Japan

Question asked: How close do you feel (in terms of culture, values and lifestyle) to the following individuals: [Question no. 14]

![Bar chart showing sense of cultural proximity in the European Union, Russia, United States, and Japan.](chart.png)


**Societal aspirations and future prospects**

Diversity was also prevalent in the form of societal aspirations, confidence in the future and perceived future threats to society.

The North Americans wanted to live in a society with low taxation, in which personal success is valued, and in which the government does not dominate society, yet pursues a protectionist policy. The Russians had rather similar aspirations in terms of personal success and protectionism, but expressed them more vigourously: of all the countries, the Russian panel credits these two factors among their most strongly sensed values (4.93 and 4, respectively, as opposed to 4.42 and 3.62 for the American panel). However, the Russians differed from the Americans in their very firm insistence on a strong Welfare State. The position of the Europeans ranked halfway between the that of the North Americans and the Russians in terms of the relationship between the tax level and the Welfare State; they stood out primarily because they were most in favour of a redistribution of wealth and attributed the lowest values to the idea of protectionism (3.86 points, as opposed to 4.05 for Japan, 4.06 for the Americans, and 4.13 for the Russians). Japan’s results, on the other hand, placed this country in an intermediate position.
Figure 2. Model of an Ideal Society Desired in Europe, United States, Russia and Japan

Question asked: What would your “ideal society” be like? [Question no.15]


This concerns the confidence level expressed by the respondents about their own future and that of the future of the society. It should be pointed out that there were common trends in the various countries. On one hand, the individuals were more optimistic about their own future than about the future of the society. On the other, the level of optimism tended to decline with age. All the same, these similarities could not conceal significant divergences between confidence levels—the Americans expressing the highest levels
Do Europeans have a specific approach to globalization?

of optimism (5.17 as individuals and 3.86 as a group, and the Japanese the lowest (3.17 as individuals and 2.71 as a group). The European Union and Russia ranked halfway between the two (although the Russian panel aged 30 to 50 expressed anxiety about the future of the society approximating that of the Japanese panel).

**Figure 3. Level of Confidence in the Future of Europe, United States, Russia and Japan**

Question asked: To what extent do you agree with the following suggestions? [Question no. 12]

Lastly, with respect to the perception of future threats, we should underscore the strong resonance of the American political context in the responses of those surveyed: the American panel was the only one to indicate war and terrorism as their two primary concerns for the future. Similarly, the Russians attributed the highest value to environmental risks (6.27 points), which is probably due to the country’s repeated chemical and nuclear pollution crises, and ranked drug trafficking as one of their three greatest fears for the future, a more or less direct result of the growing drug addiction problem in this country. After Russia, the Europeans expressed the second-highest fears about environmental risks (5.97 points, as opposed to 5.86 points in Japan, and 5.47 in the United States).
Generally, the fear of unemployment was considered important (according to the country involved, with values varying from 4.58 in the United States to as high as 5.07 in Japan and in Europe), but ranked last among the concerns.

**Globalization: significance and influential institutional actors**

The significance attributed to globalization turned out to be as diverse as the range of worldwide areas/spaces considered: in Russia, the European Union and the United States, globalization was perceived mainly as a process that accelerates global trade. The next most frequent response, in somewhat similar proportions between the European, American and Japanese areas, was the impression that globalization favours cultural exchanges and mutual understanding. Certain specific dissimilarities emerged, however: the Russians closely associate globalization with the setting up of common rules, the Americans see it as a means to strengthen research and development, the Europeans consider it a way to increase mobility within the Community, and the Japanese perceive it as a process leading to declining prices.

However, it was at the level involving the perception respondents had of actors who influence globalization that responses differed the most. For the Americans, the federal government is the most influential institution—far more than the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the United Nations. In the European Union, the most influential institutions are considered to be the multinationals (as in Japan), followed by the European Union and, close behind the latter, the WTO. Rather logically, the Russians, who believed that globalization leads to a standardization of rules, consider the WTO and the Union as the most influential actors. Lastly, the Japanese believe that, in addition to the multinationals and the WTO, the media also play a major role. This acknowledged importance of the media should, however, be put in perspective, inasmuch as the credit imparted to them reached a level somewhat similar to that obtained in the other countries (about 4.4 points).
Do Europeans have a specific approach to globalization?

Figure 4. The influence of institutions on globalization. Analysis of the results from the European, Russian, North American and Japanese panels

Question asked: Which of the following actors do you think have the most influence upon globalization? [Question no. 20]


3. THE EUROPEANS: AN X-RAY OF HOW THEY PERCEIVE THEMSELVES, SOCIETY, THE FUTURE AND GLOBALIZATION

An analysis of the points of divergence and convergence between the various global areas relies on the postulate of homogeneous perceptions within each of the national panels. However, as indicated in our introduction, the results mentioned in respect of the European Union are the arithmetical mean of the results transmitted by each of the eight European panels (France, Germany, Italy, United Kingdom, Estonia, Poland, Spain and Sweden).

Consequently, does this specificity of the European model, in comparison to the other global areas translate into a genuine perceptual homogeneity? Or are there wide disparities between countries that the European mean may have minimized?

“Européanité”: a feeling “under construction”?

To the question, “How much importance do you attribute to nationality, and to affiliation with an ethnic group, a linguistic group, and to the regional and European communities as far as your identity is concerned?” it appears that the Europeans’ identity is formed, for the most part, on the basis of the family unit (5.95 points) and affiliation with a linguistic community (4.49 points), and then less significantly upon national and regional affiliation, these two factors being practically equal (3.92 points, as opposed to 3.87). Compared with the average at the EU level, the national results show very moderate variances that usually
do not exceed four-tenths of a point. This finding admits of an exception with respect to the judgement expressed about the European community as an identity factor. This factor is considered only somewhat important at the Union level (3.44 points). But it is evident that the Italians considered this factor important (4.20 points, which was the highest result of all countries combined), who ranked it third among identity factors. Conversely, the British and Swedish panels are the ones who credit the European affiliation with the lowest levels of importance (2.94 and 2.85 points, respectively).

Figure 5. The Europeans’ Identification Factors

Question asked: “How much importance to you attribute to nationality, and to affiliation with an ethnic group, a linguistic group, and to the regional and European communities as far as your identity is concerned? [Question no. 7]

The sense of cultural proximity expressed by the respondents is somewhat similar to that concerning the basis of identity. The respondents indicated the highest sense of proximity to their compatriots (4.48 points) and second highest to other Europeans (4.10 points). Cultural proximity with populations of neighbouring countries was ranked in third place (3.93 points). Once again, the Italians stood out by expressing a strong sense of proximity to other Europeans (4.32 points, the highest result of the panels), while at the other extreme, the British were the ones who believed they had the least in common with other Europeans (3.50 points). The Swedes took an intermediate position: they indicated the highest sense of proximity with their compatriots, their neighbours and other
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Europeans; however, having a sense of cultural community in which they share the values of other Europeans was considered not very important and ranked slightly below the European mean (4.02 points).

**Figure 6. Europeans’ Cultural Proximity**

Question asked: How close do you feel (on the basis of culture, values and lifestyle) to:

[Question no. 14]

![Figure 6](image_url)


**European society: hopes and fears**

Do Europeans have little confidence in their future? As individuals, the response was decidedly negative: the level of optimism indicated by the respondents with respect to their personal prospects shows a relatively high result on the average at the Union level (4.43 points), while varying on the national panel level, with 3.93 points in Poland and 5.08 points in Sweden. On the other hand, with respect to the future of society, the Europeans proved somewhat pessimistic: on the average, the results obtained in the Union was only 3.27 points, and fell to 2.69 points in France (the lowest result among the eight panels). Actually, three country groups can be distinguished: the “very optimistic,” consisting of Estonia and Sweden, the “moderately optimistic,” constituting the national average in Europe which include Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom, and, lastly, the “pessimists,” consisting of Italy, France and Poland.
Figure 7. Europeans’ Level of Confidence in the Future

Question asked: To what extent do you agree with the following suggestion? [Question no. 12]


The moderate nature of the Europeans’ optimism about the future of society can be explained by the very high levels of the respondents’ perception that there are threats to the community. Interviewed on a set of nine major threats (see the question in the Annex), the Europeans credited the threat to the environment with 5.99 points (on a graduated scale of from 1 to 7), terrorism with 5.64 points, and war with 5.58 points. Only Poland ranked the terrorist threat higher that of ecological disaster.

Fear of unemployment, considered important (5 points), was ranked in seventh place, just ahead of drug-related problems and the risk of a crisis in the international financial system (which all the same obtained a result of 4.78 points!). It should be pointed out that the fear of unemployment seemed to be of greater concern to the populations of the European Union’s large Member States. This threat was most strongly expressed in Germany (5.51 points), France (5.25 points), Poland (5.24 points), Italy (5.18 points) and in Spain (5.17 points).

Nonetheless, although the Europeans similarly perceived threats to the future society, the expectations expressed concerning the society in economic, social and legal terms are not identical from one country to the next. To the contrary, the aspirations have been shown to be very disparate and do not allow a clear profile to be drawn of a commonly desired European societal model. The only exception to this finding of
do Europeans have a specific approach to globalization?

Divergencies resides in the marked preference of all respondents for a society based on a lawful society and one of public order rather than one governed by individual (or contractual) freedom.

Three societal models can be identified:

- A society characterized by a high level of social protection, significant redistribution of resources, and by protectionism (France, Spain);
- A society that advocates a moderate level of taxation, as opposed to less social protection, that rewards personal success, and favours free trade and global competition (Italy, Poland);
- A society with protectionist tendencies in which the level of taxation and social protection are in balance, thus promoting a system that rewards personal success (United Kingdom, Germany).

Figure 8. Europeans’ Societal Aspirations

Question asked: What would your ideal society be like? [Question no. 15]

<table>
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European perceptions of globalization

As far as globalization in particular is concerned, Europeans have a primarily economic perception of it. Sixty percent of the Europeans surveyed think that the key significance of this process is to increase trade with the United States. The vast majority of respondents also think that globalization results in greater mobility within the Union and fosters more numerous cultural exchanges and improves mutual understanding. Contrary to certain preconceptions, the association of “globalization = threat to the national job market” is the one, among the 12 suggestions submitted to the panels for evaluation, that respondents considered the least relevant (3.89 points, as opposed to 5.01 points for the association of “globalization = increased global trade”). This should be all the more highlighted inasmuch as converse association, “globalization = new personal opportunity,” was credited with 4.33 points.
However, correlating the assertions that “globalization = new? personal opportunity/threat to the national job market” makes it possible to identify:

- the countries in which globalization is perceived more as a threat to the national job market than as a process that will allow the respondents to take advantage of new professional opportunities (Germany and France);
- the countries in which advantages/disadvantages in terms of employment are in balance (United Kingdom);
- the countries in which professional opportunities linked to globalization are perceived as more important than the threats overshadowing the national job market (Estonia, Poland, Italy, Sweden and Spain).

Furthermore, although all of the national panels share the opinion that globalization is a factor threatening the national job market—the Union average is .89 points—bear in mind that the preoccupation with employment does not represent a major concern of the surveyed populations (see “supra”).

Figure 9. Significance of Globalization According to Europeans: an individual opportunity and/or a threat to the national job market?

Question asked: To me, globalization means … (12 suggested assertions) [Question no. 19]

In this context, what institutions do Europeans consider the most influential in terms having a say in the process of globalization (as an accelerator or regulator)?
As an economic phenomenon, globalization has made the concept of national borders obsolete. In fact, Europeans believed that the multinationals have the most influence in this matter (5.05 points). Next come the international economic institutions: the European Union and the WTO, which obtained relatively close results (4.86 points for the EU and 4.75 for the WTO). National governments, on the other hand, were given little credibility (3.84 points); as were non-governmental organizations. Public action was perceived to be influential, having been credited with 4.02 points. This result is nearly identical with that obtained when institutional influence is measured independently of any specific issue (3.96 points).

Two countries, stand out from the group, however: Estonia and Poland, both of which ranked the European Union as the actor most capable of influencing the globalization process. The influence level credited to the Union by these countries far exceeds even the credit attributed by the other countries to multinationals.

Figure 10. The Influence of Institutions on Globalization, According to the Europeans

[Question asked: no. 20]

In its in-depth analysis of the reasons that led up to the French “no” vote of 29 May 2005, Gaëtane Ricard-Nihoul reports that “what is interesting about the 2005 vote is that it may well be the first vote on a European topic that was fully integrated within the globalization issue, even if in this context it translates more into a perception, or “feeling,” than into a
genuine grasp of the facts.” The author also commented that it is in the 18 to 24-year age group that the highest proportion of individuals who voted “no” can be found, with support for the constitutional text increasing with age, and reaching somewhat of a majority with the group aged 55 or older. Among the many explanations provided, emphasis was given to the young respondents’ perception of a precarious situation in terms of employment—caused in part by the globalization process—and the difficulty for this population to perceive the advantages of the European framework.

Is this perception justified on the European level? Does a true difference of opinion really exist between the young adults, the young labour force (aged 16 to 29) and those already well-established in the labour market.

“Européanité”: an identity that deepens with age

According to the respondents, the factors which forge their identity do not reveal anything particularly surprising: among those aged 16 to 29, identity is first and foremost formed through relationships with friends, then the family. In the next higher age group, the priorities reverse: the family becomes the leading value defining their identity. As concerns the other factors submitted for the respondents’ assessment (affiliations with their linguistic community, ethnic, nationality, local community and European community), their opinions slightly diverge between the two categories. However, they all agree in considering that their affiliation to the European area has little impact upon their identity (3.46 points among those aged 16 to 29 and 3.41 points among respondents aged 30 to 50).

Confirming the preceding opinion surveys is the fact that the feeling of “Européanité” tends to increase with age in Spain (+ 0.1), France (+ 0.13) and Italy (+ 0.17). To the contrary, however, it tends to drop slightly in Estonia (− 0.06), Germany (− 0.09), the United Kingdom (−0.12), Poland (− 0.12), and to an even greater degree in Sweden (− 0.27). For each age group considered, the sense of a European identity is weakest in Sweden and the United Kingdom and strongest in Italy, followed by Spain.

Do Europeans have a specific approach to globalization?

Figure 11. Identification Factors among Europeans, Ranked by Age

[Question asked: no. 7]


When the respondents were asked to designate the populations with whom they sensed they shared common cultural factors, values and lifestyle, both age groups received a similar ranking: the sense of proximity was strongest with national compatriots, followed by Europeans. The only exception consisted of Sweden, where the highest sense of proximity was perceived as national and regional (namely with Scandinavia and Nordic countries).

Essentially, what distinguishes the “young” panels’ results from those of the reference panels is the order of magnitude. Over time, the sense of cultural proximity—whether with compatriots or other Europeans—increases in value. However, this sense of proximity is
usually considered more important in the group aged 30 to 50 than in the one aged 16 to 29. However, there were a few exceptions: in the United Kingdom, France and Estonia, the sense of cultural proximity with Europeans stabilizes, and even falls slightly with age (-0.04, – 0.06 and – 0.14 points, respectively).

Figure 12. Cultural Proximity with Europeans, Ranked by Age

[Question asked: no. 14]

Does Europeans have a specific approach to globalization?

Does this mean that the “young” define themselves as less European than the older population age groups do? It would be tempting to think so. However, regardless of the country considered, the results provided concerning the proximity of values with Europeans exceed 4 points, which corresponds to half of the value scale used in the survey. Moreover, the difference between the group aged 16 to 29 and the one aged 30 to 50 remains slight, varying between –0.19 (Estonia) and +0.23 (Spain), which is considered an insignificant gap.

Young Europeans are more optimistic than their elders

The way in which the two population groups perceive their societies and the future threats awaiting them also indicates rather large divergences of opinion.

The group aged 16 to 29 assessed their personal situation in more optimistic terms than their elders, with the largest gap being in the British panel (–0.72 points between the group aged 16 to 29 and the one aged 30 to 50) and the least significant being in the Spanish (–0.22 point). As for the assessments of society, the young also indicated that they were more optimistic, but the divergences between the group aged 16 to 29 and the one aged 30 to 50 vary from –0.34 for Germany to +0.23 for Spain.

Optimistic, young respondents credit with a lower value the various threats in their societies’ future. Nonetheless, age differences did not fundamentally change how they ranked the significance of threats: the environment was always ranked highest, while war was ranked second by the young respondents and third by their elders, and the results were reversed for the threat of terrorism. Results for the fear of unemployment, however, were stable, if we assess the means of the results obtained on the European Union level. Yet closer examination reveals some differences between the countries: the latter can be classed according three categories, depending upon whether or not:

− the threat of unemployment was identical or very close in the two age groups (Spain, Italy, Sweden);
− unemployment was perceived as more threatening to the group aged 16 to 29 than to their elders (United Kingdom and Poland);
− at the other extreme, the fear of unemployment was higher in the group aged 30 to 50 than in the group aged 16 to 29 (Germany, Estonia, France).

Does this optimism translate into distinctly different societal aspirations between the two age groups? When partially interviewed on the characteristics of the ideal society (“Regulation and order/Individual freedom”, “Free trade/Protectionism”, “Low taxation/Welfare State”, “Redistribution/Personal success”, the two panel groups provided responses indicating occasionally significant divergences (above 0.3 point), yet not excessive. Thus on the Union level, respondents aged 16 to 29 (3.98 points), like the group aged 30 to 50 (3.95 points), advocated in favour of a strong Welfare State. On the other hand, they wanted a society in which their individual freedom and order would be in balance (3.45 points), while the older respondents clearly showed they advocated an order-based society (3.11 points). On a related note, the
young respondents indicated they were more favourable to free trade and global competition (3.76 points) than their elders and more concerned about protecting domestic industry (3.94 points). Lastly, when offered the alternative of a “redistributive society / society that rewards personal success”, the young respondents gave less emphasis to redistribution than did the adults. A country-by-country analysis gave rise to the addition of some nuances, particularly with respect to the development of perceptions between the young and older respondents concerning the latter factor. In Spain, France, the United Kingdom and Sweden, expectations in terms of redistribution were greater among the group aged 30 to 50 than the one aged 16 to 29, which suggests that the young respondents would be more individualistic. For these same countries, emphasis on a strong Welfare State increased—or remained stable—with age.

Figure 13. Societal aspirations of the Europeans, Ranked by Age

[Question asked: no. 15]

Do Europeans have a specific approach to globalization?

The young respondents concerning globalization

The general finding according to which the national panels believed that globalization corresponds primarily to an increase in trade between countries and in second and third place, respectively, to increased mobility between the Member States of the EU, and more numerous cultural exchanges, remained the same once the factor of respondent ages was taken into account.

The difference lay in the perception that the various panels had of globalization’s impact on employment:

− In all countries—with the exception of Spain—groups aged 16 to 29 believed to be less important the suggestion that “globalization = threat to the national job market” (which is linked to the perception of threats being less important among the younger than among the older respondents): the latter obtained only 3.82 points at the European level, on average, as opposed to 3.95 points for the group aged 30 to 50.

− Regardless of the country concerned, the young indicated that globalization represented an opportunity for them, while older respondents were less decisive in this matter. In France, the gap between the group aged 16 to 19 and the one aged 30 to 50 turned out to be highly significant, reaching 0.57 point, and, above all, revealed a reversal of opinion on what advantages globalization could bring them individually: the young respondents credited the suggestion “globalization = opportunity for me” with 3.89 points, while older respondents gave it 3.32 points.

Figure 14. Significance of Globalization According to the Europeans and According to Age: An individual Opportunity and/or a Threat to the National Job Market?

[Question asked: no. 19]

It should also be stressed that in two countries, the United Kingdom and Germany, although individual opportunities are perceived by those respondents aged 16 to 29 as greater than the threats to the national job market, this perception is reversed among those aged 30 to 50.

The opinion expressed by young respondents about institutions and their capacity to influence the process of globalization did not fundamentally differ from the those indicated by older population groups. If we assess the Union’s results, the institutions ranked the most influential are, in decreasing order of significance, multinationals (5.01 points), the European Union (4.96 points), and then the WTO (4.82 points). The national governments and the NGOs were perceived to be the least influential.

Once again, this similarity in perceptions conceals a few differences. First, all of the institutions submitted for consideration were deemed to be more influential by younger respondents than by the older ones. Secondly, this overrating by young respondents proved very advantageous to the European Union. It is with respect to the latter that the most significant gaps were found between the various age groups.

Figure 15: The Influence of Institutions on Globalization, According to the Europeans and According to Age

[Question asked: no. 20]
Do Europeans have a specific approach to globalization?

At the end of 1998, the Commission was making globalization one of the key political priorities of its Work Programme for 1999. In that document, it specifically indicated:

“Concerted regulatory efforts will have to be made in order to limit the negative effects of globalization. […] The European Union must be capable of exercising political responsibilities on the international scene to match its economic and commercial stature. In order to mobilise its full potential, the Union should not only promote an approach which integrates the various aspects of its external action to a greater extent but also exploit the links between its internal and external policies. […] The Commission will also seek to ensure greater coherence in its human rights policy, a vital component of relations between the Union and the rest of the world.”

Ten years have nearly passed, and the issue of globalization for Europe, its States and its citizens, is as important as ever. It should suffice to consider the decision made in February 2007 by Airbus management to eliminate 10,000 jobs and to increase the volume of subcontracting operations performed outside of the EU area?

This decision could provide an opportunity for the Union to implement the recent financial instrument which it had appropriated for itself in order to deal with the consequences of globalization: the European Globalization Adjustment Fund (EGAF). Created

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**5. CONCLUSION**


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at the pressing request of France and in operation since 1 January 2007, this Fund strives to provide additional support to that of the Member States for workers “made redundant as a result of major structural changes in world trade patterns.”

However, does this innovation constitute an adequate response to the most destabilizing effects of globalization? Is it not necessary, as several candidates to the French presidential elections have suggested, to develop a European protectionism?

Although neither its purpose nor its goal is to respond to these various questions, the Kairos Future - Fondation pour l’innovation politique survey does shed some interesting light on how citizens perceive globalization, the threats that it represents and the level of governance most likely to exert an influence on this process.6

In comparison to the North-American, Russian and Japanese populations, Europeans are less inclined to protect their national industry, yet they are the most favourable toward a society characterized by a high level of redistribution of wealth. Optimists, but not excessively so, they perceive globalization as a primarily economic and cultural process, the course of which can be most influenced by multinationals and the European Union; the national governments are given little credit in this respect. This feeling is in sharp contrast with that expressed by the North Americans, for whom the national government is by far the most influential institution.

In this group, France stood out from the seven other countries taking part in this opinion survey (Germany, Estonia, Spain, Italy, United Kingdom, Poland and Sweden) by the fact that it is the country in which the level of optimism in the future of the society is weakest, and in which the demand for protectionism is the highest. These results should be correlated with the strong fear for the future expressed by the French in matters concerning job loss. In this respect, the French—like the Germans—stated that globalization constitutes more of a threat to the national job market than an opportunity that ought to be seized by individuals. As for the government level capable of most effectively dealing with globalization, the French ranked the European Union ahead of their national government, but after multinationals and the WTO.

In reference to the respondents aged 16 to 29, their choices, aspirations and perceptions did not differ a great deal from the population as a whole, and particularly the group aged 30 to 50. At most, it should be mentioned that the sense of identity and cultural proximity with other Europeans is slightly greater among young respondents than among older ones. Moreover, they consider the threats to the society’s future less important. In this respect, the fear of unemployment was ranked well below that of environmental, military or terrorist threats; only young British and young Polish respondents expressed a fear of unemployment more categorically than their older respondents.

Do Europeans have a specific approach to globalization?

In this context, it should not be surprising that the groups aged 16 to 29 were less protectionist than the groups aged 30 to 50, and that they perceived globalization more as an opportunity than as a constraint exercised upon the national job market—with the exception of young French respondents, who were as critical of it as the older ones were. Lastly, the young respondents tended to value the influence that institutions can exercise on globalization; such validation is primarily advantageous to the European Union.
B. THE GLOBALIZATION CHALLENGE: AREAS OF EUROPEAN CONSENSUS AND FRENCH DISSENT

1. PERCEPTIONS OF GLOBALIZATION: AN OVERVIEW

It is easy to make a general observation as to how Europeans perceive globalization. As a whole they are quite aware of globalization, able to identify the key actors involved in the process, and, for the most part, they seem convinced that, in the final analysis, globalization offers more opportunities than disadvantages.

Four main issues can be identified when examining Europeans’ perception of globalization:
– a socio-economic issue;
– a national identity and cultural issue;
– an environmental issue;
– a migration issue.

A more detailed exploration of individual cases leaves the impression that perceptions of globalization fundamentally stem from the various countries’ sociological, cultural, historic and even geographical context. This accounts for the disparities between Sweden and France, for example, in terms of how they perceive the socio-economic factor and lends credence to the theory according to which the globalization process reveals the societies’ internal tensions and contradictions. However, very strong points of consensus are also observed on certain subjects (one leading example being the high degree of environmental awareness) which place the European Union in the role of becoming a factor in unifying European ambitions to have a collective influence on the globalization process.

After reviewing these different concerns, we will endeavour to explore the general trends in the perception of the globalization phenomenon, which can be classified from the viewpoint either of an opportunity/threat for the future, or of a contingent/easily influenced process. Cross-checking these two dialectical approaches makes it possible to obtain an overall positive, or overall negative, perception of globalization. Even if it has been established from the start that the general perception was rather positive, certain countries are exceptions to the rule. Above all, the various strata comprising this perception should be given greater emphasis because of what can be learned about the impact of the economic, as well as cultural and historic, factors in its formation.

1.1. Significance of the national context

In order to fully grasp the key concerns relating to how Europeans perceive globalization, we must first briefly consider the eight countries in the study before reaching any
general conclusions about the four meaningful issues associated with this perception, and ask ourselves to what extent such issues apply to each of these societies.

**National specificities**

In Germany, economic perception has been shifting, due both to the crisis resulting from reunification—which is fueling pessimism—and the Y2K economic recovery led by efforts to adapt and renewed confidence in national assets. From a cultural vantage point, the overlapping of political, social and economic factors characteristic of the Rhine model is conditioning the Germans’ perception. When the economy is slowing down, the model is viewed as being at risk. When it is picking up, people start trusting its system again, even to the point of believing it should be exported to the rest of the world. Environmental concerns have been very evident in Germany ever since political environmentalism became the focus of Germany social and political debate.

Spain perceives globalization primarily in its economic form. Paradoxically, although most do not individually fear that they will lose their jobs, the job relocation issue is often a subject of public debate, in similar proportions to that of the French situation. The other major preoccupation the Spanish have in relation to globalization is the emergence of a new phenomenon for their country: the massive immigration of poorly skilled workers originating from Eastern Europe, Latin America and the Mediterranean region, which is now turning Spain into a crossroads for global migration flows.

Estonia places the emphasis on preserving its national identity and language. More than elsewhere, Estonia’s Soviet heritage raises the issue of social cohesion in cultural and linguistic terms, since globalization in that country is perceived, more strongly than anywhere else, as a civilizational phenomenon of Westernization. The economic concern is characterized by deliberate optimism based on Estonia’s traditional trade history and on a massive plan to invest national resources in new technologies and research. As for the environmental issue, it has been very visible in Estonia ever since “environmental dissent” was used in the 1980s as a way to structure the Estonian political landscape.

France’s perceptions of globalization appear to be conditioned by a “socio-economic pessimism syndrome” which is negatively distorting all aspects of the globalization process—even those considered as positive in other countries: fear of global competition, job loss (the dreaded spectre of relocation), losing external influence, and, at the same time, fear of the fragile coherence of a social model based solely on a centralizing and lawmaking State. This is accompanied by the negative perception of “inequalities” believed to be made massively more acute by globalization, as well as by uncertainty over the egalitarianism flaunted by a system which overprotects certain social and professional categories to the detriment of others. This French perception of globalization, which can be seen for the most part in unemployment and job issues, is creating an interesting contrast between the country’s actual performance in terms of the international economy, and in the way the French perceive globalization. This scenario is not apparent in any other country in which
the relative trends (or trends towards optimism) in the way globalization is perceived are heading in the same direction as the country’s economic performance.

Italy has been exhibiting a somewhat “fatalistic” understanding of how national economies are led by globalization into an increasingly interdependent process which automatically results in a loss of influence at the national level. Inasmuch as the Italian government is not highly regarded, this phenomenon is experienced in a positive way, contrary to what is occurring in other countries. This explains the fact that the Italians would rather trust the European Union and other international bodies to regulate globalization. Immigration issues are discussed in public debate, but the free movement of persons is not being called into question, and the “Polish plumber” symbolism never caught on in Italy. On a cultural plane, globalization is for the most part experienced as a positive process which promotes exchanges and mutual understanding among peoples. Political ecology having received little support in Italy, Italians are scarcely giving a thought to environmental awareness.

Poland views the globalization debate primarily from an economic vantage point. It has an intriguing way of assimilating globalization with European integration, which explains the positive perception of the process as a whole, thanks to the European funds channelled to the major Polish agricultural sector. The State is also firmly expected to provide protection against, or rather compensation for, any damage which globalization might inflict on the Poles’ economic fabric, in which traditional small businesses are strongly represented. In terms of culture, the powerful “traditionalist” trends influencing Polish political circles have paved the way for rather positive economic visions to co-exist with national identity anxieties and sovereigntist inclinations. The environmental issue does not seem to be a factor in the public opinion’s perception of globalization.

Sweden has been positioning itself as a trading nation practically from its creation. The Swedes therefore enthusiastically welcome the acceleration of trade and financial flows associated with globalization. The very high degree of consistent adaptability and protection offered by the Swedish model merely reinforces the serene way in which the Swedes view globalization, as a natural gift that will benefit their country and improve their way of life. It is noteworthy that, unlike their elders, the attitude of young Swedes towards the European Union is similar to that of other young Europeans. It would seem that, from one generation to the next, the European Union is taking the place of the United Nations as the organization playing the leading role in regulating globalization. However, the Swedes still perceive their State as the pre-eminent regulator and protector. Naturally the environment occupies a key position among the concerns voiced by the Swedish people, who are determined to export their high environmental standards to the rest of the world, notably through the reductive vector which the EU represents on the international scene.

The United Kingdom epitomizes the intriguing dependency of globalization perceptions on political and economic discourse conveyed by the elite. Globalization is traditionally perceived, via discourse promoting free trade, as this “inevitable force” which must
compel all sectors of the economy and of society to constantly adapt in order for the UK to successfully compete on a global scale. The study clearly shows how the official line can obscure the reality of the situation, particularly with respect to the ratio between the globalization and Europeanization of the British economy. Although political discourse emphasizes the former, the reality of trade and financial flows argues, to the contrary, in favour of the latter. Even more curiously, while the British supposedly perceive globalization, for “domestic purposes,” as an uncontrollable economic fatality which entails creating losers and winners, externally globalization is portrayed as a political project with a social aim of benefit to all. Obviously this “official perception” does not reflect the true feelings of the British—especially young people, who negatively perceive the pressures which globalization place on their jobs via external competition or immigration. The environmental issue does not seem to play a part in British perceptions.

Predominance of economic challenges

The economic issue is, by far, the primary channel through which globalization is perceived and assessed by Europeans. We therefore thought it important to explore whether, how, and by what factors, perceptions of globalization are affected by the economic situation in the countries studied. It was found that these perceptions are influenced both by the way in which the citizens view their own personal situations and by the interaction between the national economic context and individual attitudes towards globalization.

The second important factor is the anxiety raised by the effects that globalization might have on the countries’ national and cultural identities. However, it was noted that this fear tends to prevail to some degree in the upper strata of society, and more specifically among the opinion leaders of intellectual circles, and often among the political arena’s far-right groups.

In comparing these two main causes of concern, a social rift is observed which we might be tempted to intuitively establish. This is the rift between the economic or intellectual elite and the majority of the population originating from the middle and working classes. While the intellectuals and politically elite—or what is commonly referred to as “opinion leaders”—are much more concerned about the national identity and cultural impact of globalization on the countries’ lifestyles, the majority of the population are more worried about its socio-economic aspects.

For example, Far Right intellectuals in most of the countries condemn globalization as a creeping Americanization process that threatens to destroy national traditions and identities. The Far Left also condemns it as an Americanization process, while also typically denouncing capitalism’s unbridled global expansion. They fear, moreover, that globalization may result in an irreversible decline in the public debate arena. Intellectuals, who may be classified in the major category of reformists, welcome, in globalization, the propagation of Western universal values and of human rights, as well as the understanding that global problems such as the environment or poverty can only be solved through joint planetary
efforts. The middle and working classes, to the contrary, obviously have much more immediate concerns which globalization seems to be bringing into their daily lives: more competition, job losses, cultural shock.

The point here, however, is not to prove that there is a dichotomy between globalization’s “winners” and “losers,” as many may be intuitively inclined to do according to classifications based on a person’s economic status or income. Rather, it would be more tempting to promote the idea that Europeans’ perceptions of globalization are only slightly influenced by their social status or class attitudes. However, in European countries, a fundamental differentiation can be demonstrated according to the individuals’ educational level and the advantages that such a store of knowledge is supposed to provide them in order to fully benefit from the opportunities offered by globalization. Those who have a high level of education and specialization are found to be more capable of coping with globalization, and, at any rate, consider themselves less threatened by it. On the other hand, those who perceive themselves as having a low level of education and/or of specialization feel more exposed to the dangers of globalization, while at the same time think that they are unable to adequately benefit from the advantages it offers.

This confirms that the idea according to which globalization, as far as Europe is concerned, will depend on levels of education, occupational skills and technological specialization, is gaining ground. This is all the more significant in that such a distinction is found not only within societies, but also among the various countries. As it will be seen in the second part of this study, the countries staking their all on these factors—such as Sweden, Estonia and, to a lesser degree, Germany—have the most aggressive and optimistic vision of the globalization process and of the winning role they can play in it.

As for the perception of actors likely to have an impact on globalization, certain dominant trends can be also distinguished, although the criteria under which “influence” is classified differ from one country to the next. Multinationals are, by far, the actors perceived as profiting the most from globalization. At the bottom of the list—which comes as no surprise—are the judicial system, the government and the non-governmental organizations. Europeans seem to firmly convinced that globalization affects the capacities of national governments—all the more so when the government in question (as the Italian example shows) is already perceived as weak and ineffectual in its own right. This trend, which may be considered troubling for European democratic systems, is counterbalanced to some extent by the relatively strong confidence that European citizens have been placing in each other and in their compatriots in terms of the role that they may play in the globalization process.

With respect to the factors regulating globalization per se—once we have stressed the modest role that Europeans are attributing to their governments—, it appears that they expect, or want, to see international bodies emerge. The European Union emphatically ranked second after multinational companies, followed by the World Trade Organization.
and the United Nations. Paradoxically, Europeans do not seem to place any more trust in their institutions than in their national governments, yet seem to think that they are nonetheless actors more qualified to play a role in globalization. Regarding this point, we should highlight the example of Italy, in which Italian survey respondents stated that that they have more confidence in the EU than in their national government.

A third factor of common concern for Europeans is the environment. This concern is particularly evident, as might be expected, in Sweden, Germany, and Estonia, as well as in the minds of the British. In countries where this is the dominant issue, it was noted that the role attributed to the European Union—notably among the young generations—is becoming increasingly critical. In this context, the EU is perceived as a power control mechanism which can convey European concerns and their need for high environmental standards, on an international scale.

The fourth factor that we wanted to focus on is emigration, which is perhaps less universally experienced in all of the countries studied. Even if the latter’s public opinion has been acutely aware of the migratory flows resulting from globalization, it is surprising to note that negative perceptions are in the minority. Immigration—which is considered a serious problem in Spain and in Italy (relative novices in such respect)—is not causing widespread negative reactions for the moment. To the contrary, the image of Great Britain as an open and hospitable country appears to be marred by the negative perceptions Britain’s young people have in competing with foreign labour in their homeland. In the other countries, immigration is not a major concern in the public’s perception.

Having said that, the problem is transnational by definition, and it might be argued that if the concern exists in any one of these countries, it becomes a general concern for the EU. In that sense, it is worth pondering what form of political mediation will manage to bring these populations into agreement on this subject.

### 1.2. A positive perception is emerging in Europe

In order to have a clear perspective of the general trends of these perceptions, we first need to make a brief survey of the eight countries in the study before drawing any general conclusions as to the interactions between the positive and negative trends in these countries and the general European trend, which is quite positive, and then weigh the significance of the economic, as well as the cultural and historic, factors in explaining this irrefutable fact.

**Distinctive national characteristics**

In the 1990s, Germany perceived globalization somewhat pessimistically because the country was mainly focused on its internal reunification process, which was severely testing its economic and social situation—particularly its international competitiveness. Once the difficult period of reunification was behind it, the German society formulated
a consensus among political, economic and social actors on the need for Germany to fully exploit its assets in the world marketplace. After implementing critical reforms, here again in a spirit of “national union” so as to modernize the German economic and social model, the country resumed its economic growth and began to get out of the red zone in terms of social indicators such as unemployment and public debt. Although somewhat apprehensive, German public opinion has reached a consensus in favour of regulating the risks and taking advantage of the opportunities offered by globalization. Their ambition extends even to the point of wanting to export the German socio-economic model to the rest of the world in order to guarantee global stability and the comparative advantages enjoyed by Germany.

Spain does not yet seem to be paying any particular attention to globalization in public debates. Its view of the latter remains positive overall, though somewhat less so than the European average. The Spanish are very conscious of the fact that level of education is the most decisive factor in determining the way they perceive and direct the globalization process. Optimistic about their individual futures, the Spanish associate globalization with the modernization of their country on the basis of such key words as competitiveness and international credibility. For Spain, what matter is to put globalization to the best possible use in order to recover some of the lustre of its bygone years as a great colonial and trading power. Globalization is mainly perceived as the means to increase Spain’s economic influence in Latin America, and to gain political credibility within the EU.

Estonia seems haunted by a decidedly idealistic and pro-active vision of globalization, perceived as the opportunity for the country to prove the superiority of its economic model. This openness to the world which was, historically, Estonia’s key trait, revived permanently after the Soviet “freeze” period. As a trading nation, Estonia understood that globalization would offer many comparative advantages to small nations demonstrating innovation and adaptability. By unconditionally adopting a liberal economic and social model, Estonia sought not only to be in harmony with global expansion, but is also striving to show its European partners that the model it has adopted is the only viable one for the continent if it wishes to assume its rightful place in a globalizing world.

France has been developing a more pessimistic view of its future and pro-active perspective of globalization than all of the other countries. The differences are especially clear in terms of all aspects of the future and confidence in the future. The insistence on protection (national identity, Welfare State) is also more strongly expressed in France. The issues associated with globalization are also more negative in France. The aspects of globalization considered to be positive in the other countries are far less prevalent in France. Conversely, the negative consequences of globalization, of which threat to employment is the key factor, are much more prevalent than in the other countries. We therefore conclude that globalization is seen primarily by the French as a threat to the country’s identity and to jobs. “Pessimism” and “distrust” seem to characterize French perceptions as a whole, and globalization is no exception to the rule—pessimism and fear of an economic and social welfare system which, since it cannot be directly called into question, is criticized
for its excessive “permeability” to harmful external influences. There is also distrust of a political system deemed incapable of protecting the country from these influences. While the other countries take into account the greater “impetus” globalization contributes to the world’s economic and political dealings, in all of its complexity, weighing the advantages and evaluating the risks, France perceives only the “hardships” which this process is inflicting on the country.

Italy is no doubt the country in which the issue of globalization is the least evident in the concerns of public opinion. It would appear that Europe is much more the focus of its apprehensions than globalization, which is being experienced as an inevitable process, somewhat removed from daily preoccupations. More specifically, the Italians are very keenly experiencing their relationship with the outside world through the filter of the EU. Basically, the Italians—especially young people—perceive globalization and “Europeanization” as a pathway to general economic opportunities and to personal and professional success. As the Italians have a generally pessimistic view of their country’s situation, they rely on the outside world to provide their economic resources and to regulate global trends, which accounts the weight they give to European and international institutions.

Poland, as in other countries, interprets globalization in a variety of ways: although the economic definition of the term is well-known, little attention is paid to its political, and even less to its cultural, aspects. Generally speaking, globalization is viewed as a positive phenomenon, and little emphasis is placed on the negative effects of economic liberalization. What should be stressed in the example of Poland, and is also true to a certain extent in Estonia as well as Italy, is the fact that globalization is perceived as correlated with the European Union. What distinguishes the Poles is the positive role in the globalization process which they attribute to the United States, while in the other countries, the “globalization equals Americanization” equation is experienced as negative. The pro-Atlantist position taken by the great majority of the public opinion logically accounts for this Polish particularity. The Poles believe that the role played by their American partner in globalization is consistent with their interests.

Sweden is unquestionably the country in which globalization is perceived—notwithstanding the enthusiasm it inspires in Estonia—with the most equanimity. Despite the extent of globalization’s effects on Sweden, the Swedes’ attitude towards globalization is emphatically positive, with a substantial dose of optimism, of trust in its destiny, and of confidence in its economic, social and (noteworthy exception) governmental model to enable them to play a positive and winning role in globalization. They have few fears about it, no doubt due to cultural factors and to the organization of a society which relies on an implicit contract to the effect that, in exchange for a certain freedom granted to businesses, the economically disadvantaged are remarkably well cared for.

In principle, it is not surprising that, in the United Kingdom, globalization is perceived in primarily economic terms, and correlated with a series of economic and social
imperatives (such as investment in R&D and in life-long vocational training). But as far as Britain is concerned, we observed attitudes which are inconsistent with the preconceptions about the uncompromising commitment of the population to the process. It is particularly interesting to note that the young respondents, much more than their elders, seem to be deeply concerned about economic insecurity, which they seem to associate with open and flexible labour markets, as well as with high immigration levels. It would also appear that the British respondents, unlike their political elite associate globalization with significant threats to national identity and their job prospects.

**European convergence**

Results therefore point to the fact that, with the notable exception of France, globalization is ultimately being experienced as a positive process and occasionally as a positive phenomenon. As we have seen, the various factors shaping Europeans’ overall perception of globalization vary, and the optimism of some countries is matched by the indifference of others. However, in no country other than France is the perception so decidedly negative. It would be tempting to divide the eight countries in the study into four different categories, plus the “French exception”:

- **Sweden and Estonia** have a fundamentally optimistic view of globalization. They believe that their models of economic development and social management are the ones best suited to globalization. The two countries emphasize their economy’s adaptability, as well as their investments in R&D as their main assets in the globalization process. However, while Estonia believes in a pure neo-liberal model that places absolute confidence in economic actors, Sweden is aware of the combined need for free economic operators, which create wealth, as well as for a wealth-distribution and social-protection model supported by the State.

- **Great Britain** displays an “official” optimism, but one which entails a certain number of underlying concerns as to what rank the country will hold in globalization and in the European Union. On the other hand, Germany is experiencing renewed optimism, while remaining cognizant of the pressures globalization may exert on the German social and economic model. It is therefore taking an aggressive stand in this respect in its public discourse, as is Great Britain. The two countries clearly wish to “play the global game” and make full use of their comparative advantages in global competition, which is not viewed as “a zero sum game” but as an opportunity worth exploiting. The nuance is that Germany affirms that it is equally aware of the opportunities and the risks involved in globalization, while Great Britain tends to de-emphasize the risks, which, however persist in the British collective “subconscious.”

- **Poland and Spain** affirm their assets for globalization, yet at the same time perceive more sharply than the other countries the risks that they are incurring. Having only recently entered the global trade arena, these two countries do not yet seem to have adopted a dominant way of perceiving the process, inasmuch as public opinion remains reticent, yet
nonetheless confident, about the opportunity for the two countries to benefit from globalization, provided that a certain number of adjustments are made. While the world tends to consider these two countries as supporters of “liberalism” and as distrustful of any form of State protection, Poland is revealing a need for the State to intervene as the agent which will compensate for any damage that globalization may cause to the Poles’ economic and social system.

Italy seems to be considering globalization somewhat reluctantly, perhaps with a touch of “philosophical fatalism.” Globalization is real, it can offer opportunities, and it undoubtedly encompasses risks, yet the whole process seems to be somewhat removed from the immediate concerns of the Italians, who conceive of their role as world trade actors in terms of their adherence to the European Union. To a certain degree, Italy joins the ranks of Poland and Spain as countries having mixed feelings about globalization, except that it does not show any confidence in its capacities as a nation to deal with globalization’s challenges. The Italians do not believe in the collective opportunities thus presented to their country, but believe that globalization will increase the possibility for individuals to realize their full potential.

France is at odds with all of the other countries. Here the all-too-familiar “French exception” concept takes on its full meaning. Even in the countries where general confidence in the future is not very strong—as in Italy—negative perceptions of globalization are not as pronounced as in France.

What might we conclude about the “perceptions” component? In general, our findings tend to show that the accepted clichés about how globalization is perceived are false. Central and Eastern European countries are not all die-hard “neo-liberals,” the British are not as enthusiastic about globalization as people tend to think, and the Swedes believe that a “massive” welfare system is not a handicap but rather an advantage in global competition.

It seems evident that the perceptions of globalization are above all conditioned by the historical and cultural data which characterize each country. Sweden—which has been a naval and trading power open to the world for several centuries, and confident in the strength of its national coherence and in the viability of its social model, is unsurprisingly the most serene nation when it comes to dealing with globalization. France, which has opted for an agrarian and rural development model rather than naval domination (as Sweden and Great Britain were able to do), has not developed the same relationship with everything that enters France “from the outside.” Paradoxically, certain of the universality of its social model, and that it needs to be exported to the rest of the world, and at the same time conscious of this model’s shortcomings in coping with a modern economy in which exchanges and flows are constantly expanding, France perceives globalization from a defensive vantage point. Based on that, it may be concluded that globalization acts above all as a means to expose the state of the countries’ economic, social and national identity. The external pressure exerted by globalization reveals the economic strengths and weaknesses, the social
models’ adequacy or obsolescence, the secular coherence of certain nations, and the artificial State mechanisms of certain others. Globalization therefore is, in itself, neither good nor bad. It reveals the good or bad aspects of each country.

Another factor that should be emphasized is the relatively key position occupied by the European Union in the Europeans’ perception of globalization. This perception is positive for the most part, inasmuch as in most of the countries the EU is considered as the source of a pertinent level of regulation, or at least of constructive action in terms of globalization—sometimes even more pertinent than that of national governments or of other international organizations.

The two main conclusions which may be drawn from this study on the European public’s perception of the globalization phenomenon is that the reaction as a whole is positive and that there is a certain amount of confidence that Europe is an entity with a major role to play. It remains to be seen whether the national actors are considering these perceptions and can provide solutions to the questions on Europeans’ minds, despite their determination to take full advantage of globalization.

2. WHICH ACTORS ARE LEADING THE DEBATE?

How do Europeans perceive globalization? This question has no single answer: Europeans’ perceptions differ, and this variety can be partially explained by the unique historic, cultural and political profile of each Member State. Nonetheless, from this overview of “Europeans’ attitudes towards globalization” some common trends have emerged which merit being discussed in greater detail.

Our aim was to determine which actors are shaping the debate and discourse on globalization in the eight countries surveyed. In view of the conclusion that globalization is perceived as an economic phenomenon with which the States must cope, what role remains to be played by political actors and civil societies?

The range of actors in this debate is rather broad and encompasses political actors and those of civil society: trade unions, management, political parties, NGOs, intellectuals, and churches. As each actor category is reviewed, an attempt will be made to answer the following questions: is there a Left-Right divide over globalization? What links are there between the perception of political parties and that of civil society? How committed are civil society actors to the public debate on globalization? Is there a trans-European aspect to the reactions to globalization? Are civil societies and political circles more in favour of, or opposed to, globalization? Is there any room for opposition to liberal globalization, or for alter-globalism?

This list is not exhaustive and is offered as a patchwork overview of all of the data collected for the qualitative analyses of the eight countries studied. The specificities of each
country and of each society will be highlighted and the points of consensus comprising the formation of European trends will be identified.

2.1. Is globalization a potential source of political dissent?

As a source of polemic and diverse interpretations, globalization—in most of the eight countries studied—is an unavoidable subject for political discussion. This section will map out the positions taken by the various parties concerning globalization. Will this outline reveal a Left-Right divide, or will there turn out to be a consensus among the major political parties?

Globalization: an unavoidable subject in the political debate

A comparison of two studies conducted in France (Zaki Laïdi on French parliamentarians)\(^1\) and in the United Kingdom (Colin Hay and Nicola Smith dealing with the British elite’s opinion of globalization and the EU)\(^2\) made it possible to highlight the differences in opinion between these two countries’ elite. The latter’s public opinions are diametrically opposed, according to the GMF 2006 Trade and Poverty Reduction survey.\(^3\) The responses to the question of whether or not trade barriers should be maintained even if it might result in slower economic growth is very enlightening: only 6% of respondents are in favour of it in the United Kingdom, while 86% are in favour of it in France. Concerning the more general question of whether or not there should be freer international trade, 84% of those surveyed in the United Kingdom are in favour of it, as opposed to 44% in France.\(^4\)

Having reached this conclusion, it is not surprising that the British members of Parliament should for the most part have a more favourable—and French MPs a more reticent—opinion of the globalization phenomenon. Moreover, a Left-Right divide was seen among French MPs.

Indeed, France is the only country in the study to indicate such a political cleavage. The French Right, which had long advocated state control and sovereignty for many years under the Fifth Republic, gradually redefined its position on sensitive issues, notably those related to the job market, as liberal ideas gained momentum. Conversely, the survey suggests a hardening of the Left’s attitude towards anti-liberal political values. This phenomenon translates into the fact that 43% of the UMP parliamentarians view globalization as a positive phenomenon, while only 5% of the Socialists interpret it in that way. Scarcely 3% of UMP parliamentarians, to the contrary, considered globalization a negative phenomenon.

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while this proportion climbed to 38% among the Socialists. The negative perception of globalization is therefore incomparably stronger on the Left than on the Right.\(^5\)

In the United Kingdom, however, a similar survey of British MPs revealed more positive attitudes among all right-wing and left-wing MPs: of the total respondents, 78% believe that the benefits of globalization outweigh its disadvantages (83% Tory, 70% Labour), and 86.4% think that globalization promotes prosperity (88% Tory, 79% Labour). Lastly, 81% of the British MPs view as positive globalization’s impact on economic prosperity (of which 79% Labour, 88% Tory), and 61% believe it has a positive impact on employment.

There was only one question on which a similarity was noted between the responses of the British and the French politicians: the one concerning globalization’s “winners and losers.” Of the UMP parliamentarians, 50% indicated that farmers would be the main losers, while among the Socialists, only 17% believe that this category is the main loser. The vast majority of Socialist Party (PS) respondents indicated that they considered blue-collar workers to be the main losers of globalization (77%). In response to the similar question: “Is globalization of any benefit to the poor?” 36% of the British MPs (61% Tory, 28% Labour) believe that globalization is beneficial to the poor, and 55% believe that globalization is beneficial to British workers.

The comparison of these few British and French responses underscores the Left-Right divide which exists in French politics on the subject of globalization. In the United Kingdom, the discourse of the Conservative and Labour parties is positive as a whole with respect to globalization, as shown in the extracts of discourse cited by Hay and Smith in their study. The New Labour party’s discourse is very positive concerning the advantages of globalization and stresses the need to regulate the process in order to reduce North-South inequalities/inequalities between developing and developed countries.\(^6\) The reigning consensus on globalization in the United Kingdom is enabling the Labour Party to strategically use their discourse on globalization to de-politicize certain reforms. We may well ponder what effects the Left-Right divide may have on action initiated by political parties in France and what manoeuvring room they have to carry out labour market reforms.

In the other countries studied, there is a consensus on the concept of globalization and the challenges it poses. Globalization is most often perceived and portrayed as an inevitable fact with which the world must come to terms.

However, the emergence of a consensus on globalization was not evidenced in all countries. The example of Germany clearly demonstrates the progress made since the 1990s, when opposition to globalization was the dominant view and there was lively political debate about the needed reforms. The new Bundestag majority took the initiative of

\(^5\) Laïdi, Z., *op. cit.*

\(^6\) Hay, C., and Smith, N., *op. cit.*
forming a committee of inquiry into the challenges and risks of globalization, which published its report in 2002. This context of thoughtful inquiry into globalization, combined with the need to reform the Germany system, led Chancellor Schröder to launch a set of structural reforms as part of his “Agenda 2010” programme. This aggressive commitment has also been supported by Horst Köhler, the current President of the German Republic, who has been urging the German people to get their country back on track. Despite some pessimistic perceptions, the debate did not take on a defensive tone and has been predicated for the last ten years on the necessity of adapting the Germany model in order to preserve it while also keeping it competitive. Germany’s attachment to the social market economy has brought the two major parties closer together—both of them now wish to harness globalization.

In Sweden, the Social Democrats and the Centre-Right Party as a whole favours globalization. The Social Democrats are more neutral, acknowledging the impact of globalization without showing any desire to question it or block the process. Ninety percent of the MPs support the idea that Sweden must adapt to the new global conditions. Estonia, which is very similar to Sweden in its positive and pragmatic approach and its openness to globalization, is experiencing widespread agreement among its political parties concerning the benefits of globalization.

A dearth of debate on globalization has been noted in Italy. Nonetheless, it is a subject which promotes consensus more than political dissension. Most members of the Left, represented by Romano Prodi’s Marguerite Party, as well as the Centre-Right under the leadership of Forza Italia directed by Silvio Berlusconi, believe that globalization can be a positive phenomenon if properly managed. However, globalization is scarcely mentioned in the parties’ political programmes. Although it is not opposed by Italy’s major political groups, there are Centre Left parties—the Federation of the Olive Tree, the Communist Refoundation Party, the Communist Party and the Greens—which are critical of globalization. Similarly, in Spain there is no Left-Right divide on this subject. The debate on the ratification of the Constitutional Treaty in Spain showed that the majority of the Spanish associate globalization with the European Union in a positive way. In view of the relatively recent reintegration of Spain into the European and Western institutions, few groups are questioning what is being perceived overall as progress.

In the example of Poland and Estonia, the perception of globalization is linked with their recent integration into the European Union and with the liberal reforms initiated in the 1990s. In Poland, the Law and Justice Party (PiS, a pro-state and conservative party) is concealing issues related to globalization and the European Union behind sovereignist slogans. On the other hand, the opposition parties such as the Civic Platform (PO) and the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) explicitly present the country’s membership in the EU as a

7. See Henrik Uterwedde’s article in this same volume.
8. See Alain Lefebvre’s article in this same volume.
historic opportunity that will allow Poland to join “globalization’s winner’s club.” Due to its configuration as a small country with an open economy, Estonia has been focusing its political strategies on export and market openness. In this context, the political consensus on globalization is not unexpected.

*The Far-left and far-right parties’ opposition to the globalization process*

Despite a mild contrast between the opinions of the Centre-Left and Centre-Right parties, it was observed that globalization is reviving parties of the Far Right and the Far Left in Europe. During the referendum campaign in France, opponents of the Constitutional Treaty managed to associate “social anxiety” with the European challenge. The parties of the Far Right and the Far Left are still opposed to liberalism and to the European Union. For pro-sovereignist and conservative reasons, the Far Right refuses to open up to the world and to other cultures. In France, the sovereigntist Right correlates European market liberalization policies with globalization. The Far Left’s opposition to liberalism is coupled with the idea that “another world is possible.” In its leftist version, the refusal of globalization is not fuelled by negative opinions about the “Other”; to the contrary, it is in the name of promoting brotherhood among peoples and a more equitable world that the Left’s alter-globalist opinions are being expressed.

Poland is one of the countries surveyed in which the Far Right’s protest against globalization is the strongest. Samoobrona, a party that originated from a populist peasant union, recruits its electorate among those disillusioned with the socio-political and economic changes which have been taking place in Poland since 1989. Globalization is associated with a risk of loss of control over the economy to the benefit of foreign investors. The League of Polish Families (LPR), a Far-Right, ultra-nationalist, and anti-European party, opposes the influence of foreign investment and European integration. This party advocates increased state intervention in the economy, as well as the defence of such traditional values as the family, patriotism, freedoms and ownership. The League of Polish Families considers globalization as a threat to “Polishness” and to the Catholic faith.

In Sweden, opposition to globalization is still extremely marginal. A party consisting of former Communists and certain groups of the Far-Left, the Left, and the Green Party oppose to globalization, but they have nonetheless supported Social Democrat policy for a dozen years. They represent 5% of the electorate in Sweden.

Clear trends can be identified within the European political parties. With the exception of France, a consensus on the overall positive effects of globalization and on the need to support globalization seems to have won over the political circles. This consensus is the outcome of debate, reviews and reforms carried out during the 1990s (in the case of Germany and Sweden). The initial controversies gave way to a more mature and thoughtful debate on globalization. It is noteworthy that Germany and Sweden have a more consensus-based political culture than does France. What is not known is whether or not the French political
The globalization challenge: areas of European consensus and French dissent

dichotomy on the subject of globalization will lead to a paralysis of political action, further complicating the adaptation and reform process. The reticence of the French political parties, which are not sufficiently decisive about this thorny issue of globalization is paving the way for alter-globalist groups and for Far-Right and Far-Left parties, to be the only ones to express a true opinion on this matter.

2.2. A civil society scarcely mentioned in the debate

If there is a consensus within political circles on the need to cope with globalization, how is the latter perceived by the European countries’ civil societies? In this context, “civil society” means all of the active forces (notably professionally active persons) of the country and of its associations—as opposed to the politicians looked upon as political “professionals.” Do civil society’s opinions differ from those of the political realm? Does civil society truly act as a counterweight on the subject of globalization?

Civil society’s actors are more diverse than political actors, the latter identifying themselves with well-defined categories. National studies list five main types of actors: unions and employers; intellectuals, foundations and think tanks; alter-globalist groups; NGOs and associations; and churches. What is the respective influence of these various actors and to what extent are they involved in the public debate? Are they in favour of, or opposed to, globalization? Is the European political parties’ consensus favouring a positive discourse on regulated globalization perceptible within the civil society? Are transversal issues emerging within European civil societies?

Unions and employers

Germany and Sweden are countries strongly marked by a tradition of corporatism. The role played by unions and employers in these two countries is interesting because of their strong involvement in their nations’ economic management.

Swedish employers support globalization and defend free trade. They do not speak in favour of artificially supporting sectors or jobs condemned by the market. But while they try to challenge certain aspects of social protection in order to increase “competitiveness,” their primary concern is to preserve social peace. Swedish unions are rather positive in their assessment of globalization. The Swedish model is suitable to regulating globalization. The productive private sector benefits from significant freedom of action and labour laws are liberal, yet offer the employee considerable protection. The main Swedish union, LO, believes that globalization is a good thing provided that social protection is maintained and the growth of unstable jobs is limited.

The German employers’ organization, BDI, is maintaining a liberal discourse on the positive effects of opening markets. It is opposed to protectionism, being of the opinion that

global competition promotes progress. The four main German unions play an important role in the decision-making process and share in the country’s economic and social regulation. The government regularly consults management and labour, which takes part in the public debate by issuing reports, holding congresses and addressing the media. One of the largest German unions, the DGB, is actively engaged in the debate over globalization, arguing for a globalization based on social justice and sustainable development. The unions are also an important channel for alter-globalist positions. After the 2002 elections, in cooperation with ATTAC Deutschland and the association of German NGOs, the DGB published a joint declaration on development aimed at the Schröder government.

The two main Spanish unions are pessimistic about globalization. According to the union Comisiones Obreras, the latter represents a threat to employment and democracy and exacerbates inequalities and environmental degradation. In the eyes of the other union, the Unión General de Trabajadores, globalization does not create jobs. Spanish employer organizations, challenging the unions’ position, feel that globalization is a source of major benefits to Spain. The level of foreign investment and immigration has been two positive effects of globalization on the Spanish economy.

As for Swedish and German social partners, their participation in the political process can be interpreted as facilitating their support of globalization, whereas in other countries, such as France, unions and employers are only marginally involved in the country’s economic management.

The intellectual debate: the role of intellectuals and foundations

The involvement of intellectuals, foundations and think tanks in the debate over globalization differs according to the country. Well rooted within the German intelligentsia, foundations and think tanks are recent players in other European countries. Nevertheless, overall, a lively debate on globalization is underway in the countries studied.

Germany is a country where foundations and research institutes abound. These institutes, such as the Bertelsmann Foundation, publish voluminous annual reports which are reported by the media. The debate underway in Germany allows citizens to access more information and voice their opinions more often on significant social subjects such as globalization.

Even before the end of Communism, research findings by Western specialists had been debated heavily in Estonia, without being contested. Conferences with specialists who challenge globalization are rare.

In Italy, the intellectual debate on globalization is ineffectual. The lack of significant publications authored by Italians, as well as the limited number of press articles, underscore the dearth of debate on this theme. Only a few left-wing journalists and intellectuals, such as Antonio Negri, discuss the issue.
It would seem the intellectual debate in the other countries studied is not very vigorous.

“Alter-Globalization” (also known as the “global justice movement”)

Alter-globalization receives substantial media coverage: major international summits, World and European Social Forum and thunderous individuals such as José Bové, etc. It is a force to be reckoned with in France and, to a lesser degree, in Europe.

Defined as a movement that opposes liberal globalization and calls for other economic, social, environmental and cultural models, alter-globalism is known primarily through its most emblematic association: ATTAC. Founded in France in 1998 to promote the taxation of financial transactions in order to create a development aid fund and to slow speculation, ATTAC now has national associations in 45 countries. It is an indicator of a country’s unconventional political participation and “protest policy.”

ATTAC plays a part in the debate in Poland, in Germany, in France, in Sweden and in Italy. Its influence in Europe, however, varies from one country to another. In this respect, Fredrik Ugglá’s article on ATTAC’s implantation in France and in Sweden clearly shows the importance of national political culture on the movement’s success or failure. In France, ATTAC has benefited from the support of a renowned political journal (Le Monde diplomatique), while in Sweden the association was confronted by accusations of extremism following violent protests in Göteborg. In France, the fertile ground which is fuelling opposition to globalization has enabled ATTAC to gain the support of part of the political class. Bruno Cautrès’ classification indicates that over one-third of French voters would be “outside the system,” that they are neither to the left nor to the right of the political chessboard and claim to trust neither the left nor the right to govern. This fringe of those “disillusioned” by politics opens the way to alter-globalist movements. However, the Swedes’ favourable view of globalization is responsible for ATTAC’s very weak political support. Similarly in Poland, alter-globalism is associated with violence and ATTAC Polska remains unknown to the general public.

Among the countries studied, Germany is the only one that approximates France in terms of alter-globalism. ATTAC Deutschland is the best-known German alter-globalist association and it is maintaining its ties with the unions. Nevertheless, its influence remains limited. The lack of emblematic figures, as well as a weak cultivation of political protest, partially explain the lacklustre support for ATTAC in Germany.

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10. “Alter-globalism [altermondialisme]: a school of thought which proposes a form of economic development opposed to the liberal model (globalization) and is more concerned with human development and environmental protection” (Le Petit Robert 2007).


12. See Bruno Cautrès’ article in this same volume.
Thanks to the multiple networks of ATTAC and of other organizations such as the European Social Forum, alter-globalism is a trans-European movement that confirms the emergence of a European civil society.

**NGOs and the non-profit sector**

NGOs and the non-profit sector’s action and commitment overlap to a certain degree with certain themes of the alter-globalist movement. They address various subjects encompassing the defence of human rights, the environment, women, culture, development assistance, the fight against racism, etc. The associative sector plays a mobilizing and consciousness-raising role with respect to globalization. Many NGOs criticize liberal globalization by defending the rights of special groups and of the Third World, as OXFAM’s lobbying against EU agricultural subsidies has shown. In Poland and in Italy, NGOs and associations have had only a weak influence on government decisions about globalization. According to the Kairos survey, NGOs have a lesser influence on the regulation of globalization (the European average is 3.54 for the 16 to 29 age bracket and 3.44 for the 30 to 50 age bracket).

**Churches**

Catholic and Protestant churches are active in the debate over globalization. These are trans-European and international actors who lobby for a more just globalization. They criticize capitalism and advocate a globalization more concerned with helping the Third World.

Churches play a greater or lesser role in function of each country’s tradition. In Germany, the influence of the Church is institutionalized in media advisory boards. In Italy and in France, Catholic associations are deeply involved in development assistance.

In Poland, two major trends within the Catholic Church compete in the debate over globalization: the one associated with John Paul II, which espouses openness and solidarity among the world’s peoples, and Radio Maryja’s, more conservative, which considers globalization a menace to Poland’s traditional and Catholic values.

This synthesis suggests that political parties have clear perceptions of globalization. In most of the countries studied, they interpret globalization as a positive economic phenomenon and as an opportunity. However, the various government parties emphasize the need to influence its process. This need for managing the process will be discussed in the next section. For now, it suffices to know that the political parties of the Centre-Left and Centre-Right believe that globalization is, overall, a positive and easily influenced phenomenon and one which must be defended.

In several European countries, this consensus seems to push protest to the outer edges of the political chessboard. It is nevertheless necessary to underscore the particular case of France, where there is a spreading strong apprehension about dealing with globalization, and, by association, about the European Union. A comparison of the votes on the
Maastricht Treaty and on the Constitutional Treaty of 29 May 2005 confirm the ideological shift which took place in French public opinion. The surveys reveal the growth of opposition to European construction among left-wing sympathizers, an opposition based on socio-economic considerations and on a larger resistance to liberalism.

For its part, civil society introduces new issues into the debate over globalization. Civil society’s actors bring to the fore different concerns from those raised by political parties: the Third World, the environment, human rights, etc. The main actors of this civil society are the unions and employers, who, according to their level of involvement in the economic management of each country, more or less influence the major political decisions relating to globalization. In Germany and in Sweden, the process of adapting to globalization was implemented by involving unions and employers, thus legitimizing the measures taken and facilitating a broader understanding in public opinion of the corresponding challenges.

Associations, NGOs and churches chiefly focus on development assistance issues and on North-South relations. They wish to promote awareness of globalization (achieved by exploring the issue of cancelling poor countries’ debts) and they are having a decisive impact on public debate, even if their recommendations are not always followed in practice.

Alter-globalist movements, which benefit from a European and international network and a high media profile, are key ideological forces that structure the debate over globalization. They nonetheless have little real influence on political decisions.

The influence of research institutions and foundations on the intellectual debate is more diffuse in the countries studied with the exception of Germany, where foundations and research institutions are well-entrenched in civil society: their expertise is taken into consideration and shapes the society’s debates.

In sum, it may be concluded that even if civil society has mobilized around globalization’s challenges, it does not fulfil the role of a true countervailing power. Its role at best complements political power by mobilizing and informing public opinion. The public debate over globalization still needs to be taken up within civil society in most of the countries studied.

NGOs based in Brussels represent European civil society in committees such as the NGO Social Platform: this reinforces the European social dialogue’s effectiveness. The extent to which these committees are involved in the European Commission’s consultative procedures, and their efforts lobbying European institutions enable them to influence community policies. This influence becomes obvious when, for example, they query heads of State and of government on social Europe. This model could perhaps be considered at the national level if the vocation of the civil societies is to become sources of recommendations and forces for lobbying about challenges linked to globalization.
3. ARE EUROPEANS IN DIRE NEED OF REGULATION?

Do Europeans hold the same view of the way in which globalization can be influenced?

Neither the Kairos survey nor the qualitative analyses presented in the rest of the study deal with the regulatory measures implemented or discussed in each Member State. However, the comparative study of these eight States:

- sheds light on the actors who are considered the most likely to have an impact on the regulation of globalization;
- and, beyond that, outlines the limits of responsibilities between the national level and the European level.

These comparative indexes merit closer examination at a time when the impact of European market liberalization is again being questioned in France, and the need for—perhaps even the legitimacy of (“since other competing economic powers are calling for it”)—a new form of European or national protectionism, labelled “economic patriotism,” is being raised. Are other Europeans similarly tempted?

3.1. A globalization that has been accepted, yet calls for regulation

The prevailing concept of the way in which to regulate globalization depends on whether globalization is perceived as unavoidable or incidental on the one hand, and as a positive or negative factor on the other.

Except in France, where it is very clearly a factor of political divide, globalization is not a major topic of discussion in the public debates of the seven other countries studied. This does not mean that the other Europeans feel subjected to “an exogenous economic constraint” to which they can only submit through adaptation and on which they can have little influence (limited opportunity for regulation). Presenting globalization in this manner, however, may have sometimes enabled policymakers to justify the most unpopular socio-economic reforms.13

France, where globalization is perceived with suspicion, seems to be the country with the highest proportion of individuals who believe globalization to be “a political project that must be managed and directed” towards a better allocation of benefits within the country, as well as between developed and developing countries. Like any political

13. For the three types of characterization of globalization mentioned here, please refer to C. Hay and N. Smith’s typology in the study of the United Kingdom. The two authors point out the different conceptions of globalization that are used in this country, in turn, according to the sectors concerned. In the case of challenges pertaining to the national economy, we are dealing with an unavoidable phenomenon that justifies diverse economic reforms. As far as foreign trade is concerned, globalization is a manageable phenomenon. And finally, in matters relating to development policies, globalization is more than ever a political process that must benefit all.
project, this one would result from a choice among several options. This explains the tendency in France for globalization to invade political debate through alter-globalist movements: discussions on the various possible directions globalization can take are becoming increasingly frequent (hope for strong opportunity to regulate). This approach exists, of course, in some States, but only to a minor extent. The impact alter-globalist movements have had in recent years on French public debates, which contrasts with the highly marginal, and even non-existent, effect of these movements in the other countries, explains this national specificity.

The seven other countries studied seem to perceive it more as an “inevitable phenomenon on which politics can, or should, have an impact.” It is therefore possible to envisage a regulatory framework for globalization (possible regulation) while fomenting efforts for reform.

Also, the notable erosion of trust which citizens are placing in their national governments does not mean that expectations about national or European governance have dwindled. This political expectation seems less pronounced, however, in countries which have been the quickest to anticipate globalization’s new benefits, such as Sweden, the country in Europe in which public opinion seems the most satisfied with the current level of regulation.

3.2. A comparable subsidiarity: the roles are allocated according to challenges

Europeans’ expectations in terms of regulation (priority areas and privileged actors) are significantly influenced by their perceptions of the challenges involved. As has been shown, the comparative study reveals that Europeans see globalization first and foremost as a predominantly economic phenomenon. But although the young people generally accept globalization’s economic aspect as a phenomenon structuring their future, they are showing greater concern over environmental degradation, or growing immigration, apparently, than over their employment prospects. The call for regulation varies significantly in function of the sectors concerned.

On the one hand, in all eight countries, for young people as well as for their elders, the threat to employment is only ranked 7th on the list of 9 threats anticipated in the future, while environmental problems are ranked first. On the other hand, the young people are relatively more optimistic than those aged 30 to 50 about their prospects of finding a good job in the future. Even in France, the index is 4.31 out of 7 for young people, as compared to 3.62 for their elders, with an average for all eight countries of 4.55 for young people versus 4.06 for those aged 30 to 50. However, it will be evident that if young people perceive globalization as slightly less menacing than do their elders, it remains significantly more menacing to the French than to their neighbours (4.36 out of 7 for young French respondents versus 3.82 on average for young respondents in all eight countries; 4.69 out of 7 for individuals aged 30 to 50 in France versus 3.95 for the adults included in the sample).
Moreover, all eight countries establish a close link between globalization and the need to invest in research, development and lifelong training. This suggests a sound understanding of the challenge of adapting the workforce: the average index for the eight countries is 4.65 out of 7 for young people and 4.65 for their elders. Despite the weak mobilization and coordination of national governments to attain Lisbon’s strategic goal of making Europe the most competitive knowledge-based society in the world by 2010—as demonstrated by the midcourse report of 2005—this strategy’s goal seems to be well-accepted by overall public opinion, and notably by young people. Should national mobilization be construed as having been stronger than it appears to be, or should national policies be deemed inadequate in light of citizens’ expectations concerning R&D and continuing education?

The hypothesis that emerges from comparing the qualitative analyses seems to be that Europeans have a rather clear perception of the institutional level most suitable for meeting each challenge. They make a clear distinction between economic challenges that require a progressive adaptation effort in which the national government is already, most often, well-engaged (Sweden, United Kingdom, Germany, etc.) and the challenges—such as environmental and immigration issues—which, having been until now insufficiently addressed despite the urgency of the situation, call into question the national governments’ capacity to intervene. Therefore workforce adaptation is supposedly perceived as a continuous, long-term requirement predicated on a progressive adaptation of individuals (skills, mobility, continuing education, improved language skills, etc.) for which national governance would have primary responsibility. The acute concern noted in diverse countries with respect to illegal immigration (notably in Spain, Italy, the United Kingdom and Poland) as well as environmental degradation—two insufficiently regulated challenges—raises new expectations of governance at the community level, or even at a global level. Also, if there exists a consensus on the opportunities to be derived from economic globalization, particularly among young people, these possibilities do not dim fears of “perverse effects.”

The positive view of globalization remains, as discussed above, closely linked to the perception of a country’s economic performance. Countries such as Poland and Estonia, which closely correlate the benefits of globalization with their membership in the European Union, are very optimistic. Those countries which have faced a period of economic crisis during which globalization was perceived as a threat (Sweden at the end of the 1980’s and the beginning of the 1990’s, Germany in the mid-1990’s), and which, today, have succeeded in pulling through and collecting the benefits of their efforts to adapt, remain equally optimistic. In the United Kingdom, however, where the qualitative study characterizes the last two decades as “hyper-globalist,” young people seem to be less optimistic about their future than their elders. In addition, in Spain, where new signs of economic difficulties are starting to appear, and in Italy, where citizen distrust of public institutions, and more generally of politics, taints their overall view of the future, the future seems less serene. The strong pessimism of the French about their future as well as about the future of the country, predisposes them to cast a very negative eye on globalization whose social effects they fear, particularly for the most vulnerable worker categories. The concern about a French decline is largely shared. The results of the
Kairos survey would nonetheless tend to prove that French youth are a bit less pessimistic about their future than their elders, particularly about the country’s future.

Although the economic dynamism of certain States does not lessen citizens’ opinions that a better national control of globalization is necessary, it does not erase a strong demand for international regulation. This expectation is found in all countries studied.

Germans expressed a certain ambivalence over greater global regulation: the Kairos survey indicated a less insistent demand for global regulation than did the average of the eight countries, while the qualitative study shows a strong demand for a global regulatory framework. This ambivalence can no doubt be explained by the determination, underscored by Henrik Uterwedde, to export the German globalization regulation model not only on a European, but also on an international scale, and consequently the fear that any global regulatory framework would be too far removed from this model.

### 3.3. The national State must continue to play its role

Diverse qualitative studies specifically stress the lack of confidence in the national government revealed by the Kairos survey. It is without a doubt in Poland and in Italy (largely due to corruption) and in Germany and in France (probably due to fears triggered by the need to reform their aging providence State) that defiance of the political system is the strongest. The discredit of any form of institution therefore appears all the more sharply in the survey, inasmuch as beyond the low confidence index assigned to institutions, the strongest index obtained is for citizens themselves: the Eurobarometer also records this tendency, which translates citizen distrust of the current functioning of representative democracy and a stronger demand for participative democracy. Everywhere, Europeans believe that the national level’s manoeuvring room for regulating globalization is limited. Multinationals are credited with having the most impact on how globalization is regulated. But this sentiment does not erase the determination to see the national State influence its course. The index obtained for the role played by national governments in globalization is particularly noteworthy when compared with the much lower figure obtained for the confidence which it is accorded.

The challenge here echoes systemic and national identity concerns. While many Europeans associate globalization with a consensus on social protection systems (average index for the eight countries of 4.29 out of 7 for young people versus 4.26 for their elders), they are committed to their socio-economic organization’s national specificity and express grave concern over the weakening of national identities: the average index is 4.06 out of 7 for young people, versus 4.15 for their elders. It is worth underscoring the strong German and Swedish attachment to their method of social regulation (central role given to highly representative unions and strong tradition of negotiation between social partners). This attachment is also explicit in the French debate. But the French cannot seem to diverge from the alternative which consists of choosing between a radical alignment on the constraints of
globalization (fear of promoting uniformity) and their resolve to impose the French system at the European—and even global—level (nostalgia for a power bearing universal values). The Germans defend a more “evolutionist” perspective of globalization, one more optimistic about the national model’s capacity to survive: though undergoing a major phase of mutation, the German model is not changing its course to rally around an alternative national socio-productive model. The French still need to define the median path that will enable them to opt for an original national way to adapt to the challenges of globalization.

When the sui generis nature of social regulation policies is less obvious, as in the case of Poland or of Estonia—recently imported recently from foreign models—concern focuses on the defence of the language (Estonia) or on a more diffuse claim of national identity (“Polishness,” akin to the “Italian soul” in Italy).

3.4. A regulation at all levels

Not only do all Europeans of both age groups studied place more trust in the European Union than in their national governments, but this trust in the European Union is also higher on average among young respondents than among their elders. The British youth seem to have more confidence in community institutions than do their elders, and are only slightly less inclined to identify with them than the average among other Europeans. In France, young people’s trust in the Union is slightly less pronounced than in the average of the eight countries, yet remains dominant, while the surprising negative youth vote in the May 2005 referendum had been unexpected in terms of its suggested criticism of the European Union.

Moreover, the European Union is acknowledged as an influential actor of globalization. Among a list of nine actors, it interestingly ranks in first place among youth in the United Kingdom, Poland and Estonia (countries with very liberal economies); in second place in Sweden, Germany and Spain; and in third place in France and Italy. Should the case of the United Kingdom, Poland and Estonia, in which multinationals rank second, be construed as suggesting great expectations of the European Union or, from a more negative viewpoint, that regulation implemented at the European level is perceived as a barrier to economies consistently aspiring to be more open to international trade? The qualitative studies confirm a strong wish for European control, yet clearly demonstrate that this desire concerns first and foremost specific preoccupations such as immigration and the environment, which are perceived as being more effectively addressed at the European, or even global, level. Young respondents also believe that the WTO has considerable influence, and ranked it in third place in five countries and even in second place in France and Italy, followed by the United Nations. These results suggest that Europeans acknowledge regionalization’s usefulness, while insisting on the need for broader regulation.

NGOs, unions and all types of associations, perceived on the whole as intermediary bodies of civil society, benefit from relatively high levels of trust, notably in Spain and in
France, even if Europeans on the whole trust themselves most. Conversely, their impact on globalization does not appear significant. It is probably useful here to differentiate between the role of NGOs and diverse types of associations on the one hand, and the role of unions on the other. First, qualitative studies reveal a very weak influence (except for Germany, if this category were to include foundations, which play a key role in conveying ideas to the general public). In the second instance, these studies bring out strong cultural specificities, with countries such as Sweden and Germany, where the strong negotiation power of unions enables them to play a strategic role in the country’s adaptation.

3.5. Towards a European culture of globalization?

Is globalization destructive or does it create new solidarities? Without answering this question directly, the study highlights Europeans’ need to reinvent new logics of solidarity in order to face globalization’s challenges. Most Europeans believe, therefore, that society should mobilize to achieve a common objective: the index is 4.9 out of 7 for the 16 to 29 age bracket, and 5 for respondents aged 30 to 50. In addition, the average indicated by young people from the eight countries associates somewhat more strongly globalization with increased European solidarity than do their elders, with an index of 4.29 out of 7 versus 4.19 for the 30-50 age bracket.

Although the assessment of the feeling of closeness experienced towards European neighbours (from a vantage point of culture, values, lifestyle, etc.) still suggests, for all eight countries, a greater sense of closeness to fellow citizens rather than to European neighbours, the spread between these two levels of closeness is less broad among young people than among their elders. These results would confirm the tendency identified in Eurobarometer surveys of an increasing compatibility between national identity and European identity. Surprisingly, young French respondents are the only ones in the Kairos survey to feel as much of a sense of closeness towards their European neighbours as towards their fellow countrymen.

3.6. What type of regulation? Should the State help and/or protect?

The State is solicited above all to help individuals strengthen their ability to adapt in the workplace (R&D investment, continuing education, improved language skills, mobility). It is also called upon to assume a protective role and, first, to take charge of globalization’s negative effects through an efficient social protection system. Yet some would also like to see it act as a bulwark against product imports in the most vulnerable sectors.

Even in countries with a liberal economy such as Poland or Estonia, there is considerable demand for a Welfare State, which reflects a will to make their social protection system more like those of their European neighbours. Sweden, however, is known for having chosen a very liberal economy inseparable from a high level of social protection. When asked whether they prefer a tax cut or a strong Welfare State, the average of the eight countries,
all age groups combined, favour the Welfare State without, nevertheless, the spread being very significant (the average index for the eight countries is 3.96 out of 7 for young respondents and 3.95 for their elders). Only Italians, because of their strong distrust of the how the State functions, still prefer a tax cut. For their part, the French are the Europeans most in favour of the Welfare State, to the detriment of a fiscal reduction. It is no surprise that the French are also (along with the Spanish) the most inclined to prefer redistributive policies to a social model which favours individual performance.

There is no consensus among Europeans on the issue of responsibility for losses caused by globalization. For the Poles, it is up to the State to take charge of globalization’s negative effects rather than to leave it up to companies or to individuals themselves. This arbitration is reversed in France and in Germany, where it is felt that companies, and specifically multinationals, which relocate jobs, should assume globalization’s damages. Although certain studies prove that job losses due to globalization, and particularly to job relocations, remain in the minority,14 multinationals—the principal beneficiaries of open borders—must also be able to compensate for adjustment costs.

Moreover, what do Europeans think of protectionism, understood as a more radical control alternative than State aid aimed at reinforcing individual adaptive skills in the job market? Even though France is the country among the eight which is the most favourable to protecting national companies rather than supporting free trade and global competition, and Sweden and the United Kingdom are situated at the other end of the scale, the Kairos survey indicates a slight preference among all Europeans for protection of state-owned companies. Young British respondents seem slightly more apprehensive than their elders about free trade. The qualitative studies show, however, there is no significant debate on the issue of protectionism outside of France. If public opinion is aware of some of globalization’s negative effects, notably for individuals with lower level skills, the solutions envisaged to make up for them hardly involve economic protectionism options in the seven other countries. The same question asked in Japan, in Russia and in the United States proves that Europeans (3.86) comprise the least protectionist of the four regional groups, followed by the Japanese (4.05), the Americans (4.06) and the Russians (4.13).

Furthermore, there is a gap between the global view of protectionism and individual consumer behaviour. The rather weak indexes obtained on questions of ethical and environmental consumption (“I usually buy environmental-friendly products,” “I usually buy fair-trade products”) as well as on community preference in the act of purchase (“I prefer to buy European products to protect jobs in Europe”) highlight the difference in individual perception and behaviour according to whether the latter thinks as an employee or as a consumer. Europeans’ preoccupations over globalization are still cantered on the challenges of

national or European redistribution rather than worldwide redistribution between developed and developing countries.

In other words, the trade-off initiated by European citizens among the various potential control levels of globalization seems to offer the community level an important position. European governance would be perceived more from a protective angle when addressing migratory or environmental challenges, than when dealing with those in the economic sector. The attachment to free trade as well as to a Welfare State capable of providing security to its citizens is a clear point of consensus among European citizens. Finally, the very challenge of regulating globalization remains diffused in public opinion. In this scenario, the French nonetheless hold a more marginal position. Its inclination could be associated with a State-oriented nationalist and protectionist position. A more marked concern could also be detected about the capacity of politics to meet globalization’s challenges, regardless of the level of governance considered.
PART II

QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS BY COUNTRY
1. INTRODUCTION

Analysis of the public debate on globalization in Germany and its evolution over the last two decades is a complex task if not for the sheer enormity of the notions “public debate” and “public opinion”. In effect, these notions cover a broad range of levels, players, arenas and media, including declarations of government policy, public opinion polls, parliamentary debates, election programmes, political party campaigns, discussions and conflicts between unions and employers, positions and debates adopted and fanned by the media, as well as the impact of certain best-sellers such as L’Horreur économique by Viviane Forrester. The notion of globalization\(^1\) gives little indication of the debates that are associated with it. Hence the need to identify the themes that act as vehicles for the expression of these debates. Because over time we have evolved from a debate about globalization as such (consequences, threats, opportunities, control) to a proliferation of debates impinging a wide range of economic, social, political and cultural problems that incorporate the reality of globalization. In this essay we have attempted to take the wider implications of globalization into account.

As a consequence of this approach, what follows does not pretend to be a scientific study but rather an overview of the meanings that the term globalization has assumed in the German arena of public debate. We also try to situate the debates in their historical, economic, political and cultural contexts.

Our starting point was a choice of meaningful and enlightening sources:
- An analysis of articles published between 1995 and 2006 in two well respected German journals that are positioned at the interface between the academic and political arenas: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, a weekly magazine published by the Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung (Public entity for civic education); and Internationale Politik, a monthly journal edited by Deutsche Gesellschaft für auswärtige Politik (the German society for foreign policy), one of the best reputed think tanks on international relations. These two publications may be considered as broadly representative of German reflection and attitudes;
- The final report of the Bundestag’s commission of inquiry into the consequences of globalization for German policy. Published in 2002, this was a very exhaustive study. Published

\(^1\) In Germany, the term used is Globalisierung. Throughout this study we use the notion of “globalization”. 
during a year of central government elections, this study reflects the breadth of the debate via the inclusion of minority views from the parties in opposition at the time;

– The political programmes of the main political parties and social forces; the results of diverse polls and surveys on globalization-related issues;

– the results of the Kairos survey made available to the Fondation pour l’innovation politique\textsuperscript{2}, and of other surveys such as the special inquest conducted by Eurobarometer on globalization in 2003;

– Other documents from various sources, such as think tanks.

The author would like to thank Nathalie Lerch (intern at the Deutsch-Französisches Institut) and Xavier Froidevaux (documentalist at the Institute’s library) for their invaluable assistance.

2. Hereafter referred to as the “Kairos survey”. N.B. we have decided to attribute numbers to the questions in this survey (1 to 20).

The public debate on globalization in Germany


NB: The figures indicated correspond to the number of occurrences (use of the term *Globalisierung* in its full or composite form) over the number of articles or words counted over this period within the texts of the publications reviewed.


1.1. The systemic context

The German globalization debate is substantially imbued with the political, economic and social culture of the country and with the specific characteristics of German capitalism.

Having experienced the economic meltdown of the Weimar Republic (1919-1933), then the dictatorship of the Nazi regime (1933-1945), and then the existence of the GDR’s communist regime during the division of Germany (1949-1989), the German Federal Republic has been constructed on a foundation of specific values, institutions and reflexes: stability, centrist policies and the rejection of extremes from both the left and the right.

As a result, stability (including of prices) is a principal that has particularly influenced the motives of German economic policy. The insistence of the German government - before the creation of European monetary union - on the Stability Pact, on the orientation and role of the European Central Bank and on monetary stability is indeed the expression of this “culture of stability”\(^4\).

\(^4\) See also the results of the Kairos survey, question 7, in which the Germans distinguish themselves from other Europeans on the scale: Tradition-stability vs. Change. Note also the positive connotation of the term *Ordnung* (order) for Germans: The economic and social regulatory framework is entitled Wirtschafts und Sozialordnung; the economic model at the base of the Social Market Economy is ordoliberalism; the favoured method of government in this model is Ordnungspolitik, an untranslatable term that describes policies destined to maintain the German regulatory framework in order to guarantee fair competition and social justice.
The attachment to a social market economy, a formula invented by the “father” of the post-war “economic miracle”, Ludwig Erhard, is a second characteristic of German values. This model includes a rejection of a purely liberal economy with a strong emphasis on the social role of government; however it does not reject the term “market economy”.

Lastly, the opening of markets, competition and free trade are notions that are always supported by Germans\(^5\).

As regards German socio-economic culture, the search for social partnerships via co-management systems and highly developed labour negotiations has always been a key objective for the different elements of German society.

Indeed, the development of the Social Market Economy, later referred to as “Rhinean capitalism” (Michel Albert, 1990), was underpinned by these values with three fundamental pillars: economic (a high level of specialisation and a capacity for industrial adaptation generating surpluses for export), political (a philosophy and a State organisation based on subsidiarity and federalism, producing a diversified and appropriate level of State intervention) and social (the corporatist management of sectional interests, a social framework with the capacity to manage conflicting interests through negotiation)\(^6\). *Values and attitudes: results of the Kairos survey.* In this multi-player system, power is often shared and a large proportion of the economic management is handled by non-state organisations implying a high level of flexibility and cooperation from all parties. Although slow in its decision-making processes, this system has the benefit of a broad social legitimisation since the main political, economic and social forces are all involved in making the decisions. In addition the system is based on the idea of the corporate partnership in which *stakeholder value* is more important than *shareholder value*, and the capital structures of major corporations are protected by the banks holding significant stakes. This allows companies time to develop their strategies and to protect themselves from the danger of hostile takeover bids. At the time, the label *Deutschland AG* (or Germany PLC) was often used to indicate this intricate network of social partnerships.

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\(^5\) German Marshall Fund: *Perspectives on Trade and Poverty Reduction. A Survey of Public Opinion*, Key Findings Report (2006). (http://www.gmfus.org/trade/research/survey.cfm). According to this Survey, the Germans are the largest majority in favour of international trade (83%; Europe: 75%, France: 64%), and 83% are in favour of less restrictions to international trade (Italy: 82%, France: 64%, UK: 76%).

The public debate on globalization in Germany

VALUES AND ATTITUDES: THE RESULTS OF THE KAIROS SURVEY

The data provided by the Kairos survey gives an insight into German society, its identities (questions 2, 6), its general values (questions 1, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 13, 16, 19, 20) and its attitudes on international mobility (questions 14, 15, 17, 18). The results concerning German attitudes towards globalization are discussed in section 3.1.

As regards their identity factors, like their neighbours, the Germans put language as the key determinant, followed by the local community which is clearly considered more important than nationality (in contrast to the average European respondent who situated nationality in second place) and Europe. Germans are thus more dependent for identity on their local environment and national identification still seems to be problematical (question 1). Germans feel they share their culture and their life-styles above all with their compatriots and, to a lesser extent, with their fellow Europeans; note that the compatriot / European distinction is less marked amongst young people and people with university educations (question 6). As regards which values the Germans consider important to transmit to their children, young Germans place responsibility and independence higher up the ranking than work and entrepreneurial spirit. Their elders nevertheless place “work” in second position and give it more weight (as they do with “initiative”) (question 1). This reflects the greater traditionalism of the elders who also distinguish themselves by their preference for tradition and stability over change (question 7). The other answers to question 7 also seem to lead in the direction of a slightly more accentuated conservatism, but the differences are below the survey’s error margin. Compared to their neighbours, German society also appears to be relatively mistrusting because the level of confidence in the institutions mentioned was generally lower – except for the police and the justice systems which they put in first place, young and old alike. As regards interest in politics and the environment, the elders expressed more interest than younger people and interest in politics is more developed than in the reference 30-50 age-group. Generally speaking, the survey shows that German society is slightly less progress-oriented than the average in Europe, an impression that is corroborated by German’s reserved attitudes towards “ethical” goods (purchase of products produced by companies that can prove they conduct their business in an environmentally, socially and ethically responsible way). Only the “European buyer” tempts the 30-50 age-group in a bid to protect employment.

As regards attitudes towards mobility, the results are mixed. Germans are no different from their European neighbours as far as international experiences are concerned (question 14). For young and old alike, job security and independence are more important than the capacity to travel and to live abroad, whereas the differences are much less clear in the reference groups. (question 15). But interest in living at least a certain period abroad is the same and it is more developed among the 16-29 age-group than among the elders, who remain relatively more “home-oriented” (question 17). Above all, the desire to travel abroad in the coming years is substantially stronger among Germans in both the younger age-group (22.9% vs. 18% in the reference group) and the older age-group (15.6% vs 11.6%).

The system provided stability for German companies and generated good productivity and its overall performance allowed relatively high levels of wages, salaries and social protection right through until the 1980s. Indeed, for many years German enterprise seemed to be sheltered from global competition as the German economy reaped the full benefits of the processes of internationalisation of trade and investment. That is why these processes - such as European economic integration or the liberalisation of global commerce - hardly elicited any debate in Germany. Hence good economic performances went hand in hand
with public opinion in favour of a market economy and free trade. Even today Germans are remarkably attached to these economic principles.

Globalization has nevertheless had an impact on the coherence of this complex system that depends on a certain consensus regarding its structures and modus operandi.

This explains why the debate on globalization may look less animated in Germany than elsewhere. In effect, Rhinean capitalism is equipped with economic and social springs to meet the challenge and it often seems motivated precisely by the fear that globalization could destroy its alterative model.

1.2. The German model has been under continual pressure since the 1980s

The first real shock to the German model occurred at the beginning of the 1980s with the deterioration of the German economy’s domestic performances (growth, employment, public finances) following the second oil shock. The change of government in 1982 with accession to power of a centre-right coalition government headed by Helmut Kohl accelerated the debate on necessary reforms. Nevertheless, the Kohl government advanced prudently, wishing to maintain as far as possible the German economic and social system. This was a far cry from Margaret Thatcher’s policies in the UK at the same epoch.

At the beginning of the 1990s German re-unification eclipsed the economic debates during a relatively short period as national considerations took centre stage and the economic recovery caused by re-unification boosted domestic demand. However, as of 1993 a first recession marked the beginning of a period of weak economic growth, making Germany the economic laggard of Europe. Thereafter the debate on German economic problems renewed with vigour, focusing on the weaknesses of the German production site (Standort Deutschland), international competition, and increasingly integrating the reality of globalization. This was how globalization entered the German collective conscience triggering significant apprehensions and concerns: the end of the national State; politics at the service of multinationals; a loss of the existing “order”, a deterioration of employment and of purchasing power. The somewhat reductionist alarmism prevailing during this initial phase of “confrontation” with globalization is described in an article from the *Süddeutsche Zeitung*

7. In 2006, 65% of Germans agreed with the idea that “the system of free enterprise within a liberal market economy is the best system for the future of the world”. The statement was also confirmed by similar proportions of respondents in the UK, Poland and Spain. By contrast, the French appear to be relatively sceptical with 50% not agreeing and only 36% endorsing the statement. Cf. Globescan 2006. Likewise, a comparative survey conducted by the German Marshall Fund shows that amongst Europeans, Germans have the most favourable view of international commerce (83%); France: 64%, European average: 75%). See also GMF, *Perspectives on Trade and Poverty Reduction*. Key Findings Report 2006. See also Eurobarometer 65, Spring 2006: The Germans endorse notions of free trade and competition, and strongly reject protectionism.

8. “In Germany, a generalised end-of-the world mood was tangible (...). A scapegoat was quickly identified: globalization. It was as though globalization had hit us like a natural catastrophe, and it was perceived as leading Germany inexorably down the path of decline” Jürgen Wiegand, “Lohnkosten der Angst”, *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 7 August 1997.
and it was reflected by the success of the book *Le Piège de la mondialisation*\(^9\), (the Globalization Trap) and the translation of Viviane Forrester\(^{10}\) book *L’Horreur économique*.

The controversial debate on the Standort Deutschland was initially marked by a stand-off between the two camps on globalization. The “liberal revolution” camp presented globalization as initiating liberal ruptures with the past while the “status quo” camp were engaged in a demonisation of globalization. But little by little, this simplistic confrontation gave way to a more differentiated discussion on the weaknesses, but also on the advantages, of the German economy within the globalization process, as well as a more subtle appreciation of the limitations and possibilities of national politics. This debate was nourished by a multitude of contributions from public figures, experts and think tanks.

The end of the Kohl era was marked by a heavy mood of political immobility. The Chancellor’s lack of determination, but also the SPD’s opposition, contributed to this sense of impasse. The image of a Germany stuck in its ways started to gain acceptance; the theme of Reformstau (blocked reforms) prompted the Federal President, Roman Herzog to launch a solemn appeal for Germans to find a solution to the prevailing inertia. The red / green victory (SPD, Green Party) and the formation of the government of Gerhard Schröder in 1998 delivered a further set of prudent policies. The only really significant measure was the 2000 budget, which introduced tax cuts and fiscal advantages in cases of subsidiary divestments. However, the government’s consensual approach began to show its limits. After 1996-1997 Germany remained largely excluded from benefits of global economic acceleration, stuck in a rhythm of mediocre growth that fuelled unemployment and put public finances in a delicate situation.

This difficult situation was accompanied by a transformation of German capitalism involving a) the progressive sale by a number of banks and financial groups of their holdings in German industries in the context of a switch to more financially-oriented strategies; b) a strong commitment by German enterprises to the development of their activities in Central and Eastern Europe, and c) the revelation of serious lacunas in the German education system (the OECD’s Pisa Report).

Confronted with these difficulties, the globalization debate re-ignited once again focusing this time on the causes of Germany’s reluctance to change. The slogan was: “It’s not analysis

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10. Published in 1996 in France, the book is available in Germany under the title *Der Terror der Ökonomie* (Vienne : éd. Zsolnay 1997).
we lack, but rather the determination to identify and implement the political consequences”. This debate was largely driven by a liberal camp that sought to stigmatise social and co-operative capitalism as a “German exception” destined to disappear. At the same time, the lack of reactivity of the German political system was put under the spotlight, with certain critics condemning “a society of consensus” and of status quo. In this way, the debate gradually began to integrate the impacts of globalization, and each side was motivated by real political interests with the camp of business heads, employers and liberal thinkers guided by the will to eliminate a certain number of constraints and the camp of unions and social democrats, on the contrary, defending the German cooperative system.

1.3. Reforms: from Schröder to Merkel

In 1999, the new parliamentary majority took the initiative of setting up a Bundestag commission of inquiry to identify the risks, opportunities and challenges for political action. The commission’s report was published in 2002 and bears the hallmarks of the controversies between the SPD-Greens coalition, the opposition CDU-CSU liberal party and the post-communist PDS.

Accused of inactivity, at the beginning of 2003, Chancellor Schröder launched his Agenda 2010, a package of structural reforms. It included reform of the social security system, reform of unemployment benefit, reform of the management of the national employment and labour market agency and a new set of priorities for education and research. The reforms in the Agenda 2010 threatened to undermine a substantial number of social advantages. However, most of the reforms were voted with support of the opposition parties even if Agenda 2010 was the main cause of Chancellor Schröder’s loss of the early elections he had precipitated.

The very close results of the 2005 elections (electors punished Schröder’s SPD) led to the formation of a grand CDU-CSU / SPD coalition under the leadership of Angela Merkel. But it was perceived as a warning from the electorate: although they did not reject all the proposed reforms (the opposition on the left-wing of the SPD did not make much effort to capitalise on the wave of protests), electors clearly showed their attachment to social equilibrium and their mistrust of neo-liberal strategy. This prompted the Merkel government to abandon the pursuit of reforms; however, it is accelerating its efforts in the area of education.

We have seen how the debate over globalization evolved over the years until it finally began to question the wisdom of the German social model and some of its values, and the way German democracy operates. However, it is interesting to note that despite certain rather pessimistic prognoses, few voices can be heard advocating a defensive or protectionist line. On the contrary, over the last 10 years, the debate has mostly focused on how to make the necessary adaptations to the German model in order to save it and render it more competitive at the same time.
This does not mean the debate is free from controversy. Take for example the polemic surrounding financial investors, described as “locusts” (with allusion to biblical plagues) by the president of the SPD, Franz Müntefering\textsuperscript{11}. Notwithstanding the somewhat cyclical nature of the controversy, it nevertheless shows a certain scepticism vis-à-vis what is considered as one of the excesses of globalization.

Another nuance: The very difficult economic conditions with high unemployment in the Eastern regions of the country have created situations of distress and a lack of perspective that adds fuel to the strongest critiques of globalization. This discontentment has translated into a significant vote for the ex-communist party, the PDS.

The economic recovery in 2006 was seen by both major parties as the reward for past efforts (structural reforms, budgetary cost-cutting, etc.). Indeed the recovery may well inject a little optimism into the globalization debate, shedding light on some of the positive aspects for the German economy. The future of the German model, and - by extension - of the European social model in a globalised economy, and the price that will have to be paid in terms of adaptations will be at the heart of the debates.

1.4. Key dates

A chronological analysis shows how since 1997 globalization has become more “threatening” for Germans. Data from the Allensbach Institute shows a strong decline in the number “don’t know” s or “no answer” s, suggesting that globalization is no longer perceived as an abstract notion. In addition globalization is increasingly understood to represent a threat. The proportion of respondents fearing job losses as a side-effect of globalization rose from 48% to 61%, and that of those fearing an erosion of the German social security system increased from 43% to 54%.

\textsuperscript{11} It began with an interview of the SPD leader, Franz Müntefering, in a major German newspaper, in which he denounced the excesses of purely financial capitalism: “Some financial investors do not have even the slightest thought for the men whose jobs they destroy – they remain anonymous, have no face, attacking companies like a swarm of locusts, exploiting their prey, and then disappearing. It is against this form of capitalism that we are fighting” (Bild am Sonntag, 17 April 2005). While the socialist left and certain unions decided they liked the SPD leader’s comments, the media criticised the false perception of the role of investors. The Anglo-American press saw Franz Müntefering’s comments as a further sign that the Germans have understood nothing about the way modern capitalism functions.
Table 1. Globalization, threats or opportunities, as perceived by the German public (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Globalization = Threats</th>
<th>Globalization = Opportunities</th>
<th>Don’t knows, No answers</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>17</td>
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<td>2003</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Allensbach Survey Institute

Table 2. Key dates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Political events</th>
<th>Globalization debate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>German re-unification</td>
<td>Short-term improvement in the economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Beginning of the recession: Weak growth, rising unemployment</td>
<td>Federal government report: Future of the production site (Standort) Beginning of the debate on the place of the German economy in global competition (Standortdebatte)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Kyoto agreements</td>
<td>Critique of blocked reforms Berlin Speech by President Herzog</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Amsterdam Treaty: Pact for stability and growth End of the Kohl era</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Legislative elections: Defeat of Kohl, Schröder government: SPD, Green party Launch of the Pact for employment: tri-party discussions</td>
<td>Church: Campaign to waive debt of poorest countries. Germany sets up “greencard” for NICT specialists: “Kinder statt Inder”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Start of European monetary union</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Legislative elections: Schröder government re-elected (September)</td>
<td>The Bundestag commission of inquiry report on the globalization of the economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Schröder: Agenda 2010, announces structural reforms</td>
<td>Conflicts over the reforms 2003-2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Political events</td>
<td>Globalization debate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 2005 | Parliamentary ratification of the European Constitution Treaty  
Electoral year: SPD loses NRW region (May)  
Legislative elections: Almost a dead heat - CDU-CSU just a head of SPD  
Merkel government: CDU-CSU, SPD (November) | Financial capitalism: described as “locusts” (financial investors, hedge funds) by Franz Müntefering, SPD.  
The new President Köhler puts emphasis on the need for structural changes  
Legislative elections: controversy: liberal rupture versus reformative “gradualism”  
Criticism of the Bolkestein directive: Polish tile-workers, threat to the German social benefit system? |
| 2006 | Reforms: federalism, families, pensions  
Compromise on the services (“Bolkestein”) directive at the PE  
Recovery in German growth | Renewal of the social market economy? |

Sources: author

1.5. The themes of the debate

In view of the number of debates linked to globalization - in practically all domains of economic, social and political life - it is very difficult to measure the exact importance and scope of the themes and their evolution over time. In order to obtain a meaningful overview we have analysed articles from two reference journals between 1995 and 2006 (see introduction) and studied the voluminous report produced by the Bundestag commission of inquiry in 2002 (tables 3 and 4). It soon became apparent that the globalization theme is present in a number of different areas. While the economic domain is the principal arena for the discussion of globalization, it nevertheless finds its way into a multitude of cultural and social debates.

Some remarks about the themes selected here, their emergence and their evolution:
- The question of the consequences of globalization for the economy and for society, and particularly, the survival of the German social model and its necessary adaptations occupies a significant proportion of the discussions.
- The theme of the Information Society (education, R&D, innovation) also occupies an important place in the German debate.
- The environment (the theme is in reality more important than it looks in Table 3) has been an area of public debate in Germany for over a decade, including in an international context. Today, the notion of sustainable development is increasingly gaining acceptance.
- Debates around development nevertheless remain confined to relatively “specialised” forums.

− Since 11 September 2001, questions relating to terrorism and domestic security have appeared in numerous globalization-related debates.

− Again, more recently, the debate on the competitiveness of the education system has become an important issue since the publication of OECD’s comparative Pisa report. Awareness that future competitiveness and the prospects for economic growth depend on an excellent education system has gained acceptance in public opinion.

− Relatively minor on the map of the globalization debate (and uncontroversial) are themes such as corporate relocations, social dumping and financial issues such as the euro too strong against the dollar due to the relatively strong position of the German economy, but also due to the country’s economic culture. In effect, these problems are not considered very important in the public debate.

− The theme of the economic attractiveness of Germany could well start to gain in stature especially when linked to the attractiveness of its universities and research centres and, by extension, to the overall attractiveness of Germany. This is linked to a new approach towards immigration that looks set to evolve from a defensive attitude towards a more positive vision of “deliberate immigration” that will involve German society in an effort to improve its host and integration structures. In this context the polemic surrounding the issue of “green-cards” (temporary authorisations to work in Germany) to specialists in NICTs (new information and communication technologies) in 2000 was revealing13.

Table 3. Themes linked to globalization in two highly-respected journals (1995-2006)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Domain</th>
<th>No. of articles</th>
<th>Major themes: Globalization and ...</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The economy</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>International trade and finances (20), employment, social security (14), position of the German production site (7), globalization in general (8), political challenges and projects (5), new economy, neo-liberalism (3), diverse sectors (3), Europe and globalization (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politics</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>Politics (6), State structures (6), democracy (6), global regulation (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>Cultural globalization (11), inter-cultural dialogue (4), education, sciences (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Society, public opinion (3), religion (3), civil society (3), critique of globalization (3), women (1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

13. In August 2000, the Schröder government launched a special authorisation (greencard) designed to allow 20,000 foreign specialists to work temporarily in Germany. This initiative provoked a public debate fuelled by opposition to immigration that was succinctly summarised by the controversial slogan “Kinder statt Inder” (Have German children to occupy these jobs rather than getting people over from India). However after two years, the number of specialists who took up the offer was only between 10 and 12 thousand, perhaps because of the contracts’ restrictive clauses, but also suggesting Germany’s lack of overall attractiveness. The NICT sector was “satisfied” with the initiative. Since then, the grand coalition under Angela Merkel has launched a new law on immigration designed to make it easier for foreign specialists to move to Germany with much improved conditions compared to “NICT greencard” initiative. This is a sign that the debate on immigration is beginning to change.
### The public debate on globalization in Germany

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Domain</th>
<th>No. of articles</th>
<th>Major themes: Globalization and ...</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Development</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Development policy (4), developing countries (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Globalization and national environment policy (2), Global environment policy (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Internationalisation of media groups (2), diverse (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security, terrorism</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Al-Qaida (1), organised crime (1), the political economy of terrorism (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diverse</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>History (2), Memory of the holocaust (1), ethical globalization (1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: archives of the Deutsch-Französisches Institut, Ludwigsburg

### Table 4. Themes related to globalization in the Bundestag’s commission of inquiry report

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Domains</th>
<th>Main subjects discussed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Financial markets</td>
<td>Necessary reforms: stabilisation of currency markets, reform of control mechanisms, reform of international financial institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Markets for goods and services</td>
<td>German position on markets; role of SMEs; corruption; international transport. Reform of the WTO, creation of a regulatory framework for global competition; social and environmental standards; codes of good conduct for trans-national corporations; role of SMEs in international trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour markets</td>
<td>The German labour market in global competition; globalization and structural mutation of the German labour market; room for manoeuvre of national States; the problems of economic governance in the European Union and their impact on employment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global information society</td>
<td>The mutation of the industrial economy towards an information economy; the gap between the information haves and have-nots; legal question (cyber-criminality); problems relating to patents, software patents; information economy: challenge for universities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender equality</td>
<td>Globalization and equal opportunities; access to work and careers; specific vulnerabilities of women; gender mainstreaming</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resources</td>
<td>Environment and development in globalization; agriculture and food; biological diversity; climate protection and air traffic; management and quality of water; institutional reinforcement of global environment policy: creation of a global environment organisation; strategies for sustainable development: modes of consumption, economic use of resources, technology transfers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustainable development</td>
<td>Globalization and sustainable development. Global, European and national initiatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demographic evolution in the era of modernisation</td>
<td>Global demographic evolution; growth of the global population and sustainable development; global demographic policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global governance</td>
<td>Global governance: a densification of international cooperation, a strengthening of multilateral relations. Global governance: a strengthening of trans-national cooperation between public and non-public bodies. Challenges for Parliaments</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Bundestag, commission of inquiry report, op. cit.
2. THE PRINCIPAL CONTRIBUTORS TO THE DEBATE IN GERMANY

There are many contributors to the debate: Horizontal negotiation and coordination takes place between the Federation (the Bund) and Federal States (Länder), between the coalition partners, between the government and the Verbände, (professional organisations and social partners). Within civil society, there is also constant interaction between the multitude of organisations and informal collectives (foundations and associations). The domain occupied by independent experts and think tanks is one of the richest and most developed in Europe. Although we have chosen to exclude analysis of the media from this paper, we nevertheless note that a broad range of views and opinions are carried by German television and radio (public and private) and its national newspapers.

2.1. The political arena

The Bundestag
The Bundestag is one of the primary focuses of power and political debate. A parliamentary commission of inquiry into economic globalization was set up in 1999[^14].

The Federal government
The way the German Federal government works allows ministers a high level of management autonomy. Although the Chancellor does not write all the government’s speeches, he/she has considerable leverage on public opinion. An example of this was Gerhard Schröder’s speech presenting his Agenda 2010 and preparing Germans for the structural reforms his government planned to implement.

The heads of the Federal State governments
The Länder governments (Federal States) participate in the formulation and application of legislation. The heads of these governments are nearly always “political heavy weights” destined to occupy the country’s top political positions, and they do not hesitate to express themselves on all the major issues of the day (Helmut Kohl and Gerhard Schröder were both Federal State government leaders before becoming Chancellors). In the major political debates, one very often hears these minister-presidents; in the Bundestag, apart from the government bench, there is the Bundesrat bench.

[^14]: The parliamentary commission of inquiry into globalization (2000-2002) comprised 13 MPs, 13 deputies, and 13 experts from universities and economic fields. Its objective was:
– identify the factors that triggered globalization;
– analyse its consequences in the economic, social and political domains;
– identify political options for the control of globalization.
The commission worked for over two years (March 2000 - May 2002). The final report was published in 2002. As well as a number of analytical essays, the report includes numerous recommendations.
The President of the Republic

The head of the German State is required to maintain political neutrality. This allows him/her to exercise moral authority, usually in the form of political speeches.

The current President, Horst Köhler, has been very active on this front. As soon as he was elected, he made a speech in which he advocated “making Germany once again a country that wins”. In his speeches, he recommends a “far-reaching renewal”\(^\text{15}\). At Bochum, on 22 November 2006, he called for “a continuation of the already initiated reformative momentum (...). Billions of people in Eastern Europe and Asia have entered into competition with each other with determination and intelligence in order to obtain their share of global wealth (...). Germany is a country that has every chance of saving its good position in a world of global change.”

The political parties

With the SPD advocating moderate reform, and the CDU\(^\text{16}\), a Christian Democratic party, Germany has two major political parties representing the centre-left and centre-right respectively and dominating the political sphere. Besides these two major parties, there is also the liberal FDP party which plays a pivotal role to ensure parliamentary majorities. In the 1980s, a fourth party, the Green Party, joined the German political arena, and after German re-unification, representatives of a fifth left-wing party also entered Parliament.

German political culture is fairly centrist and parties at the edges of the political spectrum have little influence. The traditional left/right cleavage has been dissipated by a series of political alliances of which the current “grand coalition” is a perfect example.

Nevertheless, the parties attach a certain importance to their political programmes. In fact somewhat surprisingly, the formation of the grand coalition prompted both the CDU and the SPD to set about rewriting their respective party programmes. Comparison of the two parties’ positions shows that despite a number of differences, they have a number of fundamental values in common: a commitment to the Social Market Economy, a “gradualist’ approach (eschewing ‘neo-liberal break-with-the-past’ discourses), and the will to find ways of accommodating globalization via control and regulation\(^\text{17}\).

\(^{15}\) The President’s speeches are available for consultation on: www.bundespraesident.de

\(^{16}\) In this paper we have side-stepped the CSU as it is affiliated to the CDU and only present in Bavaria.

THE CDU’S POLITICAL PROGRAMME

Although the CDU shares the same fundamental values (liberty, justice, solidarity) with the SPD, the notion of liberty is particularly important for the CDU. For the CDU competition is a key regulating factor and not just in the economic sphere. Social justice is seen as equal opportunities for all and inter-generational justice, even if the at the end of the day there are winners and losers. The CDU leans towards a refocusing of State activities onto domains which foster and promote the information economy and national cohesion. The principles of subsidiarity, of individual responsibility and of the “society of citizens” are advanced in the context of an appeal to each citizen to take responsibility for tasks that the State can no longer assure. The social market economy is seen a model of society that goes beyond the strictly economic sphere. This model is today facing a twin challenge: it needs to prove its capacity to adapt to the conditions of a global economy, and it needs to prove its legitimacy among the population. With respect to international issues, the CDU is in favour of exporting the social market economy model to other countries and for the establishment of an international regulatory framework.

Source: Henrik Uterwedde, *CDU et SPD à la recherche de nouvelles orientations*, op. cit.

THE SPD’S POLITICAL PROGRAMME

As with the CDU, the principles of Bürgergesellschaft, of individual responsibility and of subsidiarity are close to the heart of the SPD. The role of an “active and cooperative State” is vigorously defined. There is a clear acceptance of the need to redefine State responsibilities and redeploy public resources. Peer Steinbrück, Federal Minister of Finances and an SPD modernist, advocates equilibrium between the State, the market and civil society for the execution of “public tasks”. This equilibrium should lead to a concentration of action and public resources into education, research, innovation, training and family policy. The defence of social protection necessarily involves its restructuring. The model of a “provident social State” is advanced for its capacity to manage new social problems, invest more in prevention and social infra-structures, and promote the notion of individual responsibility.

All the SPD’s texts reveal a clear attachment to the “cooperative capitalism” of the Rhinean model. The party’s “manifesto” states that it is in favour of alliances between companies, research entities, employees and political groups; the SPD favours a competition policy based on quality and not on low wages; it wants successful companies to be protected from hostile bids; it is seeking to create an economy that gives priority to industrial logic rather than to purely financial considerations. Where change is necessary, the SPD wants that change to be part of a gradual process respecting the social traditions of the country, without any reference to ruptures or radical changes. The control of globalization is also one of their priorities. The party advocates the establishment of an international framework for the regulation of markets that would determine rules for international finance and standards relating to social and ecological matters. The European Union is destined to become a major economic player. It must combat fiscal and social dumping with a policy of social standards and by the harmonisation of fiscal and social policies. Lastly, the harmonisation of economic, financial and monetary policies must be pursued and consolidated. The strategy of innovation contained in the Lisbon Agreement (2000) perfectly summarises the call for the renewal of the European social model as advocated by the SPD.

Source: Henrik Uterwedde, *CDU et SPD à la recherche de nouvelles orientations*, op. cit.
Political foundations

Political foundations contribute to the globalization debate by commissioning experts to conduct reports and studies, by organising debates and conferences and by informing the public.

THE POSITION OF THE KONRAD-ADENAUER-STIFTUNG FOUNDATION ON GLOBALIZATION

- Globalization is not new; it is neither good nor bad in itself; it is not only economic, but rather deeply political and cultural; if controlled by policy, it is an opportunity.
- “It is true that the critique of globalization is exploited abusively by extremist groups willing to use force. But globalization is also criticised by the Church, by enterprises and by unions, by interest groups, by academics and by politicians who see uncontrolled globalization as a major cause of injustice and loss of cultural identity. This critique is taken seriously by the Konrad-Adenauer Foundation.”
- “We need to create a set of global rules based on the principles of a social market economy. In this context, the European Union must play a decisive role”


2.2. Interest groups (Verbände)

The Verbände – organisations representing socio-professional or economic interests – play a very important role in the German decision-making process. Well organised, they enjoy a good level of representativity. They communicate via several channels: consultation with government, studies, research reports, conventions, TV, radio, press etc.. All governments maintain close relations with the four confederations:

- The Confederation of German Unions (DGB);
- The Confederation of German Industry (BDI);
- The Confederation of German Employers (BDA);
- The Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry (DIHK).

The DGB is very active in the globalization debate and is an important vector of ideas and opinions that fall under the rubric of alter-globalization (or alter-mondialism). It teamed up with ATTAC Deutschland and the Association of German NGOs for a joint declaration addressed to the Schröder government after the 2002 elections.

18. The internal regulations of the Federal government require it automatically to communicate all draft bills to the interest groups concerned, thereby giving them the opportunity to take more effective action upstream.
In stark contrast, Employer organisations carry a liberal message.

2.3. Religious organisations

One way in which the Catholic and Protestant churches influence the globalization debate is via their seats on the Advisory Boards of TV channels and radio stations. They often express views on social and societal questions, particularly on globalization, on the third-world and on global solidarity. The Churches lend their support to initiatives such as the cancellation of debt for the poorest countries as advocated at the G7 summit in Cologne in 2000. They also use their international networks to promote their positions.

2.4. Researchers, academics and specialists

Germany has somewhere between 130 and 150 social and economic institutes and research institutes representing approximately 20% of Europe’s total research capacity in these fields. This network of institutes is “highly diversified, reflecting both the poly-
centrism of the executive bodies and a high level of organisation within civil society, particularly via the multiplicity of intermediate representational powers and structures." This sector is a key player in the public debate, and the media regularly reports their conclusions and publications.

Among the think tanks, we note particularly the Council of the Wise (Sachverständigenrat) which publishes a yearly analysis of the evolution of the German economy and of its growth. This survey is extensively aired by the German media and the government is obliged to answer for the developments (or lack of) cited each year.

The other players in the public debate are: the major independent economic research institutes, ad hoc commissions set up by the government, commercial institutes such as Prognos AG, private initiative such as the “Stiftung Marktwirtschaft” and lastly individuals such as Norbert Walter (Deutsche Bank Research) and Hans Werner Sinn, head of the Ifo (Institute for Economic Research) in Munich and who recently sparked a controversy by describing the German economy as a “bazaar economy”.

2.5. Civil society: the Foundations

The foundations are dynamic. Out of the 13,490 German foundations at the end of 2005, half of them were less than 10 years old. In effect the movement accelerated sharply following the improvement in the fiscal framework governing foundations in 2000. In 2005 alone, 880 new foundations were created. The foundations sphere constitutes a third sector between the State and the market. They play a significant role in fields such as social action, scientific research, education and integration, culture and political innovation. In effect, the diversity, flexibility and capacity for innovation of German foundations gives them a role of “stimulating incentives”. Two of the most important foundations in Germany are the Volkswagen Foundation and the Bertelsmann Foundation.

Some foundations seek political and public impact by proposing innovative initiatives, by serving as a forum for the different contributors to the debate, by establishing good conduct indices or by allowing new approaches.

Others have placed international work as the main focus of their activities. The ASKO Europa Foundation, for example, which is dedicated to European integration and to Franco-German dialogue.

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THE BERTELSMANN FOUNDATION: THEMES AND FORMS OF ACTION

The Bertelsmann Foundation is one of the most prominent players in the public arena. It focuses on themes that will influence the future of society such as education, the evolution of the socio-economic model, the development of a system of “preventative” health care, the development of a civic (Bürgergesellschaft) society and international cooperation. Its objective is to identify the challenges and develop the appropriate solutions.

Among the many theme discussed by the Bertelsmann Foundation are: the management of demographic change, communal management, political management (towards a more “strategic” management), immigration policy and the integration of immigrants, the “corporate social responsibility” project, the “corporate cultures in global interaction” project.

Source: www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de.

2.6. Civil society: associations

German associations play an informative and “mobilising” role with respect to globalization. Numerous associative initiatives have been undertaken in the field of third-world economic development. The BUKO coordination association (Bundeskoordination Internationalismus, www.buko.info) covers 150 groups and initiatives oriented towards the third world. Its activities are directed against “global capitalism”, racism and patriarchal society. The group Germanwatch (http://germanwatch.org) is committed to seeking fairness and balance in North-South relations, with much of its attention focused on a new economic and ecological orientation in Northern countries as a sine qua non for sustainable development and better living conditions in Southern countries. The coordination group “erlassjahr.de” (www.erlassjahr.de) brings together roughly a thousand organisations and initiatives, particularly from the Protestant and Catholic churches, and lends its support to campaigns advocating the cancellation of third-world debt that were officially initiated by the two major German Churches in 2000. While the public impact of the very large number of third-world-type initiatives is fairly limited, one should not under-estimate their impact on the attitudes of many people, particularly young people, towards development issues and North/South relations. This influence is particularly strong at the level of the Catholic and Protestant parishes which are often very active on third-world themes and present in towns via boutiques selling third-world products and engaged in fair trade.

As regards movements coming under either the heading anti-globalization or alter-globalization (or alter-mondialism in English), it is essentially ATTAC Deutschland that has earned the widest audience and recognition for its initiatives in the civil domain. Its operating methods and its themes are based on the model pioneered by ATTAC France, which started the international movement. Among the member organisations of ATTAC Deutschland there are:

– extreme left groups and movements positioning themselves to the left of the SPD;
– some unions, such as the first German federation, Ver.di (services, civil services), ou or the metal-workers union, IG Metall, which has close ties with ATTAC without formal membership;
− more moderate movements and initiatives, of Christian inspiration, focused on the problems of the third world;
− ecology movements including the BUND (Bund Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland);
− lastly, with less density, several local sections of the SPD and of the Green Party.

The themes of ATTAC’s actions include the classic themes of “alter-mondialism” but also themes relating to German economic and social policy. For example, the movement participated in a series of demonstrations against the Schröder government’s reform programme. In so doing, the movement runs the risk of becoming a “protest group”, often dominated by its political and union elements close to the socialist left, and in some cases, the extreme left. Indeed, the extreme left, completely marginalised at both the political and the electoral level in Germany, is trying to use the ATTAC network as a platform for increasing its own audience. At the same time, via its populist operating methods, ATTAC occupies an area left empty by the Green party since it entered parliament: that of populist groups hiking certain themes and demands into the public arena and imposing them on the political agenda.

In Germany ATTAC’s political influence is limited - in any case - much less than in France. ATTAC is undoubtedly very present in certain protest movements and enjoys a certain territorial foothold via certain informal groups and while some of its positions may be shared by a relatively large section of the population. However its actions rarely succeed in liberating themselves from the classical mould of the trade unionist left and the radical left. This may be because it lacks charismatic leaders, is working in a less developed culture of protest in Germany, is faced with the aloofness of the German political class, but also the indifference of a population that recoils from non-conformist political arguments and rejects populist and/or political protest campaigns. It is not easy to gauge exactly why ATTAC has had such a limited impact in Germany.

### 3. SURVEY RESPONSES

#### 3.1. Attitudes towards globalization

Germans are fairly pessimistic about the consequences of globalization for their country and for their personal situations. For example, IPSOS (March 2006) revealed that two out of three Germans point to the disadvantages of globalization while only one in six mention advantages\(^\text{21}\). For the Allensbach Institute, the figures are respectively 47% (disadvantages) and 20% (advantages). IPSOS identified the following motives for optimism and pessimism in its 2005 survey.

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The primary motive given for optimism was:
- Promotion of technical progress 72 %
- New export markets 69 %
- More efficient response to natural catastrophes 53 %
- Lower prices for consumers 50 %

The pessimists, on the other hand, cited the following factors:
- Widening gap between rich and poor countries 58 %
- New terrorist threats 51 %
- Increasing difficulty in finding a job 50 %
- Loss of influence of the German government 50 %

However, the pessimists also accepted the argument about new export markets and the more efficient response to natural catastrophes (47% for each).

IPSOS’s observations about the results of the survey underscored a certain ambivalence in the “for” and “against” camps, as if Germans lacked an unequivocal framework for interpreting the phenomenon. Thus, the positive appreciation of the opportunities that globalization presents (60 % in 2006) does not prevent a majority of Germans (60% as well) from demanding measures to protect German companies from being acquired by foreign corporations.

The Allensbach study provides a list of the problems and advantages associated with globalization. We note the importance of economic and social fears and concerns; by contrast, cultural aspects elicit a much more positive vision.

Table 6. Globalization is associated with...

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2006 (%)</th>
<th>Change vs. 1998 (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Relocation of jobs abroad</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>+ 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment loss</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>+ 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat to social protection</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>+ 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More cultural exchange</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>- 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advantages only for owners of capital</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>+ 17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Easier understanding of the world</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>- 22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Better chances for professional promotion</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>- 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politics becoming less transparent over time</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A generalised reduction in salaries</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>+ 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Damage to the environment</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>+ 6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There is not much data allowing an effective international comparison of attitudes to globalization. Eurobarometer (Autumn 2006) shows that Germans hope to find new outlets for their companies (41% vs the European average of 40%) while 47% vs a European average of 41% see danger ahead for their company and their job. The influence of globalization on employment is perceived pessimistically (73% of Germans, and 90% of East Germans see negative effects, vs. 52% for the EU-15 average).

The Eurobarometer-Flash globalization survey of 2003 provides a number of comparable figures\textsuperscript{23}. It implies that Germans have a more positive attitude towards globalization and its influence on their personal and family situation than the European average. A majority endorses the notion of the need for globalization to be regulated, but there is greater scepticism about such regulation among Germans than among Europeans generally. As regards the consequences of globalization, only the impact on employment is seen particularly pessimistically in Germany, and substantially more so than in the rest of the EU. In line with the rest of Europe, answers relating to the environment and ecological questions are more mixed; however, on matters relating to global democracy, solidarity between countries and above all cultural exchanges, a distinctly positive attitude prevails, higher than the EU average as regards the last two themes (table 7).

These results have been corroborated by the Kairos survey (question 11) which shows that Germans are more worried about the effect of globalization on employment than their European neighbours, both in the younger (16-29) and the older (30-50) age-groups. Also of interest among the rare significant deviations from the EU average, the importance attributed by young people to Research and Development and to life long learning, as well as the low score for the association of globalization with common rules and global regulations\textsuperscript{24}. In question 12, Germans attribute NGOs with very little impact on globalization.


\textsuperscript{24} Is this an implicit criticism of the lack of rules and regulation, or, on the contrary, lesser importance attributed to such regulations? See also the Eurobarometer survey, Table 4.
Table 7. Responses selected from the Eurobarometer-Flash Globalization survey (Germany; UE-15 average)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>EU-15</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>for/positive</td>
<td>against/negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For or against globalization</td>
<td>70 %</td>
<td>28 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal advantages and disadvantages</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is regulation/control possible?</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is regulation necessary?</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consequences: GNP growth</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consequences: employment</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consequences: international solidarity</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consequences: global democracy</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consequences: cultural exchanges</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consequences: environment</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: European Commission: Eurobarometer-Flash, Globalization, November 2003

It is generally accepted that attitudes towards globalization vary according to the social status and the level of education of the respondent: it is seen positively by those who believe they will benefit from it. The IPSOS survey confirms this reality, showing that the proportion of people associating advantages with globalization doubles in the population having successfully completed their secondary education or higher. The Kairos survey also elicits the same observation: young people with university educations are interested in politics, the environment and third-world development to a far higher degree than those with only elementary qualifications. Within the 30-50 age-group the educational differences appear to have less impact suggesting a generational effect (question 19).

Young people with university educations are numerically more convinced of the positive effects of globalization (better cultural understanding, growth of international trade and mobility, question 11) and feel more concerned by the notion of international mobility (questions 15, 18). Those with elementary qualifications are more pessimistic: the younger respondents are concerned about AIDS and drug abuse, whereas among the 30-50 age-group, the attitude gap with their more educated peers is even more apparent with all of society’s ills being associated with globalization (AIDS, drugs, terrorism, war, organised crime) and unemployment (question 13).

3.2. Political responses: what national strategy?

Globalization has intensified the debate on the evolution of the German economic and social system. The system was built on a foundation of State and societal regulations that was broadly
respected by the Germany’s economic and social partners. But this foundation has been shaken by the intensification of globalization, both because of the contradictions that globalization generates and because of the new perception that certain elements within German society have of their interests and their capacity to concretise these interests. The resulting tensions within German society have generated different and conflicting forms of political response.

a) The dominant element in the debate has been the neo-liberal approach which advocates acceptance of the ruptures with the past induced by globalization and priorities the implementation of structural changes such as a substantial reduction in labour costs, greater flexibility and a significant reduction in the level of government intervention. Proponents of this approach dispute the capacity of the German consensual model to survive changes they consider unavoidable and believe that globalization engenders a brutal exposure to competition of the national socio-productive system that will eventually force Germany to abandon its model in favour of an Anglo-American style of capitalism. Some commentators see this political attitude as being less a description of economic reality and more an ideological discourse aimed at advancing neo-liberal solutions and creating a new rapport de forces within German society (Beck 1997). Although this neo-liberal approach is popular with the liberals (FDP), a substantial section of the CDU-CSU alliance and above all with a large section of the German business community, the economic media and university economists, it is not the majority view inside Germany.

b) Those who consider this approach destructive are opposed to all reform policies and defend the status quo. This approach brings together alter-mondialists, union militants (and in some case their leaders), extreme left-wing parties as well as a section of the moderate left within the SPD. It adopts a defensive position and seems out of step with the current evolution of the economy. Although the demonstrations organised against the Schröder government’s policies mobilised the masses, they have not prevented any of the reforms from being implemented.

c) The third current in German politics advocates a controlled adaptation of the existing model within a more evolutionist vision of globalization that is more optimistic about the German model’s survival capacity. It maintains that this model does not need to change direction in its evolution towards another national socio-productive model, but rather that it requires a significant phase of mutation. It accepts the necessity to control costs, but it also insists on the preservation and improvement of the advantages (excluding costs) underpinning the German socio-economic model. It believes in the capacity of the German system to renew and reproduce its qualitative competitive advantages within a post-Fordist competitive environment. It accepts that globalization presents a number of challenges, but also insists on Germany’s advantages, particularly its potential for high quality resources (networks of companies, infrastructures, education system, political and social stability, etc.).

This third approach is closer to the complex reality of the German socio-productive system and appears to have a better understanding of the challenges involved in the integration
of that system into an increasingly globalised economy. It is an approach that is accepted by a majority in both of Germany’s major political parties (CDU, SPD), and by a majority of Germany’s union leaders and of its general population. It leaves a wide-open space for discussion and debate of the scope and depth of the necessary adaptations. Indeed, the two major political parties each offer a different definition of this approach: The CDU advocates the social market economy model as being an alternative to a State run society, while the SPD sees essentially the same model as an alternative to the neo-liberal model in which market forces dictate the direction of the economy and society at large. The debate between these two currents is conducted as if the backdrop to the political conflicts involved is an implicit consensus (preservation of the social market economy model via adaptation). The only seriously discordant voices in this otherwise consensual landscape come from the PDS-Die Linke and from the Verbände (interest groups) with more differentiated positions (2.2), and from the sphere of associations (ATTAC for example, cf 2.6).

3.3. Political responses: global governance?

A similar degree of consensus is also apparent with respect to global policy. The key terms employed in the context of globalization are “management” and “control”.

Globalization is perceived with a high degree of ambivalence, as being both positive and negative, (except by the left which adheres to a more negative analysis): it carries both opportunities and risks. For this reason, all the parties advocate the development of a stronger regulatory framework at a global level based on the principles of open markets and international cooperation. However, there are different opinions about the political content of such a regulatory framework: the FDP wants a more liberal framework while the left wants a more restrictive framework. The CDU and SPD also express the implicit idea of “exporting” the German socio-economic model by using it as a template for the development of global regulatory frameworks (table 8).
Table 8. Policies advocated by the political parties with respect to globalization

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<tr>
<td>CDU</td>
<td>“Globalization represents the increasing mobility of people, labour, capital, goods and services on world markets. It engenders a profound change in modes of consumption, investment, work, life-style, forms of cultural expression and societal structures. The customary perception - both emotional and functional - of geographical and temporal frontiers is being subjected to change.” Globalization has its own internal dynamic; it threatens to diminish the field for effective policy implementation by national governments.</td>
<td>Ambivalence. Risks: Too rapid a pace of change; loss of well-being, of social security, of traditional cultures. Fears for employment and social services / support. Loss of confidence in economic and social systems. The opportunities: new potentials for global economic growth, increase in well-being in rich countries and the struggle against poverty in developing countries; peace via international cooperation.</td>
<td>Create a regulatory framework. Free trade in goods and ideas. Universal human rights. Develop and strengthen international organisations. Include NGOs and trans-national enterprises in the search for solutions, but priority for the democratically elected governments. Remove economic and cultural protectionism. The economy: “for an international social market economy”. This will facilitate maintenance in Germany of the social order which, under the social market economy, has combined egoism with the common good”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>Globalization: “The central reason for numerous changes in society and their interactions”; “a process involving all domains in society”: economy, but also culture, education, research, gender equality. “Nation states can no longer control the economic and social evolutions alone”</td>
<td>Globalization cuts both ways: “Globalization is perceived by people as both an opportunity for the future and a vehicle of future problems……”: Well-being and poverty, cultural exchange and marginalisation of certain cultures, global consolidation of democracy, human rights and gender equality but also of global inequality.</td>
<td>Creation of an extensive global regulatory framework; Strengthen international organisations, better coordination between these organisations. Inter-cultural dialogue. Cultural auto-determination, but struggle against fundamentalism, nationalism and ethnocentrism. Zones of regional integration, (like the EU): a key first step in the process. Fair trade: Opening of developed countries’ markets; an end to agricultural export subsidies. Rules to govern international financial markets; in this context: The Tobin tax “may be a viable instrument...” Fight against factors contributing to climate change.</td>
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| **FDP**          | “Globalization is the growing capacity of man to act and communicate at a global level. It is an existing phenomenon, whatever the anti-globalization camp may say” | “Naturally this process carries risks that must be minimised by our political leaders. But, as liberals, we see above all opportunities in globalization that politicians must exploit in the interests of man in order to impose liberty, human rights and a global market economy” | Global cooperation and governance  
For a liberal legal and regulatory framework at a global level.  
Strengthening of existing institutions and mechanisms  
For free-trade: “Often criticism of globalization is nothing but an expression of nationalist protectionism in industrialised countries. (…) Only free trade is a truly fair trade.” The elimination of the multitude of barriers to free trade “offers more chances for development than total global contributions to development aid.”  
Against the introduction of social standards in the trade negotiations of the WTO.  
Against the Tobin tax |
| **Green party**  | Critique of current globalization: “It must not be a process that subjects everything to an economy without limits; it needs social and ecological frameworks”. | “Risks, but also opportunities for the spread of democracy and well-being throughout the world.”  
“The path towards a more equitable globalization process necessarily involves the fight against poverty, the preservation of our environment, common responses to climate change and a system of fair trade. Fair globalization also means the globalization of values” (human rights, recognition of other cultures and religions, democracy, social integration). | “Build supra-national institutions in order to maintain the primacy of politics within the globalization process.”  
Profound reforms: UN, IMF, etc.  
“a future global governance structure must open itself to a higher level of participation from national parliaments and civil society”  
Opening of markets to developing countries, elimination of agricultural subsidies.  
Money for development.  
Support the objectives of the Millenium.  
Good governance in developing countries, and cancellation of debts.  
International taxes: Tobin tax, tax on air transport tickets. |
PDS

Globalization is the result of technical innovations and of national and international political decisions (GATT, WTO), and the liberalisation of trade and capital flows as well as of deregulations and privatisations in national economies. A profound transformation of the global economy.

It carries only risks
The emergence of powerful global players and a global financial network (banks, institutional investors, ratings agencies, the IMF) that exert pressure on national economies (by demanding profitability).
Aggravation of the gap between rich and poor.
Danger of international economic and financial crises

Limit the power of major corporations and financial networks; reject neo-liberal ideas.
A European Union expressing and acting with “solidarity”; minimum social standards in Europe.
Flexible monetary zones for the major currencies in order to avoid crises des crises; re-introduction of controls on capital flows.
Tobin tax.
Possibility for developing countries to protect their markets from industrialised and Asian countries.

Sources: Author’s synopsis from political party programme documents

3.4. The perceived role of the EU

In the Kairos survey, Germans consider that the European Union is the second player (behind the multinationals, but ahead of the WTO) and has an influence on the regulation of globalization (question 12). The survey’s results in this respect show the German attitude as being in line with the average European view. As regards the level of confidence expressed in the EU, it was somewhat lower than in the other reference countries, particularly among the 30-50 age-group, and just slightly lower in the 16-29 age-group.

The Eurobarometer-Flash survey on globalization allowed an even clearer picture showing that while Germans approve of the European Commission being responsible for trade negotiations and while they consider the EU’s influence on regulating globalization to be too weak, a smaller majority in Germany expressed confidence in the EU’s capacity to play that role than the combined average European majority. We also note that while Germans are globally satisfied with their degree of economic openness, 34% criticised what they considered an “overly liberal” EU (EU-15 average: 26%).

Compared with this ambivalent public view, the political parties are more positive. Certainly, the EU comes in for criticism: the socialist left party calls for “an EU that acts with unity both internally and externally” in order to fight against neo-liberal globalization, and the Green Party advocates reform of the Common Agricultural Policy and the elimination of export subsidies to facilitate developing country access to European markets. But on the whole, the EU is seen as an efficacious platform for the promotion of global regulation.
For the CDU, “the EU is a common European response to the challenges of globalization. (...) By their union, European national governments have retained areas of possible intervention that would otherwise have been lost long ago.” This is particularly true in the area of governance. The CDU stresses that in the domain of globalization and its control, the member States act “as partners in the European Union.” It observes that “in one form or another, the social market economy has become the basis of economic policy in all nations in the European Union.” In this perspective, the EU is a suitable vehicle for the establishment of a global regulatory framework that seeks to reconcile open markets with social justice.

In a similar vein, the SPD states that “Europe has developed a specific and unique social and civil model. Europe is the symbol of economic, social, cultural and ecological equilibrium. (...) Even under the conditions of globalization this model offers good opportunities for development and may be exemplary in international relations.” In the progression towards a multi-polar world, the EU is seen as an advantage by the SPD.

Thus both Germany’s major political parties are attached to the notion of “exporting” the Social Market Economy model via Europe and of using Europe in negotiations for establishing rules of global governance. This position rejects the notion of the EU as a rampart against neo-liberal globalization. The convergence of views on Europe by both parties reflects their political will to accelerate the process of integration.

4. CONCLUSION

In common with other European countries, the globalization debate in Germany has evolved from an initially broad-based alarmist reaction towards a more fragmented and differentiated range of perceptions and opinions. Today the debate may even be described as ‘flat’, ‘dispassionate’ and ‘measured’

This is because of Germany’s systemic context (political system, political culture, position of the German economy in the international division of labour and the specificities of its economic and social model). In a country grown allergic to ideological confrontation, that prefers pragmatic, cooperative and even consensual solutions, political controversies are often expressed in moderate tones. Germany’s relatively strong position within the global economy also allows the different players to believe they are among the winners in the process of globalization.

Today, globalization is above all perceived as a challenge revealing the weaknesses of the German economy since the 1990s. These apparent weaknesses engendered a broad debate on the qualities and defects of the German production site, and then later, on the viability of the German socio-economic model, “Rhinean capitalism”. The numerous positions adopted in response to these debates have mainly focused on a requisite adaptation of the

25. Fabrice Larat, op.cit., p.171.
German economy and of the way its markets operate. These positions have fed the debates on recent and current reforms. The sentiment of impotence in the face of an inevitable steam-rolling process, very present at the beginning of the globalization debate, has given way to an attitude that is more confident in the possibility of political action at two levels: the control of globalization by channelling it through an international regulatory framework, and the adaptation of the German economy so that it can take full advantage of globalization. The key terms are “globalization management” and “global regulatory framework”, thus demonstrating the permanence of the German tradition of ordoliberalism.

This generally positive view does not exclude fears about globalization, and particularly the apprehension that the German consensus on maintaining its system of cooperative social market economics based on negotiation and compromise between interested parties could be undermined by a more Thatcherist vision of capitalism. Such fears are fuelled by statements such as “the economy has no obligation to be ‘social’” and “Germany now needs to undergo a phase of real capitalism”. (...) The power of the trade unions must be broken. We need a dose of Thatcherism” (Financial Times Deutschland, 21 January, 2002). But this a minority view since the majority of the political and economic players are in favour of maintaining the Soziale Marktwirtschaft (Social Market Economy).

In Germany, the debates are characterised by a strong centrifugal tendency. Although Germany - like other countries - has a political spectrum offering everything from a more or less radical socialist critique of globalization on the left to a neo-liberal vision recommending a break with the past on the right, it is the more moderate and gradualist views in between that dominate the public arena. Taking its cue from the German model of social capitalism that it is trying to protect, the debate is focused around the adaptations that are necessary for its preservation. It does not seek a break or rupture with past; it seeks above all continuity. This middle path seeks to maintain an equilibrium between market law and social justice, while offering sufficient space for genuine debate on policy decisions. The battle for hearts and minds between the left and the right is essentially played within the framework of this implicitly accepted reality. It naturally remains to be seen whether Germany is backing a global winner - whether it is really possible to save the Soziale Marktwirtschaft model via adaptation and renewal.
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Other documents on the site: http://www.sozialisten.de/service/suche/index.htm?srubrik=&orderby=relevance&words=Globalisierung&Abschicken=y=7&Abschicken=START&menu1=ServiceMen

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Eurobaromètre 65, Spring 2006.
1. INTRODUCTION

Texts, public speeches, views and opinions of Estonian influential political leaders and prominent people are analysed in this part of study. Globalization is understood first of all as a result of changes in the global economy, which are caused mainly by the increase of global trade and global intercultural communication. Globalization is quite often mentioned in public discussions, less often it is analysed in concrete studies. Today’s transport and communication systems, the Internet, uncontrolled migration, mass media and environmental problems have changed global problems into local ones and vice versa. Globalization is very often defined as processes of transformation which unifies cultures and makes them more similar to western and urbanised societies.

Today there is a growing consensus that we must engage with progressives from other countries and situate European and national responses within a broader international framework of progressive thinking (see: Global Europe, Social Europe 2006). While globalization involves increased competition and expanding business networks, it also involves the spread of democracy and the development of resources. These two aspects are of utmost importance for rapidly developing East-European countries.

2. MAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ESTONIAN SOCIETY

2.1. Background

Estonia is an economy in transition. Estonia’s current economic situation began with the rebirth of an independent Estonia at the start of the 1990s. Leaving the centralized planned economy of the Soviet bloc brought challenges as well as opportunities. Today, Estonia is a member of the European Union. The opportunities of larger markets and increasingly free trade are balanced by the demanding challenges of increasingly integrated participation in the global economy. To meet these challenges, Estonia is now considering the development of a national design policy. This aim of this policy is to counterbalance the increasing effects of the global economy.
Globalization was a topic of discussion, especially among intellectuals, far before the restoration of Estonian independence. Estonia has always been much more forward-looking and advanced than the other former Soviet republics, economically and many other ways, long before the Soviet Union fell apart. (Estonia was considered one of the most western republics not only in geographical reasons.) Since 1970s there has been access to Finnish TV channels for people living in North regions of the Republic. This gave them the chance to see through the “iron curtain” during the two decades before the collapse of the USSR. (There were also other aspects that made communication with western world more common.) Several topics of discussion related to global problems, initiated by the Club of Rome, especially those, related with environmental pollution and nature protection, were discussed among a small group of scientists and social analysts already in 70-80s. At this time public interest in nature protection was quite non-political field of peoples’ activity and therefore was allowed by Soviet administration. Globalization was discussed mainly in context of nature pollution (waste products of oil-shale industry, wastewater in rivers etc). Later, in the wake of the Singing Revolution (1988-1992) environmental activity became more political.

Together with political emancipation in the beginning of 90s Estonia faced complex economic and environmental problems. Together with the disposal of Soviet military-related enterprise, restoration of global economic (and other) ties was the top priority of this time. Westernisation and integration into western international structures have been central aims of the new political leaders of Estonia throughout the transition period.

In any country, market forces are the true drivers of competitiveness. In Estonia, the average growth of productivity of 7-9 per cent over the last 5 years and healthy level of job creation relied on the initiative and inventiveness of local companies. Thus, Estonia’s competitiveness is publicly discussed and this topic has strong link with the problems of globalization.

2.2. Return to western political and economic landscape

The Soviet period was depressing for people in Estonia because of suppression of western values, among others those values concerning economic freedom: total social leveling among ordinary people (except communist party leaders), negative attitudes towards personal economic success, total equality of living resources etc. Restoration of the liberal society was like a cascade for most of people. Therefore political flows, parties and movements have had quite similar positions concerning the country’s future and economic freedom. Typical for this are the considerations made by the former Estonian Prime Minister, Mart Siimann: “The participation of Estonia in European integration is a natural process, which results from our centuries-long belonging to the Western-European cultural area. Considering this background, membership of European structures means a restoration of historical, economical, political and cultural ties.”

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Since the beginning of 90s most influential political parties consider modernisation and quick economical development as possible only through prevalent liberalization. Estonian experience of modernization and development provides empirical evidence. For Estonia, foreign trade plays an inordinately large role in the economy.

During the last decade and half, one of the characteristic traits of Estonian foreign policy was the making of fundamental decisions, realising the national interests and getting real support in favouring one foreign power against another. In the late 90s, according to opinion of leading Estonian politicians there was only one way to guarantee stability and security for Estonia – joining the EU and NATO.

On the one hand, globalization calls for new ideas, new approaches and solutions in order to keep up with the rapidly changing world. Estonia has proved to be rather competitive. Estonian exports have increased their market share in the EU. Estonia is still one of the largest recipients of foreign direct investments. In 2005, the World Bank and World Economic Forum listed Estonia in the top 20 countries in terms of competitiveness.

Andres Tarand, the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee argued in a foreign policy discussion in Estonian Parliament (November 1999) that the starting points for defining Estonia’s foreign policy priorities are the following: globalization as one of the ever deepening processes in the modern world; and three aspects of the Estonian state: Estonia as a nation state, as small state, and border state. There are a number of conflicts between globalization and nation state, but also between the internal balance of the recently independent states and European integration. On the other hand, the concurrent status of Estonia as a small state and border state means that these conflicts have to be overcome as a priority in order to maintain sovereignty. Foreign policy priorities that arise from this position and that have been generally agreed are therefore membership of the EU and NATO. (Tarand 2000: 39-43).

One of most important aspects of the globalization debate is the discourse of big and small nations. Estonia belongs to the list of small states in Europe and the world. The term Europe is often used additionally to the geographic unit also as a meaning for a cultural, economic and political construction. Estonian top-politicians consider Estonia as belonging to Europe in all the aforementioned fields.

Lennart Meri, President of the Republic of Estonia (in 1992-2001) said at the 26th Conference of European Ministers in the Hanseatic City of Wismar (November 9, 2000) that his vision was of a Europe of states, where the European Commission is the guardian of the Treaties, it is the engine that has supported and promoted the development of the Common Market. It is a balancing force between the large and the small member states. It is the institution

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that ensures that the European Union, where there are countries like Luxembourg, and soon countries like Estonia, but also countries like Germany, would function so that also small countries can feel that their interests are taken into consideration.3

In another speech Lennart Meri, at the Sofia Summit, October 5, 2001 connected globalization and the emerging threats of international terrorism. In this text, Mr Meri underlined the importance of solidarity in relations between big and small states. He said that combating terrorism means also supporting democratic governments and rejecting undemocratic ones, and rewarding behaviour that respects the sanctity of human life. It also means providing development aid and opening up our markets so that developing countries can sell their products - including agricultural goods - in the countries of Europe and North America.4

Eiki Nestor (leader of Estonian Social Democratic Party) has analysed in his article ‘Openness instead of the left-right political dimension’ relations between political dimensions and the openness/closeness of societies. The real opposition is not between left and right definition of politics, but rather contrasting concepts which are actually global politics and closed (local) politics.5

Estonians, due to their location on the Baltic seashore, consider themselves as a trading nation and therefore have a direct interest in the improvement of a multilateral trading system that is capable of diminishing the barriers that still exist between nations. When Estonia had acceded to WTO organization, the Estonian Minister of Foreign Affairs Toomas Hendrik Ilves6 (Since October 2006 T.H. Ilves is President of Estonia) gave a speech at the third session of WTO ministerial conference (1 December 1999, Seattle). In this speech T.H. Ilves, as one of Estonia’s most influential opinion leaders, spoke about “internetisation” and globalization in exceptionally positive tones. He said: “The open and liberal trade policy that my country has pursued for almost a decade has resulted in remarkable economic growth; extremely high foreign direct investment as well as integration of the Estonian economy into the world trade system to a far greater degree than expected from a small, formerly planned economy. A decisive role in this process can be attributed to the pursuit of similar goals within the WTO. Successful application of these principles is evidence of the viability and necessity of a liberal and open trade regime”.

Membership of the WTO was considered as recognition of Estonia’s economic and reform policies. Foreign Minister T.H. Ilves said that this membership imposes also an obligation and a responsibility to continue the path of trade liberalization and a duty to share experiences with other members of the organization. Only through globalization and increase in trade and other economic ties Estonia can achieve economic growth, optimal allocation of resources, the most effective and efficient means of production and development of

5. SLOhtuleht. 19.05.2001
technology. According to Mr Ilves, the economic development that accompanies increased trade flows benefits all nations. Reduction or elimination of barriers was considered a far better policy option than barricading oneself with protectionist mechanisms. Increased trade should not be feared. Rather, it should be promoted. Mr Ilves said: “Globalization and a concomitant increase in trade is not an enemy that should be fought. Rather it is a challenge that we must tackle and make the most of while concentrating our efforts to address the side effects that might possibly accompany the process.”

In the Estonian Foreign Policy Yearbook 2003, just before Estonia joined the European Union, T.H. Ilves (this time as Member of Estonian Parliament) wrote an article ‘The Grand Enlargement and the Great Wall of Europe’. He focused here on a development of Europe and its partners elsewhere. These views he presented in this article are very important because Mr Ilves did not analyse only Estonia’s future but put forward his vision of Europe’s future in a wider context.7

As mentioned before, liberal economic policy has been overwhelmingly the position of most political coalitions. The majority of the political parties support the slogan: as ‘thin’ a government as is possible.

Former Estonian Prime Minister Mart Laar (winner of the Cato Institute’s 2006 Milton Friedman Prize for Advancing Liberty) has discussed globalization in respect of innovation and communication policy. Mart Laar was the Prime Minister who initiated the idea of Estonian e-government. EGovernment in Estonia provides state and local government agencies at all levels with the opportunity to offer citizens and businesses higher quality services in a faster way. At the beginning of 2001, the Estonian government together with private companies started to develop an Information and Communication Technology (ICT) framework in order to create a common system for eGovernment services. A truly new environment of service management and service delivery was developed. The environment architecture was built on separated customer-centered front and back offices and on seamless connections between organizations. On one hand this process has been an indicator of globalization (development of global networks), on the other hand this made eGovernment services quick and efficient, which makes the providing of such public services a significant challenge.

The Estonian Reform Party has had a leading role in most ruling political coalitions and the party’s ideology has been prevailing on the general political landscape. They declare that the liberal economy and open state borders are principally the only reasonable way to be a part of a global economy. Moreover, most of leaders believe that there is something to be learned from Estonia’s experiences in applying one of the most liberal economic policies in the world and especially using that policy as a tool of development. This period of ‘euphoria of total liberalism’ still continues to this day.

Toomas Savi (member of the Reform Party, former Parliament Speaker, one of Estonian Members of the European Parliament in Brussels) in local weekly *Maaleht* (06.04.2006) published an article about globalization and energy consumption. Increasing consumption of energy is a global problem that has a huge impact on small states’ economies. As economic relations between states are becoming closer and the economy is globalising this becomes a corporate problem of states.

In May 2006 Riigikogu (Estonian Parliament) ratified the Constitutional Treaty for Europe. 73 Members of the Parliament voted for the Treaty, 1 voted against and nobody abstained. At a business seminar in Riga (December 7, 2005) the Governor of the Eesti Bank Andres Lipstok stated: “The enlargement of the European Union is a good example of successful globalisation. The EU combines economic growth with balanced social development and thus fundamentally supports the competitiveness of its member states.”

According to A. Lipstok competitive countries can vastly improve the living standards and welfare of their citizens in today’s globalising world by making use of global and regional trade and investments. Competitiveness and open markets are important for our central banks as well. Increasing trade keeps inflationary pressure under control, as has been the case in Estonia over the last couple of years. Globalization offers more opportunities to manage financial risks. Maintaining macroeconomic stability is perhaps the most important responsibility of the state to support competitiveness. The economy needs a stable currency and well functioning financial markets to accumulate savings and to invest. The monetary and financial systems in Estonia are quite similar to those of Latvia and Lithuania. The currencies of these states are fixed against the euro, they are members of ERM II and their financial systems are fully integrated with the Nordic countries and Continental Europe.

2.3. Identity discussions and global changes

In their fundamental treatise on the “Return to the Western World: Cultural and Political Perspectives on the Estonian Post-Communist Transition” social scientists at Tartu University Marju Lauristin and Peeter Vihalem explained how Estonian political leaders and scholars depict Estonia’s geopolitical significance on the political map of Europe. Their academic research has shown that for the Estonian political and academic elite Europe and, more precisely, Northern Europe has become an ideal; belonging to this area is taken for granted. From a cultural perspective, Estonia belongs to the Scandinavian rather than to the Baltic area. Nordic identity is strengthened through linguistic closeness with Finnish, observed through traditional cultural customs introduced by the Lutheran Church, and the influence of contemporary Nordic standards, social guarantees and welfare.

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Paul Goble (columnist at Estonian daily Eesti Päevaleht) writes from a more global perspective and warns Estonian people that the future will probably not be less complicated than recent history was. Goble said that Estonia has to consider that in the future situation where – there is probably only be a few big cities in Estonia and that these cities are inhabited by high proportion of immigrants. At the same time an unoccupied countryside is abandoned and deserted – this picture is quite a realistic future perspective. (Eesti Päevaleht, 10. juuni, 2006). Estonia has to consider neighbouring countries as well as global development.

Kristiina Ojuland (Head of the Parliamentary Committee for European Affairs, former Foreign Minister of Estonia) gave a speech in the Riigikogu (Estonian Parliament) on 6th of April 2006. She stated that globalization and immigration are unavoidable processes and related to each other. Illegal immigration is a serious problem in the European Union. According to her, European Union member states have to take common measures to control illegal immigration.

During last few years there has been debate in Estonia about options for the next big goal that could unite people and increase solidarity between social groups in society. Up to 2004 there was common effort to become a member of European Union and NATO. Katrin Saks (member of the Social Democratic Party, currently a member of the European Parliament) has proposed a shared vision for Estonian society – the maintenance of Estonian culture in the globalising world. This could be the main common purpose for the Estonian people. (Eesti Päevaleht, April 21, 2006).

Kaur Hanson, political secretary of the party Respublica, is one of few politicians who interpret globalization in negative tones. He thinks that global competition and rivalry is increasing in all fields of human activity and that Europe is too small to resist this process. European states have a shortage of workers, thus immigration is inevitable and in his opinion, Estonian political parties have to work out their immigration policies.

2.4. Estonian ethnic and national identity

The most important aspect for Estonians regarding globalization is the preservation of their collective ethnic identity, consolidation of the nation state and the personal ethnic and national identity of future generations. One of the key questions in discussions of Estonian politicians and the cultural elite is the danger of an imposed shift of ethnic and cultural identity. This statement is the starting point of an overview of the changes in the debate concerning small state national interests in joining the EU. Does ‘Europeanisation’ have the same effect as that which is apprehensively expected from globalization? How can Estonian culture be preserved in a multi-ethnic Europe where state borders are less and less significant?

Some Estonians have expressed the fear that the identity of Estonia as a nation will be diluted in the European Union. Martin Helme – a young and ambitious conservative Estonian
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– wrote in his article10 “Imaginary seduction of dying out” (in Estonian: “Väljasuremise näiline ahvatlus”) that immigration means that we postpone the process of disappearance of the nation, at the same time it means also growth of the unstable and insecure society. Intensive immigration means that share of native people is diminishing more and more. Multicultural societies seem to be more insecure than mono-cultural society.

In this respect, it is interesting to mention that to support use of Estonian language Estonian language computer programmes have been elaborated. Linguists have analysed role and use of Estonian language in the sphere of information technology.

The topic of free movement of people, migration as one of the pillars of free (labour) market is still not seriously raised in Estonian public debates. The problem is, on one hand, the penetration of foreign work force; on the other hand, the problem of brain drain of the Estonian workforce. The third and most important aspect is fear about dissolution and disappearance of the Estonian nation. This is something specific that big nations do not feel commonly.

One reason why the topic of free movement is not yet publicly discussed is also because real immigration from other European Union member states or third countries is still very small. Immigration to Estonia is under control. At the same time emigration of people for better job conditions abroad is becoming more intensive. In Estonia we see problems in the health sphere (doctors, nurses), in construction sphere, in transportation etc because of shortage of workers. The situation is even more complicated because Estonia has to make a greater effort to integrate part of the Soviet period immigrants who have still not adapted and are not integrated into Estonian society.

Globalization is also a subject of analysis for university students. For example, some students (Ene Kuusk) have defended master thesis in Tartu University about measurement of factors of sovereignty. She argues that globalization and regionalisation seem to be two opposite processes but that actually they complement each other. She argues that globalization in geopolitical and ethnic-cultural context brings along unification of the world but at the same time, it creates new borders.11

In some issues of Estonian Human Development Report, problems related to globalization have been analysed philosophically – in the general context of social studies, especially discussions about theories of modernism and post-modernism. For example social scientist, professor Rein Ruutsoo12 analyses development of ITC technology, which changed in a most radical way our understanding of global issues. The slogan ‘think globally but act locally’ is analysed in the context of emerging new values and social movements. In the global arena competition is not creating better standards of living but protecting accustomed

lifestyles and values. Struggle for nuclear power, for equality of men and women, the fight for nature protection (Greens) has in general a protective character. The main question of these movements is not economic distribution but protection of values. Professor Ruutsoo points out also that main global ‘battle field’ is now the media. More debates are held through media channels than in reality. These circumstances create new rules. Global information filed is huge. On one hand this is promoting the development of democracy: people can make more competent decisions. On the other hand the increasing amount of information has a de-centralisation effect.

In the Estonian Human Development Report13 1998 Erik Terk (Director of the Institute for Future Studies) wrote a chapter about European integration and globalization. Erik Terk pointed out that European integration as an entity has been construed as one way towards globalization of the whole economy and other communication, but at the same time also as a certain regional countermeasure to the global dominance of the US and Japan. In this issue Erik Terk argued with Manuel Castells (Castells, 1998) who said that the basic factor creating the unification of Europe is still globalization, but that this process is occurring through European institutions themselves. Terk underlined that ‘our information age does not globalize the whole economy – rather, it globalises the strategic components of the economy.’ The electronically interconnected networks channel the exchange of capital, goods and information. Although, a large section of employment remains regional, national or even local, the processes shaping the countenance of the economy are nevertheless global, not regional. ‘In cyberspace, there is no Europe’ – was the slogan recorded in the Estonian press this time.

Terk is tentative about the opposition between the global and European level approaches could be a problem for Estonia in the future. Relations that Estonia had before membership in European Union with third countries should be less favourable than the ones Estonia has with the EU. Terk was critical of the new experience of European-style regulated economy and society. It is obvious, that on becoming a member of the EU, Estonia had to limit its economic relations with some third countries (for example, Ukraine, Byelorussia etc).

Globalization in the sphere of university studies and research has become a subject of debate quite recently. Contemporary university, despite of the location of this university, should concentrate on problems of development of technology, creation of new and global scientific networks. The university studies must be more flexible and mobile than in the last century. Estonian universities and secondary schools started to change these principles relatively recently. Changed circumstances also introduce higher requirements for school-leavers. In an open society and due to free movement of workforce inside of the European Union young people are free to choose to live and to work in places outside of their home

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country. (This debate was held in Tartu University 14.–17. September 1998 in framework of Estonian and German university researchers named “Akademica II”.)

The most visible aspect of today’s global knowledge economy is the fact that the greatest value is added to products and services through human activity. For this reason, national competitive strategy generally involves finding ways to develop industries that add the greatest value to national economies. In a world where design represents an opportunity to add value to products and services at a relatively low marginal cost, governments are now considering design policies as a tool for creating competitive advantage. In this sense, design policies can become an instrument for economic growth in some ways similar to those aspects of other policies that affect economic growth, including policies affecting taxes, education, health, or immigration.

2.5. Innovation policy and ITC technology

In the modern globalizing world, economic success and high quality of living are achieved only in countries attaching great importance to the efficient handling of knowledge and information and using them for the benefit of the society. The term “information society” usually denotes a society, where the majority of values created by mankind are contained in information. Most of the information stored by the society is maintained, transformed and transmitted in a universal digital form. By using a data exchange network, all members of society have access to information.

There is no doubt that information and communication technology has a significant impact on economic growth, employment and human behaviour. Thus, for a small country with limited resources like Estonia, the development of knowledge-based economy, compact yet efficient functioning of public administration and inclusion of all citizens in the organization of public life are of particular importance. In Estonia, too, modern ICT solutions developed and used both by the public and private sector give reason to regard the development of the information society as a strategic choice.

A practical example of this new era is the Internet. According to recent study of all people in age 16-64 years have used the computer and 80% of people have used the Internet. In less than a decade internet use in Estonia has become as essential and natural. Estonia is one of the most ‘internetted’ countries in Eastern Europe. This opening up to globalization in one specific sector has immensely contributed to the overall rapid development of Estonia. Men and women used computers almost equally. Most common was the use of computers and the Internet among pupils and students; practically all of them used computers and the Internet. The computer and the Internet were mostly used at home, and depending on the age and educational level, also at work or

The high level of Internet use in Estonia is largely correlated to the early adoption of the Internet in the research and higher education sector and the existence of a developed telecommunications network. All Estonian schools are connected to the Internet. School children are above-average users of the Internet.

The research of Urmas Varblane, Tõnis Mets and others from Tartu University has shown that the influx of foreign capital has not significantly improved the influx of new technological know-how and raised the pace in the growth of added value. Estonia has some examples of successful know-how business in Estonia like Skype, Playtech, Microlink, Regio etc. There are good examples that economic success does not depend on state subsidies and artificial protection of “national champions”. But unfortunately in those examples the business models of foreign owners have been more successful than business conceptions of domestic entrepreneurs. This fact brings up a question of innovation ability of Estonian enterprises and of Estonian society at large. High innovation ability exists only together with learning ability.

Varblane and Mets are sure that in a true market economy, companies can and should take care of themselves. The key factors are access to qualified labour, developed financial systems and good infrastructure. This sounds like opposition to those who speak about support of national economy by the state.

Here we should ask how Estonia has managed to accomplish the Lisbon Strategy instructions in reality, and within such a short period (only three years!). This is why we should know development ability of all the society – on the one hand – to merge a new developmental ideas mechanism into the social life, and on the other hand to improve the ability of all members of society to learn and train continuously as professionals (life long learning).

This future vision has been elaborated in national development plans: Sustainable Estonia 21 and Knowledge Based Estonia 2007-2013. At its meeting on 19 October 2006, the Estonian government approved the enterprise policy: Development plan for the years 2007-2013. The development plan primarily deals with promoting knowledge based enterprise and enterprise creating a lot of added-value, spokespeople for the government said. Estonia’s enterprise policy for the period until 2013 embraces four main fields of activity:
development of the skills and know-how of managers and workers for focusing more on value-creating activities, promoting investments to implement modern and innovative technologies, support for globalization to improve Estonian companies’ export capacity, and possibilities of offering wider freedoms and opportunities to entrepreneurs through a better legal environment.

So, on state level several national plans are worked out. Partly they are created to counterbalance the international (global) economic impact. On one hand these are concrete measures to protect and to develop national economy. On the other hand, in these strategic papers discussion concerning the influence of global factors on Estonian society is minimal.

Tarmo Pihl, national expert for European Union Information Society Technologies (IST) and member of the Programme Committee and national delegate to the EU eContentplus programme, together with Marek Tiits and Tarmo Kalvet have analysed Estonian ITC sector innovations (2002). Tiits and Kalvet stated that Estonia alone is unable to gain the critical mass needed to access international markets, support technology standardisation activities or even to attract the best people world-wide with the specific knowledge needed. International research and technology development cooperation is therefore essential in gaining experience and skills, in adopting innovative solutions to the market needs, and for obtaining more market power via strategic alliances. Estonian accession to the European RTD programmes opened a completely new perspective for research and technology development in Estonia. Estonia had 75 project proposals in the European Commission IST programme by June 2001. However, the Estonian participation success rate is only 17%, while the programme average is 25%. The majority of failures with the project proposals are caused by low scientific and technological quality, low innovation and weak exploitation plans, and come from weak strategic planning and innovation management.

Currently the situation in the European Union candidate countries is that both R&D expenditure and average productivity are still much lower than the average within the EU. Trade, transport and communication, financial and business services are the most productive sectors within the candidate countries’ economies, where labour productivity has reached 66% of the EU level.16

In view of globalization and worldwide markets, in recent years Estonia has lost its relative position in exporting medium and high value added goods. As value added has slightly increased, the share of medium and high tech goods in total exports has diminished considerably. Still, it is not due to the fact that Estonia has small market. Today’s innovation hotspots such as Finland, Taiwan, and Singapore are all small countries. The essence is to be able to position oneself right onto emerging technology curves, which provide future markets and generate far more wealth than traditional industries.

Concerning Estonia’s future authors see basically several scenarios that could be followed. Either to be the periphery to Scandinavia, with favourable tax base, sufficient investments into education and advantageous cost level, or focus on upgrading traditional industries, at the same time developing capacity in rising economic areas such as nanotechnology and biotechnology. Alternatively, it is possible to focus primarily on new paradigm led industries and apply active industrial policy.

Despite some success in applying new technologies, Estonian economic development seems to be diverging from the goals of Lisbon Strategy. Regarding this, stronger and more specific innovation policy measures are needed characterized by focusing on entrepreneurs, upgrading of the quality of foreign direct investments and stronger policy co-ordination.

Up to now, the ‘low tax’ scenario has been followed, where the low tax base has attracted investments from Scandinavia. However, the structure of those investments has preferred traditional industries and has not facilitated an upsurge of innovation activity. This has become a common realization and therefore more and more discussions about feasible innovation policy, where the state’s role is to stimulate innovation and share R&D risks with research community on a consistent basis, have taken place.

According to EU the new financial perspectives, investments in innovation activity are expected to rise 2-3 times, however there is still not clear picture about the implementation opportunities. It will take a relatively long time to design national sector specific programmes, which might be the best option for small economy, where some sort of selection has to be made – one cannot be good at everything. So, to sum up, strong innovation policy is still missing, although one might witness a gradual shift towards something we can actually refer to as innovation policy.

The policy of unification is, however, seriously counteracted by the globalization of the economy. Investments tend to flow out of countries with high social costs and rising wages, and head for the cheaper countries, far away from Europe. Counterbalancing that tendency can only be the promotion of infrastructure and education in the country. It is the former socialist countries, including Estonia, that are facing a serious dilemma: how to enhance the quality of life, the degree of equality and solidarity of citizens, in a way which would preserve the motivation for rapid economic growth. The last paragraph was written in 1998. We can ask today – more than 10 year later – what has changed? This dilemma is more pertinent than ever before.

The E-Governance Academy was created in 2002 as a non-profit organisation for the development and analysis of e-democracy. The institution was established to transfer knowledge to top policy-makers and Information and Communication Technologies specialists in developing nations. The Academy provides a platform for analysing and systematizing

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Both international and domestic experience into forms of knowledge that can be transferred to those interested both in Estonia and abroad. When looking at the competitiveness of the Estonian economy at large it is evident that important challenges lie ahead, reflected also in the European Union’s Lisbon Strategy.

2.6. Debates with western analysts

Well known visionaries of the world’s future like Francis Fukuyama, Samuel P. Huntington, Pierre Bourdieu, Ulrich Beck, George Soros, Joseph Stiglitz, Jeremy Rifkin, Manuel Castells, Zygmunt Bauman, David C. Korten are known above all to Estonian intellectuals. Several works by these authors are translated into Estonian and published by Estonian publishing companies, and also as articles in newspapers. Francis Fukuyama and Samuel P. Huntington have made presentations at international seminars in Estonia which discussed world economic trends and problems.

Although, prominent western books and opinions are considered rather often as final truth for Estonia, which are useful just to take into account but not to discuss. Only few debates are held with distinguished conference guests. For example, in July 2000 well known Susan George, author of the book “Lugano Report”, visited Estonia. She made presentation at the conference and later gave an interview to a local newspaper. In this interview she said: “A small nation-state should participate in this process in a highly selective way and on its own terms since it will not be much of a match for the trans-national corporations and the organisations they use, like the WTO, to impose their rules. I would recommend concentrating on supplying locally as many needs of the population as possible, particularly helping small farmers to produce healthy food at reasonable prices, plus high investments in health, education and technology infrastructure [internet, communications]. This is not the same as “protectionism” or abstaining from trade—it does mean trading selectively and not orientating one’s economy towards exports to the detriment of local needs”.

There are few spheres where the concept of globalization has got exceptionally negative meaning. One of these is criminal sphere, for example human trafficking. A journalist of the Estonian daily, Kristi Pent, wrote for example, an article ‘Human trafficking – rude global business’ (21.06.05). This kind of global business as well as drugs business reached Estonia relatively recently but very quickly.

It is interesting to mention that word ‘globalization’ – in Estonian very similar ‘globaliseerumine’ was used in Estonian language long time as a direct loan from English word. Discussion about the content of this word caused a new Estonian origin word ‘yleilmastumine’. But the discussion was only between linguists and considered only aspects of Estonian linguistic development. In general, we can say that globalization as a process is not a very popular topic of public debate in Estonia today. Although, when some aspects

of this process are discussed then positive aspects of the globalization are prevalently ana-
lysed. Until people in Estonia are affected by the more dangerous aspects of global proc-
esses, this positive disposition will be defining for years to come.

3. ANALYSIS BY THEMES OF THE SURVEY ON ESTONIA

In this survey two groups of respondents were studied: 1) age group 16-29 and 2) age
group 30-50 years.

3.1. Qualities that children can be encouraged to learn at home

These qualities were listed in the questionnaire as follows: independence, hard work, respons-
sibility and entrepreneurship. Respondents were asked to indicate how important they con-
sider these qualities to be.

For young Estonians (16-29 years age group) the most important quality was respon-
sibility (average value 6,66 by 7-item scale) and second important was hard work (average
6,06). Another two qualities are also quite highly evaluated: entrepreneurship (5,78) and
independence (5,8).

Comparing the answers of two Estonian age groups we did not find essential differences
in opinions of younger and elder groups concerning qualities that children should learn
at home. Younger group of respondents (16-29) evaluates hard work little more than elder
group (difference between averages is 0,21). We can say that two generations (younger and
elder) have given quite the same evaluation rates concerning the named qualities.

A different picture emerges if we have a look at the evaluation of these qualities (entre-
preneurship and hard work) by other countries young people. For Estonians entrepreneurship
as a personal quality is much more evaluated than for young people from other countries.
Difference in opinions for this indicator of two groups is 0,97. Opinion about hard work given
by young Estonians is also significantly higher. It is worth mentioning that also in compar-
ison to older respondents groups we can see the same trend – higher scores are given by
Estonian respondents. For example, for the quality entrepreneurship the difference between
Estonian and reference sample is 0,67 and for quality hard work difference is 0,46.

It obvious that all Estonian respondents evaluate entrepreneurship and hard work signifi-
cantly higher than respondents from other countries. Moreover, the Estonian youth group
has a higher opinion about all four qualities (independence, responsibility, hard work and entre-
preneurship) compared to all other reference groups.

This result can be interpreted as an indicator of a quite stable and traditional home
education in Estonia. In general, during last fifteen years no substantial revaluation
happened concerning those personal values as entrepreneurship, hard work, responsibility and independence.

3.2. Respondent’s identity dimensions

Four questions were asked to measure and define the respondent’s identity. It was interesting to compare the assessment of four distinct dimensions: ethnic and cultural (language) factor and nationality on one hand; local community identity and European identity on the other hand. The composition of respondents’ answers is very interesting (see Fig. 1). The Estonian young age group (16-29) stresses more often the importance of the Estonian language as a factor, which determines largely their identity. Average score for language is 5.10 on 7-item scale. Comparing young respondents from Estonia and other countries the difference is 0.58 and comparing young Estonians with the older age group from other countries, the difference is 0.63.

The Estonian younger and older group answers indicate that difference in opinion between these two groups of respondents is much smaller but still – 0.19. It is very interesting result that young Estonians think that language is more important factor defining their identity than this is for Estonian older generation.

Nationality as a factor of identity is also quite important. Two Estonian groups: respondents from the younger and older group both evaluate nationality relatively high (mean values are respectively 4.41 and 4.39). Difference of mean values between two Estonian groups is practically non-existent (0.01).\(^1\)

\(^1\) It is important to notice that in Estonian language nationality (“rahvus”) has meaning of ethnical origin.
The reference sample of the Estonian young respondents’ group estimated also language as most important factor defining their identity. The hierarchy of other factors is also the same: nationality, local community and European identity. The difference between Estonian young age group and reference sample age group shows following differences according to mean values: 0.49 with the same age group and 0.48 with elder (30-50 years old) group.

The other two factors – local community and European identity as factors of Estonian respondents’ identity – are less evaluated by young respondents compared to language and nationality issues. If 16-29 years old respondents’ mean value score to language was 5.09, then average result for European identity was 3.70.

These results show that Estonian identity formation is still quite traditional, one can say even quite conservative. Estonian people’s ethnical self-definition has always traditionally based on Estonian language and culture. This is surprising that the language is especially significant for the younger generation, which is usually more open to identity change (Kirch, Kirch, 2001:141).

It is worth mentioning also that European identity is a more important factor for identity of Estonians than for the reference sample from other countries (mean value is 0.24 points...
higher for young Estonian group). Comparing two Estonian age groups we can see that for younger people European identity is a slightly more evaluated.

What is the reason for strengthening lingual-cultural identity on one hand and forming European identity on the other hand? Could this be satisfaction with different aspects of Estonian life? The answer to this question we can partly find in the following analysis.

In the third paragraph of the study the following questions were asked: how satisfied or discontent are respondents with listed personal aspects of life – *life as whole, finances, work* and *general situation in respondents’ country*. In general answers to all options given by respondents were relatively modest and similar: average opinion about all four aspects of life was between 3,4 and 4,8 scale points (7-item scale). The mean value for indicator *life as a whole* was highest and satisfaction with general situation in respondent’s country was the lowest.

Again we see that Estonian young group of respondents differs in some aspects. They are more satisfied with whole life than elder group. Estonian young people are more content also with their *finances* and with *work* (compared with reference group from other country respectively +0,34 and + 0,24). The *general situation* in Estonia is also estimated by Estonians more positively than by the reference group (+0,44). Estonian 16-29 years old group estimates their work situation also better than Estonian elder group does. The most visible difference (0,58) is between Estonian youth group and older group from other countries.

Estonian respondents educated on university level express relatively high optimism towards working environment (mean value 4,73). Satisfaction with whole life: Estonian’s group mean value is 4,93 versus reference group’s 5,00.

Estonia’s GDP per capita is still one of the smallest among European Union member states (about 64% of EU average), although, rapid economic development especially since the beginning of this century is real reason of the optimism of young people.

According to the data of 2003, Estonia’s indicators of economic growth and contentment with life were among the lowest compared to the other new accession countries. However, during the last couple of years, (see Figure 2) Estonia’s position has improved significantly and the country’s GDP per capita already exceeds that of Poland and Slovakia.
3.3. Statements concerning the personal and society’s future

These questions were about society, about people, and about respondents’ personal feelings concerning the future. Estonian young people have extra positive attitudes towards their and country’s future. The young Estonians’ group compared to the reference group has given to all statements higher mean values. Estonian young people see personal future as ‘bright’ more often as people in other countries (mean value by 7-item scale is 5,18). Mean value for the statement ‘my future looks bright’ is 0.7 points higher than reference groups’ mean value. But Estonians see society’s future also more often bright as reference sample does (difference is 0,85).

It is an interesting result that both groups – young Estonians as well as young people in selected EU countries gave the most favourable opinion to the statement ‘our society could really use a common goal to work for’. We could see this as a base for people’s increasing solidarity in Europe. This is also similar for two groups that personal life looks more often bright than society’s future.

People with secondary and university education agree more often with the statement ‘my future looks bright’ than people with primary education. Compared with reference sample abroad Estonian young people with university education are relatively more optimistic (mean value by 7-item scale is 5,18). Estonian respondents with university education feel quite assured that they will have good job in the future. Concerning opinion about society’s
future men are more optimistic than women. Concerning the older groups of respondents the picture is as follows: the Estonian older cohort’s mean value is lower (-0,32) and difference with older cohort from other countries is even lower (-0,81).

Figure 3. What extent do you agree with the following statements?

These results – overall optimism of Estonian respondents concerning the future – could be interpreted as a result of rapid economic growth, as was mentioned.

Here we give more information about the changes of social background in recent years. For the last three years Estonia’s GDP has grown ca 25%, including growth in 2006, which was 11%. According to recently published Eurostat prognosis by GDP, Estonia could reach Portugal and will probably be second after Slovenia among Eastern-European countries in 2008.

Future perspectives are closely related to the employment situation. Concerning the labour market situation we can add that the unemployment rate is today the lowest during all years of the independence period (4-5% from all working age population). The unemployment rate has decreased since 2001, but in last two years the decrease was especially rapid. If in the 3rd quarter of 2004 the unemployment rate still reached 10% then in the 3rd quarter of the current year it was nearly half that rate. Compared to the 3rd quarter of 2005 the number of employed persons increased by 6.2%. The employment increased in all regions, the most in North-East Estonia (18%), where Russians and other national
minorities (about 90% in 3 cities – Narva, Sillamäe and Kohtla-Järve) live. The number of employed persons increased mainly on account of the employment growth in the services sector. In the industrial sector employment increased only in construction where 21% more persons were employed than in the same quarter a year ago. Compared to the situation in 2005 the employment increased due to the decrease of unemployment as well as due to the decrease of inactivity.

According to the data of the Estonian Labour Force Survey in the 3rd quarter of 2006, 37,000 of the population aged 15–74 were unemployed and 363,000 were economically inactive (students, retired persons, homemakers, discouraged persons etc.). The number of unemployed persons was 9,000 and the number of inactive persons 29,000 smaller than a year ago.

**Figure 4. Unemployment rate, 1st quarter 2000 – 3rd quarter 2006 in Estonia**

![Unemployment rate graph]

*Source: data from the homepage of Estonian Statistical Board: compiled (22.11.2006) by Ülle Pettai.*

The new social innovation process in labour affairs in Estonia is visible: activation of employment of Russian young people. There were two important factors that foster the process. One of these was the Unemployment Act which was renewed (became effective in 2006). Second was creation of activation centres for unemployed persons. Last action was focused for unemployed Russian-speaking people amongst others. In 2004 there were established training centres for unemployed people in Tallinn and Jõhvi, which are regions with notable non-Estonian population. During couple of years a network for social integration of non-Estonian unemployed young people was created. The training courses consist of extra state language studies and working practice in companies. Due to these training courses Russian-speaking young people have the opportunity to update their working skills and to practice the state language.

State support for training in a new profession has been carried out by means of European Structural Funds. All this activity has changes employers’ attitudes towards newly trained
young people. Those who have passed the Labour Department training courses have now a good position in the labour market. Altogether, adaptation to labour market needs, improvement of knowledge of state language, offering stable working position – these have been values of the of the EU Social policy.

Estonian social policy that is targeted on employment and activation of the labour market should set up an aim about turning youth into Estonian patriots through modernisation of labour environment. Our analysis showed that active employment policy and interference in the labour market processes may raise positive shifts in employment sphere. Study results of sociological studies of unemployed youth (May 2006 in Tallinn and Ida-Virumaa county) show the equality of positions of non-Estonians and Estonians and similar satisfaction with their lives in general (see Kirch and others, 2006).

High motivation for personal achievement is characteristic of Estonian young people, especially for young men. Relatively many people consider it important to achieve a better material living standard than their parents. Estonian young respondents’ mean value to this indicator was 4.86 by 7-item scale. The reference sample’s mean value was 3.89 – difference is 0.97, which is quite significant. The differences in motives of personal achievements are significant also if to compare Estonian young sample with both older age groups. The difference with Estonian older cohort is 0.43; difference with of all other countries’ older cohort is 1.07.

This result is similar to study of Marju Lauristin and her research group from University of Tartu. They showed that trust of Estonian young generation in welfare state coming in the near future is very strong. Their life is concentrated to the economic sphere, they see positioning in society as big competition (Lauristin, 2004: 252).

Marju Lauristin and her associate scholars from Tartu University revealed a very high level of self-confidence of Estonian students. Majority (59%) of the youngest group of 15-19 years old respondents (this was 9% of the total sample of 1470 people) positioned themselves into the higher strata in Estonian society (levels 6-10) (Lauristin, 2004: 261). Majority (58%) of them had also significant or very strong consumerist orientations. There were some differences between the younger and the other age groups. Young people appreciated individual values more and social values less than the other age groups.

The Eurobarometer 66 study that was carried out in autumn 2006 show also that among countries that integrated European Union in 2004 Estonian people are one of the most optimistic among all EU people. Estonian people show optimism towards the European Union future as well as they believe in their own positive future and in continuing economical success (Eurobarometer).
3.4. How much people feel common with other cultures, values, lifestyles?

This block of questions tries to characterise commonality and similarity with people from own country, with people from the neighbouring countries and with all Europeans in general.

One of results of the globalization process is emerging new communication networks between different people (very often from different countries). Perceived similarity regarding culture, values and lifestyle is of utmost importance in this process.

Common culture, values and lifestyle with ‘fellow countrymen’ is perceived in Estonia on the level of 4.35 by 7-item scale. Compared to reference cohort the difference between Estonian and other group is not significant. Mean value given to the indicator ‘people from neighbouring countries’ is 3.89 which is almost same as for reference sample.

Concerning feeling about commonness with Europeans: the difference of opinions here is much bigger. Estonian young age group’s mean result for commonness with Europeans is 0.28 points higher than reference samples’ one. Young people with university education feel that they have common culture, values and lifestyle with more groups than others. Their evaluation of this indicator is significantly higher towards ‘fellow countrymen’ as well as towards people from ‘neighbouring countries’. Better educated young people (secondary and university education) are more empathetic towards fellow. Differences between age groups are relatively insignificant.

3.5. Characteristics of ideal future society

Respondents had to choose between country or city life; low taxes or strong welfare system; change or tradition and stability. In addition they had to give their opinion if native citizens and immigrants should have equal or different opportunities in society and choose between two options: free trade and global competition or protection of national industry.

At first glance it seems that problems of taxation and welfare system or questions about the protection of national industry are new for Estonian people and they do not have ready answers to these problems. The answers of respondents seem to be contradictory: some liberal opinions together with more conservative answers.

The attitude toward immigrants in Estonia is not a simple problem to describe. For historical reasons the share of immigrant population is very big (approximately 25%). Most of these Soviet period immigrants are Russian-speaking Slavs (Russians, Ukrainians, Byelorussians). Most of these people do not speak fluent Estonian and they still have Russian schools, media and other cultural institutions. This is main reason why some Estonians have critical opinions of immigrant groups and are sceptical about equal opportunities of native citizens and immigrants.
Figure 5. What characterises your ideal future society?


Age group 16-29 gives 0,69 points more than their reference sample in other countries in favour of different opportunities for immigrants. But we can see positive change if to compare their opinion with age group 30-50. For this group mean value is 0,74 points higher.

Relatively big surprise is the admiration of a strong welfare system by young people. Their given opinion is much higher compared to other countries respondents. Mean value to strong welfare system is 0,60 scale points higher than mean value of other countries reference sample. Difference with older people is even bigger (0,63).

The reason why Estonian young people appreciate strong social system could be quite simple. Estonia has a very weak social protection system and young people want improvement of this system. The most important expectation is of a better social protection for young (16-29) people with university education.

Attitudes towards free trade and global competition versus protection of national economy are expected to be very liberal. The difference between young age group (16-29) and older age group (30-50) is visible.
If Estonian young group’s mean value to free trade indicator was 3.96 then the same indicator for age group 30-50 this result was 4.40 (difference 0.44). Most liberal towards free trade and global competition are people with higher education. This result shows that the young Estonian generation is in favour of free trade and sceptical about protection of national industry.

There were no significant differences between Estonians and other groups in comparison of results by indicator ‘tradition and stability or change’.

In conclusion we can say that Estonian young generation is a ‘city generation’, wants a better social system and evaluates free trade more than the older generation. Older respondents from other EU countries evaluate much more country life (difference is 0.451) than young Estonians.

3.6. To what extent people trust groups and institutions in society?

It is surprising that Estonian people who are the most secular according to some other studies (Eurobarometer 66) trust even more (33%) religious organisations. According to the Eurobarometer study there is only 20-25% of people who belong to some church community in Estonia.

Compared to the position of the UN, the police and justice system and WTO – young people trust somewhat less the national government and media. Although, the Estonian young generation trusts these institutions more than the reference group.

In general, international and local institutions have got average prestige for Estonian young people. It is interesting to add that Estonian age cohorts have quite similar opinion towards trust of institutions, which means that there are the smallest differences between the two Estonian generations in this respect.
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### 3.7. Free university education

The question “Does everybody should have the right to a free university education?” is very sensitive for Estonian young people because approximately half of students in Estonia study in private universities and secondary schools or in public schools for their
own expense. For example during 1998-2003 number of students increased 2,5 times (14,600 students) but in public schools in state financed places only 1 percent (200 students). All together there is 47,100 students in all academic branch universities and plus more as 18,500 students in applied higher education branch (Kirch, 2005: 186).

All students can take a study loan. After graduation many students prefer to go for better job conditions to abroad. Brain drain is only one of the consequences of this situation. Therefore this is understandable that a very big part of young people appreciate the opportunity for free higher education. Mean value for this indicator is 6,01 by 7-item scale, which is 0,39 points higher than for reference sample. Compared to the older Estonian generation, young generations are more in favour of free education. Comparing the young Estonian group with the older age group from other countries we see a difference of 0,509.

Better education and better work place in the future are very important motivators for Estonians and others. As you see from last result of Estonian Social Survey (Sept 2006, on Figures 7a and 7b) in Estonia there is no disparity between young Estonian and Russian people’s educational level.

**Figure 7a. Education level among Estonian aged 16-35, Estonian Social Survey (%)**
3.8. Understanding what globalization means

Principally, the process of globalization means for people quite similar issues: this is more trade between countries, increased opportunities for national companies, increased mobility between countries, greater emphasis on research and development and life-long learning. Both Estonian age groups gave to named features of globalization stronger evaluation than both reference groups. There are issues that all respondents’ samples agreed to be less related to globalization: threat to employment to respondents’ country, lower prices of goods and services, increased European solidarity.
Figure 8. The meanings of “globalization”

- A threat to employment in my country
- Lower prices of goods and services
- Increased European solidarity
- Weakened national identities
- Common rules and regulations worldwide
- Welfare system becoming more similar in different countries
- New opportunities for me
- Greater cultural exchange and mutual understanding
- A greater emphasis on research and development and life-long learning
- Increased mobility between EU countries
- Increased opportunities for national companies
- More trade between countries


Estonians have not seen practically how globalization could influence the prices of goods and services and lead to their lowering, because the period of free trade and the free market has been too short. During the transition period goods and services have often become more expensive despite the free market. Therefore they could estimate this issue less related to globalization than their reference sample do. It is interesting that all four groups of respondents do not see globalization as a big threat to employment.

In general we can say that Estonians see globalization more idealistically. They connect more possible good opportunities with globalization than reference groups. For example, increasing cooperation in research and development, increasing opportunities for national companies and for persons are considered to be results of globalization. The difference between given answers for indicator ‘new opportunities for me’ between two young peoples’ groups is 0.61. Estonians believe that through globalization the welfare system could become more similar to that of other countries (for Estonians this means more social benefits and better social security system through homogenisation of welfare systems).
Although, there is one threat which Estonians estimate bigger than other respondents do – this is *weakening national identities*. Both Estonian age cohorts are sensitive about negative impact of globalization on national identity. Difference between two younger groups is 0.477.

### 3.9. Regulators of globalization

From the listed nine players, which could probably have influence on the regulation of globalization, respondents choose following: multinational companies, European Union and World Trade Organisation as most influential factors. 16-29 years old Estonians appointed a role of media as one of the most important (5.02), the reference group’s estimation is significantly lower (4.41). This result could be explained by increasing role of media in Estonian inner political situation. Many people believe that if the role of government is weaker the media will get a role of ‘fourth power’ in the country.

*Figure 9. Which of the following players have the greatest influence on the globalization?*

![Bar chart showing the perceived influence of different players on globalization]


Estonians see also role of United Nations and role of social movements and trade unions as somewhat larger than respondents form other countries.
Both Estonian age groups gave a much higher role in the globalization process to people in general (difference between young Estonian sample and elder sample of respondents from other countries is biggest : 1,00). Especially young Estonians think that people themselves play important role in globalization.

There is only one aspect where Estonian groups’ opinion is lower than opinion of the reference groups. This is the role of the national government. Estonians see the role of government as less important in the regulation of globalization. This opinion (that Estonian government does not make enough effort to regulate globalization, thus most important players are multinational companies, European Union and WTO) reflects quite realistically the contemporary circumstances. Before accession with European Union a lot of Estonian legislation was adopted and existing legislation was changed with references to EU law.

Although, in general we can say that Estonians see international companies and organisations as bigger regulators of globalization than local institutions: police and justice system (mean value 3,58), NGO-s (3,86) and the government (3,70).

3.10. Greatest threats to the society of the future

In general all respondents see quite similar main threats to the society of the future. The danger caused by threats named in the questionnaire is seen in quite black tones: mean values of respondents’ answers are between 4,4 and 6,1 by 7-item scale. The highest threat for everyone is environmental pollution (mean values between 5,920 - 6,126).

Danger caused by terrorism is especially important for older respondents’ cohorts (for Estonians 5,81, for the reference sample 5,49). War is a real threat in contemporary world for very many people in Europe – this is very important result. This threat was more often mentioned by older Estonians.

This is very interesting that Estonian people see threat of unemployment and poverty as less dangerous than respondents from other countries. At the same time organised crime, aids and pandemics, drug abuse if much bigger threat according to opinion of Estonian people. For example about drug abuse young Estonian generation has 0,81 scale points higher opinion than their reference sample. Also about aids and pandemics people are more threatened in Estonia (differences between reference groups are 0,52 and 0,57).

The biggest differences between opinion of Estonian groups and the reference groups are regarding the question of drug abuse. In Estonia drug abuse is considered third in hierarchy of all threats to the society of the future.

In general we can say that Estonian people are quite worried concerning future threats. However, respondents’ answers reflect very realistically Estonian problems. There have been some big environmental accidents recently with oil tankers in Baltic Sea and forest
fires that make the danger of pollution very realistic. There is also discussion about the gas pipe in the Baltic Sea serving as a connection Russia and Germany. This has probably made people more cautious.

**Figure 10. What are the greatest threats to the society of the future?**

It is worth mentioning that unemployment and the probable collapse of the financial system are seen as relatively unimportant threats in the future (compared to others). Although, Estonian daily newspapers write almost every day about overheated economy and rapid increase of amount of personal bank loans. Especially optimistic is, once again, young Estonian generation towards their employment future.

### 3.11. Respondents’ international experience

Questions “how much people are travelled abroad, studied abroad and worked abroad?” show very homogenous picture. Only significant difference concerning studied samples is between two Estonian age groups. Almost all people have travelled abroad, much less people are worked abroad and only few of Estonians have studied abroad. Estonian older age group had no possibilities to study abroad and therefore the difference between mean values of two age groups is statistically significant (0.11).
Other comparisons show us that Estonians have travelled, studied and worked abroad approximately as often as reference group respondents. People with university education have travelled and studied abroad more than Estonians in general.

The share of young people who have studied abroad could be smaller because students after graduating university abroad do not return to Estonia but prefer working abroad to pay back the study loan. Very often they stay abroad for a long time. Quite many young people have still experience of studies and working abroad if to take into account that better conditions for this were opened only after Estonia joined European Union.

3.12. Important aspects of the future career

Expectations towards future career of respondents were asked through three aspects: employment security in the future, to travel and work all over the world and independent work.

Figure 11. How important are the following aspects of your future career?

All named aspects are relatively important for respondent groups, but most important is employment security (Estonian mean value 6.19). Independent work is evaluated and is a more important aspect of future career for by the older age group of Estonians. Estonian groups evaluate also the opportunity to travel and work all over the world, this is especially highly estimated by Estonian young age group. This means a greater readiness by
this age group to take a chance, and a higher level of work mobility compared with other groups. The difference of mean values of 16-29 years age group with the reference group is quite significant – 0.60.

The overall tendency is that women appreciate *work security* more than men, which is the result of analysis of all samples. Difference between Estonian men and women is 0.387. It is worth to mention that education of respondent does not influence much on results.

In general we can say that Estonian young people are quite oriented to independent and mobile workplaces.

Analysis of the answers to the question about *preferences in future living environment* show, that Estonian young people would prefer better working opportunities even when poor living conditions are inevitable.

Answers to the question *where respondents would like to live* shows that most of questioned people prefer living in their country or live abroad for period and then return home. In general very few young people plan to live most of their lives abroad (mean value 2.601 by 7-item scale). Estonian women are slightly more oriented to live in the same country or in the same town. Young people with primary education prefer slightly more living abroad, mean value of this group is 2.84 and mean value of young people with higher education is 2.45.

**Figure 12. Place where Respondents would like to live**

![Image of bar chart showing preferences for living environments](image)

Young generations from other countries showed more interest for living most of their life abroad. (Difference between two 16-29 years respondents’ samples mean values is 0.26). Estonian elder generation seems to be more conservative concerning moving abroad and living there for long time. Estonian young people showed slightly stronger wish to return home after being abroad for periods than other groups.

The majority of all respondents do not plan to move abroad in the next 15 years. About 12.5% of Estonian young generation versus 18% of reference sample would like to move abroad in next 15 years. Among older Estonians this percentage is twice as less. The bigger difference is between the opinion of men and women (women are more interested in leaving). The reason for this is that women in age group 40-50 are not as successful in finding jobs. At this age women get also lower salaries compared to men in Estonia.

The question as to what extent people are interested in politics and environment and sustainable development gave interesting results. In general both Estonian respondent groups are less interested in politics and more interested in environment issues and sustainable development. The mean value on environment issues is 4.90 for young people’s sample, which is more than average on a 7-item scale. Reference age group (16-29 from other countries) estimated environmental issues less (4.43). Men and people with university education are in general slightly more interested in politics than women and less educated people. Mean value to interest about politics is 3.21 (young respondents).

Older Estonian people are also not very interested in politics (mean value 3.28) their reference sample (from other countries) showed a little more interest to this issue (3.46). Interest towards environment and sustainable future is significantly higher in the younger Estonian generation; the difference between reference group is 0.46 in favour of Estonian respondents.

In general we can say that Estonian people less interested in politics than in environment and sustainable development issues. As the Estonian environment is principally even in better conditions than average environmental situation in Europe then we can say that Estonians’ ethics and consciousness about environmental issues is quite high.

3.13. Estonians and their consumption behaviors

According to the results showed in a chart we can say that Estonians (both age samples) do not think about preferring European produced goods and protection of European jobs as much as citizens of other countries do. We may conclude that for Estonians this kind of consumer behaviour is not proposed nor accepted. For most Estonians it is still more important to buy cheaper goods and services than to look at the place of production or to see behind this opportunity to protect European jobs.
Figure 13. What are your views on consumption?


Only if we compare young Estonian (16-29) men and women we can see that men prefer more to buy European produced goods and they probably think about European jobs more than women do (difference between men and woman group is 0.49 in favour of men).

It is interesting that comparison of other two indicators – *buy goods from companies that are environmentally friendly*; and *buy goods from companies that are ethical and take social responsibility* – did not show significant differences between generations and between Estonians and reference groups. Only if we compare Estonian young (16-29) we can see that they prefer more as reference group to buy goods from companies that are ethical and take social responsibility.

Efficient cooperation between Estonians and other nations in the context of the European Union could be more productive in the framework of a common scope of international institutions, in the broader European context. The status of European citizenship should help form a valued national identity for Estonians and Russians and other ethnic minority groups, very likely influenced by European values. In their everyday life people place more and more value on modern arrangements and post-industrial values, which have created a certain contradiction between their identity structure archetypes and these new values. These new opportunities create the ground for the reception of the new set of European values. According to our analysis, we can conclude that Estonian society has reached the phase where increasing international communication and economic and cultural ties have initiated a strong shift towards the creation of a new “borderless” identity.
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HOW DO SPANIARDS FACE GLOBALIZATION? A QUALITATIVE STUDY ON INDIVIDUAL ATTITUDES TOWARDS GLOBALIZATION

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1. INTRODUCTION

Approaching the study of globalization and how Spaniards and the rest of Europeans understand it is not an easy task for three reasons. First, because there is no frame of reference already established. It is still in the making. As Held and McGrew (2004) state, “within shared traditions of social enquiry, whether neoclassical economics or world systems theory, no singular account of globalization has acquired the status of orthodoxy” (2004:2).

Though there is not a preponderant unified theory of globalization, however, it is possible, for analytical purposes, to set up the world in a weberian ideal-type construction. In that sense, regarding globalization we could say that there are the supporters and the opponents. The supporters, also known as globalists, think that “contemporary globalization is a real and significant historical development” while, the opponents, or the sceptics, affirm that ‘globalization’ is mainly an ideological, social construction with a scarce explanatory value. Could we say that Spanish citizens are more prone to scepticism towards globalization or, on the contrary, they believe that there is something specifically different from this period? To what extent are those views affected by the social strata of the respondents?

The second reason why the study of globalization is not a straightforward enterprise is because of the concept itself. Stated bluntly, what is globalization? How is it defined? Is it a concept mainly linked with the field of the economy or does it include ideas related with issues of national identity, human rights or environment situation? For instance, being conservative, assume that globalization is only related to the economy. How important is job creation, delocalisation, downward pressure on wages, social dumping or the immigration when trying to circumscribe what constitutes globalization? Evidently, if we understand that globalization does not only include economic relations, certain difficulties arise.

If you agree with us until here, allow us to provide the third reason why the study of globalization and how Europeans approach it is not easy work. And the difficulty lays in the concept ‘Europeans’. It implies individuals and every single one has a different way
of obtaining, processing and structuring the available information (Lupia, 1994; Lodge, Steenbergen and Brau, 1995; Popkin, 1991). There is heterogeneity in the different understandings of the concept. Plainly phrased, what Mr. Martínez understands by globalization does not necessarily need to be the same of what Mr. Larsson does. Logically, then, how individuals may judge globalization can vary significantly. However, we may also inquire if there is any difference on how those two individuals understand the concept because of their origins or the environment. Is it any difference understanding globalization term just because Mr. Martínez is Spanish and Mr Larsson is Swedish? Of course, those differences not only have to be inter country but may also happen intra country. Assuming that we had a concrete and established definition of globalization, could we observe any regional differences? What would the origins of those be? Are inhabitants of big cities more likely to support the globalization process than those coming from rural areas?

In sum, we observe three main difficulties in analysing how Spaniards and the other Europeans approach globalization. Given that context, we may question the way to focus the study. Our proposal tackles directly the three problems stated. In the next section, we will focus on the definition debate, hence clarifying one of the problems. After it, ideally we should be able to solve the other difficulties. However, we still need the presentation of our data and our methodology (focus groups). Hence, section three will deal with the technicalities of the research project. Section four will present the views of the Spaniards regarding globalization and its different angles. In section five we present some specific issues not covered in any of the preceding parts that would be helpful to close the discussion on globalization and Spain.

2. THE FIRST DIFFICULTY: THE GLOBALIZATION DEBATE

One of the difficulties of the study of globalization is the division amongst those that think that globalization is a “real and significant historical development”, the globalists, and the sceptics who think that the concept of globalization has little explanatory value. Hence, if there are such different views, it is maybe because both sides interpret globalization differently. In other words, there is a conflict in the definition of the concept. The consequence, then, when we deal with different meanings of the same term is that it has divergent effects or consequences. The goal of this section is to analyze those two different views and to document their effects. Once we complete the different views of the debate, it will be easier to see where the Spanish public opinion stands in relation to globalization.

Although the debate on globalization is on-going, there are some basic characteristics such as flows of trade, capital and people around the world that it is possible to identify. This movement is possible thanks to certain infrastructure such as transportation and certain norms like contracts. But the concept is not only limited to this “stretching of social relations and activities across regions and frontiers” but also to a “significant shift in the spatial reach of social relations and organization towards the interregional or interconti-
ental scale” (Held and McGrew, 2004: 3). This does not mean that what is local becomes of second order in relation to the global, but the local “becomes embedded within more expansive sets of interregional relations and networks of power”. In other words, the local is also affected by what is happening in another context. And if this is the case, it is not as Held and McGrew argue that “the constraints of social time and geographical space, vital coordinates of modern social life, no longer appear to impose insuperable barriers to many forms of social interaction or organization” (2004: 3) but those constraints are less likely to affect modern life. In any case, if we had to adopt a definition, their proposal by which globalization is the “expanding scale, growing magnitude, speeding up and deepening impact of interregional flows and patterns of social interaction” (2004: 4) is the most appropriate.

Firstly, the sceptics consider that the ‘globalization’ concept lacks specificity since globalization cannot be understood as a universal process (Hirst, 1997). If there is no geographical reference, then, the distinction between the global and transnational is not possible. Since there is no clear definition, then the concept becomes so wide that is almost impossible to apply it. Also, when the terms are so broad, they rarely mean anything. Instead of using this term, the sceptics would prefer to use terms such as ‘internationalisation’ –“one in which the principal entities are national economies” (Hirst and Thompson, 1999) or ‘regionalization’.

But the discomfort of the sceptics is not only limited to the issues of definition. Globalization, they argue, is mainly an ideological creation by which the neo-liberal project is justified and it could be simply dismissed. The US plays a major role in globalization since it is at the centre of these processes and its consolidated economic model is the one that the rest of countries should follow. In that sense, for some Marxists, there is no globalization but a new kind of Western imperialism. Realists, on their side consider that globalization only exists as long as the states, the authentic agents of international relations, consider and, in this case, the role of the US is especially relevant. In other words, without the power of the US, this situation would collapse (Gilpin, 1987).

We would also add a third argument to explain the discontent of the sceptics. In a sense, we argue, globalization would serve a similar purpose as the European Union does for some politicians: the perfect excuse used by governments to accommodate the new necessities of international markets. This is, taking unpopular decisions using globalization as the excuse – as they could use the convergence to European standards - to avoid being accountable to citizens: “It is not that I am unable to solve the situation, but the international context forces me to act in such a way” a politician could say to vindicate himself.

We think that the power of our last proposed argument – the perfect excuse- versus the other two presented by the sceptics is that the globalists normally reject the first two and, on the contrary, do not have many problems accepting that one. First of all, globalists argue, globalization can not only be limited to economic relations. Neglecting the linked processes affecting society, culture and politics and only focusing on the financial exchanges would give us a poor picture of the current process our societies are going through. Second, for the globalists,
the globalization process is neither an only Anglo-American way of new Imperialism nor it would only happen as long as the US wish. It also implies a change in the focus of the established socio-economic framework, of the territorial principle and of power. This implies that though we have seen the differences regarding the meaning of globalization, such differences have divergent impact on the consequences. Concretely, the academic debate has been focusing on five key elements widely discussed and of vital importance in our societies and in the political science literature: power, culture, economy, inequality and order. This overview of the debate between the globalists and the sceptics is necessary if we want to understand where the Spanish public opinion stands in the globalization debate and its different angles.

2.1. Power: Does the modern State still rule?

Jointly with the elites and, to a lesser extent the populace, the state has been the main actor for the last 500 years of human History. States have been the main actors in the international arena: they declare wars, sign peace treaties, establish trade agreements, respect rights… The State was first established in Western Europe but it has expanded easily around the globe. Typically, European powers would enter a territory that when they left became a – successful or not - state. Even in cases where the invaders were not states, when they left the invaded became a state. For instance, when the Castilian Empire arrived first to America, there were no States. When the Liberation initiated by Bolivar in 1808 and San Martín in 1812-13, the Spanish state left those previous places they became Venezuela and Argentina, respectively, and had a key effect in the formation of Bolivia, Peru and Chile.

States are not only successful in their relations with other states at international level. More importantly, they play a key role in the lives of their countrymen, since they provide order and they have the monopoly of the use of power. They control all of our lives: States provide us with a birth certificate: they establish the minimum age for children’s attendance in school; if its inhabitants should serve or not in the army and for how long; how the labour market is regulated; how much taxes they will pay; in sum, they even control the amount of children that the couple is allow to have (which implies that at least some of those couples have married); establish the retirement age and the pension that the individual can receive. When one dies, the State issues death certificates. In that regard, it is hardly possible to live in a Western society and not to be affected by state regulation. Because all of those reasons, international and internal, and others, the sceptics may rightly argue that if the states are not more important today than two centuries ago, at least, they are as powerful as they used to be.

Globalists disagree in many grounds. However, for the purposes of this study, we will treat two. First, the state is suffering from an erosion of its sovereignty either from above and from below. On the one hand, international treaties and organizations: EU, NATO, IMF, WTO, MERCOSUR, ASEAN and others’ decisions have more significance in states and citizens’ every day lives. This implies the interaction of a number of important actors and results in multilateralism. On the other hand, from below, some nationalist movements may be tempted to become independence movements and lead to the formation of a state.
themselves, thus eroding the state’s sovereignty. A second argument concerns the role of the state. According to Weber, the state has the legitimate monopoly of the use of violence. Globalists agree in the whole with this definition. The question arises if we leave aside the ‘legitimate’ concept: Are we convinced that the states have the monopoly of violence in front of internationally organized terrorists or drug dealers? Precisely because this is not the case, there is an increase in international cooperation in fighting crime.

From our perspective, both globalists and sceptics have valid arguments. For instance, we may agree with the globalists that the state is suffering a clear erosion of its sovereignty, either from above or from below. But even in this case, the objective of many nationalist movements is precisely becoming a state. If this is the case, then, this is a point which supports the view of the sceptics. If the state is not the most powerful tool that a community has in order to organize themselves, then why would those movements aspire to become it? However, on the issue of security we stand with Held and McGrew when they state: “The paradox and novelty of the globalization of organized violence today is that national security has become a multilateral affair. For the first time in history, the one thing that did most to give modern nation-states a focus and a purpose, and which has always been at the very heart of statehood, can now only be realized effectively if nation-states come together and pool resources, technology intelligence, power and authority (2004: 13).

2.2. Is national culture threatened?

As the reader will deduce, this epigraph is closely linked to the previous one. However, for analytical purposes, we decide to analyze them separately.

Once modern states were set up, nations were formed. Following Gellner (1983), nationalism is the tool states use to create nations. In order to form citizens, states have relied on three main tools: army, bureaucrats and school. Nationalism then is the tool that elites use to link states to nations. In other words, the cement of the nation-state would be the nationalism. Though nation-states are only about two hundred years old, it is undeniable that the organization of cultural life has been organized inside the state boundaries. Because of this, sceptics believe that national identity is still playing a determinant role and there would not be much room for globalization. Another argument, related to something said above, is the resurgence of nationalist movements. The reasons for this recovery may be diverse but, for instance, if we take a look at the Spanish 2004 Parliament elections, we observe that nationalist desires were successful since their parties obtained 30 out of 350 seats (we are excluding the regionalist parties). So in this context, sceptics argue, globalization plays a limited role, if any.

However, globalists disagree. First of all, there is a global popular culture, in which the media plays a capital transmission role, and sometimes what somebody says, writes or draws, for instance, in Denmark has effects all around the globe. Second, and also following Gellner, if nations are constructed, they are neither indestructible nor unable to change. Third, technological changes have provoked that controls to information are hardly effective. Fourth, ideas
flow around the globe and an important part of such communication is done in English. Fifth, corporations would have become “producers and distributors of cultural globalization” (Held and McGrew, 2004: 18). Sixth, national culture is no longer what it used to be when about 10% of the population is made up of immigrants having substantively different origins. It is clear, then, that globalization forces us to redefine the concept of a national citizen.

In our opinion, we think that sceptics raise fair points. The vigour of nationalist movements is the perfect example that globalization may not be very successful as it is portrayed. However, the globalists could argue that it could be the case that because of globalization and the fears that it generates, citizens decide to look back to their nationalist ‘origins’. In any case, it is not a closed debate.

2.3. Is economy really global?

It is in the economic arena that globalization has received the most attention. And it is in this area that more actors perceive that the development of international markets has developed deeper than ever before. This, at the same time, has created a certain frustration since some may perceive that their national economies are not able to control their own fates and they depend even more on the international context. If we accept this argument, globalization today is unprecedented. But is it truly unprecedented?

For instance, Zevin (1992: 43) writes that “while financial markets have certainly tended toward greater openness since the end of the Second World War, they have reached a degree of integration that is neither dramatic nor unprecedented in the larger historical context of several centuries” and in the same line Rodrik argues that “in many ways, today’s world falls short of the level of economic integration reached at the height of the gold standard” (1998:2). Those two quotes would be able to summarize the idea that for some authors “prior to the disruptions of two world wars and the collapse of commodity and financial markets in a global depression, markets were every bit as internationalized as today” (Bordo, Eichengreen and Irwin, 1999: 1). But then, if this is the case, as Bordo, Eichengreen and Irwin question “why did globalization a century ago not create the same dilemmas as now”? (1999:2).

The first argument sceptics use is that there is no globalization but the development of regional blocs. Instead of observing an integrated global economy, there is an increasing concentration of economic activity within three blocs: Europe, Asia-Pacific and the Americas. According to this view, each of these blocs would have its own centre and periphery. And the crystallization of those blocs would be in those formal regional structures like NAFTA and MERCOSUR in America, the EU in Europe and the ASEAN in Asia. Moreover, the second argument is that relations would intensify among the members of those areas but not with the members of the other blocs. In other words the relations that would be taking place would be intra regional bloc but not inter regional bloc. Finally, there is not something that could be labeled as a global economy for other reasons. The first is that even among the OECD countries, the most interconnected of all economies the figures suggest a limited
level of integration (Zevin, 1992; Garret, 1998). Second, Hirst and Thompson (1999) show that it does not exist nor it is emerging a single global economy. And, third, even multinational businesses, despite being implanted around the globe, normally remain linked to their national or regional markets.

The sceptics’ views are again confronted with the globalists’. The first of some of their arguments is to account for the most significant contemporary global economic integration compared to the belle époque, the reference the sceptics use to confront their views regarding economic globalization. For instance, Bordo, Eichengreen and Irwin show that “while production of tradable merchandise constituted a larger share of overall economic activity a century ago, trade played a much smaller role in that production than today” (1999: 4). Moreover, “trade and direct investments have opened up what a century ago were ‘non-traded’ sectors, such as services, retail trade, and public utilities, to international competition” (1999: 4). Hence, trade is more important today. A second argument pointing that we are in a financially integrated context typical of global economy is the contagion effects: the East Asia crash in 1997-98 had effects all over the globe. Finally, on the globalists arguments two of the traditional actors in the economy seem to redefine their roles: employers and employees. The former play a vital role since they exercise “decisive influence over the organization, location and distribution of economic power and resources in the contemporary global economy” (Held and McGrew, 2004: 26). The employees are clearly affected by this new context of the deindustrialization of the OECD countries linked to outsourcing to countries in Asia, Latin America and Eastern Europe. This is a growing concern for many since one could wonder how it will be possible to maintain the high living standards, like former candidate Ross Perot warned regarding NAFTA or, more seriously, the White Paper of the Commission of the European Communities did in 1993 (Krugman and Venables, 1995). In other words, according to this view the situation is a zero sum game: China’s growth will be to the detriment of the West.

As before we accept sceptics as well as globalists points. However we are more inclined to agree with the later because of what Bordo, Eichengreen and Irwin note: “globalization today raises new issues of governance not just because it is conjoined with a political system which gives a louder voice to special interests, but because the economic phenomenon itself is different: integration is deeper and broader than a hundred years ago” (1999:3).

2.4. Does globalization bring inequality?

Though global poverty has diminished in the last fifty years and the welfare of people has increased in almost every region of the world, there are still important inequalities. Here we only refer to economic inequalities but there are also important asymmetries concerning political, social and power opportunities. For the discussion, on inequality for sceptics and globalists is not whether or not there is inequality since both agree that there is. Their disagreement lies in its origins. Also because of the different interpretations, there would be different ways of actions to solve this situation.
For the sceptics, there are irreconcilable conflicts of interests provoking contemporary capitalism a more divided and unequal world. In their view, international capital has not created one global world but it has accentuated global inequalities through the marginalisation – if not exclusion - of most of the Third World countries. Evidently this only increases the growing North-South divide, and it may be understood as a new mode of Western Imperialism. With regard to this situation, there are different possible solutions. The Marxists propose a socialist international order formed by socialist states in order to solve global poverty by wealth redistribution. A pure realist approach suggests quite the contrary to the revolution. For realists, inequality is embedded in the world order structure since there is a hierarchy regarding economic and military power, at least. This hierarchy is vital to maintaining a stable order. If hierarchy is key, it is also the case for inequality. Hence, though keeping global inequalities low may be a moral aspiration, it does not have to be a rational one since it undermines the main basis of international order: stability. The only way, then, to reduce inequality is within the country.

The globalists are also divided. While for the neo-liberals the creation of a single global market will lead to modernization and development, and global inequality as well as poverty are transitional conditions that will fade away when complete globalization is accomplished, for those globalists more linked to the social democratic tradition, economic globalization is responsible for the increasing of the disparities around the planet. In that case, the societies would be divided as: a) winners and losers in the labour force from the economic globalization; b) the marginalization of those that are losers and; c) and the erosion of protection within societies unable or unwilling to pay for the costs of the most vulnerable. Moreover, globalization, because of delocalisation, would be responsible for the growing expansion of poverty in OECD countries. One of their proposed solutions is a new global ethic recognizing ‘a duty of care’ not only inside borders but also beyond them and “a global new deal between rich and poor states” (Held and McGrew, 2004: 30).

From our point of view both perspectives raise fair points. We agree with sceptics that inequality has been a constant in almost all societies and with the globalists that globalization may deepen those inequalities. Our position is perfectly expressed by Amartya Sen stating that “a crucial question concerns the sharing of the potential gains from globalization – between rich and poor countries and among different groups within a country. It is not sufficient to understand that the poor of the world need globalization as much as the rich do; it is also important to make sure that they actually get what they need. This may require extensive institutional reform, even as globalization is defended” (2002: 3).

We have seen that the discussion about globalization is far from being closed. The concept has clear supporters and detractors. As we have studied, the concept itself is multifaceted and it is related to different aspects of our societies. There are still other aspects that could be considered. This discussion, however, has been mainly academic. Is the citizens’ discourse related to the academic or, on the contrary as is normally the case, do they bear little relation to each other?
The following sections reply to this question and analyze what Spaniards think about globalization. First we discuss the methodology used and then we present the results.

3. PERCEPTION AND IMAGE OF THE SPANIARDS ABOUT THE GLOBALIZATION PHENOMENA

3.1. Methodology

In May 2005 the Centre for Sociological Research (CIS Spanish acronym) did a survey on the population of 18 years and over titled “Perception and Image of the Spaniards about the Globalization Phenomena”. The novelty was that CIS decided to include a qualitative study to deepen in the globalization debate, how it is defined and how it affects the life of Spaniards.

The general objectives of the study were to complement the quantitative information of the 2609 CIS Study, known as, “Globalization and International Relations” to understand the discourses and the perceptions of the different social groups about the issues treated in the survey and to map the different perceptions of the globalization process. More specifically, this qualitative study intended to get a more precise picture about i) the ‘exterior’ perception: how do Spaniards perceive the ‘exterior’ world? Are they very interested in what is happening outside? Do they feel linked to other countries? In what way? ii) Globalization and everyday life: what are the changes that globalization has provoked in their lives? Do they perceive it as something close to their lives or it is something distant from their lives? How and who does globalization affect? Are there any generational differences? iii) Subjective globalization definition: how it is the process perceived? Is it new? What is the importance given to the different dimensions of the process (economical, political, social and cultural? iv) Evaluation of the globalization: what is the evaluation of the whole process? Which are the positive aspects of it? And which are the negative ones? Which solutions may be possible for the negative aspects of the globalization? Who wins and who looses in the process? v) Globalization and citizens’ participation: how does its perception affect the participation and mobilization of citizens? What is the level of knowledge and the support for anti-globalization movements? vi) And, finally, what is the role of the state: how has affected in the perception of the citizens the increasing economic internationalization and the growing role of international and supranational political institutions? Such a qualitative study covered a lot of topics, among them are those treated in the second section and it is an invaluable source of information.

In order to obtain answers to all those questions, a qualitative approach is the most suitable. Concretely, focus groups allow us to analyze the predominant discourse of the different social groups involved. The objective, when designing the groups, was to comprehend a sufficiently wide spectrum of the population to include the different points of view on the issues treated. In order to achieve such a result, the most important variables taken into
account were age, gender, habitat, region and educational level that it is not categorical in all groups. In some of them it is determined by the group characteristics.

A brief description of the groups is summarized in table 1:

Table 1. Groups’ description

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Age range</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Specificities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Group 1 Madrid</td>
<td>University students (already studying, or looking for the first job, or with a short working experience (2 years max))</td>
<td>18-25 years</td>
<td>Mixed: 50% women, 50% men.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group 2 Barcelona</td>
<td>Young professionals. They are working with a working experience of 3-7 years in liberal professions, mid or superior technicians, administration or business directives</td>
<td>26-35 years</td>
<td>Mixed: 50% women, 50% men.</td>
<td>University degree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group 3 Badajoz</td>
<td>Professionals. They work with more than seven years experience in liberal professions, mid or superior technicians, administration or business directives</td>
<td>40-55 years</td>
<td>Mixed: 50% women, 50% men.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group 4 Madrid</td>
<td>People that collaborate in an active way with any kind of NGO, political party, trade union... They not only pay the fees of their organisation</td>
<td>28-46 years</td>
<td>Mixed: 50% women, 50% men.</td>
<td>Madrid is the Autonomous Community with more NGO collaborators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group 5 Martorell</td>
<td>Active in the industrial or the service sector in no qualified places</td>
<td>30-50 years</td>
<td>Mixed: 50% women, 50% men.</td>
<td>Martorell is an area affected by the industrial delocalization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group 6 Zaragoza</td>
<td>Housewives with kids. Middle class</td>
<td>40-55 years</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group 7 Vigo</td>
<td>Workers with low skill jobs (sellers, receptionists, distributors, stockers)</td>
<td>18-25 years</td>
<td>Mixed: 50% women, 50% men.</td>
<td>They left school between 14 and 17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group 8 Madrid</td>
<td>Workers in the sector service. Level of studies: Primary completed or secondary</td>
<td>26-40 years</td>
<td>Mixed: 50% women, 50% men.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group 9 Medina del Campo</td>
<td>Autonomous workers or agriculture business and retailers</td>
<td>40-55 years</td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>Between 20,000-40,000 inhabitants</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
How do Spaniards face globalization? A qualitative study on individual attitudes towards globalization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Age range</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Specificities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Group 10</td>
<td>Barcelona (metropolitan area is accepted)</td>
<td>Retired and pre-retired of the industrial sector</td>
<td>Men</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group 11</td>
<td>Metropolitan industrial area. Bilbao</td>
<td>Unemployed of the industrial sector</td>
<td>30-50 years</td>
<td>Mixed: 50% women, 50% men.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The group distribution by categories of the variables considered of its composition would, then, be:

Age:
- Range: 18-70.
- Youth (range 18-30, approximately). It would be attributed to groups G1, G2, G4 and G7 partially.
- Adult (range 30-55, approximately). Groups G3, G4, G5, G6, G8, G9 and G11 would be the associated groups.
- Mature (range 55-70, approximately) would be linked with group G10.

Gender:
- 8 groups are mixed except of G6 which is exclusively composed by women and G9 and G10 composed only by men.

Habitat:
- Big city: G1, G2, G4 and G6
- Mid-size city: G3, G8
- Industrial: G5, G7, G9, G10, G11
- Rural: G9

Autonomous Community (AC):
- Madrid: G1, G4, G6, G9
- Catalonia: G2, G5, G10
- Galicia: G7
- Basque Country: G8, G11
- Extremadura: G3
- Aragon: G6

As the reader can perceive, those focus groups are an extremely important source of information. First of all, there is a large heterogeneity in the educational attainment of the respondents ranging from those with university degrees (even university professors) to individuals with a primary education. Second, the respondents come from big cities as Madrid – over 3,1 million inhabitants - and Barcelona – over 1,7 million inhabitants - as well as from rural towns such as Medina with approximately 20,000 inhabitants. Third, all except three groups
are mixed; the one that is only composed by women are housewives while those composed by men are self-employed or farmers and retailers, and pre-retired or retired industrial workers. Finally, in Spain there are seventeen Autonomous Communities among which six of them are directly included in the study. It is a quite representative selection. It could be argued that there is no case study from Andalucia. Our response is that, though admitting this, there is no reason to think that there is an Andalucian specificity regarding attitudes towards globalization since such an autonomous community has not been affected in a significantly different way compared to the other regions. Next, we look at the information they provide.

3.2. Main results

This section is divided into two parts. The first one treats the main issues that have emerged around the notion of globalization, like delocalisation and immigration. The second treats on the main actors of globalization such as corporations, the state or the anti-globalization movement. Our arguments are supported by the evidence provided by the members of the diverse focus groups and the Kairos Future International Survey 2006.

The first thing that we can say relating the results of the qualitative groups with the academic debate presented above is that almost all groups, with the exception of Group 7 (GR, will be the acronym), would fall into the category of globalists. In the case of GR7 it is not that they are sceptics but that they do not seem to care much about the discussion on globalization. The rest, though thinking that something is going on in the world today differently previous times, would be labelled as globalists while being quite critical of such the process.

Participants on the focus groups mainly detect two kinds of events – historical and social - that affect their perception of this process. The first historical event is the fall of the Berlin Wall and then the Maastricht Treaty, the Common Agricultural Policy and the adoption of the euro as a common currency. In that sense, it seems that they interpret globalization as a European process. This corresponds with the facts: the European Union has transformed Spain, including its agricultural sector. As one member of GR9 states “when we joined the common market, they told us that we produced little and we were not competitive and we should produce more. Nowadays, we are the country that produces the most beet in all of Europe…”. Interestingly, the Kairos Future International 2006 Survey supports this view. This survey poses the following question “Which of the following players have the greatest influence on the regulation of globalization?”. For the Spanish population between 16 and 29, the European Union obtains 5.05 out of 7. This mean is higher, though not significantly, than the reference mean of 4.96. Notably, individuals with primary education in Spain consider the European Union as a main player of globalization: 5.54 out of 7, more than 0.6 points higher than their counterparts in the European Union. The group between 30 and 50 years old follow a similar pattern. Spaniards in this age group point out to the European Union as a global actor to a higher extent than the average European, although not it is statistically significant. Along these lines, Spaniards seem to feel that Europe is
more important for their identity than for the rest of Europeans, mainly for those individuals with primary education. However, even more than for the case of the European Union, Spaniards show the greatest deviation from their European counterparts in the role of the police and justice system in globalization. Whereas Spaniards think this system has a role in globalization (3.5 for both age groups), Europeans do not seem to find much relationship between them (3.2). The fact that Spain has received much help from other police and justice system in our fight against terrorism, may explain such a significant difference.

The results of the CIS focus groups show that respondents reduce the social aspects of globalization to a single word: internet. The availability of internet has made globalization a reality. It has brought the possibility of being connected all around the world, obtaining information or being in contact with other people working in the same sectors. When asked about what the term globalization suggest them, the respondents impressions are varied. First, for some globalization is an economic term linked with consumers and business (GR1). For others globalization implies “standarisation of tastes and ideas” (GR1). For a different group it implies “movement of people” (GR6) and is associated with immigration. Some others link it with high technology (GR6). But there is also a negative connotation that we think is predominant: “a new model of economic and cultural slavery”, “a complete unfairness”, “stress” (GR1) “mafia”, “thieves”, “benefits for the powerful”, “anger” (GR7), “the rich will get richer and the poor poorer”, “inequalities” (GR8), “the big fish eats the small one” (G10), “exodus of firms to other countries” (GR11). Finally, there is a link with the USA that brings some of them to question the term: according to this view, the US is the only actor that obtains benefits out of the process (GR7); while for others, the US is seen as protecting the interest of companies (GR11).

More concretely, the focus groups have been asked about how they define globalization. This is a very useful information that will give us insights into their ideas and about the difference between the academic debate and the reality. We have detected more than one definition of the term globalization. For some, it is just the imposition of a way of life, of consumer society on the rest of the world (GR1). For others, it is the proliferation of multinational corporations, automatic production systems and diversified business by those corporations (GR3). In this context, the small companies either specialize or will disappear (GR3, GR11). In other words, companies concentration (GR5, GR 10). Another group thinks that it is just another step of capitalism (GR6) while for a small number of other respondents, the powerful, will control the world (GR9).

Given that context, it is not strange that the perceptions are that the negative effects overcome the positive ones. First, because some of them realize that they benefit from the process but they also see it as a zero-sum game: if somebody is winning, then, somebody is loosing (GR2). And also, the more globalization there is, the more un-solidarity we observe (GR4). A second argument is the deterioration of the environment, leaded by the decrement of the ozone layer (GR3). Or another one that there are no borders for capital but there are for human beings (GR4). This may lead to slavery of workers by multinational corporations.
But there are also positive effects. For some, globalization has helped Spain to have a role in the world (GR4); and some others think that once the inequality aspects are solved, the general result will be a substantial improvement (GR4).

Among all of those definitions and effects, globalization is linked to economics widely understood. Concretely there are two issues more important than the rest: immigration and companies delocalization. We may note, however, that though we link immigration and delocalization to economy, those two issues have also effects in other arenas like the political, social or cultural. Though we mainly focus in the economical aspect, we may cite them.

Regarding immigration, the situation has more than one angle. On the one hand, it is widely admitted that every single individual has the right to live and have a job in order to take care of himself and his family. Even more since the Spaniards emigrated during decades (GR6). However, the members of the groups say that such situation was a different one since the Spanish immigrants had a labour contract to work and the new arrivals do not have it (GR6). But more important than the comparison between the history and present time is which is the situation today. And, on our point of view, there are reasons to worry. For many groups (GR1, GR2, GR4, GR5, GR6 and GR7) immigration is perceived as a threat. First, because they compete for many of the same jobs: low skilled and low added value positions. This is seen as “unfair” competition. Second, this affects their salaries that do not raise, since they are easily replaceable by somebody who will do the same job for a lower salary. Third, it is stated that they obtain benefits that Spaniards do not get, like fiscal incentives for their business, scholarships or simply, do not pay taxes. Fourth, for some of them, “Chinese people are invading us and they control the whole trade” (GR 2). Fourth, immigrants would be not adapting to the new place they are but imposing their culture on the rest of us (GR1).

One could argue that, at the end of the day, each individual tries to make a decent life and take care of his or her dependents. Normally the more money employees earn the more content they are. Hence, we should observe that the employer, who pays the salaries, is held responsible for their situation. The argument could be that the immigrant that comes to work who is at fault but the employer who pays less to the national citizen. We hardly have found any criticism of employers and we wonder why this is the case. There are two possible interpretations for this. One is that the employees do not understand the reality of the situation. Another is that, though being aware of this fact, they consider that the employers try to maximize their profits as well as the immigrants try to improve their lives. In any case, we do not observe any relevant criticism of the general globalization process or of the state or the government.

Delocalization, companies deciding to move to other countries, is the other ‘star’ topic on the economic side of globalization. As in the case of immigration, there is a rational side that all the members of the groups - all of them with the exception of the GR7 members - mention and understand: companies are created on the basis of profits. Since employers
know that labour costs are lower in other parts of Europe or the rest of the world than in Spain, they decide to move the company there and increase their profits. As some members said, companies came to Spain when it was profitable and now they will move to Poland, Romania or China. And, with the same logic, at the moment that there is a place where the production may be cheaper those companies will move there. Respondents are aware that delocalization has affected many sectors of the Spanish economy. For instance in the car industry, Seat and Opel have moved (GR1, GR5). The fashion and the shoe business, once especially important in Catalonia and Valencia, is not different and some companies either moved to China or some, simply closed since they were unable to compete in the international market.

From our point of view, the groups accept this situation more than immigration. It seems that they have accepted it as an inevitable event they can not do anything about it. As before, we observe little criticism of the state’s role in the globalization process. More importantly, protectionism is not explicitly presented as a solution to global economic competition.

The Kairos Future International 2006 Survey confirms this accepting / realist view of Spanish society towards globalization. When asked for the potential positive aspects of globalization, Spaniards consider these aspects significantly less important than their European counterparts. Along these lines, significantly more Europeans see globalization as a factor decreasing prices and increasing opportunities for them and for national companies than Spaniards. Europeans also consider globalization as a process leading to more international trade to a higher extent than Spaniards. Certainly, the Kairos survey shows again and again that Spaniards are not willing to take advantage of globalization by looking for a better professional career abroad. When asked where they would like to live most of their lives, Spaniards show a significantly higher agreement with the statement that ‘I would like to live most of my life in the town I live now’ and a significantly lower support for the statement ‘I would like to live most of my life abroad’ or at least some periods. In fact, there are less Spaniards that have ever travelled or worked abroad or planning to move abroad than the average European result.

One could expect then that Spaniards would lend more importance to the potential negative aspects of globalization. But this is not the case. In Spain, there is significantly less support for the notion that globalization poses a threat to employment. Even when the focus groups included in the CIS qualitative study suggest that immigration has negative effects on the labour markets for nationals, this opinion seems to have less support than in the rest of the EU countries considered in the Kairos Future International 2006 Survey. In fact, when asked about the ideal future society, Spaniards agree to a significantly higher degree that a society in which native citizens and immigrants have equal opportunities as opposed to different opportunities. As we shall see later in the country specific section, the economic expansion and job creation of Spain in the last decade might be interrelated with the Spanish self-confidence in employment stability. The disagreements, both in the potential positive and negative aspects of globalization with the European counterparts, might suggest that
Europeans consider that globalization has much more economic implications than Spaniards do. The Kairos Future International 2006 Survey corroborates also some of those comments about globalization made by the CIS focus groups. Thus, when asked about ‘What characterises your ideal future society?’, Spaniards are less in favour of protecting national industry as opposed to free trade and global competition than Europeans.

It is interesting to note that both age groups (16-29 years old and those aged between 30-50) show a similar pattern: they show significantly less enthusiasm than Europeans for the positive aspects of the globalization and are less suspicious of negative aspects. The only difference of the Spanish age group between 30 and 50 years old with respect to the youngest group is that they consider globalization as a factor leading to a convergence in the Welfare Systems among European countries. Spain started to build its welfare system in the 1980s, a decade later than in the rest of EU Member States (Sanz and Velázquez, 2006). The Spanish youth group became adult when its welfare system was already in place, so they value less the expanding process of the Spanish social welfare system. Finally, we should say that most of the differences between the Spanish and European views about globalization are based on the group with primary education. Both individuals with secondary and university education show similar opinions than their European counterparts.

We should next consider what the respondents think about their future. After analyzing the groups, the key explanatory variable to understand their views about the future and their expectations is not age, as we could expect, but education. Those optimists about the future, and more particularly, their future are more likely to have a higher education, normally a university degree, than those with a lower educational level. Those members between the ages of 18-25 (GR7) with low educational attainment are more pessimistic than those studying at the university (GR1). The comparison of the conclusion between GR 3 – those 40 to 55 years old in liberal professions, mid or superior technicians, administration or business directives with a university degree - and GR9 – those 40-55 years – autonomous workers or agriculture business - points at that, as well as those between 26-40 represented by GR 8 and GR 2. The retired group is divided between pessimists and optimists while the housewives are overwhelmingly pessimistic.

Analyzing the Kairos Future International 2006 Survey, we reach the same conclusion: it is education that is the variable that makes the difference in the views about globalization and the future rather than gender or age. In fact, all over the Kairos survey we find that it is the group of individuals with primary education from both age groups that makes the difference between Spain and Europe. The rest of groups, individuals with secondary school or university, females and males from the 16-29 and 30-50 age groups have similar opinions to the other Europeans. We have just seen that individuals with primary education in Spain have different views about globalization than their counterparts in Europe. This pattern applies for both age groups: 16-29 and 30-50. We also find similar results looking at the answers to the question of Kairos survey: ‘About people and society. To what extent do you agree with the following statements? European and
Spaniards in the 16-29 age group show similar confidence that they and the society will have a bright future. That is, there is not significant difference in the extent to which Europeans and Spaniards find that their future looks bright. By groups, however, individuals with primary education in Spain are significantly less confident in their future than in Europe. And this is despite the fact that this same group in Spain is convinced that they will have a good job in the future, even more than individuals with primary education in Europe. For the rest of the focus groups - individuals with secondary and university education, females and males - show a similar self-confidence to their counterparts in Europe. For the 30-50 age group, the Kairos Survey also shows that Spaniards with secondary and university education are more optimistic than Europeans whereas individuals with primary education are more pessimistic. However, in this case this difference is not statistically significant.

As a conclusion to this section, we could say that the main attitude differences towards globalization among the groups depend mainly on the educational attainment of the individuals and their labour situation. This result is no different from other academic results such as those found by Mayda and Rodrik, 2005 and Sanz and Martínez-i-Coma, 2007.

4. THE GLOBALIZATION DEBATE IN SPAIN

Since the advent of democracy in 1976, Spanish foreign policy has enjoyed a high degree of political consensus. From the start, the primary objective of all major parties (the centre-left Partido Socialista Obrero Español, PSOE, and the centre-right Partido Popular, PP, and Unión de Centro Democrático, UCD) was the integration of Spain into the economic tissue of developed Western countries and particularly into what was then the European Economic Community. In effect, the general consensus around foreign policy and globalization was clearly demonstrated by Spain’s adoption of the European single currency, the euro. In 1993, Felipe González’s PSOE government signed the Treaty of Maastricht containing strict economic conditions - including budgetary discipline - as a pre-requisite for incorporation into the third phase of Economic and Monetary Union (EUM). In 1995, the same government, and in particular its economics and finance minister, Pedro Solbes - currently in office today in 2007 - initiated several measures designed to reduce the budget deficit and public debt that had mushroomed as a consequence of the economic crisis in 1993. A year later, the subsequent government formed by the PP and José María Aznar (1996) completed the process by ensuring that Spain fulfilled, to a large extent, the nominal convergence criteria of the Maastricht treaty.

This consensus on foreign policy issues also covers questions that divided Spanish political opinion in the 1970s. Spain’s admission to the NATO in 1981 under the last government of the UCD was highly unpopular with both the PSOE (centre-left) and the Spanish communist party. However, in 1982, the subsequent PSOE government chose not to repeal that decision and in 1986 it called a referendum the results of which showed that a clear majority
of Spaniards wished their country to remain in the NATO. Some authors, such as Aixalá-i-Blanch (2005), argue that this public consensus on foreign policy issues has deteriorated and that the massive demonstrations against the war in Iraq in 2003 support this view. The same author suggests that the emergence of new trans-national players has forced questions of international relations into the public domain producing a politicisation of foreign policy. Thus, it is argued, foreign policy is no longer just a ‘State affair’ but rather has entered the arena of public political debate.

Notwithstanding these observations, Spanish international economic policy still appears to enjoy a certain degree of public consensus, essentially reflecting a widely held public view that globalization is an exogenous factor that cannot be changed, exerting an ever-growing pressure in terms of economic efficiency and competitiveness. In short, the majority of Spaniards believe that globalization is “out there”, progressing, and that, while strong differences of opinion about this process may exist, nothing can effectively be done to stop it. The rest of this paper will focus on how the debate on globalization is evolving amongst 1) the political parties, 2) the unions, 3) the business community and 4) the general public.

4.1. Political parties

So far, Spain has not seen the emergence of any major political divide over the question of globalization. The absence of any significant debate about this economic evolution is due to two factors:

− The widely held view that as a medium-sized country in a massive global community, Spain cannot influence the pace of progression of globalization. Hence, Spain’s only option is to adapt itself to the international economic environment.

− Spain’s integration into the group of “developed Western countries” is very recent and few groups are willing to jeopardise that progress. The idea of “disconnecting” Spain from the globalization of economic activity looks a risky option considering the currently very positive economic conditions within the country.

One indicator of the public consensus around globalization in Spain was given by the results of the referendum on the ratification of the European Constitution on 28 February 2005. During that vote it became clear that a broad section of Spanish society identifies globalization with the process of European integration, since the European Union (EU) is in effect a major driver of that process and it has been the catalyst for the internationalisation of the Spanish economy. Thus, in contrast to the discussions that accompanied the same referendum in the Netherlands and France, in Spain both major parties (PSOE and PP) supported the ratification of the European Referendum. The table below shows the overall results of the last general elections of 14 March 2004, as well as the official stance of each party represented in congress vis-à-vis the referendum on the European Constitution:
Table 2. Spanish general election results 14 March 2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>% of total</th>
<th>Seats</th>
<th>Stance on European Constitution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Partido socialista obrero español (PSOE)</td>
<td>11,026,163</td>
<td>42.59%</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partido popular (PP)</td>
<td>9,763,144</td>
<td>37.71%</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convergencia i unio (CIU)</td>
<td>835,471</td>
<td>3.23%</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Esquerra republicana de Catalunya (ERC)</td>
<td>652,196</td>
<td>2.52%</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partido nacionalista vasco (PNV)</td>
<td>420,980</td>
<td>1.63%</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Izquierda unida (IU)</td>
<td>1,284,081</td>
<td>4.96%</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalicion canaria (CC)</td>
<td>235,221</td>
<td>0.91%</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bloque nacionalista galego (BNG)</td>
<td>208,688</td>
<td>0.81%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chunta aragonesista (CHA)</td>
<td>94,252</td>
<td>0.36%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eusko alkartasuna (EA)</td>
<td>80,905</td>
<td>0.31%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nafarroa bai</td>
<td>61,045</td>
<td>0.24%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Thus if we group together the parties on the basis of their position regarding to the European Constitution, we observe that the parties supporting ratification of the Constitution in the referendum of 28 February 2005 obtained 86.07% of the national vote at the 14 March general elections.

Table 3. Breakdown of the electoral results according to the parties’ stance on the EU Constitution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Groupings</th>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Parties that supported ratification of the EU Treaty in the referendum of 28 February 2005 PSOE+PP+CIU+PNV+CC</td>
<td>22,280,979</td>
<td>86.07</td>
<td>332</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parties that opposed ratification of the EU Treaty in the referendum of 28 February 2005 IU+ERC+BNG+ChA+EA+Nafarroa</td>
<td>2,381,167</td>
<td>9.20</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: own sources

The fact that the main parties were in favour of the EU Treaty was reflected in the results of the referendum of 28 February 2005:
Table 4. Results of the referendum on ratification of the EU Treaty (28 February 2005)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number of</th>
<th>Valid votes</th>
<th>Invalid votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Electoral register</td>
<td>34,692,491</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of voters</td>
<td>14,491,752</td>
<td>14,367,229</td>
<td>124,523</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abstention</td>
<td>20,200,739</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of voters</td>
<td>14,491,752</td>
<td>14,367,229</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valid votes</td>
<td>14,367,229</td>
<td>99.14%</td>
<td>0.86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Invalid votes</td>
<td>124,523</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valid votes</td>
<td>14,367,229</td>
<td>99.14%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>11,057,563</td>
<td>76.96%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>2,453,002</td>
<td>17.07%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blank</td>
<td>856,664</td>
<td>5.96%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Thus nearly 77% of those who voted were in favour of ratifying the EU Treaty. The high level of abstention was a consequence of the disinterest surrounding EU-related questions, the tediousness of the constitutional text, and the certainty of the result before the referendum. It is also interesting to note that, unlike the French Socialist Party, the PSOE manifested a high level of discipline and unity in favour of ratifying the EU Treaty. This enabled the then (and current) Prime Minister, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, to call the referendum. We should add that, at that time, the PSOE had the preferential support of both the IU and the ERC, two parties further to the left than the PSOE, and that both these parties campaigned against ratification of the EU Treaty. In any case, the differences between government and its minority partners did not cause divisions and both the IU and the ERC continued to demonstrate support for the government.

Lastly, it should be said that the notion that Spain needs to gain in competitiveness within the context of an increasingly globalised economy is accepted and incorporated by both major parties in Spain. The current government is aware (as was the preceding one) that Spain’s current rhythm of economic growth is largely founded on two factors, immigration and construction, that are not durable growth drivers in the long term. The economic growth model needs to change in order to achieve productivity gains that render the country more competitive and diminish the alarmingly high trade deficit. Both the PSOE and the PP agree with this diagnosis and both support the Lisbon Strategy (2000) via which the UE has given itself the objective of becoming “the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of combining sustainable growth with the creation of more and better jobs and greater social inclusion”. In order to achieve such an ambition, Spain needs to increase its human capital and above all technological capital, which lags far behind the level of its EU partners. The lowering of corporate taxation could also be a useful lever in the competition to attract foreign investment. Within this logic, the current PSOE government has just introduced a tax reform
that reduces company tax from 35 to 30% for major corporations and from 30 to 25% for small and medium-sized enterprises (Law 35/2006, of 28 December, relating to the taxation of personal income [IRPF], with partial amendment of the Laws on taxation of companies, non-residents and personal wealth). This would appear to be additional proof that the majority of the left in Spain is not opposed to globalization, and is seeking, like the political right, the best way to adapt to it.

In short, the debate on globalization between the Spanish political parties is almost non-existent and what debate there is does not in any way correspond to a typical left/right schema. Only the minority parties and those on the fringes of the political spectrum appear to support anti-globalization groups.

4.2. Unions

The globalization debate within the unions focuses on the volatility that the process introduces into labour markets. Thus, the Organización Internacional del Trabajo (OIT) conclude in one of its reports on globalization and employment that international trade and the mobility of capital has introduced greater volatility into employment and added to economic insecurity (OIT: Final report on the social impact of globalization, 1999). The two main labour unions in Spain are Comisiones Obreras (C.C.O.O.) y Unión General de Trabajadores (U.G.T.)

In June 2006, CCOO published a document entitled: Guide for the defence of employment in a globalised economy, which the union stated was a “summary in support and defence of employment with rights as a vehicle of human development with identification of the responsibilities and consequences of the current process of economic globalization”. The position of this union with respect to globalization is based on the notion this process threatens employment stability. Thus the CCOO maintains that globalization:

− Gives priority to economic growth over human development
− Exacerbates inequalities
− Jeopardises democracy
− Aggravates the ecological crisis

As observed and already mentioned in a publication by the CIS (the knowledge management arm of the Programme on Safety and Health at Work and the Environment) “How the Spanish perceive Globalization”, it is criticism that receives the most support from public opinion. Globalization is perceived as a process that limits the power of the State and transfers power to multinationals and financial markets. The other area in which this union receives most support is that related to employment stability. When a multinational company operating in Spain announces the relocation of a plant or activity to some other country, the unions usually organise actions demanding that the factories remain in Spain and requesting the government to force the company to abort its plans. Indeed, during first week of February of this year 2007 the North American automobile components com-
pany, Delphi, announced the closure of a plant in Spain involving the redundancy of 1,600 employees. On the CCOO’s website one can read that the union is demanding an urgent meeting at the Ministry of Industry, Tourism and Commerce “in order to prepare the negotiations to maintain the industrial centre of the Delphi plant at Puerto Real (Cadiz)”. In effect, the union is requesting the government to force Delphi to respect the plan to maintain employment and activity until 2010. In negotiations with the company to avoid the plant’s closure, it has been suggested that the government should demand repayment of the public aid paid to the company over recent years.

The CCOO surprised many at the end of last year when it produced a document entitled “Immigration and the Labour Market”: proposals for flow planning” (19/12/2006) in which, as a first point, it concluded that “The regulation of flows should be determined on the basis of the country’s capacity to absorb, which in turn should be determined by the level of demand in labour markets to cover its real needs”. The second point of the conclusion adds “the absorption capacity is not unlimited, and it therefore needs to be planned. The best way to do this would be to establish an annual entry quota.” This document marked a significant change in the union’s views on immigration since it had previously taken a much more liberal stance on the question. It is possible that the spectacular increase in immigration in Spain over recent years has had a negative impact on the salaries of the least qualified workers in the country, and that this has prompted the CCOO to modify its position.

The other major union, the UGT, has adopted a very similar stance towards the globalization. On the same dates the CCOO published its document Guide for the defence of employment in a globalised economy, the UGT organised a convention in Zaragoza (27 June 2006) alongside a number of European unions entitled “Youth, Unionism and Globalization”. The summary declaration of this meeting stated that globalization generates the following results:

− Social and labour insecurity
− Poor distribution of global wealth
− The growing weakness of national States and of their capacity to generate and supervise social and employment policies

Nevertheless this same declaration recognised certain positive aspects stating, for example, that “globalization has also generated new forms of communication”. It is interesting to note that the UGT emphasises that, in its view, globalization does not generate a net gain in employment. This union is aware that both public opinion and scientific research recognise that globalization increases employment volatility. However, public opinion does not seem to have such a clear idea of the net effect on employment. What would be the problem with globalization if it destroyed jobs via relocations in other countries whilst creating many more jobs facilitating new investment and opportunities? The problem facing unions when they try to convince public opinion about the negative effects of globalization on employment in Spain is that it is precisely over the last few years that the Spanish economy has created the most jobs. The INE’s (Spanish national statistics office) Active Population Survey shows that in the first quarter of 1996, there were 12,626,700 people in
employment whereas in the fourth quarter of 2006 there were 20,001,800. This job creation has allowed unemployment to fall from 22.83 to 8.30%.

4.3. The business community

The sector of Spanish society that lends most support to globalization is the business community. Globalization has brought two major benefits to Spanish employers:

- It has opened the doors to international commerce and above all to investment outside Spain. Until the mid-1990s Spain had been a net receiver of foreign direct investor (FDI). However, over the last decade, Spanish companies - especially from the banking, telecom and infrastructure sectors - have invested more in FDI than multinationals have invested in Spain.

- Immigration has provided a large pool of unqualified labour, putting downward pressure on workers’ wages.

Thus, regarding the first point, at the end of 2005, the Consejo Superior de las Cámaras (the Council of Chambers of Commerce) organised a series of day events to celebrate “Spain and its multinationals” (26/11/2005). The participants concluded that “it is necessary to support the development of multinationals in order to maintain the current pace of economic growth” and it recognised that “the expansion of Spanish companies has coincided with a stage of globalization”.

At the time of writing, i.e. around 20 February 2007, the Chambers of Commerce were celebrating their Annual General Meeting, with the main focus being “production and marketing in a global environment”. The meeting proposed a reorientation of support policies towards the internationalisation of Spanish companies based on the need for competitiveness required by the new global economic context.

For the Council of Chambers of Commerce, this new focus means “first and foremost working towards making Spanish society and its political, economic, social and media agents more aware of international issues and the promotion and support of a genuine culture of internationalisation. This implies greater effort in the domains of language learning, experience in foreign companies, knowledge of the idiosyncrasies and corporate cultures of the main countries, expatriation, etc.”

Regarding the second point, the benefit to Spanish companies contributed by immigration was aptly summarised by a report in September 2006: “Immigration in Spain. Analysis per Autonomous Region”. Having analysed immigration figures from the municipal census and estimated the total number of immigrants in Spain at 3,730,610 (8.5% of the total population), the report focused on the consequences of the phenomenon on the labour market. In the Spanish labour market, immigrants represent 10.9% of those employed and 9.3% of those registered with Social Security system. The document devotes a particularly interesting section to explaining the benefits of this inflow of immigrants to Spain: “The benefits of immigration for host countries are numerous. The most notable positive aspects of immigration
are that it contributes positively to the problem of aging populations in rich countries both in terms of the average age of immigrants and their contribution to birth rates; it has fiscal benefits via the payment of taxes; its helps maintain our social security system via social contributions; it takes on necessary jobs that the local population no longer exercises, and it enhances society by contributing to higher levels of cultural and human diversity.”

4.4. The general public

As observed in the CIS report “How the Spanish perceive globalization”, Spanish views on globalization are, in effect, fairly conformist. The economic process is perceived as being inevitable - as an exogenous factor - in the face of which the best response is adaptation. It is nevertheless important to emphasise, as already mentioned above, that Spanish views on globalization have to a large extent been influenced by the good economic conditions within Spain since 1996. Indeed, it is difficult to conclude that globalization destroys jobs when Spain is creating more employment than any other country in the EU. Moreover, the sharp fall in the unemployment rate in Spain has been accompanied by a substantial increase in per-capita income that has allowed Spain to reduce its differential with average EU per-capita income.

As a result of Spain’s generalised conformist attitude towards globalization, very few voices are raised in support of protectionist or isolationist policies. This general attitude is further reinforced by the fact that the economic policies of the two major centre-left and centre-right parties can both be described as liberal policies which, for the time being, appear to be producing good results. Another report concluding that Spaniards have a conformist view on globalization is the Kairos Future International 2006 Survey. The Spanish appear to be less aware of the advantages and disadvantages of globalization in their lives. In effect, the citizens of Spain do not appreciate in the same way that other Europeans do the contribution of globalization to reducing prices and creating opportunities.

However, there are three aspects of globalization that do worry the Spanish, and particularly the younger generation:

- The effect of globalization on economic inequality
- The impact of globalization on the environment
- The partial appropriation of State power by major multinationals and financial markets

In fact the anti-globalization movement has managed to persuade a large section of public opinion that globalization exacerbates economic inequality. Campaigns for fair trade, 0.7% in Third world aid, are widely supported by public opinion and young people in Spain. Climate change is the other theme which despite a high level of ignorance of the technical questions represents a significant worry amongst the general population. Indeed, the Kairos Future International Survey showed that the younger generation of Spaniards, as well as the not-so-young generation, is significantly more concerned than other Europeans about the effects of globalization on the environment and sustainable development. The survey
shows that the Spanish are substantially more in agreement with the notion that environmental pollution is one of the major threats to the future of humanity, and such pollution is considered to a large extent to be a side-effect of globalization. Regarding the last point, the CIS study “How the Spanish perceive globalization” showed that the Spanish appear to believe the State has little leeway to control or affect globalization. Various groups argue that globalization has increased the weight of economic power and diminished that of political power in the decision making process.

5. SPANISH EXPECTATIONS AS REGARDS THE REGULATION OF THE GLOBALIZATION PROCESS

5.1. The State

The main conclusion about the state is that its effect and the possibilities for the state to control the processes of globalization are limited. First, the economic decisions, some members of GR2 argue, are not taken independently but in relation to other actors. Independent decision-making capacity is hardly possible in the case of Spain since it is a middle sized country. In the same vein, GR 4 members consider that, the economy dominates over all other kind of decisions. If this is the case, then, the state does not many possibilities to influence the political circumstances. Third, GR1 participants think that the state hardly can do anything since the world is dominated by financial interests not politics. Also, for this group, globalization implies privatization and the elimination of public companies and the consequent reduction of the public sector. Fourth, for some members of GR7 the states decide but they ignore their citizens. The Kairos Future International Survey confirms the worries of the Spanish society about the impact of globalization on the size of the public sector. When asked ‘What characterizes your ideal future society?’ Spaniards show a significantly higher tendency than Europeans towards a strong welfare system rather than lower taxes. This different opinion about the characteristics of the ideal society in Spain and Europe seems to reflect the worries of Spaniards about the reduction in the power of states in an ever more global world. This concern about the future of social welfare is confirmed when Spaniards show a significantly higher agreement than Europeans with the statement ‘I feel that everybody should have the right to a free university’.

5.2. The European Union

While recognizing the benefits obtained due to the EU membership (GR3) it is seen as something strange, not linked with common citizens’ everyday life. It affects peoples’ lives, though some do not perceive it as something close to them (GR1) and it does not take account of the citizen’s opinion (GR7). However, we would not say that the situation of the EU is different or worse if we compare it with the opinion of national governments. It seems that the opinion about the politicians, independently of the arena they are working in, is the same in both cases. In fact, the Kairos Future International 2006 survey
reveals that in Spain there is significantly lower interest in politics than in Europe. Again, when asked about ‘to what extent do you trust the following groups and institutions?’, Spaniards show less trust in both the national government and the European Union than their European counterparts.

5.3. The multinational companies

Theory says that corporations concentrate their efforts on making benefits and on the economy. But they also have power. For instance, a member of GR1 says that companies have more power than the political parties. A member of GR11 goes further in that reflection considering that companies are even more powerful than countries. In this situation, then, the role of the state limits to a metaphor: “countries are the cops of the corporations but benefiting those corporations” (GR11).

5.4. The anti-globalization movements

The perceived role of these groups by the participants is quite varied. Some members on GR1 say that they are against multinational corporations and against the USA. Also, a member of GR5 explains that those groups fight against the general concept of globalization, the powers that lead the countries and the de-humanization that provoked by globalization. Finally, in GR8 there is a member that links those groups with the environmentalists. Spaniards show some sympathy with anti-globalization movements because they link such movements with the fight against climate change and support for the Kyoto Protocol. Along these lines, the Kairos Future International Survey clearly illustrates that Spaniards seem more concerned about environmental issues than Europeans, both the 16-19 age group and to a lower extent the 30-50 age group. When asked ‘How interested are you in the following?’ Spaniards show a significantly higher interest in environment and sustainable development than Europeans do and, as mentioned above, a significantly lower concern for politics. This evidence is supported in another question of this Kairos survey, when Spaniards agree to a significantly higher extent than Europeans in the idea that environment pollution is one of the greatest threats to the society in the future. Finally, Spaniards answer that they ‘usually buy goods from companies that are environmentally friendly’ to a higher extent than Europeans.

The image of the anti-globalization movement is not completely defined. Some of the groups link it to youth (GR3). There is also this implicit criticism of the media: the members of the focus groups know that there are quite different sectors that could be considered as anti-globalization and that there is a minority that perpetrates violent actions. Some of the members in GR1 and GR3 consider that this violence is only a tiny number but that media only show the whole movement as if those violent members were representative. They consider that this image conveyed by the media does not fairly represent the issues that anti-globalization groups are trying to raise. Some others, also consider that they are disorganized or that their actions are limited and not strong enough (GR5).
6. THE SPANISH ECONOMIC CONTEXT AND ITS EFFECT ON INDIVIDUAL ATTITUDES TOWARDS GLOBALIZATION

Since 1995, Spain has continued to lose competitiveness in world markets, as shown by the widening of the deficit in the current and capital account (Table 2). In fact, the difference between imports and exports has only worsened in the last decade. The Spanish trade deficit rose from an average of 3.4% of the GDP in the period 1995-1999 to 5.7% in 2000-2004 (Table 2). In sharp contrast, the EU-15 (excluding the Eastern and Central European Countries acceding to the EU in 2004 and 2007) has been able to withstand the emergence of new competitors, showing a trade surplus with the rest of the world. The decline in trade deficit is not the only bad news for the Spanish Balance of Payments. The income current account continues to be negative for Spain in the period 2000-2004 in line with the increase in the net debit International Investment Position of the Spanish Economy (Bank of Spain, 2006). The trade and income deficit are not new figures in the Spanish commercial relationship with the rest of the world, what it is really new is that this deficit is no longer offset by net positive current transfers. In the period 1995-1999, the current transfers received from the EU significantly contributed to the positive net current transfer balance of 0.6%. However, since 2000 the surplus with the EU has been reduced. In addition the immigrants’ remittances to their countries of origin have risen. Thus, the previous net positive current transfers account has almost disappear in the years 2000-2004.

The only good news for the Spanish current and capital account balance is the constant surpluses of the services (based on the tourist revenues) and the capital account (basically because of the EU capital transfers). However, these surpluses are far from being reliable in the future. The instability of other attractive tourist destinations and the avian flu has contributed to re-channel some tourist flows towards Spain. If, as everyone hopes, the global instability recedes then Spain might afford a significant reduction in the number of tourist entering our country. We should also expect a reduction in the capital transfers that Spain receives from the EU, as the new financial framework for the period 2007-2013 includes the Eastern and Central European Countries. These new EU Member States have a significantly lower GDP per capita (even when measured in Purchasing Power Parities) and need more support from the Cohesion Funds than Spain. Traditionally, Spain has financed the goods and income deficit with surpluses in services, current transfers and inflows of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). We have just seen that the first two offsetting elements are not reliable in the future. Table 2 shows that our country cannot count on foreign investment to finance goods and income deficit anymore. Since 1995, Spanish multinationals invest more abroad than foreign multinationals in Spain. This feature is rather new in Spain. Before 1995, Spain received far more investment from foreign multinationals than the investment made by domestic firms abroad. In sum, table 2 shows the deterioration of Spanish economic competitiveness which has resulted in an increase of the trade deficit and in a new and increasing net outflow of FDI. Recent data based on the Spanish Balance of Payments for the year 2005 and the first two quarters of 2006 reveals that the trade deficit has even worsened to 7.6% of the GDP whereas the FDI net outflows continues to be over 1% of the GDP (Bank of Spain: Balance of Payments and International Investment Position 2005 and Eurostat: Balance of Payments Statistics Metadata).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Net balance</th>
<th>Net balance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Current Account</strong></td>
<td>1995-1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Current Account, Goods</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>-3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-15</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Current Account, Services</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-15</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Current Account, Income</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>-1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-15</td>
<td>-0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Current Account, Current Transfers</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-15</td>
<td>-0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Current Account</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>-0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-15</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Capital Account</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-15</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Financial Account</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-15</td>
<td>-0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Of which</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Foreign Direct Investment</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From Spain Abroad</td>
<td>-3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From Abroad to Spain</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From EU-15 Abroad</td>
<td>-3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From Abroad to EU-15</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Net errors and omissions</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>-0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-15</td>
<td>-0.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: EUROSTAT: Balance of Payments Statistics Metadata

The deterioration of Spanish economic relations with the rest of the world might affect individual attitudes towards globalization. Support for globalization primarily depends on
how globalization might affect individuals’ economic welfare (Scheve and Slaughter, 2005). Individuals who might benefit from labour market implications of international trade and capital market integration support globalization whereas individuals who see globalization as a factor increasing job and economic insecurity oppose it. In a country with a huge trade deficit like Spain, there could be a majority of people viewing trade liberalisation as a measure increasing imports. Imports from the rest of the world might put jobs and the income of Spaniards at risk. Therefore the declining competitiveness of Spain might contribute to further enhance opposition to trade liberalisation. In a similar way, the recent outflows of investment might reduce the support to globalization. In fact, Scheve and Slaughter (2001), for example, report that American workers’ see outward FDI as exporting jobs outside the country. Delocalisation of firms previously based in Spain abroad usually has an important impact on the public opinion. Citizens think that globalization makes it easy for multinationals to locate in countries with lower wages and lower social standards.

6.1. Immigration comes to Spain

Even though Spanish competitiveness has significantly deteriorated in the last decade, Spain has been able to grow much faster than the EU-15 creating millions of jobs. As Figure 1 shows Spain has recorded an economic growth of 3.3% from 1985 to 2004 whereas the EU-15 only recorded a meagre 2.3%. The contrast of the Spanish economic expansion to the EU stagnation is even sharper when comparing employment growth. Total employment has grown in Spain at a 2.5% rate whereas in Europe the rate of growth was only 1.0%. Most of this difference between the job creation in Spain and Europe comes from the decade 1995-2004. Following the success of the Spanish economy in the last decade, our country has received big numbers of immigrants. This socio-economic process is rather new in Spain. Our country was in fact at the origin of an important number of migrants to Europe in the 60’s. An estimated 1.5 million of Spaniards emigrated to France, Germany and Switzerland in that period. In the 80’s, with the return of the democracy and economic expansion, some of these emigrants came back to Spain. However, this inflow was very low.

Figure 2 shows the number of immigrants coming to Spain and the EU-15 between 1985 and 2004. It can be seen that before 1996, Spain received only a small amount of immigrants (between 20,000 and 30,000 per year). This amount was clearly below the 2% of the number of immigrants to the EU-15 (around 200,000 per year). In 1996, Spain started to experience a substantial and continued rise in the number of immigrants. Thus, in 1996 Spain had an inflow of 30,000 immigrants, whereas in 2004 the number of immigrants was almost 700,000. To get a sense of the relevance of this inflow of immigrants to Spain, it might be more helpful to compare these statistics with the EU-15. In the mid 90’s only one in fifty of the immigrants to the EU-15 chose Spain as his destination. In 2004, more than one in five (more than 20%) of the EU new immigrants chose Spain. The Spanish population is only 8% of the total EU-15 population, but still we received in 2004 more than 20% of the new immigrants. These numbers might be even higher if more recent data were available, since the Spanish government regularised an estimated 700,000 illegal immigrants in 2005.
Figure 1. GDP and employment growth in Spain and the EU 15 (1986-2004)

Source: OECD National Accounts. Volume I. Main Aggregates
Table 3 confirms that the immigration flows to Spain have happened in a brief period of time. During the period 1995-1999, the number of new immigrants coming to Spain rose by an annual growth rate of 48%. That is to say that the number of immigrants doubles every two years. In 2000-2004 this growth rate did not diminish but even rose to 50.7%. These growth rates are much higher than the rates recorded in the EU-15 (2.5% and 8.6 between 1995-1999 and 1999-2004, respectively). The great rise in immigration levels has contributed the increase in the share of immigrants in the Spanish population. This share was close to 2.0% in 1995, far below the EU average, whereas in 2004 is 6.6% very similar to the 6.3 of the whole EU (see Table 3). This rapid growth of immigration might give rise to some fears in the Spanish population. Some low-skilled workers may feel that immigrants are competitors thus keeping their wages low. However, Spain has created millions of jobs in the last decade, an economic context which has avoided a rise in anti-immigrants feelings. But, what will happen if Spain does not create such a large number of jobs anymore? In particular, could we expect an increase in the support for a more restrictive immigration policy? Section 4.3 draws some conclusions from the EU experience on how an economic crisis affects individual attitudes towards immigration.
Table 6. Immigration flows and stock in Spain and the EU-15

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Annual growth rate of change of the flows of immigration</th>
<th>Stock Immigrants (% total population)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>-11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>-2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>-26.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>48.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>26.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>40.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>-2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>-2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UE-15</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6.2. The economic context and its effect on individual attitudes towards immigration

Table 4 shows how residents of the EU-15 answered the question of “How about people from other countries coming here to work. Which one of the following do you think the government should do?” in the World Value Survey of 2000. Following this Questionnaire, we have coded as 1 the answer “Let anyone come”; 2 “As long as jobs are available”; 3 “Strict limits” and 4 “Prohibit people from coming”. Results reveal that in the EU-15 the mean is 2.45, just between 2 (people from other countries should come as long as jobs are available) and 3 (there should be strict limits). Spain, Sweden and Portugal seem to be the countries with a stronger tendency to let people from other countries come as long as jobs are available whereas the United Kingdom, France and Germany tend to have a majority of opinions in favour of strict limits. It is interesting to see that these latter countries (above all France and Germany) have experience some years of economic stagnation. Could it be that low economic growth rates and low job creation reduce the support for more open immigration policies? It is also the case that the United Kingdom, France and Germany started to receive immigration a long time ago, much earlier than the rest of the EU countries. Could it be then, that higher flows and stocks of immigrants increase support for stricter limits to immigration? Figure 3 shows the results of the regression of the mean of the public opinion about policy immigration against GDP growth, employment growth, immigration flows and immigration as a share of total population.
How do Spaniards face globalization? A qualitative study on individual attitudes towards globalization

Table 7. Public opinion in EU countries about immigration policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1999 wave</th>
<th>Sample</th>
<th>Year of questionary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>2.45</td>
<td>1483</td>
<td>1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>2.60</td>
<td>1841</td>
<td>1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>2.64</td>
<td>980</td>
<td>1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>2.47</td>
<td>999</td>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>2.67</td>
<td>1559</td>
<td>1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>2.67</td>
<td>1942</td>
<td>1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>1127</td>
<td>1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>2.39</td>
<td>996</td>
<td>1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>2.38</td>
<td>1942</td>
<td>1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>2.34</td>
<td>1155</td>
<td>1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>2.59</td>
<td>990</td>
<td>1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>2.17</td>
<td>969</td>
<td>1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>2.09</td>
<td>2279</td>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>2.14</td>
<td>967</td>
<td>1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>2.70</td>
<td>965</td>
<td>1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Simple mean</strong></td>
<td><strong>2.45</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Coding: How about people from other countries coming here to work: which one of the following do you think the government should do?
1 Let anyone come
2 As long as jobs available
3 Strict limits
4 Prohibit people from coming

*Source: World Value Survey 2000*

Figures 3 a) and 3 b) reveal interesting evidence. Even when having a small sample of 15 observations, we find a significant negative correlation (at a 10% level) between support for strict immigration policy and GDP and employment growth. That is, in an economic national context of economic expansion and job creation, individuals are more willing to let people from other countries come. This relationship between the national economic context and individual attitudes towards immigration might explain the higher support in Spain for an immigration policy that lets people come as long as jobs are available. The economic expansion and job creation of the Spanish economy in the last decade has lead to a reduction in the demand for a strict immigration policy.
Figure 3. Public opinion about immigration policy in the EU and the socio-economic context

a) GDP Growth (1995-1999) and public opinion about immigration policy

c) Rate of growth of immigration flows (1995-1999) and public opinion about immigration policy

Figure 3 c) shows a significant negative correlation between immigrant flows and the support for stricter limits to immigration. This contra-intuitive evidence might be explained by the fact that immigrants move to countries that are in an economic expansion and creating...
new jobs. In turn, this economic expansion reduces the support for strict limits to immigration leading to a negative correlation between this opinion and immigration flows. Another explanation for this result is that the causal effect might go from public opinion about immigration policy to immigrants’ flows instead of the other way around. Immigrants might move to countries supporting less strict immigration policies and having an easier regulation. Finally, Figure 3 d) reveals that there is no correlation between the already existing stock of immigrants and public opinion about policy immigration. If there is any effect of immigration indicators to individual attitudes towards immigration, it is because of recent immigration flows rather than historical immigration.

In sum, descriptive statistics seem to suggest that the economic national context there has an obvious effect on individual attitudes to immigration. In particular, countries recording economic expansion and job creation show less support for stricter limits to integration. This explains why Spain is the country supporting the most generous immigration policy in the EU. However, it also suggests that an economic downturn in Spain might strongly increase the support for stricter limits to immigration. In contrast, immigration flows and stocks do not seem to increase the demand for stronger policy immigration.

7. CONCLUSION

Studying globalization and how Spaniards and the rest of Europeans perceive it is not an easy task for three reasons. First, because there is no frame of reference already established; it is still in the making. The second reason the study of globalization is not a straightforward enterprise is because of the concept itself. Thirdly, the study of globalization and how Europeans approach to it is not an easy because of the concept ‘Europeans’. It implies individuals and every single one has a different way to obtain, process and structure the information available. The academic debate focuses on five key elements widely discussed and of vital importance for our societies and in the political science literature: power, culture, economy, inequality and order.

We agree with the globalists that the state is suffering a clear erosion of its sovereignty either from above or from below. Despite this what is presented as a weakening of state power, the objective of many nationalist movements is precisely to become a state. If this is the case, then, this is a point for the sceptics. On the other hand, on the issue of security we stand with Held and McGrew when they state: “The paradox and novelty of the globalization of organized violence today is that national security has become a multilateral affair”. The vigour of nationalist movements is the perfect example that globalization may not be as successful as is thought. However, the globalists could argue that it could perfectly be the case that because of globalization and the fears that it generates, citizens decide to look back to their nationalist ‘origins’. It is in the economic arena that globalization has received most attention. In this respect, we are more inclined towards globalists opinions because globalization today raises new issues of governance and because the economic
How do Spaniards face globalization? A qualitative study on individual attitudes towards globalization

In order to analyze what Spaniards think about globalization we used the CIS survey on the population of 18 years and over titled “Perception and Image of the Spaniards about the Globalization Phenomena”. Focus groups are an extremely important source of information. The first observation that we can make relating the results of the qualitative groups with the academic debate presented above is that is that almost all groups would fail in the category of globalists while being quite critical of such a process. However, there is a negative connotation that we think is predominant: “a new model of economic and cultural slavery, “a complete unfairness”, “stress” “mafia”, “thieves”, “benefits for the powerful”, “anger”, “the rich will get richer and the poor poorer”, “inequalities”, “the big fish eats the small one”, “exodus of firms to other countries”. Finally, there is a link with the USA that to some of them may lead them to question the term. From this perspective, the US is the only actor that benefits from the process; while for others, the US seems to be protecting the interests of companies. Given that context, it is not strange that the perceptions are that the negative effects overcome the positives. First, because some of them realize that they get benefits from the process but they see it a as a zero-sum game: if somebody is winning, then, somebody else is losing. And also, the more globalization there is, the less solidarity we observe. A second argument is the deterioration of the environment, led by the depletion of the ozone layer and another argument is that there are no borders for capital but there are for human beings. But there are also positive effects. For some, globalization has helped Spain to be in the world; and some others think that once that the inequality processes are solved, the general result will improve substantially.

Regarding immigration, the situation has more than one side. On the one hand, it is widely admitted that every single individual has the right to live and have a job in order to take care of himself and his family; even more so since Spaniards were immigrants for many decades. However, there are also worrying answers. For many groups immigration is perceived as a threat. First, because they compete for many of the same jobs: low skilled and low added value positions. This is seen as “unfair” competition. Second, this leads to wage depression, since they are easily replaceable by somebody who will do the same job for a lower salary. Third, it is stated that they obtain benefits that Spaniards do not get, like fiscal incentives for their business, scholarships or simply, do not pay taxes. Delocalization, companies deciding to move to other countries, is the other ‘star’ topic on the economic side of globalization. As in the case of immigration, there is a rational side that all the members of the groups mention and understand: companies are created on the basis of profits. Since employers know that labor costs are lower in other parts of Europe or the rest of the world than in Spain, they...
decide to move the company there and increase their benefits. The groups accept this situation of delocalisation more than immigration. It seems that they have accepted it as an inevitable event they can not do anything about it. Even more important, protectionism is not explicitly presented as a solution to global economic competition.

We also study the main actors of the globalization process like the state, the corporations and the anti-globalization movement. The main conclusion about the state is that its effect and its leeway regarding control of globalization is limited. Confronting the state, then, there are two other actors: corporations and anti-globalization movements. However, they play a very different role. Some say that companies have more power than the political parties or countries. In contrast, Spaniards show some sympathy with anti-globalization movements because they link such movements with the fight against the climate change or support for the Kyoto Protocol.

We finally present some specific issues to close the discussion on globalization and Spain. Since 1995, Spain has continued to lose competitiveness in the world markets, as shown by the widening of the deficit in the current and capital account. In fact, the difference between imports and exports has only worsened in the last decade. The deterioration of the Spanish economic relations with the rest of the world might affect individual attitudes towards globalization. Support for globalization primarily depends on how globalization might affect individuals’ economic welfare (Scheve and Slaughter, 2005). Therefore the declining competitiveness of Spain might contribute to further enhance opposition to trade liberalisation. In a similar way, the recent outflows of investment might reduce support for globalization. In fact, Scheve and Slaughter (2001), for example, report that American workers’ see outward FDI as exporting jobs outside the country. Even when the Spanish competitiveness has significantly deteriorated in the last decade, Spain has been able to grow much faster than the EU-15 creating millions of jobs. Following the success of the Spanish economy in the last decade, Spain has received large numbers of immigrants. This socio-economic process is rather new in Spain. Thus, in 1996 Spain had an inflow of 30,000 immigrants, whereas in 2004 the number of immigrants was almost 700,000. In the mid 90’s only one in fifty of the immigrants to the EU-15 chose Spain as his/her destination. In 2004, more than one in five (more than 20%) of the EU new immigrants chose Spain. This rapid growth of immigration might give rise to some fears in the Spanish population. Some low-skill workers might feel that immigrants are competitors reducing their wages. Using the World Value Survey of 2000, we find a significant negative correlation (at a 10% level) between support for strict immigration policy among EU countries, GDP and employment growth. That is, in an economic national context of economic expansion and job creation, individuals are more willing to let people from other countries come. This relation between the economic national context and individual attitudes towards immigration might explain the higher support in Spain for an immigration policy that lets people come as long as jobs are available. However, it also suggests that an economic downturn in Spain might strongly increase the support for stricter limits on immigration. In contrast, immigration flows and stocks do not seem to increase the demand for stronger policy on immigration.
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THE PUBLIC DEBATE ON GLOBALIZATION IN FRANCE

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of the Institute for Political Studies (IEP) in Paris

1. INTRODUCTION

Has France become the European country with the most vigorous public debate on globalization? As the French prepare to elect a new president in April 2007, where do they stand with respect to the cleavages that invaded the public arena at the end of the 1980s about an “open” economy and its consequences for the country? The referendum on the ratification of the European Constitution 29 May 2005 (with the vociferous mobilisation of the NO campaigners in the run-up) and the presence of an emblematic personality from the French alter-mondialist camp (José Bové) among the current presidential candidates are strong indicators that the French are profoundly sensitive to the question of the role and place of the nation-state in the global context, to the perceived consequences of globalization for the French social system, and more fundamentally, to the question of France’s relationship to the process of economic modernisation.

None of these questions are new. They first started to appear in the public arena at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s. At the end of the 1980s a consensus began to emerge in France in support of the view that the “French exception” was no longer sustainable. The experience of a Leftist government in power since 1981 confronted with the realities of an international economy and the emergence of serious social budget deficits had considerably attenuated the climate of ideological confrontation that dominated the 1970s. The political and electoral evolutions of the 1980s (decline of the Communist party, emergence of an extreme right and an increasing level of abstentions at each vote) added momentum to the transformation of the French political and social landscape in spite of a prevailing political discourse focused on advocating France’s rejection of change.

As Eddy Fougier has remarked in his studies of alter-mondialism in France, these contextual elements explain the “half-surprise” caused by the appearance in the mid-1990’s of a strong level of antagonism to notions identified with globalization. This emergence of resistance “appeared to contradict the French version of Fukuyama’s “End of History” theory, that is to say a generalised acceptance of the principles of democratic changeover, but also, and above all, of market economy principles”. This analysis is essentially correct; however we would add the following: the emergence of alter-mondialism
(or alter-globalism) in France in the mid-90s was only a half-surprise because France has a long political tradition of contestation. This tradition, often characterised by the regional versus central dichotomy, has long been associated with political movements that frequently lack any formal political expression (inside the system) and which often redefine, re-contextualise and appropriate issues or key personalities within their political strategies once these issues or personalities have been seen to present a challenge to the system and its rules. In more recent times this typically “French contestation” appears to have been gained considerable momentum on the fringes of the debates surrounding the Treaty of Maastricht. We cannot explain the emergence of alter-mondialism in France without taking into account two key factors: the number and extent of the changes imposed by Brussels during the decade from the mid-80s to the mid-90s on the one hand, and the French intellectual tradition of universalism on the other hand. There is also a third factor which though difficult to introduce into the discussion, cannot be left out, namely, the complexity of relations between France and what the French call the “Anglo-Saxon” world, an adjective frequently used in a vague way to indicate some or all of the English-speaking countries of the world. In effect, the French intellectual tradition harbours a national sentiment that France incarnates universal values that are destined to transcend its frontiers into the international sphere. It also contains an ambiguous historical relationship with the United States and a critical reading of the political choices that were made in the United States and the United Kingdom during the 1980s. For many segments of French public and political opinion at the time, the governments of Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher embodied the absolute antithesis of the “French model”. Without embarking on a discussion here of the origins of the notion of “libéralisme anglo-saxon”, we can nevertheless conclude that the 1980s had the overall affect of crystallising the notion that France was different. Into this mix of factors we may also add that France has remained a resolutely centralised country despite a number of decentralisation initiatives. A recent reform of the 1958 constitution describes France as being one and indivisible, but also as a “decentralised Republic”. However, the reality is that France is still functioning with a vertical and centrally oriented structure in a large number of sectors. The idea that the State and its “public services” are the guarantors of the equality and uniqueness of the Republic is a fundamental ideological tenet in France, and one that cannot be reduced to the simple defence of “privileges” or of “historically accumulated social rights and benefits”. Indeed, this tenet extends significantly beyond the domain of public services and concepts of what role the State should play; it is a fundamental ingredient of the French social psyche, and is manifest in day-to-day social practices.

In many aspects, France underwent a sea-change during the years 1991-1993, and one which is key to understanding the French attitude towards globalization. In effect, during that period, three phenomena independently rendered France’s relationship with Europe and the rest of the world more problematical: the economic recession of 1992, a climate of strong political debating between a pro-European camp and a more nationalist camp, and the after-effects of the collapse of the Soviet Union.
The rest of this paper will focus, in four parts, on the exact nature of this more “problematical relationship”. However, before we attempt to explain the situation of France vis-à-vis the major globalization issues in “qualitative” terms, let us take a brief look at the possible conclusions to be drawn from the data provided by the Kairos survey.

The overall picture given by the French data in the Kairos survey is that of a more pessimistic attitude towards the future and towards globalization than the average European view. This was true for all three age-groups (young, middle, old), but particularly in the 30-50 age-group. In all the survey’s questions relating to the future and to confidence in the future, the French expressed substantially below average levels of optimism. In addition, the French (again, particularly the 30-50 age-group) expressed an above-average desire for the implementation of measures to protect their national identity and their providential state. The French also expressed more negative associations with the term globalization than the average European: All the positive associations in the survey received higher average scores in the rest of Europe than in France, while all the items suggesting negative consequences from globalization (particularly the threat to employment) obtained higher than average scores in France. The survey clearly shows that globalization is perceived by the French (young and old alike) as being a threat - and an “unavoidable” threat - to national identity and to employment in the country. Although the data does not permit a deeper understanding of these phenomena, it does show, for example, that young French people - and particularly the mid age-group - are substantially less inclined to work abroad than their European peers. The fears and concerns they express about the future are in effect very clearly conditioned by socio-economic worries over and above their concerns relating to the environment, ecological issues, war or terrorism.

The data from the French part of the survey reveals certain gender gaps (in some cases less clearly than in other countries) and distinct “education-level” gaps (stronger than the European average differentials), confirming once again that cultural competence (as measured by degrees, diplomas, etc) has a significant impact on opinions and attitudes towards globalization. The most educated are in general the most favourable to all matters relating to openness to the outside world.

2. THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE FRENCH DEBATE ON GLOBALIZATION

We have started from a basic hypothesis that opposition to globalization in France is more characterised by the place it occupies in the public debate and its expression within social movements than by its ideological contents.

This hypothesis, formulated by Eddy Fougier, is today broadly accepted. It identifies within the milieu at the end of the 1990s a distinct and “characteristically French” tendency to project the critique of globalization into the public domain.
Indeed, this period spurned a particularly active cycle of militant and political initiatives under the banner of altermondialisation: the creation of ATTAC in 1998, an intense campaign against the OECD negotiated Multilateral Agreement on Investment and the destruction of the McDonald’s at Millau by militants of the Confédération Paysanne in August 1999 (in reaction to the US decision to impose higher import duties on French farm produce). This sequence of events – from 1995 to 1999 – made France a global capital of the protest against “liberal globalization” – even before the organisation of the demonstrations at the WTO’s inter-ministerial conference in Seattle in November / December of 1999 – and the cause started to become clearly identified with emblematic figures like José Bové and a few particularly well-known and publicly prominent personalities. It should be noted that within this process, the destruction of the Millau McDonald’s played a very important part in the public’s perception of this protest. Thereafter, globalization-related protest continued to find a strong voice in France with, for example, demonstrations at the Evian G8 summit in the spring of 2003, and, later in the same year, at the European Social Forum in Saint-Denis.

However, despite the momentum of the altermondialisation dynamic in France and the rapid emergence of globalization-related themes in the arena of public debate, it would not be entirely accurate to speak of an altermondialist “movement” *per se* in France. Eddy Fougier describes the phenomenon as a “nebula of groups” rather than as a movement. The objectives, organisational structures and type of militants encountered within the different groups that question, criticise or protest against globalization are broadly disparate. The active participants in the altermondialisation debate therefore form a heterogeneous galaxy of different contributors (which in political terms covers a broad spectrum of the political Left).

Moreover, having recently seen the poor electoral score of the only 2007 French presidential candidate to stand on a clearly altermondialist platform (José Bové), we can conclude that the diversity of the altermondialist “nebula” is not easily reduced to its most visible representatives or groups (such as ATTAC). It should be said at this point that the activities of the groups and players comprising this heterogenous sphere clearly go beyond the framework of “protest” activities and are often expressed via intense lobbying of decision makers and the general public and campaigns on specific themes such as third-world debt, the Tobin tax and genetically modified organisms (GMOs). The provision of information and counter-valuations in the form of second assessments of public policy and corporate decisions is, in many ways, the hidden (but also the most effective) face of the activities of such groups.

Indeed, behind the ATTAC banner and José Bové, there is a multitude of groups that the public is less aware of, but which are nonetheless very actively involved in altermondialist campaigns and are very present ‘on the ground’. These include international solidarity organisations (ISOs), often with confessional origins, such as Agir ici, AITEC, Artisans du monde, Peuples Solidaires, le Réseau Afrique-Europe Foi et Justice, Terre des hommes and other NGOs such as the ecology groups Les Amis de la Terre and Greenpeace as well as Danielle
Mitterrand’s *Human Rights Defense Association - France Libertés*. The French altermondialisation mosaic is therefore not easy to categorise or summarise. In what follows, we have decided to adopt Eddy Fougier’s tripartite typology which distinguishes NGOs, “social movements” and “new protest groups”. What are the main differentiating features of these three categories? What objectives and militant practices distinguish one group from another? According to Fougier, the following distinguishing characteristics can be discerned.

The NGOs affiliated to this altermondialisation sphere are organisations specialised in development aid and the struggle against poverty in the Southern hemisphere, or in environmental protection. However there are also NGOs defending human rights or women’s rights or fighting for the recognition of a ‘therapeutic refugee status’ so that African AIDS patients can be treated in France. The NGOs are essentially involved in actions and campaigns that focus on the situation in Southern hemisphere countries. The basic intellectual matrix underpinning the activities of these groups is fundamentally influenced by development theory and the themes of North-South inequality and centre-periphery relations. The “social movements” category includes groups supporting marginalised segments of the population such as the unemployed, the homeless and the “sans-papiers” (people lacking authorisations to reside or work in France), as well as small-farmer movements and radical unions such as Sud-PTT. These groups express themselves in a different register from the NGOs – via, for example, demonstrations and the occupation of buildings. They seek to enhance or resist the deterioration of the rights of marginalised elements of French capitalist society and to leverage public opinion by spotlighting the situations of those on the economic or legal fringes of the system. Lastly, the “new protest groups” category contains those groups for whom globalization is, in itself, the principal object of protest. They have been specifically created around the theme of globalization. They include associations, such as ATTAC, and networks and “monitoring groups”, all of which express themselves via campaigns and publications. These groups were initially very present in protests focused on the WTO. In terms of their political flavour, these groups can of course be roughly categorised as being either “reformist” - i.e. seeking to engender dialogue with the principal motors of globalization – or “radical” i.e. adopting a more confrontational approach which refuses any compromise with the “system”. These groups embody, in one form or another, the more traditional and historically oldest forms of political protest.

However, many groups have also adopted a form of protest that is rooted in a more contemporary version of political values: This second facet of their protest is related to the “post-materialist” movements (to borrow Ronald Inglehart’s term) of the 1960s and 70s and is quite different from the type of protest traditionally associated with workers’ movements of the past. In the “post-materialist” approach, the struggle is conducted inside the capitalist system by the development of a veritable counter-balance to existing powers in the form of alternative opinions and assessments conducted by qualified experts.

There is of course a considerable degree of crossover between the three categories proposed. The “Leftist movements” find young recruits among these different circles.
The French globalization protest movement therefore has much in common with the nebulous international protest movement, but nevertheless retains certain specificities: on the one hand, the quasi-absence of think-tanks, of groups specialised in globalization research and of radical youth or “alternative” organisations, and on the other hand, a relatively large small-farmer movement and the singularity of ATTAC. Like other movements elsewhere, the French globalization protest movement organises its activities to coincide with major international campaigns (against the WTO and the Breton Woods institutions and in favour of the Tobin tax and the cancellation of third-world debt), but also focuses on specific themes such a Europe, the defence of public services, GMOs, etc. often with a tangible current of anti-Americanism underpinning the adopted positions.

France the protester?

Taken together, the features of globalization-related protest in France tend to suggest that despite many similarities to other countries, the French manifestation is somewhat exceptional. This notion does however need to be treated with caution: While we may accept that the “made in France” altermondialist movement is different from the manifestations of globalization-related protest that have emerged in other countries, we must also accept that the real measure of such protest is the influence it has on society and on the political positions and discourses adopted by the country’s leaders. In France there is a political discourse that projects a critical and anxious vision of globalization.

We can also measure the influence of the French altermondialist sphere by the number of sympathisers and members of its different groups. Of these, ATTAC is the most emblematic: ATTAC today has 30,000 members and 230 local committees. The results of the professional elections of the unions belonging to the altermondialist sphere show that these groups have a certain number of their “troops” in key sectors of this sphere. These sectors are agriculture, the public sector and education. The Confédération paysanne, created in 1987, (small farm-owners confederation) obtained 28% of the vote at the elections to the agriculture chambers in January 2001 (but it scored a lower result in 2007 with less than 20%). The network of unions bearing the acronym SUD (Solidaires Unitaires Démocratiques) obtained significant scores in votes to elect employee representatives to the boards of directors of the major public sector enterprises (second largest score at La Poste and France Télécom, third at the SNCF (national railways)) and also in similar votes within private companies (second place at Michelin for example). And, the FSU is the largest union federation among the nation’s teachers, but also in the civil service. Other yardsticks of the societal influence of altermondialism à la française are the editorial success of books by José Bové, Susan George, Viviane Forrester and Pierre Bourdieu, the growth of sales of Le Monde diplomatique and the creation of the collection “Raison d’Agir” as well as the significant number of petition signatories (110,000 in favour of the Tobin tax... 520,000 for the cancellation of third-world debt) and demonstrators (e.g. at Millau during the trial of Confédération paysanne militants in June 2000).
In addition, opinion polls suggest that these protest groups and their main propositions are positively perceived by a majority of the general population and that, except in the cases of the clearly identified left-wing groups, support or rejection of the fundamental themes does not adhere strictly to any traditional voting patterns. For example, a very large majority of the people interviewed are in favour of the implementation of the Tobin tax and cancellation of third-world debt. During the public service strikes in France in the autumn of 1995, the comprehensive opinions of employees of private companies revealed a sort of “strike by proxy” which could also be interpreted as an indicator of diffused support. In the last section of this paper we shall see how this sort of diffused support is connected with a strong French sense of social-economic pessimism: the French are in fact more prone to a fear of their nation’s inability to manage the effects of globalization (the risk of losing social benefits for example) than to attitudes that reject others or refuse an open economy.

In conclusion, we can ask the following question: is there any evidence that the diversity of the altermondialist sphere in France - and its relative impact in the public domain - translates into a good capacity to influence public policy and political decision making? The answer to this question is somewhat surprising: in effect, evidence that such a capacity exists is fairly lacking, both at the national and the local level. In his most recent analysis, Eddy Fougier cites two examples that perfectly illustrate this paradox: the failure of the negotiations on the Multi-lateral Investment Agreement (MIA) following its withdrawal, and the adoption of legislation related to the Tobin tax. “In the first case, considered as the first ‘victory’ of the protesters, their influence on the French decision was in fact far weaker than they believed at the time. In the second case, the legislation adopted has no practical value and the government, despite exhibiting support for the project, has shown itself to be firmly opposed to any real implementation of a Tobin tax.” Fougier believes that protestor influence depends on two prior conditions being met: when they are advocating the adoption of “specific and concrete micro-propositions” which the French government has the power to implement, and when such micro-propositions are adopted and endorsed by a major political party, in much the same way that, for example, the socialist left channels its demands through the broader French Left.

In sum, the principal achievement of the French groups working in the altermondialisation sphere is that they have managed to “format” a public perception of globalization and to define the terms of the debate. The results of the presidential and legislative elections in May-June 2002 were a good example of this influence. While the electoral score of the far Left was in effect considerably diminished in 2007 as voters used their vote to support the moderate Socialist Party (PS), the importance of altermondialist themes for Left-wing voters is nonetheless a considerable ‘problem’ for the mainstream PS. The parliamentary Left – straddled between economic pragmatism and political principles – has suffered electorally from the contradictions that divided the Left at the 2005 referendum.

We may conclude that in France, as in other countries, globalization-related protest is very much a symptom of a crisis engendered by the difficulty of adapting the “French social
model” and the “Republican model” to a contemporary context characterised by globalization and an intensification of socio-economic mobility.

3. THE ISSUES AND THEMES OF THE FRENCH DEBATE ON GLOBALIZATION

It is difficult to summarise all the areas in which aspects of the globalization phenomenon have penetrated the public domain in France. The term itself is polysemous, used with different meanings in different social and political contexts. Nevertheless, the major themes that have acted as the foundations for public debates in France have been first and foremost related to the principal socio-economic concerns of the French: employment / unemployment, social inequalities and more recently, the standard of living (purchasing power). In effect, these themes have been the main themes of concern for the French over the last three decades. In particular, the theme of employment / unemployment is at the heart of most public debates and it has represented a substantial stumbling block for all French governments since the end of the 1970s. This backdrop cannot be overlooked. It is impossible to understand the level of preoccupation surrounding globalization-related issues in France without bearing in mind the following fundamental realities: a high rate of unemployment in the active population, particularly among young people and the over-50s, a low rate of employment of the overall population, an increasing level of social insecurity, rotation of workers on low productivity jobs, an increasingly bifurcated labour market, a low level of transition from unemployment to employment, absence of forward planning both on the labour side (low level of re-training and mostly focused on the most qualified) and on the side of company restructuring, a low level of investment in research (particularly in the private sector), high mandatory social charges and significant public budget deficits.

3.1. Definitions

A very brief discussion of the terminology. In France, the term globalization is considered an Americanism imposed by the English language, and more fundamentally by “Anglo-Saxon culture”. The French often use the word “globalization” without fully comprehending its historical significance and failed to clearly define it in French, the French term mondialisation being partly appropriate. The term globalization is rarely used in France, being limited to an elite circle of specialists (particularly economists), and has not been adopted in the public arena. Even amongst specialist, the use of the word globalization is tending to recede, taking the same path as the more dated term internationalisation which is today hardly ever employed.

The term mondialisation is used in the titles of most recent works on the subject written in French and its use has today sufficiently penetrated the public domain to allow it to be used in opinion surveys. In some aspects the terminological shift in France from globalization to mondialisation has been similar to the shift in English-speaking counties that
took place between *internationalization* and *globalization*. In France the term *mondialisation* is associated with a range of other terms: the most frequently encountered of which are *marchandisation, libéralisation, déréglementation et délocalisation* (merchandisation, liberalisation, deregulation and relocation). The theme and practice of relocating factories to cheaper labour countries has been a powerful stimulator of unfavourable attitudes to globalization in France. The image of companies closing down their sites and relocating their machinery, leaving behind a bewildered and surprised workforce, has had a powerful impact. Indeed, as many of these relocations have been directed to cheaper locations within the European Union, we will inevitably have to tackle the following question as well: To what extent have globalization and europeanisation become one and the same phenomenon in the eyes of the French?

### 3.2. The fear of relocations

At one point the public debate on globalization became so focused on the question of relocations that a draft law against relocations was drawn up and presented to parliament in 2004 (by a communist member of parliament). Since then, an ex-Prime Minister (Laurent Fabius) has ridden the wave of emotion elicited by certain relocation operations to consolidate his repositioning in the political spectrum and initiate a campaign against a “*Europe des marchands*’ (Europe dominated by economic exchange and devoid of social or political ambition), incapable of resisting the negative effects of globalization. France was not the only country where globalization became strongly associated with relocation. In the United States, the equation occupied a significant space in the 2004 presidential election campaigns. In Germany, Gerhard Schröder, the then Chancellor of the German government, publicly reprimanded the President of the German Chambers of Commerce for having encouraged German entrepreneurs to invest in Eastern Europe. However, it would appear that the public attitude towards globalization in France (a country that is also home to enterprises that have relocated) has been significantly affected by the globalization = relocation equation. In other words, globalization is seen as being responsible for unemployment and de-industrialisation. Interestingly, this view can be found among people of all tendencies in the French political spectrum: may be used quite differently in the public debate, sometimes as part of a mild form of economic patriotism (see below), sometimes in the context of a much stronger nationalist reflex with protectionist or sovereignist views from the left or from the right. Indeed liberal partisans of competitive market economies and globalization may find themselves rubbing shoulders with alter-mondialists and ex-“*tiers-mondistes*” in their efforts to draw attention to the effects of relocating certain activities to Southern or Eastern countries. However, in purely statistical terms, relocations account for very few job losses in France. In total, it is estimated that relocations account for 5% of total job losses in Europe, with the figure for France being 4%.

Relocations are therefore a minor contributor to unemployment which nevertheless heavily affects the less qualified workers in some European Union countries, particularly France. This statistical observation obviously does not mean that we should forget those
affected by factory closures. But are these always genuine relocation operation? To answer this question we need a strict definition of our terms. The French public debate often confuses and mixes “genuine” relocations and growth in imports from emerging countries or from Central and Eastern Europe, as well as “genuine” relocations and flows of foreign direct investment (FDI) which in most cases is destined to supply the local market or for the acquisition of a controlling stake in a competitor.

Another point can be made here. France is the European country that most fears the transfer of jobs to other countries of the European Union, particularly to Eastern Europe. The ground from which the rhetoric about the “Polish plumber” grew during the 2005 referendum campaign was nourished by this fear whereas in fact the NO partisans on the Left were actually arguing in defence of the “Polish plumber” who, they argued, should be able to come and work in France without enjoying the same social rights as the rest of the population. This highlights another confusion that is frequently made in France: between relocations within the European Union and relocations outside the EU to places like China, India or other emerging countries.

3.3. Economic patriotism: a French speciality?

Examples of protectionism can be found all over the world: the Polish government’s attempt to block an Italian bank from merging with its local assets; the French and the Spanish governments’ precipitated mergers of their national energy companies to prevent them from being acquired by other European energy giants; the United States which protects companies from Arab and Chinese buyers on the grounds of national security interests, and European governments’ attempts to block the hostile bid launched by the Indian company Mittal Steel for Arcelor... are just a few examples of an ubiquitous phenomenon.

But in the international game of conquering markets whilst protecting one’s own, France manages to occupy an unusually paradoxical position. Economically, France is an outward-oriented country (exports, foreign direct investment) but simultaneously wishes to be a champion of “economic patriotism”, a notion that has been revisited in recent times by the ex-Prime Minister, Dominique de Villepin. It is worth remembering, however, that one in every seven employees in France works for an industrial enterprise controlled by non-French companies; a much higher proportion than in any other developed European country!

Public debate now seems – somewhat curiously – to have focused on the nationality of companies, with the notion that French nationality means better chances of job protection. The underlying assumption is that the nationality of a company’s capital and directors and the country of its head offices will play a determining role in the location of its activities, the protection of national employment and the development of research. This argument appeals strongly to the general public and occasionally provides the momentum for certain social and political decisions in the country: when Renault restructured its production sites, it preferred to close the site at Vilvoorde in Belgium rather than a French site.
Such examples illustrate a French paradox: that of the contradiction between the realities of economic globalization and the ambition to maintain national control of the economy. This contradiction culminates with the twin French ambition to control the capital of companies on the one hand and to promote the free circulation of capital on the other. Within this apparent contradiction, the French media do not hesitate to present the good performances of France’s industrial champions in Europe, America or Asia as genuine national victories. However, despite this real capacity to operate successfully abroad and exploit the benefits of globalization, and despite the fact that France’s major corporations have often been pioneers in emerging markets, French public opinion has remained fairly negative and fearful towards the notion of globalization – as we shall see below.

Indeed, it is not just French public opinion. The political class of the country also appears to hold views in stark contrast to the major economic choices made since the beginning of the 1980s when the then Left-wing government effectively buried the idea of a national economic development independent of the major global trends and evolutions. The Colbertist State still exists of course, along with its administrative structures; but interventionist and centrally planned economic policy has been abandoned since the early 1980s. The policies of nurturing national champions and of financing major research programmes and major Colbertist projects, all underpinned by economic and commercial protectionism, have been abandoned. France has contributed to the establishment of the single European market and the adoption of the euro; it has also massively privatised its national companies. In the space of twenty years, France has effectively transferred the control of its national enterprises to the financial markets, or, more exactly, to Anglo-American institutional investors (out of 100 billion euros of privatisation revenue, two thirds of these financial assets are owned by these funds). Today, 44% of the total capitalisation of France’s top 40 listed companies (those making up the CAC 40 index) is in the hands of foreign investors!

So what can we conclude about “economic patriotism”? In France, this notion summarises the contradictions and the failures of its governors over the last twenty years: privatisation - but without pension funds; dismantling of the Colbertist state - but maintenance of an interventionist State posture, globalization accepted - but not openly admitted by the political elites on both sides of the political spectrum, and unpopular with the majority of public opinion. And of course, these contradictions become particularly visible when global disequilibria are exacerbated and when the European Union appears to have reached an impasse.

4. EUROPE: A RAMPART AGAINST GLOBALIZATION… OR A SCAPEGOAT?

As we have recently seen, one unique aspect of France’s relationship to globalization is the generalised attribution of responsibility for France’s current economic situation to the transformations and financial flows that are part and parcel of the globalization process.

1. Jean-Baptiste Colbert was a French minister of finance under King Louis XIV.
Public opinion is worried about these changes (we shall examine this point in more detail in parts 3 and 4) and it is under the spell of a syndrome of pessimism and a lack of confidence in the economic and social future. Up until 2005, one might have been forgiven for believing that the majority of French public opinion considered European integration as a rampart against (or at least, a response to) the negative effects of the globalization of exchange. Indeed, until the mid-1990s, French politics had been highly focused on the antagonism between those who favoured a more open Europe and those who favoured protectionism and the defence of the nation. The 1992 referendum crystallised this political combat into partisans of “Yes” and “No” to Europe. The “Yes” campaigners advanced the idea that European economic, monetary and political integration was the only viable option in the face of the emergence of new economic powers. The “No” campaign was primarily focused on the potential loss of economic and political sovereignty.

The size of the “No” victory in the referendum of 29 May 2005 was a stark indicator of how perceptions of European integration evolved over the intervening 13 years. By 2005, the political split had changed in character: the referendum was less about “yes/no” to European integration, and more about the way it should conducted. Not “do you want integration?” but rather “what type of integration?”. This evolution clearly shows that in 13 years, from 1992 to 2005, the European question had indeed become more politicised in France, and yet still had not managed to establish that more Europe would equal more protection against globalization. As all the surveys show, France is one of the European countries where the fear of the socio-economic consequences of Europe is the highest, and where the fear that more Europe means more relocations (see above) is also very strong. It therefore impossible to conclude that the French consider Europe as being economically powerful or efficient in the face of globalization. In comparison to other European populations, the French are only “luke-warm” to the idea of European integration which is experienced more as an acquired right and a fact rather than as a political ambition. In comparisons of European opinion survey results on the question of European integration, the French are positioned mid-way between the “Europhiles” and the “Europhobes”.

The result of the referendum of 29 May 2005 cannot be interpreted as a freak mood swing on the part of the electorate caused by an unfavourable set of political circumstances. A year after the European elections (13 June 2004) that had allowed the electorate to deliver a strong vote of no confidence to the Raffarin government, the referendum of 29 May 2005, partly liberated from the political context of a year earlier, demonstrated in a much clearer and more significant way than the European elections exactly how much the question of European integration is a deeply problematical issue for the electorate and for the French political parties. In effect, the magnitude of the “No” victory can be seen as reflecting the social, ideological and political dynamics within the country which, over the previous ten years, had progressively evolved towards a consolidation and broadening of Euro-scepticism. Remember that in 1992 the Maastricht Treaty was adopted with only 51.4% of the vote and that in the first round of the presidential elections in France on 21 April 2002 the candidates bearing messages that were critical, sceptical, or distinctly hostile to European
integration gained 40% of the votes. Thus, as the European dimension has grown in the French public debate, it has gradually become a fundamental part of electors’ perceptions of their socio-economic environment. The referendum of 29 May 2005 showed that voters, in spite of their poor knowledge of European integration, engage in a complex system of information-processing in order to attribute social and political meaning to the process of European integration. The roots of this process would appear to be increasingly nourished by uncertainties and worries, and particularly the fear of unemployment resulting from the relocation of activities and jobs, for which they blame the European Union: In the autumn of 2003, the Eurobarometer survey found that 86% of the French respondents fear that further development of the European Union will lead to the relocation of economic activities to other EU countries with cheaper production costs.

What constructs underlie the sociological and political cleavages revealed by the 29 May 2005 referendum, and how do these constructs fit into the broader picture, i.e. the links the French make between advancement of European integration and exposure to globalization risks? In this paper we argue that the “No” vote in the referendum on the European Constitution was already significantly “discounted” in the slow structuring of French opinion vis-à-vis European integration and globalization issues. Without wishing to engage in a “sociological reductionism” and not denying the decisive importance of the political context in the spring of 2005, we nevertheless believe that the cleavages exposed by the vote already existed and that they had been clearly visible in French Public opinion for several years. We support this view by reference to the Eurobarometer survey of spring 2004, and to the European Election Study 2004 and data from the Panel électoral français de 2002.

4.1. Constructs on Europe and the economic context

When it comes to voting on European issues, voters are guided by a whole range of opinions, attitudes and values. Their perception of European reality is particularly sensitive to prevailing economic conditions. Such conditions are particularly influential when voters have to make a retro-active assessment of the impact of the progress towards European integration on their country or on their daily existence. From this point of view, the 29 May 2005 referendum took place against a backdrop of rising unemployment and a strong climate of pessimism about the present and the short-term economic future. The Eurobarometer surveys show that the level of confidence about European integration is very closely related to contextual economic conditions: As the graph below shows, there is a distinct relationship - and not just in France - between negative attitudes towards Europe and the level of unemployment (or GDP growth). According to Eurobarometer data, in the period since 1981, the answer “the European Union is a bad thing” for France was lowest (4 to 8%) between 1984 and 1990 when unemployment was relatively low. Thereafter more negative opinions started to appear through 1997 in correlation with the growing unemployment rate. At the end of the 1990s, unemployment started to contract and so did the negative responses which nevertheless remained above 10%; as of 2001 both measures began to increase again, with the highest level of negative responses being reach in 2004 (18%).
Poor economic outlooks combined with levels of unemployment above 10% of the active population create a context that is particularly favourable to the development of unfavourable attitudes towards European integration and globalization. In a difficult economic context, mistrust of political or economic processes, perceived as being imposed from outside and threatening, may be integrated into individual perceptions of the causes of the difficult context. Pessimism about personal and professional situations, and particularly about the economic situation of the country, can become associated with “Euro-pessimism”. According to the *European Election Study* conducted after the European elections in 2004 in France, of those declaring that France’s economic situation had deteriorated over the preceding twelve months, only 36% indicated that France’s membership of the EU was “a good thing”, whereas this proportion rose to 75% among those who believed the economic situation had significantly improved.

The level of confidence in institutions - whether national or European - also has an impact on opinions about Europe: the higher the level of confidence, the greater the support for European integration. Socio-economic pessimism when combined with mistrust of political institutions produces a syndrome of social and political pessimism which becomes a decisive factor in French political attitudes towards European integration. In other words, when voters have a particularly negative view of their social environment, this view is transferred to their attitude towards Europe: those who consider that French democracy functions badly do not support Europe.

The referendum of the 29 May 2005 clearly took place against a backdrop of economic pessimism and a crisis of confidence in executive powers. These two factors provided the stimulus for voters to activate already existing fears and questions about European integration. This leads to one of the fundamental conclusions of our analysis: fears about
Europe are of a similar nature to fears concerning globalization, and the vectors of these fears are exactly the same: fear of job losses, fear of a deterioration in social protection, and, at the same time, a suspicious view of all initiatives based on change, innovation or reconstruction. Once activated, these fears were partly translated into negative votes. In effect, “social anxiety” was the main theme of the 29 May 2005 referendum, and it is a similar anxiety that is providing the cement for anti-globalization. According to the survey conducted by TNS-Sofres on the day of the vote, the primary reason for voting “No” was the conviction that “this treaty will result in higher unemployment in France”; the second reason given was being “fed up with the current situation”. In effect, the “No” campaign managed to mix the European question with the wide-spread mood of social anxiety and it successfully linked the two domains in the minds of many voters. There is, however, one significant difference between a typical anti-Europe stance and a typical anti- or alter-globalization stance: more than anti-European opinions, opinions critical of globalization tend to be accompanied by the idea that “another world” is possible, a very important expression for the alter-globalization movement in France. In other words, alter-globalist or alter-mondialist opinions, particularly in their Left-leaning manifestations, are less likely to have any connection with xenophobic views; in fact, quite the opposite: the Left-leaning alter-mondialists express themselves very clearly under a banner of fraternity between peoples and a fairer world.

4.2. Political and ideological constructs on the question of Europe

The issues raised by the process of European integration have their roots in fundamental ideological debates which are the sources of profound divisions, including amongst voters. The main theme of the public debate surrounding the referendum on ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 was the place of the Nation-State and the exercise of its sovereignty inside the new emerging political landscape. The principal antagonists of this debate were the “sovereignists” who were particularly hostile to the idea of a single currency, and “Europeanists” who were in favour of introducing a single currency. According to the detailed analyses of surveys conducted during that period, the sovereignists were mainly in the Right-wing camp and particularly the extreme-Right, but also in the Communist Party. However, opposition to the Maastricht Treaty could be found within all parties. At the end of the day, close to two thirds of voters from the parliamentary Left voted in favour of ratification, while voters from the parliamentary Right were equally divided between the “Yes” and the “No” vote. The political situation at the time (with the Left in power) partly explains this result. But analysis of voters’ responses to questions about the consequences of European integration from the point of view of their political party allegiances showed clearly that perceptions of Europe were the dominant criteria in the vote. As of 1992, the degree of coherence between opinions and votes is very high; but it begins to congeal around opinion systems that confound the traditional Left/Right cleavage. From the beginning of the 1990s, a new split between pro- and anti-Europeans emerges, transcending the Left/Right cleavage, and based on a generalised opposition of moderates to extremists with the most anti-European views found at both extremes of the political spectrum.
The referendum of the 29 May 2005 accentuated this phenomenon of ideological restructuring by allowing voters to express their fears, criticisms, and even rejection of a Europe on the basis of its perceived track-record over the previous fifteen years. Already in 2002, we argued, in collaboration with Céline Belot, that European integration had created not one but two splits in French public opinion: the first between pro- and anti-integration partisans, confounding the traditional Left/Right cleavage; and a second focused on fears of the social consequences of the development of European integration, particularly for France’s social security system. This second split, distinct and independent of the first, brought the Left/Right cleavage back into focus: Left-leaning voters, socialists and ecologists in particular, expressed themselves as being in favour of European integration, but concerned, if not worried, about the social consequences. The cleavages revealed by the referendum of 29 May 2005 are thus an extension of the opinions of Left-leaning voters since the beginning of the 1990s. The surveys indicate an increase in Left-wing opposition to European integration based less on an opposition to the principles of integration from the point or view of national values and French sovereignty (a Right-wing theme) than on considerations of a socio-economic nature leading to a critique of the methods by which Europe is being constructed. Thus, while supporters of the National Front and the Communist party may appear to agree in their rejection of Europe, they are doing so for diametrically opposed reasons: defence of French identity for the former; acceptance of the European idea, but rejection of a “liberal” Europe, for the latter.

Over recent years, this critical perception of European integration has been adopted by a large number of ecologists and socialists, a phenomenon that gathered additional pace during the 2005 referendum campaigns, leading a clear majority of voters in these two camps to join the “No” vote (approx. 60%).

The European Constitution was rejected in France essentially because a clear majority (even if it was less massive than has often been indicated) of Left-leaning voters has adopted a critical vision of Europe, perceived as being at the origin of economic difficulties and a threat to the French social model.

Paradoxically, the Leftist critique of European construction further confounds the traditional ideological reference points since among those apparently belonging to the same political family, there are many who have diametrically opposed positions regarding the future of Europe. The forthcoming elections in France are therefore currently being battled out on this ideologically uncertain terrain.

4.3. Sociological analysis of opinions regarding Europe

These ideological shifts, primarily affecting voters in the different currents of the Left, can also be analysed from a sociological point of view. All survey data available so far shows that attitudes towards Europe are - in France and elsewhere - very correlated to social categories: the highest proportion of very negative attitudes to Europe is found among employees
in the lowest social categories with the lowest levels of education. Inversely, the lowest proportion of such attitudes is found among managers and upper-middle class professionals. The difference in attitude between voters from different social backgrounds is even more apparent if we factor in the intensity of an individual’s connection to the “working class” environment (i.e. being a labourer, a factory worker, a service worker, or a low-paid operator and having close family ties with other people in the same category, such as a father and/or a spouse, etc.): the stronger the links with the “working class”, the stronger the criticism and rejection of European integration. An individual’s perception of his/her social condition therefore contributes to the structuring of his/her opinions towards Europe: Those who describe themselves as “poor”, “marginalised” or “working class” generally carry the most negative opinions towards Europe.

In previous research we have already concluded that this vertical (i.e. class-based), objective and subjective divide, highly correlated to the hierarchy of professions and qualifications obtained, is hardly affected by other aspects of social status, with one or two exceptions: for example, the survey conducted by the Panel électoral français de 2002 showed that workers in the public sector had become a little more Euro-sceptical than their peers in the private sector. Opinions on European integration are thus clearly segmented according to a sociological and educational scale that opposes better-qualified, better-paid professionals whose work involves mobility and exchanges with European countries, and low-paid workers, especially those with relatively little educational and cultural capital. The other notable bias in the data is that men tend to be more pro-Europe than women.

By focusing on the themes of “social Europe” and anti-liberalism”, did the 2005 “No” campaign manage to crystallise political opinions in France back into a traditional Left/Right formation? Two significant changes appear to have occurred on 29 May 2005. Firstly, the “No” vote was large among socio-economic categories where previously a majority were in favour of European Integration: the so-called “intermediate” professions (teachers, health workers, educators, corporate middle management) and, more generally, public sector employees in all domains. According to the polling station exit-poll conducted by IPSOS on 29 May, 53% of “intermediate” professionals and “64%” of public employees voted “No” (vs. 38% and 49% respectively in 1992). Further analysis tends to show that the switch to the “No” vote was strongest amongst employees with average salaries and threatened by downward mobility and that this trend was already visible in the Panel électoral survey of 2002. The second fundamental evolution in the 2005 referendum was the weakness of the “Yes” vote among the Leftist population; the phenomena are of course linked: public sector employees, particularly those in the intermediate professions, form the foundation of the socialist vote in France.

Naturally these general trends can be nuanced with additional data from the survey: for example, the most educated respondents, whether young or old, expressed being generally in favour of the dimensions of exchange and opportunity flows that globalization offers; however, they expressed fear that globalization will induce greater unemployment
nearly as strongly as the least qualified respondents. Their overall vision nevertheless remained favourable to globalization (cultural exchange, mutual comprehension, greater mobility between EU countries, individual opportunities, etc.)... but not naïve. Amongst the less educated, our survey data reveals all the worries and fears with respect to Europe that emerged in the 2005 referendum.

In conclusion to this section of the essay, it would appear that the French do not see the European Union as promising any additional protection against globalization. While the two phenomena are not perceived as being identical, there is a very close resemblance in the political and social opinion constructs that are being applied to them.

Another inevitable conclusion is that over the last twenty years, a crisis of political representation in France has prevented French leaders from finding ways of explaining this changing world and its contradictions to French citizens. How can we explain the “syndrome of pessimism” in which French public opinion appears to be wallowing? What are the causes - and - how deep is it? We shall attempt to answer these questions in the fourth part below.

5. POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE PERCEPTIONS OF GLOBALIZATION IN FRANCE: SENSE OF DECLINE AND FEAR OF GLOBALIZATION, A COLLECTIVE SYNDROME “À LA FRANÇAISE”?

In this fourth section, we wish to conclude with a number of less specific and more generalised explanations and observations. Globalization is of course positively perceived by the groups and social categories that gain, or stand to gain, the most from this historical process both in France and in other European countries. Managers, educated people and city dwellers see the benefits of globalization far more than the social categories more exposed to its negative effects. But there is a generalised feeling in France that the country will not be able to withstand the shock.

Let us propose here our subjective opinion: we should not seek to explain this pessimism as being some kind of innate national characteristic. Indeed, a stereotypical view already exists in which France is supposedly suffering from a “change-refusal” syndrome which is said to be the principal characteristic of the French compared to other European countries. We do not agree with this easy and superficial analysis: Many sectors of French society are advancing, changing, transforming and adapting to the need for innovation. In fact, France is undergoing a sort of silent mutation. The real difficulty France is facing is a combination of fears about the future and worries about the social consequences of innovation and modernisation. This syndrome of socio-economic pessimism is coupled with a strong feeling of mistrust towards the political class. It is therefore more the perception that the French have of globalization seen through the prism of unemployment and the crisis of political representation in France that is at the root of the problem. There is in effect a strong
contrast between this syndrome and the advances made by certain sectors of French society and the economy. We will discuss this French paradox in the final conclusion.

For the time being we believe it is useful to analyse the above-mentioned combination of attitudes using the data collected by recent surveys (the CEVIPOF’s French political barometer surveys). The first wave of French political barometer surveys, conducted in the spring of 2006, revealed two major and significant characteristics of the French “state of mind”: Pessimism and lack of confidence in leaders. The high level of pessimism was above all expressed in relation to economic and social matters, and the lack of confidence concerned the entire political system in France.

The first wave of the CEVIPOF’s BPF survey (French political barometer) was conducted during the CPE crisis (strong resistance to a modification of labour law) in the spring of 2006. At that time, French society appears to have been in the grips of a profound pessimism: more than half the French respondents interviewed (54%) indicated that they “they find it difficult to make ends meet with their household income”. Pessimism concerning standards of living was very widespread - and not just among the unemployed - 76% of whom gave pessimistic responses - but also among employed people (52%) and inactive or retired respondents (55%). Overall, 76% of the respondents expressed the view that “young people of today will have less chance of succeeding in the France of the future than their parents had in their day”. Indeed, such was the breadth and depth of this pessimism that no segment of the population was immune to it: From the youngest to the oldest and from the most vulnerable to unemployment to the most fortunate classes… the entire spectrum appears to have been affected by an attitude of pessimism about the future. Hence, while 80% of the respondents who indicated difficulty surviving on their current incomes also expressed pessimism regarding their children’s futures, the percentage was almost as high (70%) among those who said they survived “easily”.

This pessimism concerning individuals’ personal situations and their children’s futures also extended into a generalised pessimism concerning the country at large: 74% of those interviewed were pessimistic about “the evolution of the economic situation in France over the next 6 years”, a particularly high percentage, even if public opinion has been pessimistic about the economic situation in France for a number of years. Young people (78% of the 18-24 age-group) and older people (73% of the over-65s), senior managers and self-employed professionals (61%) and workers (74%), those on the Left (78%) but also those on the Right - and therefore ideologically closer to the current government (66%) - all expressed the same pessimistic outlook. Again, what was striking was the breadth of the phenomenon through the different segments of the electorate - as though pessimism about the economic future of the country has no socio-economic limits.

This pessimism was coupled with an almost total disbelief in government promises to reduce unemployment. We should, however, not forget that this first wave of the CEVIPOF’s political barometer was conducted right in the middle of the political crisis provoked by
the government’s attempt to introduce a new standard labour contract with more flexible conditions for employers (CPE). Whatever the exact reality of the economic situation at the time, the reduction of unemployment was certainly not accredited to government policy. Indeed, only 23% of respondents thought that unemployment had fallen. The public pessimism encountered by the BPF cannot be solely attributed to the prevailing politico-economic climate or to the unpopularity of the government at the time. This pessimism appears to be a structural phenomenon underpinned by the notion that “France is suffering” from global changes and from its exposure to the world economy. The latter is today perceived more as a constraint and a threat than as a choice and an opportunity. French public opinion appears to be highly aware of the uncertainties linked to the global changes that are taking place. In this respect, the BPF data gives us an additional insight in a direction that interests us directly: The feeling that “France is suffering” is not just related to the globalization of economic exchange and the enhanced mobility of labour and individuals; it is also related to anxieties about European integration. In fact the first-wave BPF measures French opinions regarding various different facets of the globalization process. These different facets revealed a very high level of social and political anxiety: 46% of respondents expressed the view that globalization “presents more of a danger to France because it threatens its enterprises and its social model” whereas only 24% agreed with the idea that it “presents more of an opportunity because it opens up foreign markets and acts as a stimulus to modernisation” (30% were unable to support either affirmation). Moreover, the BPF data is completely coherent with the data produced by the Eurobarometer survey: In these European surveys, France is one of the European countries where the fear of the socio-economic consequences of globalization is the most pronounced. When asked which aspects of globalization are the most worrisome, the French express a broad range of fears, notably in the economic domain: 42% think that France is suffering from the “globalization of economic exchange” (vs. 25% who think France is “benefiting”); 41% believe that France is suffering from “the increasing mobility of workers within the European Union” (vs. 18% who think France is “benefiting”) and 34% agreed with the notion that France is suffering from “the increasing mobility of individuals within the European Union” (vs. 23% who think France is “benefiting”). As we saw in section 3, Europe is apparently perceived as not providing any sort of shield against globalization; however the perception of Europe is also coloured by the syndrome of a “suffering France”: 41% affirmed that France is suffering from European integration versus 27% who expressed the opposite view. These figures essentially tell us that French public opinion attributes responsibility for the objective and subjective problems encountered in France to exterior phenomena (globalization, Europe) and that these problems are perceived as being a consequence of an open and “globalised” economy.

Once again, all social brackets are concerned, including those whose social profiles least expose them to the negative effects of globalization: 39% of senior managers and self-employed professionals consider that “France is suffering from the globalization of economic exchange”, a proportion not much lower than that expressed by manual workers (45%). Amongst those respondents with higher education degrees and diplomas, 35% also believed that France is suffering from the increasing mobility of workers within the European
Union (the figure was 41% among the less-qualified respondents holding French vocational certificates BEPC, CAP or BEP). This image of a France not managing to profit from any of the major global changes is not restricted to political radicals whose discourses are often highly critical of globalization, of worker mobility and of the European project: thus while 48% of far-Left respondents and 47% of far-Right respondents agreed with the notion that “France is suffering from the globalization of economic exchange”, almost as many moderate Left and Right sympathisers (41% and 39% respectively) ticked the same box.

We have the same scenario with respect to the affirmation that France is suffering from the increasing mobility of workers within the European Union, and to a lesser extent, with the “assessment” of European integration.

Hence, opinions about globalization – just like those on European integration – clearly transcend the Left / Right cleavage. However, as we discuss later on, the BPF data does nevertheless reveal that opinions on both themes (globalization and European integration) are to some extent politicised. The cleavage between the “Right-wing NO” and the “Left-wing NO” revealed by the referendum on the European Constitution of 29 May 2005 is also visible in the opinions expressed concerning globalization. While French opinion is on the whole very worried about the consequences of globalization, we can nevertheless see clear differences between Right-wing fears and Left-wing fears.

One such difference is reflected in the respective Left / Right fears concerning globalization-related mobility of persons. The BPF data offered two differently formulated questions to respondents in this respect: One question used the term “individual mobility” whereas the other used the term “worker mobility”. Each term used produced very different results: while 46% of far-Left and 41% of Left sympathisers consider that France is suffering from the “mobility of workers within the European Union”, only 33% and 29% respectively of those with the same political leanings see “individual mobility within the EU” as a problem. In contrast, on the Right, both types of mobility captured the same levels of negative appreciation and on the far-Right, individual mobility is seen as much more of a problem than labour mobility: the unemployed or inactive foreigner is more feared than the foreign worker.

As we have seen in the analysis proposed by Pascal Perrineau and Jérôme Jaffré, this pessimism and these fears all lead to a fairly widespread feeling that France is somehow in the throes of decline. According to their analysis, six times more respondents consider that France is declining than those who believe France is progressing: 52% versus 8%. This sense of decline is not an idea that is solely linked to a negative view of globalization. Even among those who think France benefits from globalization, the sense of decline is fairly common and it is prevalent in all domains: 74% of respondents think that France is declining in terms of purchasing power (vs. 7% the opposite and 19% neither); 48% think that France is declining in terms of its schools and universities (vs. 19% the opposite and 33% neither); 47% hold the same view about France’s health system (vs. 31% the opposite and
22% neither); 46% think that France’s influence in the world is declining (vs. 19% the opposite and 35% neither); 45% believe that French social solidarity is declining (vs. 24% the opposite and 31% neither) and 42% believe that the competitiveness of its companies is declining (vs. 22% the opposite and 36% neither). The only domains in which the progress score outstrips the decline score are research and innovation, as well as cultural influence.

In their analysis, Pascal Perrineau and Jérôme Jaffré propose a typology that is useful for understanding the phenomenon of the “politicisation” of opinions on the decline of France, and indirectly, on globalization. They conclude that the sense of decline can be broken down into two distinct elements: “the decline of France as a power” (in terms of France’s global influence, its corporate competitiveness, its schools and universities) and the “decline of France as the bearer of certain values” (in terms of social solidarity, the health system, the purchasing power of its inhabitants). Whereas the former element clearly refers to France’s position in the global hierarchy and in the sphere of international competition, the latter evokes the notion of a deterioration in social cohesion.

The “politicisation” of opinions on the decline of France is expressed in our data by the sociology of the two types of opinions: 44% of respondents generated a high score on the feeling “France is declining as a power”; however, this feeling is most prevalent among small business owners, enterprise leaders, senior management and self-employed professionals. On the political spectrum, this sentiment is most pronounced by the Right and the far-Right. The sentiment of “France declining from the point of view of values associated with social solidarity” is more pronounced by the electorate as a whole (58% of respondents generated a high score on this sentiment) and particularly by “intermediate” professionals and Left voters.

On the basis of these results Pascal Perrineau and Jérôme Jaffré have constructed an indicator that distributes opinions vis-à-vis a “declining France”: more than a quarter of the population (28%) do not share this view, whether “power-related” or “value related”; more than a quarter (28% also) believe France is declining in terms of values; 14% only see France as declining in terms of power, and lastly 30% consider that France is declining on both scores. These differences in attitudes towards French decline and globalization are linked to a sentiment of mistrust of the country’s political elites that is also very prevalent in the BPF data: 37% of respondents considered themselves to be “neither Left nor Right” (a high percentage and one that has hardly evolved throughout the duration of the BPF) and 69% declared having no confidence in either the Left or the Right “to govern the country in the coming months”.

From this material Pascal Perrineau and Jérôme Jaffré have built a typology of the distance or proximity (i.e. degree of integration) of French voters to the French political system:
– those who are “integrated”: they position themselves on the Left-Right spectrum (on the Left, in the Centre or on the Right) and declare confidence in either the Left or the Right to govern the country;
– those who are “sceptical”, who position themselves on the Left-Right spectrum, but have no confidence in either side to govern the country;
– those who are “outside the system”, i.e. who do not position themselves on the Left-Right spectrum, and have no confidence in either side to govern the country.

The spread of the three types is as follows: less than a third (28%) of French are “integrated”, 37% are “sceptical” and 35% are “outside the system” (3% not falling into any of the classes). Thus, the “outside the system” camp represents more than a third of the national electorate. These “outside the system” electors declare being particularly mistrustful about politics and they express very strong fears concerning Europe and globalization. This attitude is not only widespread among young people, but also among the older age-groups (up to the age of 50). The proportion is high among the middle classes and even higher among the lower classes (45% of employees and workers). On the political spectrum, “outside the system” electors tend to be affiliated to or supporters of the smaller political parties, and are generally more represented on the Left than on the Right: 31% of Left-wing sympathisers fall into this category compared with only 20% from the Right (excluding the political extremities).

To end this section we would like to try to identify how the different elements highlighted so far fit together in French public opinion. The French specificity is undoubtedly the breadth and depth of the syndrome of opinions that draws together fears of the effects of innovation and modernisation with political mistrust and scepticism. In order support this interpretation, we are obliged to make a bold assumption: We believe that two fundamental elements have been traditionally linked in France. On one hand there is the sense of national identity, and on the other hand there is the conviction that the State should play a fundamental social and protective role. No other European country has developed such a profound historical link between these two notions. In France, national cohesion and social cohesion are very contiguous and related concepts. In our opinion, this explains why any dilution or modification of one of these elements is automatically perceived as having an impact on the other. Europe and globalization are perceived by the French as inevitable facts of the modern world; but the French are above all sensitive to the consequences of these processes on the social “pact” that links them to their country. French social pessimism (i.e. pessimism about social matters) is fuelled by this mindset even if vast segments of French society and of France’s economy are indeed moving vigorously in time with the global pace of change. The crisis of political leadership, and more generally, the crisis of identification with the political process, has come about because France’s political elites have been unable to project a coherent strategy for incorporating global evolution, and this past incapacity has now become an obstacle in itself to the implementation of solutions involving adaptation.
6. CONCLUSIONS

Bearing in mind the conclusions we have suggested in this essay, what overall picture should be retained?

France’s relationship to globalization would appear to be riddled with paradox. Today, the global population is over six billion. Europe, which represented 20% of the global population in 1970, today only represents 5%. In line with this trend, France’s population today represents less than 1% of the global population! At the same time, its degree of openness to the global economy, as measured by the ratio trade as a proportion of GDP, has increased from 11% in 1960 to 22% in 2005-2006. During this period, France has opened to the global economy and to foreign capital and its enterprises have acquired large market shares in Europe and the rest of the world.

If we compare France to its neighbours, we note that over the same period the United Kingdom raised its trade/GDP ratio from 16 to 20% and the United States from 3 to 10%. The comparison with the UK, always presented as the most open economy in Europe and as that which has best managed the adaptation to a globalised world, is particularly interesting. It shows not only the high level of openness of the French economy but also the rapidity of its transformation over this period. Collectively, the major companies listed in the main Paris stock market index (the CAC 40) generate two-thirds of their revenues abroad and employ two-thirds of their workforces outside France. The French economy today represents 5% of total global economic exchange. In 2005, France was the world’s fifth largest exporter of goods (representing a value of 350 billion euros) and the world’s fourth largest exporter of services (worth more than 90 billion euros). In terms of GDP, France has sixth place in the global ranking and third place in Europe. France does therefore appear to be surviving - to say the least - in a context of international competition. But at the same time, a majority of French voters expressed their fear of the excesses of globalization by voting “No” in the referendum of 29 May 2005 and the most spectacular relocations of activities, such Hewlett Packard’s plant, regularly hit the headlines of the newspapers.

France is not in fact standing still, as we are often given to believe. To cite the title of a recent work edited by Bruno Palier, Peter Culpepper and Peter Hall, France is “in mutation”. Contrary to the theories suggesting decline, France is not “allergic to change”. We note in passing that for convenience we have used the term France throughout this text in the full awareness that in certain cases it lacks precision: does “France” refer to its economy, its social structures, its elites, the French people? The most pronounced characteristic of the French people is in effect their loss of confidence in the capacity of the social political and economic elites of the country to anticipate and accompany the mutations resulting from and linked to European integration and globalization. The French have also lost confidence in their leaders ability to foresee and find answers these changes. However, as mentioned above, there is just this one specific difficulty that the French have to contend with: France is without any doubt one of the world’s countries in which the concepts of national identity
and the social cohesion are the most strongly related. Being French is also about respecting a certain form of social cohesion - sometimes referred to as the “French social model”. This handsome phrase may of course not mean a great deal in practical terms since it refers essentially to a symbolic notion of national identity and values; but it is nevertheless particularly rooted in the national psyche of most French citizens. Indeed, the winners and losers in the process of globalization are not evenly distributed across the national territory. The tensions resulting from certain globalization-induced imbalances could well find further expression on 22 April 2007 as they did on 21 April 2002 and 29 May 2005.
ITALIANS AND THE GLOBALIZATION CHALLENGE

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1. OVERVIEW OF THE GLOBALIZATION DEBATE

In Italy, generally speaking, globalization is not a topic emerging frequently in the public debate. It is certainly not uppermost in the minds either of politicians and policy-makers or, witness the lack of specific surveys, pollsters and opinion-makers. So far globalization has not acquired a distinct position in the Italian public debate nor in the political and cultural discourse. There is, of course, the scattered awareness that the Italian political system as a whole, Italian governmental office-holders and entrepreneurs are no longer in full control of their respective realm of activities and that powerful, largely uncontrollable, international, transnational, and supranational forces do affect constantly and significantly many, perhaps, even most, “national” decisions and activities. However, globalization, especially in the field of communication and financial transactions, seems to be taken for granted, being, to some extent, an inevitable and, on the whole, not too damaging a phenomenon. But in the past decade or so, another issue has surfaced and acquired greater saliency: the impact of the European Union on Italian politics, society, economy.

Popularly accepted as quite a positive factor by a vast majority of Italians who had always considered European institutions an anchor connecting Italy with the better functioning democratic regimes of the member States and the overall process of political unification a promise of a better life, recently the European Union has lost some of its charm, especially in the eyes of center right voters. In all likelihood, this loss of charm is a consequence of the negative political campaign run by former Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi’s center-right coalition as well as the perceived increase in EU regulations and sanctions. Hence, most of the social and economic problems and difficulties, that some would usually associate with globalization, are now attributed by several Italians to the malfunctioning and the bureaucratisation of the European Union. On the other hand, there are still many who believe that if Italy is to protect herself from the damaging impact of the currents of globalization or even to take advantage from some of them, it will have actively to collaborate with the other member states of the European Union through the European Commission and the European Parliament.

All this said, it is clear why I believe that is quite difficult to identify a specific period in which globalization became to be considered an important phenomenon in Italy. Equally
difficult is to select specific reasons behind the belated realisation that, indeed, globalization had now reached all of us, Italians. What is certain, however, is that, in 2000, 78 per cent of Italians said that they were preoccupied/very preoccupied by globalization, that is, by the impact of world trends on their life and on the economy. By 2003, the percentage had gone down to 66 per cent. By 2005 only 37 per cent declared that they were frequently preoccupied by the impact of globalization. By a way of comparison, 50 per cent of them felt frequently preoccupied by the issues of war and unemployment (data courtesy of Ilvo Diamanti and Fabio Bordignon who run “LaPolis” Survey). Hence, it would not be inappropriate to say that globalization may have been in the past, but it is not today an especially important topic in the public debate and in the socio-political discourse. Therefore, it would be somewhat difficult to identify a precise date in which it became important. However, it may perhaps be said that globalization made a sudden, though not necessarily unpredictable and unanticipated, irruption into Italian politics at the G8 meeting in the city of Genoa in July 2001.

The slogans and the protests of the large and composite no global movement that showed up in Genoa had different targets, one of them being the newly elected center-right government led by Silvio Berlusconi. In addition, of course, the target was also identified in the policies followed by the most highly industrialized governments of the world which, according to the demonstrators, were more or less deliberately working against the poor countries and, in any case, were allowing the winds of globalization to create and deepen socio-economic inequalities even in the wealthy countries. Overall, it seems to me that, more than the troubling existence of a phenomenon called globalization, the dramatic Genoa events highlighted the availability of several thousands individuals, many groups, and associations to criticize and physically attack the representatives of their government. What really became visible at the time was the existence of a cross-national movement made of anti-global, no-global, new global participants, entertaining different views, but united by their opposition against the perceived policies of their governments.

Even though I am not aware of in-depth studies of the opinions held by party leaders, party activists, and party members on globalization and other international and transnational related issues, globalization does not appear clearly to divide left wing from right wing political parties. The distribution of opinions is in Italy much more complex. During the most recent 2006 electoral campaign, no party explicitly stressed the issue of globalization as a significant one by this implying that they thought there were no votes to be gained by so doing putting a positive or negative emphasis on the phenomenon. Notably, party platforms devoted at the most a couple of lines indicating that globalization is a problem to be faced. Interestingly enough, the 281-page manifesto of the “Unione”, that is, the victorious centre-left coalition, contains one single extremely vague and tangential reference to globalization. “Within the larger and more complex framework of globalization one can detect a shared crisis that ought to bring Europe to give impetus to new common policies of regional development, founded on universal principles”.

With reference to their infrequent declarations, it is, however, possible to state that, generally speaking, within the centre-left one finds three groups: Communist Refoundation, Italian Communists, and the Greens that are largely opposed to globalization. They are joined by a wing of the Left Democrats representing less than one third of the party, usually trying to shape a position of its own. The bulk of the Left Democrats and the other relatively strong party of the center-left, called Margherita (Daisy), believe that, on the whole and in many specific areas and sectors, globalization will entail more positive than negative effects, though, of course, the challenge will consist in providing some guidance and in controlling globalization potentially negative consequences.

Within the centre-right coalition, one finds the paradox of a tycoon entrepreneur, Silvio Berlusconi, the founder and leader of Forza Italia, who is verbally favourable to globalization, but, in practice, in addition to showing himself much Euroskeptic, has not pursued any of those policies (trade, liberalization, mobility), usually associated with globalization. On the whole, among centre right parties, only the Northern League is explicitly criticizing globalization. This position is fundamentally due, perhaps, to that fact that the Northern League represents small entrepreneurs who appear to suffer more from unregulated competition. There is also one wing of the transformed neo-fascist National Alliance that, not unexpectedly, has reacted against globalization in the name of, so to speak, a neo-communitarian vision, that is, in order to preserve Italian traditions. Overall, Forza Italia and the small party of former Christian Democrats believe that globalization can be channelled into a positive direction.

When dealing with the notion of globalization one of the preliminary tasks to be performed consists in identifying as precisely as possible the different emerging issues and, without losing sight of the “big picture”, to disentangle issues that are primarily economic (e.g. restructuring within companies), from those that are cultural (e.g. national identity, multiculturalism) and those that refer to the environment (e.g. climate change, pollution). In Table 1 I have proceeded to regroup the various issues into three categories: economic, cultural, and social, in order better to compare the evaluations given by Italian and European respondents in the 2006 Kairos Future International Survey.

Table 1. Meanings of Globalization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic issues</th>
<th>ITAY</th>
<th>ITA A</th>
<th>REFY</th>
<th>REF A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lower prices for goods and services</td>
<td>4.759</td>
<td>4.899</td>
<td>4.401</td>
<td>4.314</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased opportunities for national companies</td>
<td>4.517</td>
<td>4.512</td>
<td>4.544</td>
<td>4.543</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat to employment in my country</td>
<td>3.399</td>
<td>3.499</td>
<td>3.818</td>
<td>3.948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More trade between countries</td>
<td>5.132</td>
<td>5.018</td>
<td>5.057</td>
<td>4.962</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
With reference to economic issues, it is interesting to note that, notwithstanding their age and national differences, there is an overall agreement by all the respondents on four major aspects. Globalization promotes trade between countries, will reduce the prices of goods and services, will formulate common rules and regulations worldwide, and will increase opportunities for national companies. Less clear in the minds of the respondents is whether globalization will also be a threat to employment in the various countries. On the whole, Italian respondents, believe that globalization is less of a threat than the other European respondents.

When it comes to cultural issues, Italian respondents are much more convinced than the other European respondents that globalization will create greater cultural exchange and mutual understanding. It is also of some interest to note that adult Italians entertain, perhaps on the basis of some previous experience, an even more positive evaluation than their younger counterparts. Almost as a logical consequence of their previous response, Italian respondents believe that globalization means “greater emphasis on research & development and life-long learning”, more so the adult Italians and all the Italians more than the other European respondents. Young Italians are at the same time more optimistic because they believe that globalization will mean greater opportunities for them (this may also be a sad and gloomy assessment of the not too many opportunities Italy offers her youth) and less inclined to believe that globalization will necessarily weaken national identities. Slightly more striking is the difference with reference to the opportunities offered by globalization between adult Italians and their European counterparts. If
it is not just wishful thinking, it may suggest that adult Italians have already had a sweet
taste of those opportunities.

Relying again on data supplied to me by Ilvo Diamanti and Fabio Bordignon (collected
in the surveys run by their “La Polis” company), it is extremely important to stress from the
beginning that surveyed in October 200, 56 per cent of Italians believe that globalization
and the internationalisation of the economy is an opportunity as compared with 16 per cent
who believe that it is a threat. Also important is that 66.5 per cent of Italians consider the
process of European integration an opportunity vs 10 per cent who consider it a threat. Of
course, several issues are articulated around the notion of globalization, most of them cul-
tural and, generally speaking, economic. Due to the weakness of the Greens, issues such
as climate change and pollution have fundamentally not entered the public debate even
though the Italian government has duly and quickly ratified the Kyoto treaty. However,
this does not mean that Italians are not preoccupied by environmental issues. In spite of
their lack of a true environment-sensitive behaviour, in a 2003 survey, 94 per cent of them
answered that they were worried/very worried by “the destruction of the environment
and natural resources”.

Much of the debate surrounding globalization has been and is influenced by the
complex phenomenon of immigration. Due among other things to the low birth rate, the
Italian economy needs many immigrants, and not just for purely menial jobs. Immigrants
into Italy come from a variety of countries, belong to different socio-cultural communi-
ties and bring with themselves, so to speak, different problems. While Eastern European
immigrants could easily be integrated in the Italian community, they are often accused
of engaging in criminal activities, especially in the North of Italy. Immigrants from the
Mediterranean, from African, and from Asian countries are much more difficult to inte-
grate allegedly because of their religious affiliations and beliefs. There may not neces-
sarily be a “clash of civilizations” in the making, but certainly there is a “clash of styles
of life”, having to do with religious practices of the Muslims and the role of the women
in Muslim families and communities.

To the exception of Chinese commercial activities and their dumping practices, eco-
nomic issues figure less prominently in the debate on globalization. It seems that, to a large
extent, many small Italian entrepreneurs have solved their wage problems by proceeding
to delocalisation in several Eastern European countries, namely, at least for the time being,
Rumania, Slovakia, and Albania. Other entrepreneurs take advantage of the opportunity
to “exploit” illegal immigrants in their companies. Italian trade unions try, though not very
intensely and not very successfully, to fight against these solutions, while charitable and
religious associations are committed to provide relief and support to the immigrants usu-
ally drawing no difference between legal and illegal ones. All this said, even the preoccu-
ipation with the preservation of the Italian identity is not frequently and fully connected
with the issue of globalization. After all, many Italians were emigrants to the USA, to Latin
American countries, and to richer European countries well before globalization made its
official appearance. While free movement of workers from member States is not questioned and does not appear to constitute a problem –there was no fear in Italy of any invasion by those famous “Polish plumbers”, immigration from non-European countries is considered a serious threat for several economic, cultural, social reasons. Fully aware that, because of the shape and the location of Italy in the Mediterranean, there is no national solution available, Italians hope that European Union authorities will quickly and finally devise a common, effective policy in this thorny area.

Among other more or less negative effects (threat to employment of nationals, growth of crime rate), immigration is also often considered a problem for countries having a weak national identity. Indeed, from the famous statement pronounced by Count Metternich about two centuries ago declaring that Italy was just a “geographical expression” up to now, it is often said that Italians have a very thin national identity. Notwithstanding the efforts of the Vatican to revive a Catholic religious identity, most previous researches (such as, famously, The Civic Culture (1959) by Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba) have put the emphasis on non-political factors. To be an Italian is to live in a country full of works of art, endowed with beautiful monuments and a romantic landscape having as ancestors Dante, Leonardo da Vinci, Michelangelo. While this overall picture largely corresponds to reality, the data presented in Table 2 also suggest another, not necessarily, conflicting story. In general, Italians, young and adults, declare a stronger identification than the other Europeans with all the items: nationality, language, local community, Europe. Strikingly more so, they indicate a by far greater identification than their European counterparts both with the nation and with Europe. By so doing, they believe those who too often maintain that it is easier for Italians (compared, for instance, with the French) to show their support for a European “nation” because of their weak national identity. Not so: indeed, Italian respondents seem to make the point that the two identities are not contradicting each other. On the contrary, they can live satisfactorily together. Identification with the nation and identification with Europe are not to be considered a sort of zero sum game. On the contrary, one can hypothesize that they can even shape a positive sum game.

Table 2. Factors important for personal identity

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<th>ITA Y</th>
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<th>REF Y</th>
<th>REF A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nationality</td>
<td>4.318</td>
<td>4.411</td>
<td>3.909</td>
<td>3.922</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language</td>
<td>4.736</td>
<td>4.629</td>
<td>4.512</td>
<td>4.472</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local community</td>
<td>4.003</td>
<td>4.107</td>
<td>3.808</td>
<td>3.919</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is worthwhile to explore if, how, and by which factors the perception of globalization is affected by the economic situation in the various countries. It is also possible that this perception may be influenced both by the outlook on the future of the citizens’ personal
situation and by the interaction between the national economic context and individual attitudes toward globalization. All surveys have found a similar discrepancy between the optimism Italians exhibit when it comes to their socio-economic opportunities and the pessimism they show with reference to the functioning of the political system, the effectiveness of their governing and representative institutions, and, as consistently reported by the Eurobarometer, their satisfaction with the working of Italian democracy. In the past thirty years or so, usually about 60 per cent of Italians have declared to be somewhat or very dissatisfied with the working of their democracy, no matter which government or coalition was in office. To a large extent the perception by the Italians of their personal and political problems is not significantly affected by the state and the forecast of the economic situation.

Since 1991-1993 the Italian political system has been undergoing a difficult unachieved institutional transition that has provoked a lot of collective anxiety. One can hypothesize that it is the weakness of the institutions, the unpredictability of the parties’ and their leaders’ political behaviour and, in some cases, their lack of competence and integrity that are bound somewhat to affect individual attitudes toward globalization. It is also fair to add that it seems that the majority of Italians either are confident in their ability to deal themselves with the consequences of globalization hoping to rely on the safety net most probably represented by the European Union. In order to supply a well rounded view, I will first explore the amount of satisfaction Italians declare to have with several aspects of their daily life (Table 3) and then, in Table 4, their overall evaluation of “people and society” (these are the words of the question that was asked in the Kairos Future International Survey).

Table 3. Satisfaction with some aspects of life

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<th>ITA Y</th>
<th>ITA A</th>
<th>REF Y</th>
<th>REF A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Life as a whole</td>
<td>4.904</td>
<td>4.973</td>
<td>4.878</td>
<td>4.889</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finances</td>
<td>4.024</td>
<td>4.027</td>
<td>3.809</td>
<td>3.878</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work</td>
<td>4.361</td>
<td>4.452</td>
<td>4.332</td>
<td>4.519</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General situation in my country</td>
<td>3.217</td>
<td>3.161</td>
<td>3.424</td>
<td>3.282</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The data presented in Table 3 show practically no difference between Italians of all ages and the other Europeans concerning their satisfaction with their work. However, it may be of some interest to underline that adult Italians and Europeans are slightly more satisfied than their young fellow countrymen and women who are, probably, still looking for possible improvement. The most important difference concerns the degree of satisfaction with finances. All Italian respondents, young and adult, are, somewhat surprisingly I would say, much more satisfied than their European counterparts. The other two items offer one not so predictable result concerning the degree of satisfaction with life as whole. Italians are quite satisfied (the item offers the highest rate of
approval) and slightly more than their European counterparts. This is so in spite of the fact that, predictably, they are not satisfied with the general situation in their country, but, again, only slightly less so than their European counterparts. Incidentally, answers to the question concerning the degree of satisfaction with the general situation of European countries may also be taken as a general criticism of the way the various countries are governed, hence a discontent with politics and politicians. However, a better understanding of this phenomenon will be possible only by looking at the specific and relevant data from each individual country.

For the time being we can get an enlarged and more revealing picture from the data presented in Table 4. There is one visible element, common to all the Italian data: a less positive outlook than the one nourished by non-Italian respondents. Less than their European counterparts, Italians believe in the brightness of their future, though their personal future is considered much brighter than their society’s future. Adult Italians are even less confident in their future, significantly so, perhaps because in a rather stagnant society, they believe that there is not much else they can accomplish or look for at their age (30-50). We find the greatest distance between the two groups in their confidence to get a good job in the future. While both adult groups are, understandably less confident (for most of them, probably, “les jeux sont faits”), adult Italians are the most disillusioned group. However, on the whole, Italians believe that they have, or have enjoyed the opportunity of choosing their life. Interestingly, while adult Italians are more convinced of this opportunity that their younger fellow countrymen, the opposite is conspicuously true for the other Europeans. The figures also reveal a clear and strong criticism of the inability of European societies to find a common goal. With hindsight and, I venture to add, probably also because of their personal experiences, both adult groups are more critical than their younger nationals.

Table 4. Feelings about people and society

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>ITA Y</th>
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<th>REF Y</th>
<th>REF A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Society future looks bright</td>
<td>2.969</td>
<td>2.864</td>
<td>3.311</td>
<td>3.206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People in my country have the opportunity to choose their own lives</td>
<td>4.244</td>
<td>4.308</td>
<td>4.534</td>
<td>4.263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complete freedom and control over my own future</td>
<td>4.251</td>
<td>4.067</td>
<td>4.540</td>
<td>4.198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confidence in a good job in the future</td>
<td>4.196</td>
<td>3.839</td>
<td>4.554</td>
<td>4.063</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My society could use a common goal to work for</td>
<td>5.054</td>
<td>5.151</td>
<td>4.995</td>
<td>5.053</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World events do not actually have much impact on my life</td>
<td>3.169</td>
<td>2.927</td>
<td>3.364</td>
<td>3.122</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legend: Numbers indicate agreement (from 1= No to 7= Yes)
Let me supplement these considerations with few data again taken from the most recent “La Polis” Survey run by Ilvo Diamanti and Fabio Bordignon and published in “la Repubblica”, January 2, 2007, pp. 18-19). As expected, more Italians believe that in 2007 their income will increase (30.5 per cent) than those who believe it will decrease (15.2). Also Italians have optimistic expectations concerning the growth of the economy (46.6 vs 26.2), but those who believe that Italian politics will improve (31.3) are still less than those who believe that it will deteriorate (35.6). These figures seem to reflect with some precision the present situation of an electorate clearly divided after the April 2006 razor-thin victory by the centre-left. Of some interest is the fact that one quarter of the respondents (25.6) believe neither in the improvement nor in the deterioration of Italian politics: a sober skeptical attitude.

In the absence of specific data probing the possible existence of differences in the elite attitudes as opposed to the lower middle class/working class attitudes towards globalization, some informed hypotheses may, at least at this point in the discussion, suffice. Much, of course, depends on the level of awareness of the problems (and the opportunities) created by globalization. Being more aware of the phenomenon, some Italian elites, especially, the entrepreneurs, argue the case for a more effective, flexible, supportive policy by the State apparatus allowing them better to compete on the international scene. Always “globalised”, the Italian Catholic Church appears somewhat worried by the driving force behind Muslim immigration and, in a very cautious way, seems to ask for reciprocity, that is the possibility of preaching its message in Muslim countries. The Catholic Church or, better, the Vatican would also like to receive some support from the Italian State protecting its privileged status. While there is no vibrant debate or confrontation, the not too many Italian intellectuals, explicitly interested in the issue of globalization, predictably take different attitudes deriving from their political preferences and influenced by them. Generally speaking, those few right-wing intellectuals who enjoy national visibility are negatively inclined toward globalization, for some of them, the process being little more and little different from a slightly revised form of Americanization or American-led modernisation (Marcello Veneziani, Marco Tarchi). This attitude may be the consequence of the conviction on the part of these right-wing intellectuals that globalization may destroy their cherished national traditions and identity. On the extreme left, too, one would find intellectuals opposed to globalization for some of almost the same reason as right-wing intellectuals, especially because it is Americanization in a different guise, but, above all, because in their view globalization amounts clearly and simply to the global unbridled expansion of capitalism. Moreover, some among these left wing intellectuals are preoccupied not so much by the destruction of national traditions and political identity, but, above all, by the shrinking of the space for public debate that globalization may inexorably entail.

Those many reform-oriented intellectuals who are on the whole favourable to globalization rarely argue their case in a forceful way. Most of them do take for granted that globalization is good for the spreading of democracy, for the universal expansion and extension of the rights of the individuals, especially women, for the highlighting of inequalities, for
the emergence of a world awareness of problems, such as hunger, health, war, that can be tackled and solved exclusively in a globalised world. But they are also aware of the short term problems and of the need to balance tradition with change. On the other hand, both the middle classes and the working classes are preoccupied by the more immediate challenges that globalization seems to produce for their daily life: greater competition, loss of jobs, cultural shocks. As in most countries, the voice of the middle classes can be heard when and whether there is a party representing, advocating and supporting their views. As I have indicated above, the party of the middle classes par excellence, that is, Forza Italia, holds on the whole a positive, though at times, ambiguous attitude towards globalization. In any case, during its governmental tenure (2001-2006), Forza Italia has certainly not raised any scathing criticism of the globalization process, nor have the former Christian Democrats who also are a party representing the middle classes. In conclusion, all these elements put together go a long way to explaining why globalization is neither a really divisive issue in Italian politics nor a highly perceived threat.

To some extent, the working classes could be more endangered by the challenge of globalization. However, two factors have so far militated against their taking a sharply negative view of globalization. The first one is that the remaining, significantly shrunk, industrial working class is well protected by Italian trade unions and by Italian labour regulations. The second factor is that, in spite of the phenomenon of delocalisation, there have been so far only a handful of cases in which globalization could be identified as the culprit for the shutting down of some factories. Even in those cases, the blame was put not so much on globalization per se, but on the owners, often foreigners, of those factories. In sum, I would feel justified in concluding that overall Italian attitudes toward globalization are not necessarily influenced by social positioning and class factors. On the whole, these are crosscutting factors, which means that they are not easily mobilized and cannot be appropriated by a single party or movement. Though this issue should be explored more deeply, I surmise that differences of interpretation and evaluation may be explained by differences in the level of education better than by class differences. In all likelihood, highly educated Italians are more inclined to believe that they have the knowledge and the skill to take advantage of the process of globalization. In any case, they are less affected by the potentially negative effects of globalization. Some of the Kairos Future International data seem to support and buttress my interpretation.

2. ACTORS AND CIVIL SOCIETY

As I have already indicated, for the Italian public, the existence of a phenomenon called “globalization” was dramatically brought to light by the bloody events at the Genoa G8 in July 2001. While, needless to say, the interpretation of those events remains highly controversial, for several days TV watchers were exposed to bloody clashes and violent confrontations between the Italian police and groups made not entirely of youngsters and, definitely, not entirely of Italians, who were decrying the negative effects of globalization.
Of course, it is well nigh impossible to evaluate whether Italian public opinion is or has been shaped by no-global and anti-global groups, especially when they resort to violent activities. Certainly, those groups have highlighted an important issue. However, subsequent events have shown that they do not enjoy much social and political support. Few of their leaders have been co-opted by left wing parties, namely Communist Refoundation, but, by accepting to join a political party, they seem to have lost their capacity to set the agenda. I am not aware of the existence of any group of significant size committed to teach about or against globalization, the topic being generally confined to perhaps a handful of university courses. As far as I can tell, there have not been TV programs devoted to the analysis of globalization and its consequences nor newspapers’ reports and investigations specifically and extensively dealing with globalization. Perhaps, stretching somewhat the political, cultural and personal “message” they wanted to send, what two famous Italian journalists, Tiziano Terzani and Oriana Fallaci, have done, namely in the last phase of their respective lives, can be said to have a significant relationship with globalization.

A left-wing journalist, Terzani argued the case for a better knowledge of the different cultures of the world and for a more fair interaction among them and their peoples. An indomitable spirit, Fallaci spent all her remaining energies chastising the weakness of the Western World and, especially, of the Europeans in their dealing with the Muslim world and Islam. Though he is a worldwide known intellectual, and his book Empire (written with Hardt) has become a bestseller, apparently not only in Italy, Antonio Negri, perhaps because of his past contiguity with left wing terrorist organizations, has not acquired the status of contemporary guru of the antiglobal thought, at least not in Italy. Nor have the not too many and not visible enough NGOs, while the Catholic Church retains a quasi monopoly on charitable activities oriented especially towards Africa. The most important of the Catholic associations working in the international arena is by far Caritas. Finally, it may be interesting to remark that there is no cult text on globalization written by Italian economists, sociologists, or political scientists. Almost all the available studies are translations from French and English and, as far as I know, none of them has acquired the status of a best seller.

When it comes to the evaluation of the role played by some actors in the regulation of globalization phenomenon, Table 5 offers some significant data. Multinational companies come on top and get the highest scores slightly more by the Italians than by their European counterparts. The two lowest positions are occupied, not surprisingly, but we should be worried about their scores, by the police and justice system and by non-governmental organizations. Nor is surprising the low score obtained by national governments, not unexpectedly even lower for the Italian government. Needless to say, globalization affects the power of national governments, more so of those governments that already are weak and ineffective (such as, according to most analysts, the Italian government). Though not high, the score that our European citizens give themselves and other peoples as players capable of regulating the process of globalization is, somewhat reassuringly, more on the positive than the negative side. Italian and European respondents have no doubt regarding who are (or should be) the most important players in the regulation of globalization. However,
on the basis of the Italian confidence in the overall importance and role of the European Union, it is somewhat surprising that, on the one hand, Italians have a lower consideration of the European Union than their European counterparts, and, on the other hand, believe that the World Trade Organisation is a more influential player than the EU. Incidentally, Italian respondents may indeed be right. Finally, it may not be a welcome result for the United Nations to be considered about as much an influential player as the media. Or, conversely, the media have some reason to rejoice if Italian and European respondents consider them “influential players” in the regulation of globalization. We should perhaps inquire whether the respondents have evaluated the situation as it is now or whether they think that the media ought to become influential players in the game of regulating the globalization process/phenomenon.

Table 5. Most influential players in the regulation of globalization

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<th>REF Y</th>
<th>REF A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National governments</td>
<td>3.791</td>
<td>3.670</td>
<td>3.926</td>
<td>3.753</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media</td>
<td>4.454</td>
<td>4.381</td>
<td>4.430</td>
<td>4.325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multinational companies</td>
<td>5.121</td>
<td>5.303</td>
<td>5.011</td>
<td>5.088</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs (social movements, trade unions, etc.)</td>
<td>3.414</td>
<td>3.618</td>
<td>3.537</td>
<td>3.436</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People in general</td>
<td>3.872</td>
<td>3.833</td>
<td>4.022</td>
<td>3.906</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The police and justice system</td>
<td>3.236</td>
<td>3.265</td>
<td>3.208</td>
<td>3.166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Union</td>
<td>4.791</td>
<td>4.513</td>
<td>4.960</td>
<td>4.758</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

An answer to my question can be found in the data presented in Table 6 and concerning the amount of trust our respondents have in selected institutions. Though considered influential players when it comes to globalization, the media enjoy a very low level of trust by both groups of Italians, though slightly less by the adults. National governments fare even worse. Not only are they not considered influential players in the process of globalization; in addition, they compete with the media and religious institutions as to the low level of trust Italians have in them. A similar ranking holds for the other European respondents who, however, show the lowest of trust in religious institutions. Incidentally, these figures strongly suggest that, against some mistaken views, there is no religious revival at least in the eight European countries here analyzed. Though rather influential as players in the globalization process, neither the United Nations nor the World Trade Organization are considered trustworthy. Finally, the European Union gets the highest degree of trust of all institutions by young Italians, though not by adult Italians. Somewhat surprisingly, because of the often tapped traditional level of Italian cynicism (“amoral familism” as defined in a famous path breaking study by Edward Banfield, *The Moral Basis of a Backward Society*, Glencoe, The Free Press, 1958), adult Italians indicate a significant amount of trust in “people in general”.

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Table 6. Trust in selected institutions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>ITA Y</th>
<th>ITA A</th>
<th>REF Y</th>
<th>REF A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National governments</td>
<td>2.703</td>
<td>2.842</td>
<td>2.831</td>
<td>2.788</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media</td>
<td>2.868</td>
<td>2.693</td>
<td>3.016</td>
<td>2.858</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People in general</td>
<td>3.916</td>
<td>4.106</td>
<td>3.950</td>
<td>4.077</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The police and justice system</td>
<td>3.346</td>
<td>3.624</td>
<td>3.636</td>
<td>3.634</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations</td>
<td>3.983</td>
<td>3.775</td>
<td>3.897</td>
<td>3.620</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Trade Organization</td>
<td>3.439</td>
<td>3.190</td>
<td>3.469</td>
<td>3.115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Union</td>
<td>4.000</td>
<td>3.687</td>
<td>3.626</td>
<td>3.255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious institutions</td>
<td>2.905</td>
<td>3.233</td>
<td>2.528</td>
<td>2.507</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The data analyzed so far indicate that Italian and European respondents are much aware of the globalization process, are capable of identifying the most important players and, generally speaking, appear convinced that, on the whole, the globalization process will offer more opportunities than disadvantages. Nevertheless, in most countries anti-globalization movements, though they may not be influential, have certainly acquired some visibility. In some cases, their visibility may be just the consequence, that is, the reflex of some transnational connections and activities. Finally, when dealing with national, international, transnational anti-global movements too many scholars have become easy prey of their ideological preferences. Some of them have chastised those who oppose globalization as if they were outright opponents of progress; with more or less sophistication, the majority of the scholars have stressed the positive role fulfilled by anti/no global movements in fighting against capitalism and multinational corporations, in preserving cherished community traditions and histories, in attempting to contain and reduce emerging socio-economic inequalities.

When it comes to Italy, anti-globalization movements are not at all influential either in terms of presence in the public debate or in terms of drafting the agenda and influencing the implementation of public policies. For instance, Italy has one of the lowest percentages of her budget devoted to foreign aid, and in the past the state organization entitled to provide this money was involved in a major corruption scandal. The organizational weakness of the anti-globalization movement translates also into many difficulties in reaching out to other movements of the same type in different countries. However, anti-globalised Italians actively participate in all international meetings such as, and above all, the annual event held at Porto Alegre. The Italian press does report on the activities of the World Social Forum and the European Social Forum, but no special coverage is provided. Often, the impression one gets from the commentaries on those meetings is that they belong to the same category as all other international meetings of office-holders and ministers. Therefore, they do not raise the level nor the quality of the, albeit limited, domestic debate on globalization.

Certainly, whatever debate takes place definitely it is not at all helped by the language that is currently used. Regarding the “semantics of globalization”, the most appropriate
answer is that the language so far used to describe the phenomena associated with globalization directly derives from a contemporary tower of Babel. First of all, there is no agreement on the very definition of globalization. Moreover, there are those who believe, first of all, that the phenomenon is not new and, that, indeed, there has already been a higher degree of globalization at the beginning of the XXth century. In a way, by then the British empire had produced a substantial (and benign) globalization bound to last for some time. As I have already indicated, there are also many who believe that contemporary globalization is in fact not much more and not much different than a more subtle form of Americanization. Globalization speaks with one language: English, and, perhaps, it seems to be almost inevitably capable of imposing one overriding culture: the Anglo-Saxon. Second, on the one hand, there are those who state that globalization is fundamentally a stage in the development of the history of mankind, and, on the other, there are those who believe that globalization is an undergoing process.

Be it a stage or a process, most Italian observers and commentators maintain that globalization is inevitable. At this point, third consideration, Italian observers and commentators take a different road. Most of them are convinced that the process is both inevitable and positive, even though it will entail many costs, in terms of competition, transformation, and adaptation. A minority believes not only that the costs are high and, for someone, probably unbearable, but that, on whole, globalization is a negative process. It will compress the diversity of cultures; it will erase national identities; it will produce homogenization, conformism, uniformity; it will shape a common (sub)culture made of soap operas and reality shows, of pop music and McDonald’s type fast food shops, of trivial communications through the Net/Web. Finally, it will open the way to new dark ages, indeed, it may have already done so. Therefore, some reactions, especially those coming from the Muslim world and Arab countries in the name of Islam, are thought to be justifiable and justified. For some, to fight against US hegemony and to oppose the attempt to create an American empire disguised under the cloak of universal rights and the “export” of democracy is more than a political necessity. It is a moral duty --notwithstanding the perpetuation of oppressive and repressive authoritarian and sultanistic regimes that, however, are deemed to represent true and original political and cultural traditions.

Fourth, indeed, the dividing line at this point cuts across those who believe that globalization is a positive force for the extension of civil, political, and, generally speaking, human rights and democracy, and those who fear that it will not just be a negative force, but that it will serve the aims of the only superpower left and, even more, of a selected small group of not so anonymous capitalists. In the first case, one can also detect a standard view among those who oppose globalization. According to their critics, both the no globals and the anti globals are supposed to be those left behind by the inevitable forces promoting change. Especially, if they are young and preoccupied by what the future holds for them, they are identified as contemporary luddites who oppose progress. They are too young and too incompetent to understand the complexities of the globalization process. They are criticized for being unable to come to terms with the indispensable compatibilities
and for not realizing that the balance between costs and advantages will be in the long run and, perhaps, even in the short run, highly positive.

To the exception of few investigative articles and editorials, the Italian press, and especially the four most important dailies, “la Repubblica”, “il Corriere della Sera”, “Il Sole-24 Ore”, and “la Stampa”, have no doubts. In several instances, they even resort to sharp criticisms of those who oppose or simply question globalization or just some of its components. In my opinion, the semantics of the globalization debate requires and deserves fine distinctions among the several components of the phenomenon. It is quite easy and, of course, politically correct to stress that globalization entails and favours the recognition, protection, and promotion of human rights and of democracy. However, it remains to be seen whether the current wave of globalization has truly succeeded in making the world unsafe for dictators and a more open environment for the rights of the individuals. It is also easy to suggest the many gains descending from the globalization of communications (so visibly extolled by the December 2006 front page of “Time” devoted to Internet), even though in the most recent period the risks, not only in terms of loss privacy, have come to be exposed. On the other hand, it has proved to be very difficult to convince some governments, some groups, and many citizens of the virtues of globalization when it comes to trade and to financial transactions and speculation. Finally, I would have thought that the most widespread fears should concern the potential loss of a sense of community, the destruction of cherished identities and traditions, the exposure to a powerful fully Americanised culture and the emergence of a situation comparable to the one described by George Orwell in 1984.

Table 7. The greatest threats to the society of the future

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Threat</th>
<th>ITA Y</th>
<th>ITA A</th>
<th>REF Y</th>
<th>REF A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Environmental pollution</td>
<td>5.973</td>
<td>6.167</td>
<td>5.920</td>
<td>6.056</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty and famine</td>
<td>5.404</td>
<td>5.600</td>
<td>5.304</td>
<td>5.511</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorism</td>
<td>5.719</td>
<td>5.795</td>
<td>5.493</td>
<td>5.784</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIDS and pandemics</td>
<td>5.068</td>
<td>4.916</td>
<td>5.154</td>
<td>5.098</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug abuse</td>
<td>4.790</td>
<td>4.858</td>
<td>4.703</td>
<td>4.978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War</td>
<td>5.870</td>
<td>5.809</td>
<td>5.519</td>
<td>5.650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>5.179</td>
<td>5.185</td>
<td>4.968</td>
<td>5.033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organized crime</td>
<td>5.481</td>
<td>5.685</td>
<td>5.098</td>
<td>5.412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collapse of the international financial system</td>
<td>5.066</td>
<td>5.135</td>
<td>4.705</td>
<td>4.857</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The data presented in Table 7 tell a somewhat different story. According to a significant majority of our respondents, the greatest threats to the society of the future have all a “global” nature and, surprisingly, have no connection with specific local and/or national communities and lifestyles. Perhaps, a precise question concerning, for instance, multiculturalism, might have provided additional interesting material. On the other hand, threats such as,
above all, environmental pollution, war and terrorism definitely pertain to global dynamics. They could be analyzed under the heading of “globalization” and, most certainly, they are magnified by globalization itself. At least, two additional threats pertain to the general area of phenomena whose impact may be conspicuously increased by globalization: organized crime and aids and pandemics. On three of the threats presented in Table 7: organized crime, unemployment and the collapse of the international financial system, Italian respondents seem to be much more worried. Rightly so for what concerns organized crime because, in practice, is so much widespread in some Southern regions: Sicily, Calabria, and Campania, to be compared for its real and effective power to a State within the State. For the citizens of a country where jobs used to be quite scarce for a long period of time, the fear of the reappearance of unemployment is fully understandable. Finally, because of their high propensity to save, there is no surprise that Italian respondents consider the “collapse of the international financial system” a very serious threat. On all three issues, one can easily notice a significant difference between Italians and the other European respondents.

The available data from the Kairos Future International Survey allows to explore another important issue, that is, the type of ideal future society entertained by our respondents. The data in Table 8 suggest, first of all, that the respondents do not envisage and would not like an unbalanced society in the future. Italians are somewhat more inclined than Europeans to prefer city life to country life, but one should not neglect that many Italian cities are not large and are highly attractive living places. Contrary to the other European respondents, Italians would like to pay less taxes instead of having a stronger welfare system. This may be due to the often not high enough quality of the Italian welfare system, but also to a fair amount of distrust with the capability of the State to provide good reliable satisfactory goods and services. The other three issues deal, more or less directly, with issues related to globalization. Italians of all ages are more favourably inclined to desire change for their ideal future society, perhaps a reflection of their discontent with the present one. Concerning the equality of rights between native citizens and immigrants and free trade vs protection of national industry, all groups favour a balanced situation slightly tilted towards some differences of treatment and some protection. It is my opinion that it would be fair to interpret these data in a positive way as an opening of credit for globalization.

Table 8. Features of the ideal future society

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>ITA Y</th>
<th>ITA A</th>
<th>REF Y</th>
<th>REF A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low taxes/strong welfare system</td>
<td>3.146</td>
<td>3.207</td>
<td>3.981</td>
<td>3.952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tradition and stability/Change</td>
<td>4.316</td>
<td>4.059</td>
<td>4.206</td>
<td>3.844</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native citizens and immigrants have equal/different rights</td>
<td>3.640</td>
<td>3.349</td>
<td>3.547</td>
<td>3.497</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free trade and global competition/Protect national industry</td>
<td>3.826</td>
<td>3.731</td>
<td>3.764</td>
<td>3.937</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legend : scale 1-3, 5-7
3. RESPONSE TO GLOBALIZATION

For decades hundreds of thousands Italians have been obliged to migrate to foreign countries in the search for a job and a decent living. In the 1950s and 1960s, thanks to the “economic miracle” the waves of migration could be mostly contained within the national borders. Between five and six millions of Southerners migrated to the North, looking for jobs and finding them especially, but not only, in the industrial Triangle (Turin, Milan, Genoa). Most of those Southerners and their sons and daughters settled in the North of Italy. In the past decade and more, internal migration has all but come to an end. Also because of some security that Southern families can at last provide to their off-springs, there is now very little geographical mobility and, banning major traumatic socio-economic occurrences, there is little mobility of the workforce either. Indeed, several sociologists and economists have denounced the existence of a rather unhealthy situation in the Italian labour market. On the one hand, there are all those workers, many of whom in the public sector, who enjoy tenure in their jobs, who are, so to speak, “guaranteed”, in some cases especially because of their affiliation with powerful trade unions. On the other hand, there are workers, largely in the private sector, especially young and female, who have no job security and no job stability. As a consequence, they have small prospects of reaching a satisfactory retirement allowance and cannot rely, for a variety of reasons, on union protection. Now constituting, perhaps, almost half the total Italian work force, these workers are in the position of being hired and fired almost at the pleasure of the employers. They are defined “precarious”.

On the whole, Italian trade unions have played a rather conservative role when it comes to innovation in the workplace. In the past two decades or so, when workers proved no longer up to their task for reasons of technological change and advancement, neither the State nor the unions appeared to be much interested nor adequately equipped to re-qualify and re-train the Italian workforce. Nothing comparable to what is said to be the admirable activity performed by the Swedish and, generally speaking, the Scandinavian unions and their respective governmental policies. Up to recent times, the Italian solution has been more simple, that is, quite simplistic, and very expensive: to send into early retirement those workers who were deemed “redundant”. No wonder, then, that the pension system is under stress and in dire need of a serious reform, to be implemented against the unions’ opposition. The fact is that, on the one hand, the unions give Italian workers, who have a job, what amounts to a, perhaps, exaggerated protection, but, on the other hand, one may hypothesize that Italian workers are little inclined, and probably not at all prepared, to practice some personal mobility. TABLE 9 contains data offering some relevant information.
Italian respondents provide what is really a mixed and unexpected picture. There are very few differences between Italian and European respondents as to their having travelled, studied, and worked abroad. Italians do better on the last item, but slightly worse on the second. Not surprising is the fact that there are more Italians than Europeans who desire to live most of their life in their own town. However, at the same time, there are many more Italians than their European counterparts who would like to live most of their life abroad and, in any case, would like to live abroad for periods. Also, there are many more Italians who declare that they would like to be able to travel and work all over the world. Their availability to be geographically mobile is good news. This said, however, very few among the respondents are planning to move abroad in the next fifteen years. Or, perhaps, if my calculation is correct, 18 out of one hundred is definitely not a disappointing result.

Is protectionism presented as a solution to the problems raised by global economic competition? Generally speaking, very few voices and very occasionally raise the issue of protectionism. Usually, the targets of protectionist policies are Chinese products, textiles and shoes, that are dumped in the Italian market or counterfeited on the Italian territory through a network of illegal immigrants kept in miserable conditions by their Chinese masters. In any case, the regulations of the European Union would not allow, very few exceptional cases and circumstances left aside, any attempt to resort to protectionism by individual European countries. Not even Italian trade unions consider protectionism a viable solution to the problems created by globalization and/or by illegal forms of competition. As to the entrepreneurs, their major request is for a more efficient State capable of providing decent infrastructures, less red tape, more logistical and
political support from Italian embassies in those countries, notably in Eastern Europe where they find themselves competing especially with German and French companies that are promoted and supported by their much more efficient, better equipped, even more aggressive State apparatus. A similar problem, perhaps of greater dimensions, exists if and when Italian companies want to make business in far away Asian countries. The attractiveness and the glamour of Italian design may not necessarily and always be, by themselves, sufficient and capable of overcoming the disadvantages of a weak, bureaucratised, and obsolete State machinery. In any case, protectionism is not a viable solution both because it will be very difficult, almost impossible, to implement it and because a country, such as Italy, exporting a high quantity of her goods, will significantly suffer from likely retaliations.

Is the EU seen as an appropriate level of governance (regulation) which can protect states against the full impact of globalization? Is the EU associated with globalization in the public debate? If not, what level of governance (local, national, international) is considered as appropriate? These are, of course, rather important questions. For a variety of reasons, among them the fact that Italy was a founding member of the first European institutions, it is no surprise that the European Union, as I have already emphasized, is seen in a favourable light. In many instances, and not only when it is clear that purely national solutions will not be sufficient and will not work, the European Union is indeed considered the level of government where it is appropriate to look at. In some instances, selected Italian associations have resented the type of specific regulations approved by the European Union. It is also true that, because of her Byzantine institutional arrangements, all Italian governments have been somewhat delinquent in translating those regulations into the national legislation. However, it is crystal-clear that the European Union has also served to somewhat opposite purposes. It is a scapegoat for a sequel of inefficient governments that try to suggest that the responsibility for their inability to perform some tasks should be blamed on the EU and its unfair, exaggerated, wrong regulations. But it has also served as an alibi for unpopular policies and reforms to be implemented: fiscal restraint, reform of the welfare state, safety regulations. There is, in fact, very little disagreement in Italy that most issues, uppermost among them immigration, will find an adequate solution if just all member States would cooperate.

Indeed, the EU is often considered the (only) appropriate level of governance. Of course, from time to time some policy-makers, commentators, and intellectuals call the United Nations into the picture. Some of them also dream of a “world government”, but very few knowledgeable Italians are willing to fall into this long-term illusion/hope. Therefore, it is correct to say that the European Union, its policies, its prerogatives, its sheer power are considered the one political and institutional instrument that can be profitably utilized in order to tame the process of globalization and to protect the member States from unpalatable and damaging consequences. And, from time to time, there are signs of dissatisfaction because the European Union does not do enough and takes/wastes a long time in preparing appropriate and effective policies. Self-criticism is not
a widespread virtue among Italian politicians (or, for that matter, Italians al large) who never ask themselves what they should do for the European Union, but exclusively what the European Union should do for them. I have already indicated that references to the United Nations are sparse and not really to be taken seriously, but, in some cases, other international organizations, some of them off-springs on the UN, are called into the picture. Most of the time the three international organizations that are believed to be entitled to play a more significant role in order to pilot globalization and to soften their impact are the World Trade Organisation, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank. Most of the time the inadequacies of these organizations are exposed, after all this exposure is not such a gigantic task, but, leaving aside some elites, favourable to globalization, and some counterelites, that is those supporting several views held by the anti-global and the no-global movements and spokesmen, the dominant attitude is disgruntlement not accompanied by dynamic, original, innovative positions argued by Italian office-holders.

As to the national level, I will not argue that it has entirely lost its relevance, but two factors militate against its playing a significant role in controlling the impact of globalization. The first one is the common knowledge that no national government can, by itself, in splendid isolation, defeat the negative consequences and profit from the positive currents of globalization. This factor is further fed by the realization that this is, indeed, the case even for more powerful States such as France and Germany. The second factor is the a widespread distrust Italians have of their national governments, their capabilities, their willingness successfully to perform difficult tasks, their commitment to the mobilization of national resources as a buffer against globalization. This distrust is not a minor factor in explaining the consequent trust for the institutions of the European Union. Finally, of course, no one believes for a moment that globalization can be successfully tackled at the local level. However, there has been a wide recourse to the concept (less to the practice) of subsidiarity, that is to the view that some problems can indeed be solved at the local level, and, even more precisely, that only the problems that are not solved at the local level must be tackled at a higher level.

In some cases, both subsidiarity and the emphasis on the local level hide some traditional Italian parochialism. In other cases, the emphasis is put on local traditions, advocating and relying on a soft interpretation of communitarianism. Needless to say, those who argue in favour of a restructuring of the classic democratic framework in order to deal with the powerful currents of globalization and its equally powerful consequences, are also inclined to stress the importance of the local level where citizens’ participation can make a difference and it may even succeed in increasing the competence and the influence of those politically better trained and educated citizens who will move up the ladder of the complexity of the problems to be solved. Out of these experiences or “theoretical” reflections an appealing slogan has then been formulated: “local whenever it is possible; global whenever its is necessary”. “Glocal” has become the magic definition of this complex combination of different levels of governance and citizens’ political activism.
4. COUNTRY SPECIFIC SECTION

In order fully to understand Italian attitudes toward globalization one must take into account and keep in mind several structural factors. The first one is that, on the whole, leaving few intellectual, professional and managerial elites aside, Italians are quite parochial. Therefore, they are not particularly interested in international phenomena and not especially knowledgeable about them. Second, also because of the lack of interest and knowledge, globalization as such has not yet become a dominant topic either in the public or, for that matter, in the private discourse. Even related topics, such as immigration, delocalization, international financial transactions, Internet are essentially analyzed in isolation and not considered, rightly or wrongly, to be part of a more complex phenomenon called globalization. As a consequence, in Italy globalization has so far not become an object of fear and criticism. If any, the prevailing sentiments concerning globalization seem to be somewhat blandly positive. It is likely that the majority of Italians would agree with the statement that “globalization exists, it is a fact of life and of the history of our time, and it may even contribute to the protection and promotion of human rights and of democracy”. The third factor is that most Italians have “functioned” according to one overriding principle: whenever there is a challenge it is absolutely important to try to cope, to manage. The name of the game is “muddling through” (arrangiarsi). Some help and some solutions may come from the authorities, but they will never be enough and may not arrive on time. In recent times, Italians have come to believe that, fortunately, some solutions will be devised by the European Union and its institutions, and, perhaps, they will even be imposed on the Italian state and authorities. The fourth factor is that Italians are functioning in a much better way when there is an emergency.

Under exceptional circumstances, Italians finally decide that they can cooperate and can produce a collective effort. This was the case of the reconstruction after World War II; this was also the case, to make a very different example when it was necessary to join the Euro at its creation. So far globalization does not appear to be a tremendously aggressive and potentially devastating challenge. As a consequence, there does not appear to be the necessity for a joint coordinated response to it. In any case, other problems, such as the ones I have mentioned above: immigration, delocalization, the environment, perhaps the clash of civilizations and the construction of a multicultural society, appear more urgent and more important. Finally, the possible underestimation of the issue of globalization is not just a phenomenon present in Italian society at large. Neither the political elites nor the academic elites and the intellectuals, usually so eager to exploit new subjects and to participate in the media circus, have so far devoted much specific informed attention, analyses, and writings to the nature and dynamics of globalization. Italian youngsters may be impatient, worried about their future, looking for some individual and, less so, collective solution to their insertion into active life, but they seem much more interested in what goes on within Italy than in the powerful and expanding force of globalization.
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL REFERENCES


1. INTRODUCTION

When it comes to nations opening up to the world—whether for trade, representation or values—in short for purposes of globalization—Poland offers a paradoxical perspective.

Widespread support for the Anglo-Saxon liberalism rooted in the “shock therapy” (adopted in the 1990s to bring the communistic country smoothly into the world market) co-exists with a no less broad support for the welfare state, attested to by the country’s continuous high public expenditures over the last sixteen years. Of all the countries that joined the EU in 2004, Poland is without a doubt the country which has devoted the greatest part of its budget to social policies (see Annex I).

Is that such an original paradox, however? Not at all, if we consider that prior to 1989, Poland was the most politically open country of the Soviet Bloc. Poland owed this opening of its markets to the numerous revolts that marked the other forty years of communist domination (1956, 1968, 1970 and 1971, 1976, and in the 1980s, with Solidarnosc (“Solidarity”). Solidarity’s uprising was the most successful one within the Soviet Bloc. This immense social movement united close to 10 million supporters, and a wide variety of political as well as economic ideologies emerged from this group—ranging from the most nationalistic to the most open, both politically and economically. One movement advocated a self-administered republic founded upon maintaining national public property and a vast welfare state system set up on to benefit workers, while a second, then minority, movement advocated for private ownership, individual initiative, and opening the country to the West and to privatizations.

It is the latter movement which prevailed from 1989 to 1990, as it happened to be “in tune with the times” and, at that point in its history, espoused Thatcherian-type approaches, the transatlantic “epistemic communities” (notably the IMF and the WB), and the aspiration of the majority of the citizens, who yearned to reach the “shores of the rich” as soon as possible. In 1990, after the fall of communism, Poland stood out by choosing to pursue a policy of radical reform, the so-called “shock therapy” which was supposed to lead to full privatization of the national heritage and to free enterprise.
Poland and the globalization challenge

But this reform came up against a considerable coalition of interest groups who had no intention of losing the advantages they had acquired over many years. This heterogeneous coalition had incorporated a large number of groups which were, moreover, very hostile toward one another: those who prided themselves on Catholicism, those still committed to the parties of the former regime, skilled workers, peasants (who at the time represented 20% of the population), small farmers (the great majority), and other groups of individuals who had been given special privileges under the previous regime. All were opposing the new wind blowing in favour of opening the capital economy to foreign countries, obtaining foreign direct investment (FDI), and joining the European Union.

Although this resistance led to a series of compromises between liberal elites (originating from the ranks of Solidarity) and anti-privatization groups, the Polish political scene in the 1990s revolved around two main axis: the first one opposing proponents of globalization and those who favour soverigntism and statism, the second one opposing the advocates of the free market and those of the state’s intervention.

In this landscape, the Catholic Church was evenly divided inasmuch as it insisted either upon the values of open-mindedness espoused in the speeches of John Paul II, or those favouring closure and nationalism. Similarly, pro-Atlantist opinion was a choice that did not seem to split the parties, inasmuch as it was shared by all of them, despite the fact that a majority of public opinion declared itself opposed to siding with the U.S. in the war in Iraq. These two lines of thought—that of solidarity, and that of “Americanization,” seem to constitute the Polish collective identity of today.

These factors clarify the diverse ways in which Polish citizens perceive globalization, why the majority seem to favour it, and the strong pockets of resistance that it inspires.

2. GLOBALIZATION: A SUBJECT OF INTENSE POLITICAL DEBATE

2.1. How do the Poles perceive globalization?

A vague perception

Although most Poles are familiar with the term “globalization,” few of them are actually capable of defining it. According to a CBOS¹ study, 62% of the respondents stated that they had come across the term, but only one out of three understood it. Their awareness of the term “globalization” seemed to be related to their level of education: 99% of those surveyed who had a higher education diploma had encountered the term, and 79% of them claimed to understand it, while only 31% of individuals with an elementary education had come across the term and only 11% of them understood it.

How do they define globalization?

How do Poles define globalization? The CBOS pollsters asked those who had stated that they knew what globalization was to explain what it means. Approximately one third of them gave rather broad answers (32%), stressing mainly the uniformity and unification phenomena (15%), and referring to processes having a global impact, the emergence of the global community, the abolition of borders, or the “shrinking” of the world (4%, 4%, 5% and 3%, respectively). It is interesting to note that 3% of those surveyed associated globalization with the creation of a global commune, with *kolchozization* of the world.

Globalization is primarily perceived as an economic phenomenon

However, the majority of respondents had a tendency to associate globalization with economic phenomena such as the emergence of a global economic community, economic freedom and the creation of multinational companies. The economic aspect of globalization seems to be the one most obvious to Polish society (53% of those surveyed mentioned it). For example, 29% of the respondents defined “globalization” as the emergence of a global economic community, or as the unification of markets and the increase of trade ties between countries. Nine percent of those surveyed perceive globalization as a vehicle for such measures as a free market, the liberalization of trade, and the free flow of capital, goods and technologies.

More rarely, respondents associated globalization with economic development and growth of well-being (2% and 1% respectively) or, inversely, with deepening inequities between countries (1%).

Lastly, a relatively large group of those surveyed defined “globalization” as the concentration of capital. According to 13% of the respondents, company mergers, the creation of multinationals, and the disappearance of small businesses are symptoms of globalization. Some respondents believed that “big business interests” are taking over the global economy (4%).

This perception of globalization as a predominantly economic phenomenon was confirmed by a study conducted by Kairos Future International in 2006, according to which many Poles associate globalization with increased mobility and trade between countries (on a scale of 1 to 7: 5.09 and 5.15, respectively, among young people and 4.97 and 5.13 among those aged 30 to 50).
A political globalization?

Less numerous were those who emphasized the political aspect of globalization (18%). Seven percent of respondents mentioned country unification, the multiplication of political ties and the emergence of a common state body. Moreover, some defined globalization as the creation of a global government whose task is to manage the planet (3%), or as the cooperation of States in different domains. It should be noted that 3% of those polled gave the European Union as an example of globalization. Lastly, some associated it with the spread of democracy (2%) and of peace (1%). In some responses, the emphasis was not placed on the economic or socio-political aspect of globalization, but on the consequences associated with them. For example, some of those surveyed associate globalization with the centralization of decision-making, the concentration of global power (3%), or a relationship of political and economic domination and submission (3%). Lastly, some of the respondents defined globalization as a process whereby a small number of rich countries dominate poor countries, or the entire world is forced to serve the interests of international oligarchies (4%).

A cultural globalization?

The respondents rarely stressed the socio-cultural aspects of globalization. Only 8% of them perceived globalization as a process that will lead to the creation of a global society and to the unification of nations and cultures, or even to the elimination of cultural differences.

Figure 1. How do Poles define globalization?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What is meant by the term “globalization”?</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General definition</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standardization; unification; assembly</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Process and actions having a global impact and supranational character</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harmonization; global unification; global community</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borderless world; opening of borders</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The world as a global village; a shrinking world; decreasing distances between nations</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International village; transforming the whole world into a “farm collective”</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expansion of something; abstract enlargement</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic aspects of globalization</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global economic community; unification of global markets; economic ties between countries; global economy; economic unification</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic freedom; free market; free trade; free flow of capital, technologies and goods</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic development; economic growth</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equalization of levels of economic development between different countries</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improvement in well-being; improvement in living conditions</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exacerbation of economic inequalities between countries and people</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Poland and the globalization challenge
What is meant by the term “globalization”?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aspect of Globalization</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>On a corporate level:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mergers; creation of multinationals and disappearance of small businesses; capital “fusions” to form supranational structures</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power of capital and of multinational companies; multinationals taking over economic power and controlling the global economy</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political aspects of globalization</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unification of countries; political ties between countries; state integration; common public body</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common state government; global planetary management; unification of political forces and resources</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperation among nations in various domains; common state-initiated actions</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Union</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harmonization of laws and socio-political standards; spread of democracy</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>End of wars; world peace</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio-cultural aspects of globalization</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creation of a global society; unification of nations and cultures; elimination of cultural differences; elimination of nations</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free flow of information</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other aspects of globalization</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centralization of decisions and actions (political, economic); concentration of decision-making power by a player</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domination/submission relationship in economics and politics</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domination of the poor by the rich</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not sure</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Poland and other countries

How do the Poles perceive the status of their country in terms of Europe and the world? For several years, CBOS studies have shown that more and more respondents favourably perceive Poland’s international status. Indeed, in 2003, 55% of Poles surveyed agreed (28% disagreed); in 2004, 45% agreed (41% disagreed); in 2005, 60% agreed (26% disagreed); and in May 2006, 52% agreed (as compared to 32% who disagreed).

In 2006, the number of Poles who negatively perceive Poland’s status in the world increased, which might suggest a conviction that national sovereignty might be in jeopardy. In actuality, the opposite point of view has prevailed. In 2006, close to three quarters of the Poles (74%) felt that no danger was threatening national sovereignty, which corresponds to an increase of 9% as compared to the preceding year. It should be stressed that

the number of respondents expressing concerns over an external danger threatening the country’s sovereignty, has been gradually dropping since 2003, undoubtedly due to the fact that Poland joined the European Union, and to the disappearance of concerns that Poland could lose its sovereignty to Brussels. In another CBOS study released in February 2006, the satisfaction rate concerning the inclusion of Poland in the EU was 88%—the highest rate of all new Member States.

It is also interesting to note that the opinions do not seem to depend upon political convictions, nor are they connected to any greater degree with affiliation to any socio-demographic group. Moreover, the pollsters observed that those persons who are less interested in political issues tend to adhere to the pessimistic stereotype of Poland’s destiny.

**Figure 2. Is an external danger threatening Poland’s sovereignty?**

![Graph showing percentage of respondents expressing concern over external danger]

*Source: CBOS*

The Kairos study highlights interesting facts concerning the close relations which the Poles feel they enjoy with other nations. As expected, the Poles stated that they felt close to their fellow countrymen (on a scale of 1 to 7, 4.5 among those aged 16 to 29, and 4.7 among those aged 30 to 50). They also felt close to Europeans (4.22 of those aged 16 to 29, and 4.36 of those aged 30 to 50), but considerably less close to inhabitants of neighbouring countries (3.88 among those aged 16 to 29, and 4.00 among those aged 30 to 50). This is undoubtedly because of the long tension-filled history Poland has shared with these countries. In this respect, it is noteworthy that young Poles felt less close to Europeans, and to inhabitants of neighbouring countries, than Poles aged 30 to 50.
European countries

In a survey on Poland’s relations with other European countries, when interviewed as to the identity of their key allies, the respondents referred most often to Germany (35%) and the United Kingdom (28%), but also to France (19%), Spain and the Czech Republic (16% each). The surveys do not identify a particular European country which is perceived as being hostile to Poland. In this respect, the three largest European countries are mentioned with almost equal frequency: France (26%), as well as Germany and the United Kingdom (25% each). It is noteworthy that, on this point, the Poles’ opinions changed quickly on the basis of the alliances formed during the negotiations between EU Member Countries and other events related to European policy. For example, between January 2004 and January 2006, the number of Poles who believed that France was one of the countries hostile to Poland fell from 54% to 26%. Their opinions toward Germany changed to a more positive perception, dropping from 57% to 25%, while at the same time, the number of Poles perceiving the United Kingdom’s attitude toward Poland as hostile rose from 13% to 25%. This phenomenon should be linked to the positions taken by Tony Blair with respect to the EU budget (the British Prime Minister declared that he would oppose any project exceeding 1% of the European GDP). In view of these swings in public opinion, it may seem surprising that the great majority of respondents declared they were in favour of long-term alliances with European partners (68%).

The United States

The Poles’ perception of their relations with the United States and of the global role played by this country deserves special attention. The alliance with the United States has always been one of Poland’s foreign policy priorities since the fall of communism, which may have caused frustration —and even misunderstandings— among its European partners. Some of the comments made by President Kwasniewski in 2002 come to mind: “If this is George Bush’s position, it is also mine.” Notwithstanding this, are the Poles’ perceptions in line with the pro-American orientation of their country’s successive administrations? Public opinion surveys show that most Poles consider the global role played by the United States since the end of the “Cold War” as ambivalent (55%). However the number of respondents who express positive opinions is twice as high (23%) as those who are critical (11%). Yet 58% of the respondents view this superpower’s current foreign policy as a factor of global instability and conflict; only 21% affirm that this policy promotes peace and stability. It is interesting to point out that the number of respondents who have no opinion about this is low (11%). By way of comparison, close to 20% of the respondents are incapable of voicing an opinion on Polish foreign policy.

Finally, since the start of the war in Iraq and Poland’s commitment to the side of the coalition led by the United States, according to CBOS surveys, the number of Poles opposed

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to the participation of their troops in this conflict is higher than that of those in favour of it (in March 2005, the respective numbers were 69% vs. 28%).

**Figure 3. The Poles’ attitude toward the presence of Polish troops in Iraq**

![Figure 3. The Poles’ attitude toward the presence of Polish troops in Iraq](image)

*Source: CBOS*

Although 41% of the respondents in May 2003 believed that the presence of Polish troops in Iraq implied some advantages for Poland (21% being of the opinion that it was rather disadvantageous), two years later, in March 2005, this relationship was reversed. From then on, only 12% of respondents have felt that “the game was not worth the candle,” and 49% feel that a Polish military involvement in Iraq is detrimental to the country’s interests. Furthermore, the Poles’ dissatisfaction over the presence of Polish troops in Iraq is not echoed in opinions expressed with respect to NATO. According to the April 2005 CBOS study, 81% of the respondents supported Poland’s membership in this organization. What is more, nearly half of the Poles had no illusions as to the intentions that may come with economic aid from the United States.

Thus, according to the same CBOS study, 48% of the respondents believed that in contributing their aid Americans are trying to strengthen their economic influence, 37% contended that they are using this method to strengthen their economic interests by seeking to improve the economic situation of other countries, while only 7% of them felt that the American commitment to the development of the poorest countries is motivated by a genuine desire to be of help.

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Figure 4. How the Poles interpret American economic aid to the world’s poorest countries.

By offering economic aid to the poorest countries, the United States is trying to...

- Strengthen their influence (48%)
- Help the poorest countries and simultaneously secure their own interest (37%)
- Help the poorest countries (7%)
- Hard to say (8%)

Source: CBOS

The Poles’ perception of the global role of the United States more often tends to be negative among Leftist sympathizers: of those espousing Rightist ideas, only 6% show a critical attitude toward the United States, as opposed to 20% among left-wingers. Lastly, it should be noted that the attitude toward European integration—paradoxically perhaps—has no significant impact on the respondents’ opinion of the United States.

2.2. A positive view of globalization

As indicated above, the majority of Poles associate globalization with the integration process and increasing economic ties and interdependencies on a global scale. But what do they think of these transformations? The Poles seem to be rather inclined to favour the globalization process in the economic sphere: 49% of the respondents have a positive opinion of it, while 19% have a negative opinion.7

Furthermore, according to a survey conducted in October 2006, more than half of the Poles interviewed believed that globalization is advantageous for Poland, while one Pole out of five stressed the negative consequences of this process (21%)\(^8\).

**Beneficial—but for whom?**

The opinions on globalization varied primarily based upon the respondents’ educational level: the higher the latter, the more frequently the opinions favoured it. Nearly three fourths of those respondents with a degree in higher education had a positive opinion (72%), while among respondents with a basic education, that opinion was shared by only about one third of those surveyed (31%).\(^9\) The benefits of globalization were perceived by most respondents aged 24 or under (63%), by employees earning a monthly income of more than PLN 1200\(^{10}\) (61%), and by individuals satisfied with their material situation (66%),\(^11\) or who resided in large cities with more than 500 000 inhabitants (65%). Among the socio-professional groups, it was the trainees and students, as well as the executives and intelligentsia, who most frequently voiced their support of economic globalization (67% and 66%, respectively). However globalization advocates were also numerous among unskilled workers (62%) and the unemployed (61%).

This rather positive view of globalization was confirmed by the Kairos study which showed that the Poles perceive globalization as a source of new opportunities. That is what the young respondents asserted when asked what globalization means (on a scale of 1 to 7, 5.16 among respondents aged 16 to 29, and 4.50 among those aged 30 to 50). This can be attributed to the fact that economic globalization is commonly associated with liberal ideas:

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\(^10\) Approximately EUR 310.

the majority of Poles are in favour of economic liberalism. For example, according to the same Kairos study, the Poles were rather more inclined to be in favour of reducing taxes than of strengthening the welfare state (on a scale of 1 to 7, in which 1 to 3 corresponds to reducing taxes and 5 to 7 to expanding the welfare state: 3.61 among young respondents and 3.64 for those aged 30 to 50). Similarly, they believed in free trade and in global competition rather than protectionism (same scale: 3.60 among those aged 16 to 29, and 3.81 among those aged 30 to 50).

The respondents also agreed on the fact that globalization promotes cultural exchanges and mutual understanding among nations (4.95 among respondents aged 16 to 29 and 4.98 among respondents aged 30 to 50). However, although respondents over the age of 30—more than their younger fellow countrymen—associate globalization with the weakening of national identities (3.92) and with the threat of unemployment in their country (3.34) (among those aged 16 to 29, 3.69 and 3.32, respectively), most of the Poles indicated that they were not very inclined to view globalization as a danger, and were developing a rather positive view of this process.

It is among senior individuals (26% of those aged 65 or older) and farmers (40%) that fewer favourable opinions about globalization are found. Nonetheless, in most cases the latter do not have a clearly hostile attitude toward globalization—they simply do not have a clear-cut opinion. This group did, indeed, indicate widely disparate opinions, if only about Poland accession to the EU: after being massively opposed to it in the early 2000s, the majority of them indicated at the time of the 2003 Referendum that they favoured Poland’s joining the EU, and two years later (or one year after it joined), the number of positive votes in favour of the EU jumped much higher: more than 70% of them stated that they were satisfied with the decision. It is true that, during that interval, the cost of land had quadrupled in some regions (notably in Silesia), and the average annual income had doubled—rising to EUR 6,500. Since then, this growth has not slackened and the peasant group has turned out to be a powerful backer of the CAP, from which they will derive EUR 25 billion during the 2007–2013 period, and more than EUR 10 billion in the form of structural aid for rural development.

Lastly, it should be stressed that the social category of self-employed apart from agriculture (30%), is the one in which most of the negative opinions are found. However, most of the latter feel that globalization has positive consequences (55%). This group’s opinion is one of the defining characteristics of post-1990 Poland. Self-employment derives its specificity from Anglo-Saxon law which, in professional relations, is characterized by the weak bonds between the employer and the employee. Founded upon the principle of the freedom of the actors, it obligates the employer to pays a sum in exchange for a service, on condition that the service provider pay his or her own payroll taxes. The popularity of

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this form of employment, which became quite prevalent in the early 1990s, has continued to grow up to 2006. Poland and Romania are the countries in which it is most popular. This confirms some studies which show that even if the self-employment phenomenon stretches social relations and isolates the provider in terms of his or her employment relations, it is nonetheless receiving massive support from many individuals who view it as a means to exercise their freedom, notably by breaking the wage contract as they deem necessary. This is also confirmed in the Kairos study by the Poles hierarchy of values—which, according to them, should be taught to children by their parents. For example, “entrepreneurial spirit” is ranked in third place (on average, 5.3 on a scale of 1 to 7 among young respondents, and 5.5 among those aged 30 to 50), below values such as “responsibility” (6.34 and 5.57, respectively) and “independence” (5.57 and 5.66), but above “hard work” (4.95 among young respondents, and 4.81 among those aged 30 to 50).

Figure 6. Share of self-employed in total employment between 1993 and 2000 (in %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1993</th>
<th></th>
<th>2000</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>25.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>18.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>19.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>18.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>32.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


With respect to the perceptions of economic globalization among those voting for the principal political parties, the majority of those voting for left-centre and right-centre parties have favourable opinions. Their number exceeds that of those with negative opinions among voters for the populist and conservative parties.

Figure 7. Opinions favourable to economic globalization among potential voters for Poland’s main political parties\textsuperscript{14}

![Bar chart showing opinions on economic globalization among potential voters for Poland’s main political parties.]

The increasingly close ties between the Polish economy and those of other nations are advantageous for Poland

Source: CBOS

Therefore, 70\% of potential voters for the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) and 68\% of those for the Civic Platform (PO) believe that the growing interdependency between the Polish economy and the economies of other countries will benefit Poland. Among those voting for Law and Justice (PiS) and for Samoobrona, this opinion is expressed by 9\% and 43\%, respectively, of those surveyed.\textsuperscript{15}

\textbf{Negative for whom?}

The Poles’ opinions on the consequences of the globalization process are somewhat ambiguous. According to the CBOS study, the vast majority think that it is the rich countries which benefit from an increasing number of economic ties and interdependencies in the world (82\%), while slightly over half of them state that this process is disadvantageous for poor countries (58\%). In addition, 42\% of respondents believe that the increasing number of economic ties between countries leads to greater disparities in living standards, and 44\% of them feel that it also raises the unemployment rate. Almost twice as few individuals feel that, thanks to globalization, living standard disparities are decreasing (23\%) and that the unemployment rate is falling.

\textsuperscript{14} Potential voters for the LPR and the PSL have been omitted because of their small number in the sample.

Positions with respect to foreign direct investment (FDI)

Most of the Poles surveyed (60%) state that they favour the presence of foreign capital: only 1 Pole out of every 8 is opposed. For over 10 years, the number of Poles who believe FDI has had positive effects is higher than that of those having the opposite opinion.

Figure 8. Table of FDIs from 1990 to 2004 (in annual stock and in millions of USD)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Value</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>3,077</td>
<td>5,130</td>
<td>6,474</td>
<td>8,293</td>
<td>6,995</td>
<td>6,159</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Economic Survey, 2003, p. 177, 2005, p. 188.

The level of support in favour of foreign direct investment (FDI) correlates positively with the favourable economic situation. Although FDI support decreased following the economic slowdown of the year 2000 (51% in 1999 and 44% in 2000), it then gradually increased until it reached 61% in 2005—the highest level in 10 years. Currently, 60% of the Poles surveyed feel that the presence of foreign capital in Poland is beneficial, while only 13% consider it detrimental, which is the lowest figure since 1995.

Figure 9. Is the presence of foreign capital beneficial or detrimental for the Polish economy?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Beneficial</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detrimental</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not sure</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CBOS

The opinions about FDIs also depend upon political preferences: those supporting the Left Centre (SLD), the Right Centre (PO), and even the Conservative Right (PiS) are usually in favour of FDIs, while those likely to vote for the Samoobrona (populist left-wing party) are more opposed to it.

Figure 10. Is the presence of foreign capital beneficial or detrimental for the Polish economy?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Potential Voters</th>
<th>Beneficial</th>
<th>Detrimental</th>
<th>Not sure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SLD</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PO</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PiS</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samoobrona</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No opinion</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abstain</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CBOS

Moreover, relatively few Poles (19%) believe that FDIs can increase unemployment. According to a recent German Marshall Fund survey, of the six nations surveyed, the Poles are the fewest to contend that trade liberalization leads to job losses: 39% of the Poles claim this—in contrast, for example, to survey results in Germany or in France, where 51% and 58%, respectively, of those respondents fear that lifting trade barriers increases unemployment. Many Poles (70%) believe that FDIs help to create jobs (by way of comparison, 62% of the French, 65% of the Germans and 79% of the Slovaks agree).

However, this does not mean that the Poles are in favour of setting up multinationals. Despite massive support for FDIs and the predominance of positive opinions about their impact, the level of confidence with respect to multinationals is very low among the Poles. For example, the number of those interviewed who say they distrust large foreign corporations is 35% higher than the number of those who say they trust them. The Poles also tend to not trust large domestic companies (24%), despite the strong performance of the Polish economy. This may be attributable to the prevalence of a rather negative perception of entrepreneurs, who are associated more with corruption and shady dealings than with job creation or the country’s economic development.

2.3. Two characteristics

*Expectations with respect to the state*

What particularly distinguishes Polish public opinion are the strong expectations in terms of state control, the duty of the state being to counterbalance the negative effects of globalization.

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18. The German Marshall Fund of the United States is an American NGO whose aim is to promote cooperation and mutual understanding between the United States and Europe. The study Perspectives on Trade and Poverty Reduction of September 2006 is based on data originating from seven countries: France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Slovakia, the United Kingdom and the United States. It concerns various issues related to economic globalization, international trade, development, etc.
In view of the strong acceptance of FDIs, and even of globalization correlated with economic development, the negative effects might be expected to be imputed to the workers. However, this is not the case. The strong acceptance of globalization is combined with an extremely strong compensatory statism. A relatively high percentage of Poles do, indeed, believe that the harm done to workers by globalization, such as the relocations of companies in countries with cheaper labour, should be compensated by the state (67%). Only 16% of the Poles believe that it is the companies that have decided to relocate their production facilities which should compensate dismissed employees. How should this be interpreted?

Is this a legacy from Poland’s communist past and a sign of nostalgia for a protector state? By way of comparison, 38% of respondents in France believe that compensating employees laid off due to relocation should be the government’s responsibility, while 45% think that this should be the employers’ responsibility. In Germany these percentages are 34% and 42%, respectively.

However, this does not necessarily mean that the Poles believe it is the government’s role to regulate globalization. The Kairos study shows that, perhaps because of their very limited trust in the capacities of the state, the Poles believe that it is incumbent upon the EU, as well as multinational companies, to fulfil this regulatory role (on a scale of 1 to 7, the EU: 5.28 among young respondents and 5.25 among those aged 30 to 50, Multinationals: 4.86 and 5.10 respectively).

**Immigration**

Many Poles fear immigration, associating it with a reduction in wages. Thus 70% of Poles surveyed believe that there is a risk of a wage reduction for unskilled workers because of the influx of immigrants, and 62% think that the risk also applies to skilled workers. By way of comparison, 39% of the French believe that immigration promotes wage reduction, and 27% think this could also apply to skilled workers’ wages. In Italy, the corresponding results are 54% and 32%, respectively, of those surveyed. Is this related to the high unemployment rate in Poland, or rather to the fact that there is a relatively low number of immigrants living there? The results of the Kairos study suggest that the Poles’ fears on this subject are not accompanied by xenophobia, or the conviction that immigrants should not be entitled to rights equal to those of nationals (on a scale from 1 to 7, a result ranging from 1 to 3 corresponds to the opinion that nationals and immigrants should benefit from the same rights, and a result from 4 to 7 to the opposite opinion: the outcome is 3.46 for young Poles and 3.37 for those aged 30 to 50).

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20. Ibid.
21. In November 2006, Poland’s unemployment rate was 14.8%.
Lastly, it should be noted that the Poles’ perception of globalization is growing more positive. According to a German Marshall Fund study,\textsuperscript{22} they have a 34% more favourable opinion of it than they did in 2005 and 49% more than in 2006.

2.4. European integration and the attitude toward globalization

The growing support for economic globalization is consistent with support for European integration. Most supporters of European integration are convinced that the phenomena associated with economic globalization, such as the increasing number of economic and commercial ties between countries or the proliferation of multinationals are beneficial (62%). On the other hand, those opposed to Poland’s accession to the EU are divided in how they perceive globalization: nearly one third of them (31%) perceive it as a negative phenomenon, while an almost equal number of them perceive it as positive (29%).

\textsuperscript{22} Ibid.
Figure 13. The Poles’ attitude toward economic globalization and Poland’s accession to the EU

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitudes toward accession to the EU expressed by:</th>
<th>The economies of the various countries are increasingly interdependent. Numerous multinationals do business in many countries, and the economy is growing freely while transgressing borders. Do you think this is a positive or negative phenomenon?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supporters</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opponents</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No opinion</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: CBOS*

The Poles’ support of European integration tended to gradually increase after Poland joined the EU in May 2004, as they began noticing its beneficial effects on the economy (development assistance within the framework of structural funds, subsidies for farmers, increased exports) and on their own situation (opportunities to work abroad). Therefore, 88% of the Poles have a positive opinion about their country’s membership in the EU, which corresponds to a 24% increase since May 2004.23

Figure 14. Support for Poland’s membership in the EU

*Source: CBOS*

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Figure 15. Aid granted to Poland by the EU from 2007 to 2013 (in billions of euros)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total granted</th>
<th>Structural funds and cohesion policy</th>
<th>CAP</th>
<th>Lisbon Strategy</th>
<th>Justice and Internal Affairs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>91 (or 10.1% of the Community budget)</td>
<td>59.6</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: European Commission, DG Budget, 2007.*

The tendency to associate the benefits of European integration with those of the globalization of the economy preceded Poland’s accession to the EU. This is confirmed by a 1999 COBS study which shows that the Poles’ attitude toward an economic opening approach correlates with their support of European integration. According to a CBOS study conducted in 1997, the percentage of respondents stating they were in favour of Poland being more open culturally and economically was higher than those who were opposed to it, but with the declining support for European integration (80% in May 1996, 55% in May 1999) and dwindling optimism as to its consequences, there has been a rise in isolationist attitudes. This tendency has been gradually reversing with the return of Polish enthusiasm for the EU that still persists today.

It should be pointed out that opinions on the globalization of the economy are also related to those expressed on the effects of the systemic transformation underway since the fall of communism. An overwhelming majority of respondents believe that the transformation has had primarily positive effects on Polish society and are convinced that globalization is a positive phenomenon (78%). Accordingly, the fact that the attitudes toward globalization are correlated with the opinions on Poland’s membership in the EU and on the systemic changes underway in Poland shows that European integration, liberalization and economic opening are perceived as parts of the “globalizing” processes.

Figure 16. Attitude toward economic globalization and systemic transformation in Poland

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Have the changes that have occurred in Poland since 1989 resulted in more benefits or more losses?</th>
<th>Positive</th>
<th>Negative</th>
<th>Neither positive nor negative</th>
<th>Not sure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>More benefits than losses</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As many benefits as losses</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More losses than benefits</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No opinion</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: CBOS*

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Support for the EU is now felt across all socio-demographic categories and is even becoming entrenched among populist parties’ supporters who were formerly Eurosceptic: 80% of League of Polish Families (LPR) and Samoobrona sympathizers state that they support the EU.25

**Figure 17. Support for European integration among the main Polish political parties’ constituents**

![Bar chart showing support for European integration among Polish voters, with the following data: LPR 80%, Samoobrona 80%, PiS 85%, PO 95%, SLD 97%](chart)

*Source: CBOS*

### 3. ACTORS IN THE POLISH DEBATE ON GLOBALIZATION

#### 3.1. The political parties

Globalization and its consequences are not a priority topic in the discourse of Polish political parties.26 The topic arising most often in public debate nowadays concerns the settling of scores with Poland’s communist past and concurrent projects aimed at cleansing a state undermined by corruption. The “decommunization” issue has been occupying centre stage since the transition began (Bafoil, 2007).

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26. The results of the various elections from 1997 to 2005 are provided in the Annex.
If globalization is brought up in political debates, it is done most often in association with European integration. This explains why the attitude toward globalization is more defensive and hostile in “Europhobic” parties such as the LPR (a Catholic far-right party), or the Left-Centre populist peasant party, Samoobrona (“Self-Defence”). In speeches by the PiS (conservative and state-control party), globalization and European integration are practically never mentioned, being eclipsed by sovereignist slogans. However, in discourses of pro-European parties, such as the PO (a liberal party) or the SLD (a post-communist party) Poland’s accession to the EU is explicitly presented as an historic opportunity that will allow Poland to join the globalization winner’s circle.

The aforementioned conjunction of strong liberalism and expectations of a welfare state may be the reason for the coalition formed in 2005 between the PiS, Samoobrona and the League of Polish Families. These three parties are joining forces in an effort to safeguard the advantages secured during the preceding period (whether acquired during the communist era or that of Solidarity) in order to strengthen solidarity, resist “the sale of Poland to foreign countries,” and defend national and family values. Although Samoobrona is more centrist in terms of supporting the EU, and the League is opposed to any cosmopolitanism (linking together, in the same rejection, the EU and globalization), the PiS has managed to maintain a suitable balance and to favour those “disillusioned” by the systemic transformation. Who are these “disillusioned” Poles? These are the populations of small cities who have been deeply affected by the crisis for the last sixteen years, the inhabitants of rural areas in the Eastern territories, and, broadly speaking, all Poles eager to see “Polishness” (polskosc) values reaffirmed—which demands national pride, ethnic homogeneity, allegiance to the land and enhancing the prestige of the national heritage.

At the opposite end of this constellation of right-wing, nationalist and extremist parties—curious as it may seem, in view of how much the ideological polarizations have opposed them in the last decade—two parties are growing closer together: the PO and the SLD. The first is heir to the liberal Solidarity movement and to the “shock therapy” of 1990 and its reforms. The second is heir to the former Communist Party, which managed to undergo a reform in 1990 and lose the elections of that year by 11% of the votes, only to make that much more progress three years later by doubling its score. Beaten again in 1997, it returned to power in 2001 with over 45% of the votes, then vanished in 2005, when it scarcely recovered the 11% of the votes won fifteen years earlier. In November 2006, on the occasion of the regional and local elections, the SLD joined forces with the centrist Democratic Party (Partia Demokratyczna – demokraci.pl - PD), which includes among its ranks former Solidarity leaders such as Bronislaw Geremek, or Tadeusz Mazowiecki. The right-liberal and Left-Centre parties together garner the votes of the urban, and usually young and well-educated, middle classes. Whether the goal is penetrating the market with the PO, or more state control with the SLD, their voters are all supporting the EU and the transatlantic axis, the rejection of sovereigntism and opening Poland to the world, which are the terms of national development.
Figure 18. The axis of preferences of major Polish political parties on openness to the world and the role of the state

**Samoobrona**

The political programme of the Samoobrona—a party that arose from a peasants’ union, are based on two arguments: denunciation of the errors imputable to systemic transformation, which is accused of having been dictated by the interests of liberal oligarchs and foreign investors, and the defence of those who lost out in this process. In a Manichean discourse, globalization is associated with the risk of a loss of control over the economy in favour of foreign capital, which would have devastating consequences on employment and would trigger a national economic crisis. European integration would intensify these phenomena, inasmuch as the abolition of trade barriers is considered dangerous. It would notably allow the pillaging of the national heritage to continue, and make it easier for foreigners to buy up Polish lands and companies. Polish businesses would be endangered by the massive influx of European competitors. Criticism of the EU is both ideological—because the nation is viewed as the greatest good—and economic, because the EU is associated with liberalism, and the latter in the person of Leszek Balcerowicz, father of “shock

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27. This is an explosive subject in Poland because of the historic traumatisms and deeply entrenched fears Poles have regarding German claims over land which belonged to them under the Third Reich, prior to World War II. These fears have led to the imposition of temporary restrictions on the purchase of real property by foreigners following Poland's accession to the EU.
therapy” and the Samoobrona’s favourite scapegoat. After all, isn’t the party’s slogan, often repeated by its leader Andrzej Lepper, “Balcerowicz Must Go”?

With respect to the country’s economic opening, Samoobrona advocates state intervention in favour of Polish businesses, a decisively redistributive economic policy, and economic nationalism. To illustrate the Polish populist parties’ discourse on the economic integration of Poland, Marek Jazinski (2003) quoted the notice glued to the door of a PSS Spolem store in Kutno (a small town in central Poland) reminding the public of “the good old days” of the former regime: “By buying Polish products in Polish shops, you are helping to fight Polish unemployment.” Moreover, Samoobrona favours reorienting the trade policy so as to give preference to Poland’s Eastern neighbouring countries, apparently deemed more credible than its Western trade partners.

**The League of Polish Families (LPR)**

The LPR’s discourse on globalization is similar to Samoobrona’s, particularly in terms of denouncing the influence of foreign capital, which is viewed as devastating to the national heritage, and the Manichean view of the world, the distinction between “we” and “them,” which is to say the external liberal forces and, inside the country, the traitors serving the latter’s interests. However, the LPR’s opposition to globalization, also associated with European integration, seems to be ideologically charged and influenced by the theory of an international conspiracy against the Polish nation. As maintained by the League’s political programme: “There will be no equitable participation of Poland in international cooperation as long as the Polish state continues to be dismantled.”

This party—with its roots firmly entrenched in the tradition of Polish pre-World War II nationalist parties—equates liberally inspired transformations, privatizations and the opening of the Polish market to foreign capital with a “program to subjugate, annihilate and dechristianize the Polish Nation and to ultimately liquidate the Polish state, ensuring the takeover of its economy and of all of its other social structures by international forces.” Globalization is portrayed here as the bearer of a threat to the national economy and as the vector of a mortal danger for the nation, whose traditional Christian values would be eradicated by the imposition of Western values and of economic and moral liberalism. The LPR’s echoes the notion of Polish martyrology—the Polish nation perceived as the eternal

28. Network of shops managed as cooperatives and symbolic of the country’s communist era.
victim of enemy foreign powers, thereby exalting the Polish culture. The party claims to be the sole force capable of saving the nation from its increasing dependency on the West.

This logic spills over into the lofty discourse of the young members of Młodzież Wszechpolska (MW, or the “All-Polish Youth”), a satellite organization of the LPR, which sent a dozen MPs to the Polish Parliament in 2005, and can scarcely conceal its fascist tendencies. Behind the nationalistic or anti-liberal slogans and its claims to a role as defenders of the Church, All-Polish Youth does a poor job of dissimulating its xenophobia and the predilection of its members for fascist ideas. In order to promote a moral revival in Poland, the organization extols the ethos of group power; it strives to propagate the spirit of patriotism and the rejection of anything derived from the depraved West (secularism, liberalism, homosexuality, individualism, etc.), of anything which could threaten “Polishness” and the Catholic faith. Consequently, globalization—the vehicle for disseminating liberal ideas and cultural standardization—appears to be a formidable danger which the Poles must face on a united front, under the banner of Catholicism and nationalist ideals.

THE ALL-POLISH YOUTH MANIFESTO

1. Młodzież Wszechpolska is the ideological heir of the National Camp, the political ideas of Roman Dmowski and of the other founders of the nationalist thought. We acknowledge that one’s country is the greatest earthly good. After God, one’s first duty should be to serve one’s nation.

2. Młodzież Wszechpolska refers to the canon of the principles of the One, True, and Holy Catholic Faith, which views God as the ultimate goal of humankind. Młodzież Wszechpolska acknowledges the role of the Catholic Church in the creation and strengthening of the nationalist ideals of the Polish people and in their multidimensional development.

3. Młodzież Wszechpolska’s goal to bring about the moral and national revival of the young generation by declaring war on doctrines calling for autonomy, liberalism, “tolerationism” and relativism.

4. Our group’s methods of action include providing training in the spirit of national and Catholic ideals to actively resist the threats against our nation and the Church, as well as active participation in Polish political and social life.

5. Through our joint efforts, our goal is to build a Catholic state of the Polish nation—a state that will be the pillar of Latin-European civilization.

Lastly, it should be pointed out that, since the formation of the PiS-Samoobrona-LPR coalition government in May 2006, the former leaders of All-Polish Youth have been given key positions within the government, including those of the Maritime Economy Ministry and Secretary of State within the Ministry of Sports.

31. Following a recent scandal over the live broadcast by a privately owned television station of a compromising video tape about MW leaders in which they are making Nazi salutes while facing a burning swastika-shaped cross, the LPR’s leadership distanced itself from its militant incubator in December 2006, due to the fact it has members in the government.
Law and Justice (PiS)

The conservative party Law and Justice (PiS) claims to be the successor to the pro-Dmowskian pre-war Right, to a part of the Pilsudskist line, to the Gierek period and to part of the work undertaken by Solidarity. Today, it is the dominant actor on the Polish political scene, and its discourse is focused on domestic affairs. Its key centres of interest are “decommunization,” the fight against corruption and the strengthening of the state apparatus. Its programme includes defending an economic nationalism and redistributive measures in the name of “solidarity-oriented Poland” (as opposed to the “liberal Poland” of the PO, its main rival). Globalization is practically never mentioned in PiS discourse, and its radical state reform programme has not provided for measures designed to overcome the challenges which such reform implies. The PiS is ambiguous on the issue of European integration. A defender of national sovereignty, it does not perceive European integration as a process that will enable Poland to adapt to the challenges of globalization. Its international policy programme is focused on the strategic alliance with the United States, and on supporting democratic changes in Ukraine and Belarus, as well as the defence of Polish interests against Germany and Russia.

The Democratic Left Alliance (SLD)

The programme of the SLD, an alliance of reformed post-communists—which claims to have a pro-European and liberal orientation—explicitly refers to globalization, which it presents as an inevitable process. According to the SLD, the state must not remain passive confronted with the changes associated with globalization. The government must actively participate in the efforts to regulate economic globalization on an international scale. The programme also states: “We want to take an active part in the socially beneficial regulation of this phenomenon in order to ensure that resources are shared more equitably around the globe and that the principle of sustainable development is upheld.”

This agenda has anti-globalist overtones: “The SLD supports a public policy which is not geared toward serving the interests of global capital and profit but oriented toward meeting the needs of individuals.”

The Polish Left-Centre would like Poland to actively promote global cooperation to provide aid to poor countries by collaborating with the EU. In SLD discourse, the economic and political integration of the EU is presented as a vehicle for connecting Poland to the global economic transformations in progress and as a means to avoid being excluded from globalization. According to Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, one of the party’s leaders and a former minister of Foreign Affairs, before 2005, globalization went hand-in-hand with regionalization; it makes the roles of regional organizations such as the EU and MERCOSUR even more important. Therefore, Poland’s membership in the EU allows Poland to have some say over the globalization processes, and to no longer be subjected to decisions made by

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33. Ibid.
others, but to be an active participant. According to Michal Syska, the problems associated with globalization, such as the uncontrollable speculative inflows, ecological crises, or global terrorism, are exceeding the capacities of the nation-state, and the government should adopt the maxim which states that “policies are that much more national and effective when they are more cosmopolitan.”

Moreover, Polish left-centre claim that the accession of Poland to the EU is linked to the institutional and economic adjustment which gives effect to the imperative to adopt the “acquis communautaire” and the need to make the Polish economy more competitive. These changes will also satisfy the requirements which must be met in order to benefit from globalization of the economy. Therefore, in the Left-Centre discourse, the efforts to adjust the legislative and institutional framework initiatives concerning the EU are associated with those related to globalization. In Cimoszewicz’s opinion, the EU constitutes the means for Poland to adjust itself to the demands of globalization and to improve its economic competitiveness.

The Civic Platform (PO)

The Civic Platform depicts globalization as an inevitable process to which Poland has one alternative: either it can take action, adapt and become one of the winners of the transformations in progress, or it can withdraw and find itself marginalized in the global economic game. For Andrzej Olechowski, one of the PO’s founders, globalization represents an unprecedented opportunity: “We should be done is to make certain that Poles are not among those who have sought refuge in a museum.” In addition, he suggests that globalization contributes democratic and liberal values which could thwart the persistence of nationalist ideals.

Therefore the PO advocates open trade, free circulation of goods and capital, as well as economic integration, both within the framework of international organizations and of the EU. Poland’s membership in the EU appears to be a catalyst for the necessary changes the country must undergo in order to meet the challenges of globalization, and a means to make Poland’s voice heard in the international arena. However, unlike the SLD, which declares that it favours an effective redistribution of the benefits of globalization, the PO is opposed to such an intervention and recommends that the state withdraws. Its economic policy should be limited to stimulating Polish competitiveness.

35. Deputy Chair of the Polish Social Democrats, a party stemming from a split within the SLD.
37. Ibid.
3.2. The Catholic Church

More than 90% of Poles claim to be Catholic, and in Poland, the Catholic Church is an actor that cannot be ignored. It frequently influences public affairs, despite the formal separation of Church and State. What is its stand concerning globalization?

The Catholic Church in Poland does not speak with a single voice. Some even talk of a division between an open Church, faithful to the ideas of John Paul II, which remains dominant, and a “Church of Torun”—a politicized conservative strand which disseminates its ideas through the media and particularly over Radio Maryja’s airwaves.

These two views advocate contrasting attitudes toward globalization and suggest different responses to the latter’s challenges. The moderate strand protests against the negative effects of the growing number of economic interdependencies, while conceding that they can be a vehicle for solidarity and peace. This position reflects the ambiguous stand adopted by John Paul II, who wondered whether the world could benefit from a global market, yet also saw in growing integration an opportunity to promote peace. Although he feared that economic rivalry could lead to instability, he stressed that globalization was opening up new prospects by promoting values such as justice, equality and solidarity.

The reactionary group’s stand is more hostile. Globalization is perceived as a threat against “Polishness” and national and Catholic traditional values. It is a distant echo of views which conceived of Poland as a sentinel of Christianity in Europe, just as it was when forged in the 17th century and thereafter perpetuated in Polish literature, except that today pagans have been replaced by liberals. On Radio Maryja’s airwaves and on the other media connected with Father Rydzyk’s “media empire,” globalists are associated with capitalists and foreign neo-liberals, as well as with supporters of liberalism and the liberal media in Poland. As such, they are demonized and stigmatized as enemies of the nation seeking to destroy it. The representatives of this faction of the Church primarily address the supporters of the populist and conservative parties (Samoobrona, the LPR, the PiS), often labelled as losers in the 1990s transformation process and as groups still committed to the former regime’s state control. They present globalization as the driving engine of neo-liberal and anti-clerical ideas and associate it with the privatization of state-owned companies and the invasion of foreign capital. The latter would, according to that view, lead to companies closing their doors, to massive layoffs and to the ruin of the national heritage. Sometimes this vision is pushed to the extreme and globalization is described as an international conspiracy orchestrated by Freemasons who are supposedly seeking to dismantle the Polish state, promote the takeover of its economy and oppose Christianity in order to

40. The well-known radio station’s headquarters is in Torun.
41. “Father/Director” of Radio Maryja and founder of the Trwam television station and of the daily newspaper Nasz Dziennik.
build a “new and better pagan world in which Man is the only God, but in actuality, these are only the elected Freemasons.”

3.3. NGOs

What is the role of non-governmental organizations in the debate over globalization in Poland? There is no denying that their voice is scarcely heard. NGOs are still marginal actors in the public debate in Poland, inasmuch as they do not benefit from any significant media exposure which would allow them to have an impact on public opinion or on policymakers. As a result, the level of confidence in these organizations is particularly low in Poland. According to a CBOS study conducted in 20 countries, although the majority of respondents claim to have trust in NGOs, their number is only 7% higher than that of respondents having the opposite opinion, which contrasts with the trust levels observed in France and in the United Kingdom (41% and 39%, respectively). Brazil (4%) and China (3%) are the only countries showing a lower trust level.

Figure 19. Trust in NGOs among the populations of various countries

Source: CBOS

The Poles do not consider NGOs to be major actors in the public sphere. Anti-globalists are often associated with the violence that has accompanied international economic summits. The results of a survey conducted by the CBOS just before the European Economic Forum in Warsaw in April 2004 are very revealing.\textsuperscript{43} For example, although more than half of the respondents stressed the benefits for Poland in terms of international prestige and trade (58\% and 52\%, respectively), the vast majority of them expressed misgivings over the fact that organizing such forums seems to encourage violent acts associated with anti-globalist organizations (62\%). This would tend to show that anti-globalist NGOs such as ATTAC Polska,\textsuperscript{44} are still unknown to the general public, who tends to associate them with violence and vandalism rather than with a global civil movement. It is noteworthy that the events accompanying the above-mentioned Forum proceeded in a manner contrary to the public’s expectations. The shopkeepers may have bomb-proofed the windows of their shops and the government may have decided to transform Warsaw into a fortress, but for their part, the anti-globalists behaved calmly and peacefully.

4. CONCLUSION

Poland presents a paradox: a mixture of widespread support for globalization and political forces inclined to promote sovereignty. Associated with globalization are the benefits derived from the Common Market, which no political force has called into question. The EU is closely linked to the market opportunities and resulting growth that Poland has been enjoying, particularly since 2004, and two years after joining the EU, the Poles are still extremely enthusiastic about it. Poland was often labelled as “Eurosceptic”, which was not unfounded given the Poles’ limited participation in the 2004 European elections and a dispatch of a strong contingent of Eurosceptical—even Europhobic—MEPs. Such enthusiasm undoubtedly stems from having been awarded a substantial budget within the framework of the current European aids’ programming period (2007-2013), but it also can be imputed to Poland’s growth, which is evident to anyone travelling through the country. Construction sites for roads and buildings, municipal and regional land-development projects are flourishing. Under these conditions, are the sovereigntists’ options contradictory? Not at all, if we consider that, as advocated in PiS discourses, pro-liberalism and opening Poland to the world can be based upon an “economic nationalism” according to which country’s development should not rely solely on FDIs, but also on building of national industry champions. Such is the fragile balance which the coalition in power is managing to maintain. It can continue to do so for the long-term, as long as the growth driven by the absorption of funds continues, the peasants derive benefits from it, wages are sufficiently low to attract FDIs, and public expenditures are meeting expectations. This just shows how much of a burden time constraints for renegotiating Poland’s agricultural policy and fiscal discipline are going to be in the short-term.

\textsuperscript{44} http://www.attac.org.pl/.
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ANNEXES

Appendix 1. Share of public welfare expenditures as percentage (%) of the GDP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>17.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>19.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>14.74</td>
<td>15.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>23.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>17.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>15.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>29.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>13.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>23.28</td>
<td>21.88</td>
<td>21.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>27.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Economic Survey of Europe, 2003

Appendix 2. Unemployment compensation as percentage of the minimum wage in 2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Unemployment comp. as % of min. wage</th>
<th>Minimum wage as % of average wage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>40.9</td>
<td>39.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>57.4</td>
<td>34.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>31.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>60.2</td>
<td>42.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>62.7</td>
<td>34.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>69.2</td>
<td>36.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>92.9</td>
<td>41.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Appendix 3. Parliamentary Election Results (2nd ballot) from 1997 to 2005

1997

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Parties</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS)</td>
<td>33.83</td>
<td>201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Left Alliance (SLD)</td>
<td>27.13</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom Union (UW)</td>
<td>13.37</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polish Peasants’ Party (PSL)</td>
<td>7.31</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland (ROP)</td>
<td>5.56</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Parties</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Left Alliance - Labour Union (SLD- UP)</td>
<td>41.00</td>
<td>216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic Platform (PO)</td>
<td>12.60</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Defence (Samoobrona)</td>
<td>10.52</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law and Justice (PiS)</td>
<td>9.50</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polish Peasants’ Party (PSL)</td>
<td>9.00</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>League of Polish Families (LPR)</td>
<td>7.90</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Parties</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Law and Justice (PiS)</td>
<td>26.84</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic Platform (PO)</td>
<td>24.23</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Defence (Samoobrona)</td>
<td>11.66</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Left Alliance (SLD)</td>
<td>11.38</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>League of Polish Families (LPR)</td>
<td>7.89</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polish Peasants’ Party (PSL)</td>
<td>6.95</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ATTITUIONAL RESEARCH ON ELITE POLITICAL AND PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF GLOBALIZATION IN THE UK

Colin Hay
Professor of Political Analysis, University of Birmingham

Nicola Smith
Lecturer, University of Birmingham

1. INTRODUCTION

In recent years there has been growing interest in the role of discourses of globalization in shaping political outcomes in Europe. As a variety of authors have suggested, these discourses may play a powerful causal role in determining the trajectory of policy change and, as such, should be treated as objects of enquiry in their own right. The UK has provided a core focus of much of this analysis, since ideas about globalization have so frequently and consistently provided a justification, often the principal justification, for social and economic reform in recent decades. Yet, whilst much recent scholarship has pointed to the need for systematic empirical analysis of public discourses, little such analysis has yet been undertaken.

In the present report, our aim is to contribute to this task, by mapping contemporary appeals to globalization in the UK by political elites and to gauge, using our own survey data, underlying elite political conceptions of globalization. We juxtapose this public and private elite political discourse of globalization with public perceptions of globalization, drawing in so doing on the pioneering multi-country survey recently conducted for La Fondation pour L’Innovation Politique by Kairos Future International.

Building upon, extending and updating earlier work (see, especially, Hay and Rosamond 2002; Hay and Smith 2005), we classify and categorise such discourses in terms of the contingent or inevitable character attributed to the process of globalization and the positive, open-ended or negative connotations it is seen to entail. What becomes apparent, in contrast to the assumptions of much of the existing literature, is the range and diversity of discourses of globalization amongst elite political actors in the UK. The analysis of elite political attitudinal data shows the continued prevalence of specific conceptions

1. We are indebted to the Economic and Social Research Council for funding this research (project grant RES000220780). We are also extremely grateful to the Members of Parliament Project Team, David Baker, Andrew Gamble, Nick Randall and David Seawright, for their extensive collaboration and support. Finally, we would like to thank Akrivi Andreou for the invaluable help she has provided with this research.
Attitudinal research on elite political and public perceptions of globalization in the UK

(and indeed misperceptions) of globalization in particular that have now been challenged empirically. Perhaps more interestingly still, it also highlights a series of core tensions and contradictions within elite political discourse in the UK at all levels of government. These, we suggest, point to a certain frailty in the prevalent ‘hyperglobalization’ thesis to which elite political actors would otherwise seem committed when confronted with its distributive consequences. Finally, using the results of the Kairos Future International Survey, we compare our findings relating to elite political constructions and understandings of globalization to those of the general public in the UK. We show a perhaps surprisingly high consonance between elite political and public perceptions of globalization, indicating that the highly distinctive character of elite political discourses about globalization is also reflected in public perceptions.

The report proceeds in six sections. In the first of these we outline briefly the research design and methodology informing the analysis of subsequent sections. In the second we consider and review the basic evidence of the exposure of the UK economy to globalization. In the third we set out a schema for characterising and categorising elite public political discourses of globalization, drawing on previous work, which we use to map such public discourses in the UK. In the fourth and fifth sections we turn from public to private discourses and understandings. Here we draw on our own ESRC-funded survey data on elite political perceptions of globalization and the Kairos Future International survey of public attitudes and perceptions to globalization respectively, to map such understandings and perception in the UK today. In the final section we compare, contrast and recontextualise elite and public discourses and conceptions of globalization, reflecting on the distinctiveness of UK political attitudes towards globalization in the broader European context.

Research design

This report draws on two new sources of attitudinal data on elite and public perceptions and understandings of globalization. The first of these is our own recently completed ESRC-funded survey of elite political opinion. The second, an equivalent survey of public attitudes conducted by Kairos Future International in 2006 for La Fondation de l’Innovation Politique, is described in detail elsewhere.

The principal objective of our own research was to survey and map elite political attitudes to globalization. The study consisted of: a postal survey of parliamentarians and civil servants; semi-structured interviews with senior policy-makers; and the discourse analysis of policy documents, ministerial speeches and parliamentary debates.

Our research was informed by the following key questions:

– What do policy-makers understand by the terms globalization and how do they perceive of such processes – as external constraints, as processes amenable to domestic-level mediation or, indeed, as political projects in their own right?

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EUROPEANS AND THE GLOBALIZATION CHALLENGE

How do policy-makers understand the relationship between globalization and European integration – as complementary or competing tendencies, as clearly distinct or as part of the same process?

Can distinctive discourses of globalization and its relationship to European integration be identified, how pervasive are these, and to what extent are they conserved between cases and, within cases, between political parties, between civil servants and politicians, and between front- and back-benchers?

Are there disparities between policy-makers’ attitudes towards globalization as revealed in survey-based research such as this and the official/public public appeal to such discourses?

To these research questions which informed our initial research we are now able, with the help of the Kairos Future International dataset, to add a fifth:

Are there disparities between policy-makers’ articulations of and attitudes towards globalization and perceptions of globalization amongst the general public?

In order to map policy-makers’ attitudes to globalization we employed both qualitative and quantitative techniques. Our qualitative analysis involved, first, the discourse analysis of key policy documents and, second, semi-structured interviews with senior policy-makers from both countries. Regarding the former, we undertook the detailed discourse analysis of over one hundred official documents including White Papers, ministerial speeches, records of parliamentary debates and party political manifestoes published between 1997 and 2005. Regarding the latter, we undertook thirty-five interviews with parliamentarians and senior civil servants. These were semi-structured and open rather than structured and closed in order to allow interviewees to elaborate on their attitudes and beliefs regarding globalization and European integration. Interviewees were offered complete anonymity and confidentiality, although most interviewees gave their permission for the discussions to be taped and transcribed (on the understanding that the text would then be anonymised). Both sets of data were then coded and analysed via QSR NVivo. Building upon, extending and updating an earlier discussion (Hay and Rosamond 2002), we categorised the discourses in terms of the contingent or inevitable character attributed to the process in question and the positive, open-ended or negative connotations it is seen to entail (as discussed in more detail in the following section). This provided the framework through which we could identify and assess (using a simple ‘number of hits’ methodology) the relative prevalence of specific discourses and whether they were more likely to be used in certain contexts than others.

Our quantitative research consisted of an attitudinal survey of parliamentarians and civil servants. The methodology deployed here closely reflected that of Gamble et al’s early ESRC-funded Members of Parliament Project (hereafter MPP) in order to ensure compatibility between the two projects. As with the MPP, data was acquired through the distribution of postal survey consisting of closed questions with identical answer formats (‘strongly agree’, ‘agree’, ‘neither’, ‘disagree’ or ‘strongly disagree’). The questionnaire
comprised 37 questions that, through our earlier qualitative analysis, had been carefully selected to reflect a range of perspectives regarding globalization and European integration (see appendix 1). The questionnaire was sent to all Members of Parliament in the UK and to five hundred senior and middle-ranking civil servants (who were randomly selected using the British Civil Service Yearbook). The survey was conducted via three separate mailings and the offices of all non-respondents were also contacted via telephone and/or email to confirm that they would not be participating if no response was forthcoming. The survey responses were then coded and analysed using the data entry and data analysis techniques available in the Statistical Packages for the Social Sciences (SPSS). Overall, we received 371 completed questionnaires from the total of 1146 possible responses, giving an overall return rate of 32.4 per cent (see appendix 2). The overall distribution of responses was broadly representative of the sample population (see appendix 3).

In addition to our primary qualitative and quantitative research, we have now also been able to draw upon the survey data gathered by Kairos Future International in 2006. This consisted of data collected by means of an electronically-distributed questionnaire to web panels in 15 countries (including the UK). Each panel consisted of a (representative) sample of 1,000 respondents born in 1990-77 and 300 respondents born in 1976-56. This data allowed us to map the attitudes of UK citizens towards globalization, to consider how such attitudes compare to those of UK policy-makers and, finally, to see how such attitudes compare to those of citizens in (the 7) other EU countries included in the analysis.

2. CONTEXTUALISING ELITE AND PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF GLOBALIZATION

Economic management in the UK since the mid 1990s has invariably been presented in terms of the necessary accommodation to the ‘harsh realities’ of new economic times. These new economic times are in turn understood principally in terms of globalization. This is nowhere more clear than in the political economy of the UK government since 1997 which is invariably presented in a superficially dispassionate, almost technocratic, manner as logical correlate of having internalised the lessons of globalization. Appeal is made to processes beyond the control of political actors which must simply be accommodated - and hence to a dull logic of economic compulsion which is non-negotiable.

Yet evidence of the globalization of the UK economy which such discourses take as self-evident is not quite as easy to find as this might lead one to assume. Indeed, it is only by appeal to the most inexacting of definitional standards that the UK can be held to have experienced a simple and unproblematic process of globalization since the 1960s. And such an inexacting definitional standard is incompatible with the assumptions about globalization on which much UK economic management has in recent years been publicly predicated. A brief survey of the exposure of the UK economy to globalization, may then serve usefully to contextualise what follows.
The evidence most easily reconciled with the globalization thesis relates to the operation of, and exposure of the UK economy to, globally-integrated financial markets.

**Figure 1. Daily average foreign-exchange turnover, 1988-2004 (billions of $US)**


As figure 1 shows, whilst the trading of sterling on foreign exchange (FOREX) markets accounts for a smaller proportion of overall turnover on such markets today than it did throughout the 1990s, the proportion of world FOREX trading taking place in the City of London has remained relatively constant and has followed the global trend. As the volume of world financial market turnover has increased, so too has turnover in the Square Mile. Data like this would seem consistent with the notion of the UK economy as embedded within an ever more tightly integrated world economy.

A rather different picture emerges if we consider the openness of the UK economy with respect to trade. For, as table 1 shows, the ratio of merchandise trade to GDP (and hence the openness of the UK economy) is in fact lower today than at any point since 1950. The fact that UK trade to GDP ratios have fluctuated since 1913 between a peak of nearly 45 per cent (in 1913) and a trough of 36 per cent (in 1950) and that the average over this period of time (of around 41 per cent) is somewhat higher than current levels is surely an important counter to exaggerated talk of *inexorable* pressures leading to *unparalleled* degrees of economic integration. In the light of this, it seems somewhat disingenuous to present UK exporters as more fundamentally challenged than at any previous point by the imperatives of global competitiveness.
Table 1. Ratio of merchandise trade to GDP at current prices 1913-2003 (exports plus imports)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>36.6</td>
<td>46.6</td>
<td>44.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>35.1</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>56.3</td>
<td>56.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>19.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>103.6</td>
<td>70.2</td>
<td>80.1</td>
<td>83.4</td>
<td>112.5</td>
<td>108.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>44.7</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>39.3</td>
<td>42.6</td>
<td>43.9</td>
<td>38.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>18.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Calculated from Maddison (1987, table A-23); Hirst and Thompson (1999: 27, Table 2.3); World Bank, World Development Indicators, various years. Note: data for 1994

The aggregate picture with respect to foreign direct investment is perhaps rather more easily reconciled with the globalization thesis. As figure 2 shows, at least until the early years of the current century, inward foreign direct investment to the developed economies exhibits a trajectory of exponential growth. Moreover, the significant downturn since 2000 is largely attributable to a decline in (essentially unproductive) mergers and acquisitions (M&A) activity following a readjustment in world equity markets (for instance, IMF 2004). It is not in itself an indication of any reversal of the globalization process.

Figure 2. Foreign direct investment inflows (1998=100)

The UK case follows, for the most part, the trend for the developed economies as a whole. Yet, since 2000, levels of inward direct investment to the UK economy have fallen off rather more markedly than in almost any other developed economy. And whilst the UK’s distinctly stock-market-based variant of capitalism has always attracted higher than average levels of unproductive FDI, a more detailed examination of the evidence reveals that there is more to this recent decline than the falling off of M&A activity. Here, too, it would seem, the recent trend has been for a de-globalization of the UK economy – associated, in particular, with the shrinking size of its manufacturing base.

Such aggregate data, however, does not tell the whole story. What the data considered thus far fails to show is the extent to which the international trade, investment and financial transactions in which the UK economy is involved are regional (i.e.: European) or genuinely global in character.

Here the evidence is very clear – the UK economy like many of its European neighbours has not globalised in recent years so much as regionalised (Europeanised). To describe the economic flows which cross its borders in terms of globalization is perverse; since an ever smaller share of UK trade and FDI, for instance, is with countries beyond the EU.

As we shall see in more detail in the following section, the New Labour government’s discourse of competitiveness depicts the UK economy as embroiled in an ever more intense competitive struggle with producers from each and every country in an ever more tightly integrated global economy. Yet the empirical record tells a rather different story. As figure 3 demonstrates, the share of UK export trade destined for EU markets has tripled since 1955. Recall too that during this time, the volume of UK merchandise trade expressed as a share of GDP has not increased substantially (indeed, in recent years it has shrunk). This is hardly evidence of globalization, though it is very clear evidence of regionalisation. Indeed, both the proportion and volume of the UK’s trade with the world excluding the EU have diminished significantly since the 1950s.
The UK economy is, therefore, less and less dependent for success on its comparative and competitive advantage in global markets, and ever more dependent on comparative and competitive advantage in EU-European markets. An undifferentiated model of the determinants of competitiveness in a fully integrated global economy is likely, then, to be an ever less useful guide to discerning labour-market and other economic policy priorities.

Similar observations can be made about the competitive struggle to attract foreign direct investment. The UK’s share of world inward foreign direct investment has fallen quite steeply in recent years. Yet perhaps the more important point is that the character of that investment, like the character of its trading relations, is far from undifferentiated globally. Indeed, in 2004, no less than 98 per cent of inward foreign direct investment flows to the UK economy came from North America, Japan or EU member states (the so-called ‘triad’ economies). Moreover, mirroring the trends in the trade data described above, an ever growing proportion of the UK’s inbound foreign direct investment is from within the European Union. Finally, when it is considered that the vast majority of inward foreign direct investment from outside the EU is attracted by the UK’s proximity and privileged access to the EU market, the notion that the UK is engaged in a genuinely global competition for foreign direct investment is rendered at best somewhat problematic.
2. MAPPING ELITE POLITICAL DISCOURSES OF GLOBALIZATION

Following and extending earlier work (Hay and Rosamond 2002; Hay and Smith 2005), we categorise official globalization discourse in terms of the contingent or inevitable character of the process of globalization that is being appealed to and the positive, open-ended or negative connotations it is seen to entail (see Table 1).

Table 2. Discourses of globalization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Character of globalization contingent upon political choices</th>
<th>Globalization as unambiguously negative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inevitable/inexorable process (non-negotiable)</td>
<td>1 — globalization as a non-negotiable external economic constraint</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 — globalization as inevitable but a process whose content is amenable to political influence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 — globalization as threat of homogenisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contingent process or tendency to which counter-tendencies might be mobilised</td>
<td>4 — globalization as a political project which should be defended</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5 — globalization as a political project which must be made defensible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6 — globalization as a political project which must be resisted</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Which, if any, of these hypothetical discourses can be identified in the contemporary UK contexts.

The UK elite political discourse of globalization is invariably seen to be dominated by the appeal to globalization as a logic of external economic compulsion. That discourse, as is now well-established, has its origins in the self-imposed ‘modernisation’ of the Labour Party in opposition in the early 1990s (see, for instance, Driver and Martell 2003; Hay 1999).^2^ New Labour’s political economy, in opposition and now in government, has been consistently situated with respect to globalization – as a pragmatic response to the constrains it imposes.

Globalization has, then, been a consistent and unifying theme of New Labour and, more recently, third way discourse. The non-negotiable character of this external imperative was effectively summoned to establish the need for the modernisation of the party and to legitimate the content of the ensuing process. In office it has been deployed to similar effect with respect to a range of UK institutions. And it has, more recently still, been taken up as a rallying cry for advocates of the Lisbon process at a European level in establishing the necessity of a wholesale rejuvenation of the ‘European social model’. Indeed, another

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^2^ This was prefigured, to some extent, by the DTI’s turn to the discourse of competitiveness and with it a series of open economy macroeconomic assumptions under the tutelage of Michael Heseltine in the early 1990s. Yet, at this point, the discourse of globalization was rarely invoked.
key theme of third way discourse is the notion that globalization exposes all institutions, from the local to the EU level, to an exacting competitive audit. Consequently, globalization is invariably presented as the context with respect to which the success of a succession of modernisation initiatives, at various levels, should be adjudicated.

This much is already well documented. Yet, less widely acknowledged is that the appeal to globalization as a non-negotiable external economic constraint does not exhaust the elite political appeal to globalization in the UK today. Indeed, in government, New Labour’s appeal to globalization has diversified considerably. Where once there was but one consistent discourse, now there are at least three, each pulling in a somewhat different direction. It is potentially instructive, then, to map the contemporary appeal to globalization by the UK government and to consider the contexts in which these various appeals are made.

Such an analysis is presented, schematically, in Table 3. This shows the full potential range of discourses of globalization, highlighting (in bold type) those to which direct appeal has been made by the Blair government since 1997. These public discourses are categorised, as indicated above, in terms of the contingent or inevitable character of the process of globalization and the positive, open-ended or negative connotations it is seen to entail.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Globalization as unambiguously positive</th>
<th>Character of globalization contingent upon political choices</th>
<th>Globalization as unambiguously negative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inevitable/inexorable process (non-negotiable)</td>
<td>1 — globalization as a non-negotiable external economic constraint</td>
<td>2 — globalization as inevitable but a process whose content is amenable to political influence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contingent process or tendency to which counter-tendencies might be mobilised</td>
<td>4 — globalization as a political project which should be defended</td>
<td>5 — globalization as a political project which must be made defensible</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This is already highly suggestive, giving us a series of significant clues as to the character of UK economic policy (foreign and domestic). First, and most obviously, it reveals a far from consistent appeal to globalization. As we shall see, however, we need to be careful in the inferences we might draw from this. Second, and despite this, it suggests a consistently rosy depiction of globalization in official UK political discourse. Globalization is invariably positively associated and, even where the contingent character of the content

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3. And although our focus here is on governmental discourse alone, this comment might just as easily be extended to each of the major UK political parties.
of globalization is acknowledged (as in discourse 5), the potential for positive externalities is emphasised. Third, and of considerable significance, the Blair government’s public discourse displays a seemingly deep ambivalence as to the negotiable or non-negotiable character of globalization as a process.

In order to assess fully the implications of each of these observations, it is necessary to examine in somewhat more detail the substantive content of each of these three discourses and, most significantly, the contexts in which they have been deployed. This information is presented schematically in Table 4.

As already suggested, three clear and in one sense mutually incompatible discourses of globalization emerge. Yet what is most interesting is the consistent appeal in specific contexts to a specific discourse. Thus, it seems, the Blair administration’s domestic – and, indeed, European – political economy resolutely privileges discourse 1, whilst its foreign economic policy in consistently presented in terms of discourse 4 and its international development policy is couched in terms of discourse 5. Moreover, this seems to survive significant changes in personnel, such as Clare Short’s resignation and replacement by Hilary Benn as Secretary of State for International Development. This distinctive and seemingly consistent patterning in both the appeal to globalization and the character of the process that is being appealed to, suggests less confusion and incoherence so much as the strategic and rhetorical deployment of globalization. That impression is reinforced by a consideration of each discourse in turn.

Table 4. The UK government’s appeal to globalization since 1997

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Globalization as unambiguously positive</th>
<th>Character of globalization contingent upon political choices</th>
<th>Globalization as unambiguously negative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inevitable/inexorable process (non-negotiable)</td>
<td>1 — globalization circumscribes the parameters of political and economic choice (New Labour’s domestic political economy)</td>
<td>2 — no appeal to such a discourse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contingent process or tendency to which counter-tendencies might be mobilised</td>
<td>4 — globalization as liberalisation is potentially beneficial for all (New Labour’s foreign economic policy)</td>
<td>5 — a socialised globalization is, and must be made, beneficial for all (New Labour’s development policy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 — no appeal to such a discourse</td>
<td>6 — no appeal to such a discourse</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Take first discourses 4 and 5. As already suggested, these emerged in office and remain largely restricted to international fora. Both acknowledge and respond directly to the
challenge of anti-globalization protestors. Interestingly there is, to date, no parallel on the domestic stage. New Labour refuses to acknowledge, far less respond to, opponents of the distributional asymmetries which might be associated with globalization-conforming domestic reforms—perhaps because they have yet to find a prominent voice amongst the opposition parties.

Discourse 4 presents perhaps the key external face of New Labour. It has been voiced most prominently by Tony Blair and, during his truncated tenure at the Department of Trade and Industry (hereafter DTI), Stephen Byers in a range of high profile speeches to international audiences from Seattle to Davos and beyond. Indeed, the deployment of this particular discourse seems to owe its origins to a hastily-rewritten plenary address delivered by Byers, then Secretary of State at the Department of Trade and Industry, at the WTO Ministerial Meeting in Seattle in November 1999. With protestors camped outside the conference centre and parts of the city under martial law, Byers launched into a rather intemperate and potentially inflammatory defence of what he clearly saw as the unassailable merits of globalization. His remarks were directed clearly at globalization’s detractors encamped outside the conference venue.

‘There are those who say that globalization and trade liberalisation are innately harmful, bringing benefits only to a handful of multinational corporations, widening the gap between the richest and the poorest, threatening the environment and undermining social structures. Such people can be found at all stages in human history, casting doubt on progress and pointing to the ills it allegedly brings while ignoring the benefits … By working together we can confound the critics and show that globalization and liberalisation together can be a decisive force for good. But in our countries we need to work at convincing our people that this is to be welcomed rather than feared’ (0 November 1999).

This set the tone for very similar—if somewhat more conciliatory—comments, this time by Blair himself, at the World Economic Forum in Davos in 2000. Blair’s theme was, once again, the challenge arising from Seattle.

‘Our conclusion should not be that open markets and free trade are wrong. The worst thing we could do for developing countries would be to shelve the trade liberalisation agenda and sit back while trade barriers were re-erected around the world. The right conclusion is that we have an enormous job to do to convince the sincere and well-motivated opponents of the WTO agenda that the WTO can be, indeed is, a friend of development, and that far from impoverishing the world’s poorer countries, trade liberalisation is the only sure route to the kind of economic growth needed to bring their prosperity closer to that of the major developed economies’ (28 January 2000).

In both cases what we see is a public acknowledgement of the potentially fragile and, indeed, highly political nature of the process of globalization—and that of trade and capital liberalisation with which it is here held synonymous. Globalization is presented as a benign and beneficial process which must both be defended against its critics—lest its
progress be halted – and further institutionalised and protected from such misinformed detractors by giving greater clout to the institutions of global economic governance. Here the government’s true colours are revealed. Since 1997, amongst OECD member states, the UK government has been the most consistent, vociferous and unyielding advocate of a global regime of free trade and free capital mobility (Watson 2002). Indeed, the comparison with the stance adopted by the Clinton administration towards anti-globalization protests, for instance at Davos, is highly instructive (Coates and Hay 2001: 455-6). Where Clinton presented the protests in Seattle as a “wake up call” to the international community and a chastening reminder of the dangers of treating with “contempt those new forces seeking to be heard in the global dialogue” (29 January 2000), Blair’s message was altogether different. Arguably it evidenced precisely the contempt against which Clinton had cautioned. Globalization’s detractors were ill-educated latter-day Cassandra’s who simply did not know what was good for them.

Whilst the Clinton administration consistently embraced discourse 5, then, the Blair administrations’ rhetoric in Seattle and again in Davos was that of discourse 4. In this respect it has rather more in common with the Bush administration than that of his immediate predecessor. Yet in other international settings, prominent Labour ministers have sounded rather more like their former US/Democratic Party counterparts. Where international attention has turned to the question of development, the UK government since 1997 has consistently deployed discourse 5. This depicts globalization as an open-ended project that is, in principle, beneficial and hence defensible, and whose character is conditional upon political interventions. It has come to be associated in particular with Gordon Brown and, before her resignation, Clare Short, Labour’s outspoken Minister for International Development. Where the Prime Minister and successive Ministers at the DTI seem to substitute discourse 1 for discourse 4 when they have left London for venues outside of the Eurozone, the Chancellor’s discourse for international consumption is that of discourse 5.

The distinctiveness of this discourse is well-captured in the following passage from Gordon Brown’s speech to the Press Club in Washington in December 2001, where it was set out most clearly and, arguably, for the first time.

‘[T]his is our answer to globalization and to the critics of globalization. Some critics say the issue is whether we should have globalization or not. In fact, the issue is whether we manage globalization well or badly, fairly or unfairly. Globalization can be for the people or against the people. Poorly managed, globalization can create a vicious circle of poverty, widening inequality and

4. It is, in fact, difficult to characterise clearly the foreign economic policy discourse of the Bush administration. For, whether overtaken by other events, or more self-consciously, the new US presidency has not ventured much into the global public sphere in defence of globalization.

5. Clare Short, like other members of the Blair Cabinet, has by no means been consistent in her appeal to globalization. Thus, particularly in response to criticism, she has appealed to the non-negotiable character of globalization, stating in October 2000, “people have accused me of being in favour of globalization. This is equivalent to accusing me of being in favour of the sun rising in the morning”. I am indebted to Paul Williams for pointing this out to me.
increasing resentment. Managed wisely it can lift millions out of deprivation and become the high road to a more just an inclusive global economy. Our answer to anti-globalization campaigners ... is that we shall not retreat from globalization’ (speech at the Press Club, Washington, 17/12/01, emphasis added).

Almost identical sentiments were expressed, in remarkably similar prose, at the Federal Reserve Bank, New York in November 2001 and have been a consistent theme of Brown’s tenure as Chancellor, though they have invariably been reserved for international audiences. In the context of the UK’s elite political discourse of globalization this is highly distinctive and somewhat at odds with the more aggressive tones of the discourses we have thus far considered. The acknowledgement both that globalization is not necessarily a good thing in itself and that its character and desirability as a process are conditional upon the quality of its governance represent a substantial concession to globalization’s detractors and invite comparison (as we shall see) with other European administrations. It also reveals something of a tension in the government’s foreign economic policy discourse – if not necessarily in the policy it is intended to legitimate. For, put bluntly, the notion that “globalization can be ... against the people” or that it could be “poorly managed” would seem unthinkable to Blair or successive ministerial incumbents of the DTI.

Significant though this tension is, however, we must proceed with a certain degree of caution. For the foreign economic policy package with which the government’s development discourse is associated is not so very different from that promoted by Byers in Seattle and Blair in Davos. The former may well place their emphasis upon the obligations on the advanced liberal democracies to alleviate the debt burdens of the most heavily indebted nations. Yet such munificence, it becomes clear, is conditional upon developing countries signing up to a comprehensive liberalisation agenda. As Matthew Watson asks himself, is this concern with debt alleviation “any more than a means of securing a suitable basis for imposing liberalisation on the Third World?” (2002: 17). Again, a seeming contradiction may mask a deeper strategic purpose.

What is clear is that since 1997 – and particularly in the wake of the Asian financial crisis – the UK government has become increasingly forthright in defence of what some have termed the ‘post-Washington Consensus’ (Schuler 2002), playing a crucial role in the promotion, with the Clinton administration, of a ‘new Bretton Woods’. Thus, whilst many of its fellow European parties of the centre-left have advocated a taming of the speculative excesses of international financial markets with the introduction of a Tobin tax, the UK government has consistently defended the value of a regime of both free trade and free capital mobility. As Blair himself explained to John Humphreys in an interview given to the Today Programme, the imposition of a Tobin tax would be precisely “the wrong thing to do ... you actually want people to be able to move money very, very quickly”. The Tobin tax, he went on to suggest, would open the door, first, to exchange restrictions and, subsequently, import controls (28 October 1998).
The Blair administration’s vision of a new institutional architecture for international finance is fundamentally different, prioritising transparency, promoting pre-commitment and seeking to institutionalise new codes for fiscal and monetary conduct and disclosure at the international level. Gordon Brown again provides a particularly eloquent, and early, exposition: “the answer to the uncertainty and unpredictability of ever more rapid financial flows is clear long-term policy objectives”. What is required is “the certainty and predictability of well understood procedural rules for monetary and fiscal policy” (speech to the Council for Foreign Relations, New York, 16 September 1999).

The UK government’s foreign economic policy is, then, characterised by its defence of the global political economy as a liberal order. Yet, as Steven K. Vogel has perceptively noted, freer markets often entail more rules (Vogel 1996). Consequently, the defence of a liberal regime of free trade and free capital mobility requires a new Bretton Woods capable of imposing and policing such an order. In more substantive terms, New Labour’s agenda is to empower the institutions of global economic governance such that they might promote and, in the case of rogue state, impose a common economic policy paradigm. This has five key elements: (i) Central Bank independence; (ii) an inflation target in low to mid-single digits; (iii) the prioritisation of exchange rate stability where exchange rates are flexible and ‘dollarisation’ where exchange rate stability proves unsustainable; (iv) rapid government action to remove all sources of enduring budget deficits; and (v) the adoption of prudential banking. This is the agenda that New Labour has increasingly come to promote in international economic fora.

If UK foreign economic policy since 1997 has been informed by a set of discourses about globalization premised upon the contingent character of the process, then this should not lead us to downplay the significance of the consistent appeal to a necessitarian discourse of globalization in domestic contexts. As is now well documented, here globalization is presented not as a contingent process but as an entirely non-negotiable external economic constraint, imposing a series of imperatives which must simply be accommodated. Chief amongst these are those of credibility and competitiveness, both of which are presented as judgements passed by global market actors – upon the conduct of domestic policy and the relative value of domestic commodities respectively. Much of New Labour’s domestic and now European agenda can be derived from these twin perceived imperatives (Hay 2004).

Before concluding this brief survey of public political articulations of globalization in the UK it is perhaps important to consider the issue of cross-party variation. In fact, unlike many other European polities, globalization is not an issue of contention or division between the political parties in the UK. Arguably this owes much to the manner of New Labour’s accommodation to the legacy of Thatcherite neoliberalism. For, as indicated above, it was precisely through the appeal to the notion of globalization as a set of non-negotiable external economic imperatives that the UK Labour Party came to embrace neoliberal economic orthodoxy in the first place. In so doing, in economic policy terms at least, it came to reposition itself on terrain that had already been inhabited for some considerable
time by the Conservative Party. Nonetheless, until recently, the Conservatives have made far less explicit appeal to the discourse of globalization. The significant change here is the election of David Cameron to the leadership of the party in 2005. This has served to bring the parties far closer together in discursive terms; they were already close in economic policy terms, but characterised by rather different modes of justification for their highly conserved economic policy choices.

Thus, in a much-reported speech about ‘The Challenges of Globalization’ delivered in India in September 2006, David Cameron argued:

‘Tony Blair made an important point about globalization which I very much agree with. “The response to globalization can be free trade, open markets, investment in the means of competition: education, science, technology. Or it can be protectionism: tariffs, tight market regulations, resistance to foreign takeovers”. He defined a choice between the first option, which he called an open economy and the second option, a closed economy. Faced with that choice, the only option is indeed an open economy in an open society’ (Cameron 2006).

The cross-party consensus on the concept of globalization is completed by the Liberal Democratic Party. As for the Conservatives, a recent change in leadership (with the replacement of Charles Kennedy by Menzies Campbell), has seen the Liberal Democrats more explicitly locate their economic policy choice in terms of a public discourse of globalization. As Campbell himself recently suggested,

‘Globalization has altered the terms of trade for politicians. As our economy becomes ever more enmeshed in the international trading system, the ability of politicians to influence events beyond their grasp has been weakened. Globalization is a great leveller. National Governments can do much to help citizens deal with the unsettling effects of globalization, notably through education and life-long learning so that new skills can be developed and new job opportunities exploited, but they should never pretend they can insulate people from an open international economy’ (Campbell 2006).

3. POLITICAL ELITE ATTITUDES TO GLOBALIZATION

The above qualitative analysis highlights how in particular governmental discourses of globalization in the UK vary greatly depending upon the context in which they are deployed and the audience for which they are intended. Such variation can, of course, be interpreted differently. It is certainly tempting to attribute any inconsistency in the appeal to a concept like that of globalization to confusion or more simply a lack of sustained reflection on the part of those deploying it. Yet the consistent patterning of the appeal to globalization – with different contexts and policy domains yielding predictably different appeals to the discourse of globalization – suggests perhaps a rather greater degree of strategic deliberation. This is reinforced by the way in which the appeal to globalization in the UK context has served to depoliticise domestic reform agendas, thereby disarming opposition,
whilst politicising issues at a trans-national level where arguably the responsibilities and capacity of UK political actors to deliver is rather less. The appeal to globalization by UK political elites, it seems, has served to depoliticise contentious issues domestically whilst drawing attention and rendering more contentious issues beyond the immediate purview of domestic authorities.

A significant part of the rationale for surveying elite political attitudes to globalization was to probe further these issues, examining the extent of any disparity between the public articulation of globalization (the ‘interactive’ dimension of discourse, as it were) and policy-makers’ underlying attitudes towards globalization (the more genuinely cognitive and/or ‘ideational’ dimension of discourse). As such, our approach to the postal survey contained both inductive and deductive elements. Deductively, we sought to explore the extent to which our (earlier) qualitative attempts to map elite discourses corresponded with the exhibited distribution of elite political attitudes. At the same time, however, and perhaps more importantly, we examined if and how distinct patterns were apparent in the raw data itself.

The results of the postal survey suggest, unremarkably perhaps, that globalization is seen, at heart, by the UK political establishment as an economic phenomenon. Nearly all respondents (99.2 per cent) strongly agreed/agreed that globalization represents ‘the integration of world markets’ (see Table 5), and nearly all respondents strongly agreed/agreed that the dynamics behind globalization are primarily economic (99.2 per cent). Interestingly, however, there does appear to be a certain left-right element to the prevalence of such views, with Labour MPs less likely than their Liberal Democrat or Conservative counterparts to agree strongly with the statement. That having been said, a significant majority of respondents also understood the term ‘globalization’ to refer to the spread of technology (77.2 per cent), although far fewer defined it in terms of the erosion of national sovereignty (26.9 per cent), the spread of liberal democracy (21.2 per cent) or governance by international institutions (27.6 per cent).

Table 5. UK policy-makers’ responses to the statement ‘I understand the term “globalization” to mean the integration of world markets’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly agree (%)</th>
<th>Agree (%)</th>
<th>Neither (%)</th>
<th>Disagree (%)</th>
<th>Strongly disagree (%)</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>British civil servants</td>
<td>70.3%</td>
<td>27.9%</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British parliamentarians</td>
<td>65.3%</td>
<td>34.7%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>77.4%</td>
<td>22.6%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. This borrows from Schmidt’s distinction between the ‘ideational’ dimension of discourse (i.e. the ideas and beliefs about the necessity and appropriateness of a particular policy program) and the ‘interactive’ dimension of discourse (i.e. the process through which policy elites ‘co-ordinate the construction of the policy program and communicate it to the general public’) (2001: 249-250).
Attitudinal research on elite political and public perceptions of globalization in the UK

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly agree (%)</th>
<th>Agree (%)</th>
<th>Neither (%)</th>
<th>Disagree (%)</th>
<th>Strongly disagree (%)</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>59.0%</td>
<td>41.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Democrat</td>
<td>62.5%</td>
<td>37.5%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If globalization was seen as a primarily economic phenomenon, it was also and perhaps more significantly regarded as a largely inexorable force. For example, nearly three quarters of respondents strongly agreed/agreed that ‘the anti-globalization movement seeks to reverse the irreversible’ (see Table 5) and nearly three quarters of respondents strongly disagreed or disagreed that ‘the anti-globalization movement is likely to prove effective’. This is a very interesting and potentially important finding – since it demonstrates the prevalence in the UK of a particular conception of globalization (as a largely non-negotiable external economic constraint) often labelled ‘radical’ or ‘hyperglobalist’ [discourse 1 considered above]. Such a discourse has frequently been assumed to inform elite political opinion, but very little substantive evidence in support of this claim has been offered until now. Moreover, while a small minority (9.5 per cent) felt that ‘globalization is being regulated effectively’ and a significant majority (57.6 per cent) felt that ‘globalization should be regulated more effectively’, less than half (40.9 per cent) felt that ‘globalization can be regulated effectively’ (see Table 6). This rather reinforces the association between globalization, on the one hand, and perceptions of political fatalism on the other, that have been reported from analyses of public discourses of globalization (see for instance Hay and Rosamond 2002; Hay 2007).

Table 6. UK policy-makers’ responses to the statement ‘Globalization can be regulated effectively’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Neither</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>British civil servants</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
<td>33.1%</td>
<td>19.6%</td>
<td>34.4%</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British parliamentarians</td>
<td>11.6%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
<td>31.7%</td>
<td>9.0%</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
<td>24.6%</td>
<td>19.3%</td>
<td>40.4%</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>14.0%</td>
<td>35.0%</td>
<td>13.0%</td>
<td>29.0%</td>
<td>9.0%</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Democrat</td>
<td>16.0%</td>
<td>52.0%</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In normative terms, globalization was primarily seen as positive rather than negative. The majority of respondents either agreed or strongly agreed that for the UK ‘the benefits of globalization outweigh the costs’ (78.1 per cent), reinforcing the hold of the ‘hyperglobalist’ conception on elite opinion. UK policy-makers were also enthusiastic about globalization’s impact on quality of life (65.2 per cent), its impact on economic prosperity (86.4 per cent), employment (61.1 per cent) and international profile (70.3 per cent).
Table 7. UK policy-makers’ responses to the statement ‘For the UK, the benefits of globalization outweigh the costs’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Neither</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>British civil servants</td>
<td>33.7%</td>
<td>49.4%</td>
<td>9.6%</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British parliamentarians</td>
<td>30.0%</td>
<td>44.0%</td>
<td>16.5%</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>43.5%</td>
<td>40.3%</td>
<td>11.3%</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>25.5%</td>
<td>44.3%</td>
<td>17.9%</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Democrat</td>
<td>24.0%</td>
<td>52.0%</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8. UK policy-makers’ responses to the statement ‘Globalization has a positive impact on economic prosperity in the UK’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Neither</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>British civil servants</td>
<td>34.9%</td>
<td>56.0%</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British parliamentarians</td>
<td>31.0%</td>
<td>51.5%</td>
<td>9.0%</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>45.2%</td>
<td>43.5%</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>26.4%</td>
<td>52.8%</td>
<td>11.3%</td>
<td>6.6%</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Democrat</td>
<td>24.0%</td>
<td>64.0%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In terms of who benefits from globalization, the bulk of respondents either agreed or strongly agreed that it benefited UK firms (83.5 per cent), although fewer felt it benefited their country’s workers (54.7 per cent). Moreover, globalization was overwhelmingly seen to benefit the affluent (87.7 per cent) rather than the poor (36.9 per cent). Interestingly, though, and somewhat paradoxically, very few respondents saw globalization as a threat to social justice in their country (16.3 per cent). Nor was globalization perceived as a significant threat to democracy (11.0 per cent), national identity (14.4 per cent), national sovereignty (20.8 per cent) or national security (19.3 per cent). These findings are particularly interesting, when compared and contrasted to UK public opinion (see the next section).
Yet, while discourse 1 (globalization as a non-negotiable external economic constraint) was certainly predominant, many instances of discourse 2 (globalization as inevitable but amenable to domestic influence) and discourse 5 (globalization as a political project that must be made defensible) were also recorded. Nearly all respondents (91.5 per cent) felt that ‘the developed countries have a responsibility to ensure that the benefits of globalization are more equally distributed’ (see Table 9). A substantial majority of respondents felt that their country should play a greater role on the international stage in shaping the process of globalization. The majority of respondents (67.2 per cent) also felt that their country was influential in shaping the process of globalization. This stood in marked contrast to the equivalent views of Irish policy makers and can undoubtedly be attributed to the significant difference in relative influence and profile on an international stage of the two governments. Yet it is interesting to note the high proportion of UK respondents who felt that globalization could not be regulated effectively yet who also felt that their government bore a responsibility towards the developing world for the distributional asymmetries of globalization and/or felt that their government was influential in shaping the trajectory of globalization. Not for the first or last time, there are some interestingly contradictory responses here that warrant further and closer analysis.

Table 9. UK policy-makers’ responses to the statement ‘Globalization benefits the poor in the UK’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Neither</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>British civil servants</td>
<td>10.4%</td>
<td>25.8%</td>
<td>26.4%</td>
<td>31.9%</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British parliamentarians</td>
<td>11.5%</td>
<td>26.0%</td>
<td>26.0%</td>
<td>27.6%</td>
<td>8.9%</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>23.7%</td>
<td>37.3%</td>
<td>25.4%</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
<td>21.4%</td>
<td>26.2%</td>
<td>35.0%</td>
<td>10.7%</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Democrat</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
<td>29.2%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Yet, while discourse 1 (globalization as a non-negotiable external economic constraint) was certainly predominant, many instances of discourse 2 (globalization as inevitable but amenable to domestic influence) and discourse 5 (globalization as a political project that must be made defensible) were also recorded. Nearly all respondents (91.5 per cent) felt that ‘the developed countries have a responsibility to ensure that the benefits of globalization are more equally distributed’ (see Table 9). A substantial majority of respondents felt that their country should play a greater role on the international stage in shaping the process of globalization. The majority of respondents (67.2 per cent) also felt that their country was influential in shaping the process of globalization. This stood in marked contrast to the equivalent views of Irish policy makers and can undoubtedly be attributed to the significant difference in relative influence and profile on an international stage of the two governments. Yet it is interesting to note the high proportion of UK respondents who felt that globalization could not be regulated effectively yet who also felt that their government bore a responsibility towards the developing world for the distributional asymmetries of globalization and/or felt that their government was influential in shaping the trajectory of globalization. Not for the first or last time, there are some interestingly contradictory responses here that warrant further and closer analysis.

Table 10. UK policy-makers’ responses to the statement ‘The developed countries have a responsibility to ensure that the benefits of globalization are more equally distributed’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Neither</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>British civil servants</td>
<td>45.8%</td>
<td>47.6%</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British parliamentarians</td>
<td>51.0%</td>
<td>38.9%</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>28.3%</td>
<td>48.3%</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
<td>11.7%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>61.0%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Democrat</td>
<td>68.0%</td>
<td>32.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Though globalization was not generally seen as a significant threat to democracy or national sovereignty in itself, a sizeable proportion of respondents did see globalization as a threat to the autonomy of domestic policy-makers (52.7 per cent). This seeming contradiction is again interesting. It suggests that those close to the policy-making process do indeed perceive globalization as a set of challenges to which they must respond but which they are often powerless to influence. Yet it also suggests that they are reluctant to associate that sense of growing political incapacity with a challenge to national sovereignty itself, far less a threat to democratic governance. It may well be that we have not reached, in their view, the point at which any loss in policy making autonomy translates into a palpable failure of national level government to respond effectively to democratic demands. But it does nonetheless suggest some awareness of this potential and looming tension.

Table 11. UK policy-makers’ responses to the statement ‘Globalization undermines the autonomy of UK policy-makers’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Neither</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>British civil servants</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
<td>47.6%</td>
<td>20.1%</td>
<td>20.7%</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British parliamentarians</td>
<td>6.6%</td>
<td>42.9%</td>
<td>17.7%</td>
<td>22.7%</td>
<td>10.1%</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>9.7%</td>
<td>40.3%</td>
<td>16.1%</td>
<td>24.2%</td>
<td>9.7%</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
<td>40.0%</td>
<td>19.0%</td>
<td>24.8%</td>
<td>11.4%</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Democrat</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td>66.7%</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In terms of specific policy effects, most respondents identified globalization as a force for convergence in labour market policy (77.0 per cent), monetary policy (70.6 per cent) and in levels of corporate taxation (67.1 per cent). Given that each set of reforms in the UK context has, in recent years, been justified principally in terms of accommodating globalization this is hardly surprising. More interestingly, given similar justifications, less than half associated globalization with convergence in terms of education policy (2% per cent), immigration policy (2% per cent) or personal taxation (39.7 per cent). Nonetheless, other respondents tended to see it as having ‘no effect’ rather than as a source for divergence. Once again, and in the most general terms, this suggests the prevalence of a view of globalization that accords quite closely with the so-called ‘hyperglobalist’ thesis [discourse 1]. Yet in contrast to what much of the academic literature might lead us to expect (Ohmae 1990; Scharpf 1991; Kurzer 1993; Gray 1996; Cerny 1997), globalization was not associated with the ‘end of social democracy’ and the ascendancy of free-market capitalism. Quite the contrary: only a small minority of respondents associated globalization with downward pressure on social expenditure (16.8 per cent). Instead, it was felt in particular to heighten the need for increased public investment in skills (88.0 per cent) and

7. Not surprisingly, of the parliamentarians it was Conservatives MPs rather than Labour MPs who were more likely to associate globalization with downward pressure on social expenditure. Other factors such as gender, age or rank did not seem to play a significant role in policy-makers’ responses to this issue.
increased R&D expenditure (86.6 per cent). Although a noticeable proportion did associate globalization with downward pressure on corporate taxation (43.2 per cent), an even larger proportion felt that it increased rather than diminished the need for environmental regulation (51.7 per cent).

Table 12. UK policy-makers’ responses to the statement ‘Globalization increases the need for UK to reduce social expenditure’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Neither</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>British civil servants</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
<td>28.7%</td>
<td>51.2%</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British parliamentarians</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
<td>14.4%</td>
<td>17.5%</td>
<td>46.4%</td>
<td>14.4%</td>
<td>194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>19.7%</td>
<td>29.5%</td>
<td>26.2%</td>
<td>24.6%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
<td>11.7%</td>
<td>57.3%</td>
<td>21.4%</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Democrat</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>13.0%</td>
<td>60.9%</td>
<td>17.4%</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 13. UK policy-makers’ responses to the statement ‘Globalization increases the need for UK to increase public investment in skills’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Neither</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>British civil servants</td>
<td>29.1%</td>
<td>55.8%</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British parliamentarians</td>
<td>36.5%</td>
<td>54.2%</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>13.1%</td>
<td>67.2%</td>
<td>13.1%</td>
<td>6.6%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>51.0%</td>
<td>44.1%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Democrat</td>
<td>36.4%</td>
<td>59.1%</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In terms of the relationship between globalization and European integration, the majority of respondents (71.0 per cent) agreed or strongly agreed that the latter is being pursued independently of the former (see Table 13). Yet globalization was also seen by many (60.0 per cent) to make European integration more important for their country, and the majority of respondents (71.5 per cent) also felt that ‘the EU should play a greater role in shaping the process of globalization’.
Table 14. UK policy-makers’ responses to the statement ‘European integration is being pursued independently of globalization’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Neither</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>British civil servants</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
<td>59.3%</td>
<td>12.6%</td>
<td>19.2%</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British parliamentarians</td>
<td>21.9%</td>
<td>51.7%</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
<td>13.9%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>32.3%</td>
<td>54.8%</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>17.9%</td>
<td>49.1%</td>
<td>12.3%</td>
<td>18.9%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Democrat</td>
<td>12.0%</td>
<td>60.0%</td>
<td>24.0%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. UK PUBLIC ATTITUDES TO GLOBALIZATION

So far we have considered how globalization is articulated and understood by political elites, both elected and appointed, in the UK – both publicly and privately. But, given the availability for the first time of high quality survey data on public opinion, we are now in a position to consider how globalization is perceived by the UK public. Hence, in this, the final substantive section of our report, will turn our attention to the data recently gathered by Kairos Future International in mapping the attitudes of UK citizens towards globalization, in considering how such attitudes compare to those of UK policy-makers and, finally, in assessing how such attitudes compare to those of citizens in other EU countries.

Before turning to the specific issue of globalization, it is worth briefly outlining what the data can reveal about UK citizens’ political values more broadly, for this provides an important context within which to interpret attitudes towards globalization. Perhaps the first thing to note here is that, on balance, core UK political values are quite close to EU medium, though generally leaning more towards the conservative pole. UK citizens’ political ideals were more likely than their EU counterparts to be associated with the country (as opposed to the city) life, with low taxes rather than a strong welfare system, with stability and tradition rather than change, and with unequal opportunities for immigrants. Given that UK political parties have, over the previous three decades consistently promoted low taxation over a strong welfare system whilst increasingly defending traditional values, this is probably very much to be expected. It also suggests that the UK public’s conservative disposition has not been exhausted by close to three decades of neoliberal government. Interestingly, and more surprisingly, younger UK citizens were marginally more likely than their EU counterparts to favour the protection of national industries over free trade and global competition; by contrast, those aged 30-50 were more likely than their EU counterparts to favour free trade over protectionism. This is an interesting finding, indicating perhaps a rather greater level of concern amongst young UK citizens than is often assumed about the much-vaunted advantages of labour market flexibility in an open economy. This impression is only reinforced by the much
higher prevalence amongst young UK citizens when compared to the EU average of hostile attitudes towards immigrants. Together these findings are suggestive of a potentially rather alarming backlash amongst young UK citizens against the labour-market effects of economic interdependence.

Table 15. The UK general public - political values

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What characterises your ideal future society? Please mark your choice on the scale between the two opposing statements</th>
<th>UK ages 16-29 (Mean)</th>
<th>UK ages 30-50 (Mean)</th>
<th>UK Total (Mean)</th>
<th>EU ages 16-29 (Mean)</th>
<th>EU ages 30-50 (Mean)</th>
<th>EU Total (Mean)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Country life / City life</td>
<td>3.849</td>
<td>3.147</td>
<td>3.687</td>
<td>4.262</td>
<td>3.749</td>
<td>4.144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low taxes / Strong welfare system</td>
<td>3.662</td>
<td>3.878</td>
<td>3.711</td>
<td>3.981</td>
<td>3.952</td>
<td>3.974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native citizens and immigrants have equal / different opportunities</td>
<td>4.050</td>
<td>3.752</td>
<td>3.981</td>
<td>3.547</td>
<td>3.497</td>
<td>3.535</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free trade and global competition / Protect national industry</td>
<td>3.870</td>
<td>3.771</td>
<td>3.847</td>
<td>3.764</td>
<td>3.937</td>
<td>3.804</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To what extent do you trust the following groups and organisation?

| Your national government | 2.858 | 2.690 | 2.819 | 2.831 | 2.788 | 2.821 |
| Media | 2.611 | 2.535 | 2.593 | 3.016 | 2.858 | 2.980 |
| People in general | 3.863 | 3.956 | 3.884 | 3.950 | 4.077 | 3.979 |
| Religious institutions | 2.687 | 2.579 | 2.660 | 2.528 | 2.507 | 2.523 |

How interested are you in the following?

The survey data also indicates, once again, the low level of trust in formal political institutions, indeed formal institutions of all kinds, amongst UK citizens (see also Hay 2007). Yet it also shows that, save other than for the media and the European Union, such distrust is no more prevalent in the UK than in the EU more generally. Moreover, it shows that the young are if anything more trusting of international institutions – such as the UN, the WTO and the EU – as indeed they are of national government than their elders. This is perhaps mildly encouraging. More alarming, however, are the significantly lower levels of interest in both politics and the environment/sustainable development shown by UK citizens in comparison to their EU counterparts and the fact that young UK citizens are less likely than their elders to show interest in either politics or the environment/sustainable development.

The Kairos Future International survey data also shows the extent of UK euroscepticism in comparison to other EU member states. As has been widely documented in Eurobarometer surveys over many years, UK citizens are significantly less likely to trust EU institutions and to identify with people from neighbouring countries and fellow Europeans, than their EU counterparts. Nonetheless, it is interesting to note that UK citizens displayed higher levels of trust in EU institutions than in their own government. Moreover, they were only slightly less likely to identify with other Europeans than with their fellow countrymen (table 1). Were we to control for the generally lower levels of trust in others (both people and institutions) which characterises contemporary UK political culture we might well find that levels of euroscepticism are no more prevalent in the UK than in the EU. As this suggests, in interpreting attitudinal data such as this, it is important not to mistake low levels of political trust in general with euroscepticism in particular. It may well also be the case that the UK’s reputation for euroscepticism is rather overstated.
Table 16. The UK general public - national identity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How much do you feel you have in common with ... (regarding culture, values and lifestyle)</th>
<th>UK ages 16-29 (Mean)</th>
<th>UK ages 30-50 (Mean)</th>
<th>UK Total (Mean)</th>
<th>EU ages 16-29 (Mean)</th>
<th>EU ages 30-50 (Mean)</th>
<th>EU Total (Mean)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I would like to live ...</th>
<th>UK ages 16-29 (Mean)</th>
<th>UK ages 30-50 (Mean)</th>
<th>UK Total (Mean)</th>
<th>EU ages 16-29 (Mean)</th>
<th>EU ages 30-50 (Mean)</th>
<th>EU Total (Mean)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>... most of my life in the town I live now</td>
<td>3.307</td>
<td>3.727</td>
<td>3.404</td>
<td>3.916</td>
<td>4.478</td>
<td>4.046</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... most of my life somewhere else in this country</td>
<td>3.709</td>
<td>3.409</td>
<td>3.640</td>
<td>4.436</td>
<td>3.043</td>
<td>3.345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... most of my life abroad</td>
<td>3.162</td>
<td>3.129</td>
<td>3.154</td>
<td>2.868</td>
<td>2.482</td>
<td>2.779</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... abroad for periods, but will always return home</td>
<td>4.052</td>
<td>4.056</td>
<td>4.053</td>
<td>4.078</td>
<td>3.897</td>
<td>4.036</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This provides the backcloth for UK public attitudes towards globalization.

Much like their elite political counterparts, UK citizens cited increased trade between nations as the most important element of globalization. A range of other factors – notably, increased opportunities for national companies, lower prices of goods and services and a greater emphasis on research and development and lifelong learning - were also seen as important. This suggests a high degree of consonance with elite political opinion, with globalization for both populations being understood in primarily economic terms, and being associated with a range of economic and social policy imperatives (such as R&D and lifelong learning). That impression is reinforced by the association, by UK citizens, of globalization with convergence in welfare policies.

Interestingly, however, globalization was associated with threats to employment and, for those aged over 30, it was significantly less likely to be associated with personal opportunities than for other EU citizens of the same age or young UK citizens. Again, this suggests, in contrast to many of the assumptions of the existing literature, some anxieties amongst UK citizens about the opening up of labour markets in a context of perceived globalization. Here there is a clear, and very interesting, disparity between elite political opinion and that of UK citizens. A similar disparity is observed in attitudes towards national identity, with UK citizens, unlike their political elites, associating globalization with threats to national identity.
Table 17. The UK general public - understanding globalization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>For me globalization means ...</th>
<th>UK ages 16-29 (Mean)</th>
<th>UK ages 30-50 (Mean)</th>
<th>UK Total (Mean)</th>
<th>EU ages 16-29 (Mean)</th>
<th>EU ages 30-50 (Mean)</th>
<th>EU Total (Mean)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lower prices of goods and services</td>
<td>4.423</td>
<td>4.364</td>
<td>4.409</td>
<td>4.401</td>
<td>4.314</td>
<td>4.381</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weakened national identities</td>
<td>4.130</td>
<td>4.166</td>
<td>4.118</td>
<td>4.064</td>
<td>4.148</td>
<td>4.083</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased opportunities for national companies</td>
<td>4.444</td>
<td>4.415</td>
<td>4.437</td>
<td>4.544</td>
<td>4.543</td>
<td>4.544</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A threat to employment in my country</td>
<td>4.032</td>
<td>4.081</td>
<td>4.043</td>
<td>3.818</td>
<td>3.948</td>
<td>3.848</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater cultural exchange and mutual understanding</td>
<td>4.396</td>
<td>4.272</td>
<td>4.367</td>
<td>4.636</td>
<td>4.678</td>
<td>4.646</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A greater emphasis on research &amp; development and life-long learning</td>
<td>4.337</td>
<td>4.320</td>
<td>4.333</td>
<td>4.651</td>
<td>4.652</td>
<td>4.651</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased mobility between EU countries</td>
<td>4.571</td>
<td>4.394</td>
<td>4.530</td>
<td>4.905</td>
<td>4.788</td>
<td>4.878</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welfare systems becoming more similar in different countries</td>
<td>4.169</td>
<td>3.917</td>
<td>4.111</td>
<td>4.286</td>
<td>4.255</td>
<td>4.279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More trade between countries</td>
<td>4.823</td>
<td>4.615</td>
<td>4.775</td>
<td>5.057</td>
<td>4.962</td>
<td>5.035</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New opportunities for me</td>
<td>4.284</td>
<td>3.758</td>
<td>4.163</td>
<td>4.539</td>
<td>4.121</td>
<td>4.443</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased European solidarity</td>
<td>3.883</td>
<td>3.592</td>
<td>3.816</td>
<td>4.291</td>
<td>4.188</td>
<td>4.267</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In terms of shaping globalization, UK citizens felt that multinational corporations had the greatest influence on the regulation of globalization, followed by the World Trade Organisation and the European Union. But UK citizens also cited their own government as having an influence on the regulation of globalization. This appears to mirror our finding (discussed above) that the majority of UK policy-makers perceive UK to be influential in shaping the process of globalization. Interestingly, UK citizens were considerably more likely to identify their own government as having an influence on the regulation of globalization than were citizens of other EU countries. This is highly consistent with our findings from surveying the opinions of UK and Irish policy-makers.
Table 18. The UK general public - shaping globalization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Which of the following players have the greatest influence on the regulation of globalization?</th>
<th>UK ages 16-29 (Mean)</th>
<th>UK ages 30-50 (Mean)</th>
<th>UK Total (Mean)</th>
<th>EU ages 16-29 (Mean)</th>
<th>EU ages 30-50 (Mean)</th>
<th>EU Total (Mean)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Multinational corporations</td>
<td>4.742</td>
<td>4.733</td>
<td>4.740</td>
<td>5.011</td>
<td>5.088</td>
<td>5.029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs (social movements, trade unions, etc.)</td>
<td>3.769</td>
<td>3.475</td>
<td>3.701</td>
<td>3.537</td>
<td>3.436</td>
<td>3.514</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People in general</td>
<td>3.913</td>
<td>3.819</td>
<td>3.891</td>
<td>4.022</td>
<td>3.906</td>
<td>3.995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The police and justice system</td>
<td>3.298</td>
<td>3.091</td>
<td>3.250</td>
<td>3.208</td>
<td>3.166</td>
<td>3.198</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In terms of future threats to society, respondents saw the most important factor to be environmental pollution, followed by terrorism, war and poverty and famine. Unemployment and a collapse in the international financial system were seen somewhat lesser threats. What is striking about these responses is how highly they are conserved between the UK public and citizens of the EU more generally. In general terms, UK respondents were likely to see all of these risks as marginally less significant that their EU counterparts, with the notable exceptions of terrorism and war – both of which, arguably, UK publics have been more directly involved in than the majority of their EU counterparts in recent years. Interestingly, unemployment was not regarded as so serious a threat in UK public opinion as in EU public opinion, reflecting, one can only surmise the comparatively low official levels of unemployment in the UK in comparison to the EU average. Organised crime and pandemics were also seen as rather less of a threat, perhaps due to the UK’s geographical position outside of the European continental landmass.

Table 19. The UK general public - international threats

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Which are the greatest threats to the society of the future?</th>
<th>UK ages 16-29 (Mean)</th>
<th>UK ages 30-50 (Mean)</th>
<th>UK Total (Mean)</th>
<th>EU ages 16-29 (Mean)</th>
<th>EU ages 30-50 (Mean)</th>
<th>EU Total (Mean)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Environmental pollution</td>
<td>5.694</td>
<td>5.840</td>
<td>5.728</td>
<td>5.920</td>
<td>6.056</td>
<td>5.951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty and famine</td>
<td>5.092</td>
<td>5.285</td>
<td>5.137</td>
<td>5.304</td>
<td>5.511</td>
<td>5.352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorism</td>
<td>5.624</td>
<td>5.606</td>
<td>5.620</td>
<td>5.493</td>
<td>5.784</td>
<td>5.560</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aids and pandemics</td>
<td>4.911</td>
<td>4.752</td>
<td>4.874</td>
<td>5.154</td>
<td>5.098</td>
<td>5.141</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Which are the greatest threats to the society of the future?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Threat</th>
<th>UK ages 16-29 (Mean)</th>
<th>UK ages 30-50 (Mean)</th>
<th>UK Total (Mean)</th>
<th>EU ages 16-29 (Mean)</th>
<th>EU ages 30-50 (Mean)</th>
<th>EU Total (Mean)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>War</td>
<td>5.649</td>
<td>5.596</td>
<td>5.637</td>
<td>5.519</td>
<td>5.650</td>
<td>5.549</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organised crime</td>
<td>4.854</td>
<td>5.045</td>
<td>4.898</td>
<td>5.098</td>
<td>5.412</td>
<td>5.170</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The survey results reveal that most UK citizens had not studied or worked abroad, though these figures were all very close to the EU average.

**Table 20. The UK general public - international experience**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Your international experience (Y=1; N = 2)</th>
<th>UK ages 16-29 (Mean)</th>
<th>UK ages 30-50 (Mean)</th>
<th>UK Total (Mean)</th>
<th>EU ages 16-29 (Mean)</th>
<th>EU ages 30-50 (Mean)</th>
<th>EU Total (Mean)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Have you ever travelled abroad?</td>
<td>1.081</td>
<td>1.090</td>
<td>1.083</td>
<td>1.119</td>
<td>1.096</td>
<td>1.114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have you studied abroad?</td>
<td>1.868</td>
<td>1.873</td>
<td>1.869</td>
<td>1.869</td>
<td>1.864</td>
<td>1.868</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have you worked abroad?</td>
<td>1.828</td>
<td>1.758</td>
<td>1.812</td>
<td>1.842</td>
<td>1.775</td>
<td>1.827</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In terms of attitudes towards consumption, UK respondents identified themselves as being slightly less rather than more likely to buy goods from companies that are environmentally friendly and/or ethical and socially responsible. These figures were similar to the average for EU citizens overall. More interestingly, however, UK citizens expressed themselves markedly less likely to purchase European goods in order to protect European jobs than their EU counterparts. This is undoubtedly reflective of a far lower sense of European citizenship amongst the UK public than in many of its European neighbours. Whilst UK citizens may well consciously purchase domestically-produced goods to defend UK jobs, they have in general a far less well-developed sense of belonging to a European community of workers.
Table 21. The UK general public - views on consumption

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What are your views on consumption?</th>
<th>UK ages 16-29 (Mean)</th>
<th>UK ages 30-50 (Mean)</th>
<th>UK Total (Mean)</th>
<th>EU ages 16-29 (Mean)</th>
<th>EU ages 30-50 (Mean)</th>
<th>EU Total (Mean)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I usually buy goods from companies that are environmentally friendly</td>
<td>3.471</td>
<td>3.497</td>
<td>3.477</td>
<td>3.345</td>
<td>3.526</td>
<td>3.387</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I usually buy goods from companies that are ethical and take social responsibility</td>
<td>3.398</td>
<td>3.360</td>
<td>3.389</td>
<td>3.261</td>
<td>3.350</td>
<td>3.282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I prefer to buy European produced goods to protect European jobs</td>
<td>2.737</td>
<td>2.775</td>
<td>2.746</td>
<td>3.053</td>
<td>3.323</td>
<td>3.115</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. CONCLUSION

The combination of survey data on elite political attitudes towards globalization and equivalent public attitudinal data for the UK and other EU member states allows us to paint, really for the first time, a very interesting portrait of discourses of globalization in the contemporary UK context. Our findings are both illuminating and suggestive in a number of respects, confirming many of the expectations and assumptions of the existing literature but confounding others.

A number of tentative conclusions might be drawn at this stage:

1. UK elite political discourse about globalization is - and remains - highly distinctive in the EU context, particularly in the extent to which it characterises globalization domestically as an overriding and non-negotiable external economic constraint to which social and economic policy choices must be subordinated.

2. Yet, however dominant this discourse may well appear to be amongst UK political elites, it is by no means consistently deployed in all contexts. Indeed, although globalization is invoked domestically – and to some extent in justifications for labour-market and other reforms on a European stage – as a non-negotiable series of imperatives, in more genuinely global contexts it is appealed to as a process which can and should be shaped for the benefit of all.

3. What we witness, then, is a consistent pattern in the public discourse of globalization deployed by UK policy-makers – with different contexts and policy domains yielding predictably different appeals to the language of globalization. This suggests a certain strategic use of discourse, an impression only reinforced by the way in which the appeal to globalization in the UK context has served to depoliticise domestic reform agendas, thereby
disarming opposition, whilst politicising issues at a trans-national level where arguably the responsibilities and capacity of UK political actors to deliver is rather less.

4. Moving from public to private discourses, our survey of elite political opinion provides seemingly powerful confirmation of the hold that a particular understanding of globalization – conventionally labelled the ‘hyperglobalization’ thesis – has over elite political discourse in the UK.

5. Yet our analysis also reveals a range of seeming tensions and contradictions in this ostensible elite political consensus on globalization. These seem to be particularly acute when respondents are asked to express normative and political judgements about the benefits of globalization, the distributional asymmetries associated with each, and the responsibility for such distribution asymmetries. Respondents who regard globalization to be both benign and beneficial and, indeed, something of an inexorable logic nonetheless seem to associate it with the proliferation of a range of distributional asymmetries, domestically and between the developed and developing worlds, for which they seem to hold western governments (including perhaps their own) responsible.

6. Turning from elite to public political attitudes, our analysis of the Kairos Future International data shows that whilst there are significant differences between UK citizens’ expressed political culture and that of their EU counterparts, their understanding and conception of globalization is remarkably close to that of other EU political cultures.

7. Moreover, this conception of globalization is, in general terms, quite close to that of the UK political elite – globalization is a largely economic phenomenon which must be accommodated, but which is largely positive in character despite demanding a series of adjustments in social and economic policy.

8. Yet if there are broad similarities between elite and public attitudes towards globalization there are also marked, and very interesting, differences between them.

9. Some of these rather confound much of the prevailing academic orthodoxy on UK attitudes towards globalization – which has not previously been able to draw on high-quality survey data such as that here reported.

10. Particularly interesting here is that young UK citizens would seem to have significant concerns about the economic insecurity they seem to associate with open and flexible labour markets and with high levels of migration. Indeed, many of them, it would seem, favour protectionist strategies which might insulate jobs from the challenges of international competition. Such attitudes are far less prevalent amongst their elders. They would also seem to associate globalization, in contrast to their political elites, with significant threats to national identity and their employment prospects.
Attitudinal research on elite political and public perceptions of globalization in the UK

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL REFERENCES


ANNEXES

Appendix 1. Elite political attitudes survey - response rates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Total sample size</th>
<th>Number of responses</th>
<th>Response rate (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>British civil servants</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>33.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British MPs</td>
<td>646</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>31.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>31.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Unionist</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour (UK)</td>
<td>353</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>30.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Democrat</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>39.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plaid Cymru</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>33.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respect</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scottish National</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sinn Fein (UK)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDLP</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ulster Unionist</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaker and deputies</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Appendix 2. Representiveness of respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>As % total sample</th>
<th>As % respondents(^1)</th>
<th>Difference (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>British civil servants</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>70.3</td>
<td>74.1</td>
<td>+3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>29.7</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>-3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>British MPs</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political party</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>+0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Unionist</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>-0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>-0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour (UK)</td>
<td>54.6</td>
<td>53.5</td>
<td>-1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Democrat</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>+2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plaid Cymru</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respect</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scottish National</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>-0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sinn Fein (UK)</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>-0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDLP</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>+1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ulster Unionist</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaker and deputies</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gender</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>80.5</td>
<td>76.8</td>
<td>-3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>+3.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^1\) These figures exclude respondents who chose not to identify themselves in terms of political party and/or gender.
In February 2007, the Swiss institute KOF (Konjunkturforschungsstelle) published its annual ranking of the most globalized countries\(^1\). This year, Sweden is in third place after Belgium and Austria, having taken 2\(^{nd}\) place in 2006 behind the United States. This ranking, which is based on analysis of economic, social and political aspects of globalization in 122 countries, highlights the success of the Swedish model: it is possible to be a social democracy with the highest level of spending on social welfare internationally and also maintain an enviable position in the globalized world.

This study will analyse the results of a large comparative survey of citizens of eight European countries (UK, Estonia, France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain and Sweden) that was conducted by the Kairos Institute. The purpose of this study is to analyse the different attitudes of Swedish people compared with a reference group of citizens from the eight countries involved. After an analysis of the Swedish model, we will look at the main stakeholders and their attitudes towards the globalization phenomenon.

1. INTRODUCTION: THE SWEDISH ECONOMY AND GLOBALIZATION

Among European countries, Sweden ranked 6\(^{th}\) in terms of percentage of GNP that can be attributed to international trade\(^2\) (42.3\% where the average for OECD countries was 43.9\%). Imports represent 43.9\% of domestic consumption (where the average for OECD countries was 50.3\%).

The Swedish balance of trade was in surplus by more than 16 billion euros for goods and by almost 2.5 billion euros for services. In the services sector, growth of exports from 1997 to 2004 put Sweden in 4\(^{th}\) place among EU countries behind Ireland, Greece and Denmark. The surplus in the balance of payments in 2004 was the highest for fifteen years (7\% of GNP putting Sweden second to Luxembourg in Europe).

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Foreign investment in Sweden in 2003 represented almost 50% of GNP (5th place in the EU behind Luxembourg, Ireland, the Netherlands and Hungary); foreign investment by Sweden was 60% (3rd place in the EU behind the Netherlands, UK and Luxembourg).

Behind these figures, showing Sweden in the leading pack of EU countries that are most internationalized and open, is the reality of an economy that is integrated into the evolution of globalization.

It must be stressed that globalization is not new to Swedish people as the majority of business people and industrialists have made their money by doing business with foreign countries often by developing business in other countries. Without going all the way back to the Vikings, who set a precedence for foreign trade, look to Alfred Nobel as an example. Nobel started his career abroad before developing a Swedish base from which he expanded his business throughout the world. People in Sweden also like to point out that the first major relocation of a Swedish company was in 1902 when Skanska, a building and civil engineering company created in 1887, first transferred some manufacturing units to Saint Petersburg.

Because of its small size – in terms of both geography and population – Swedish companies have had to move into foreign markets to develop and succeed. Today, Sweden is third in the world (behind Switzerland and Hong Kong) in terms of concentration of multinationals. The Swedish economy is mainly supported by large multinational industrial groups (Ikea, Astra Zeneca, Ericsson, Electrolux, H&M, Saab, SKF, Skanska, Stora Enso, Tetra Pak, Volvo). Foreign business is essential for the growth of the country: 45% of Swedish exports are attributable to 10 companies, a fact that Swedish employers consider a risk.

Another factor is that these large companies are often in the hands of foreign shareholders who have, in the case of Scania, Volvo, Nordea and Ericsson, gained a majority. This was not the situation five years ago. According to the Bank of Sweden (Riksbank), the portion of market capitalization held by foreign interests on Stockholm’s financial market has increased from 5% in 1990 to 37.2% at the end of 2006. Foreign capital currently controls almost 25% of companies in Sweden’s private sector and represents a third of investment into R&D.

According to the Swedish employers’ organization (Svenskt Näringsliv), many Swedish companies, and the larger ones at that, are adapting to globalization and expanding abroad rather than within Sweden. Foreign subsidiaries of Swedish companies currently employ almost one million people while their head offices in Sweden employ 500,000 people. In 1987, it was almost the opposite.

Increasingly, the foreign relocation of Swedish companies is affecting sectors that were previously considered protected. This is the case for the information technology sector as
a recent study in Sweden has shown. The results of the study indicate that relocations in this sector are a reality and that we are seeing an acceleration of the phenomenon with both a quantitative progression (number of employees) and qualitative progression (seniority of employees in the relocated companies).

A similar study has been done on the research sector. It consists of several studies covering various countries (China, India, Japan, United States, and Sweden), many industry sectors and differing analytic approaches. The conclusions show that multinationals have a growing tendency to distribute their innovation activities across several countries and to create a globalized R&D network. But the study also concludes that factors in a given country which enable companies to improve their competitiveness also benefit the country, through for example the growth of research productivity as well as through the movement of skills and investments.

These two studies cite several illuminating examples of companies such as Volvo, Astra Zeneca, SAS, Ericsson and Telia Sonera who have relocated IT services, research activity and Administrative sections to Asia or Eastern Europe.

But the phenomenon needs to be viewed in terms of the quality of jobs relocated. According to a study done by Swedish employers, 40% of relocated jobs are for non-qualified services and 37% are for non-qualified manufacturing units. This indicates that around 80% of relocated jobs are unskilled or semi-skilled jobs. Only 20% of relocated jobs affect qualified services and just 3% affect R&D services.

Sweden does not have statistics on the loss and creation of jobs linked to companies relocating abroad but the employers’ union believe that around 50,000 jobs have been lost over the last five years while 220,000 jobs have been created in foreign subsidiaries of Swedish companies. A third of companies are involved in relocating activity abroad, which is reported to have resulted in 60,000 job losses to the industry over the last five years. The number of employees in Swedish companies located in China, India and Poland has increased from 10,000 to more than 60,000 between 1993 and 2003 – a jump of almost 500%. This would represent a total of 110,000 jobs lost as a result of relocation and outsourcing specific activities abroad since 2000, which is more than 10% of jobs in Swedish industry. Employers emphasize that a further 300,000 jobs are at risk of leaving the country in the coming years as a result of the new competition and prospects that new EU member states offer. However, we must approach these predictions with caution as these figures serve to support the demands for liberalizing the economy.

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ITPS (The Swedish Institute for Growth Policy Studies) surveyed where in the world Swedish companies were investing between 2003 and 2007. The results show that 52% invested in Scandinavia, 40% in other EU countries, 17% in Eastern Europe, 7% in China and 7% in India. Eastern Europe and Asia have established themselves as attractive destinations for Swedish investors, particularly since 2005.

Taking China as an example, the rate of creation of Swedish subsidiaries has accelerated there with, according to the economic magazine *Dagens Industri* of January 11th 2007, the creation of two companies a week in 2006 compared to just one a week in 2005, and almost 50,000 employees and a turnover of more than 5 billion euros in 2006. Numerous large Swedish companies have entered the Chinese market, among which ABB (22 production sites), Alfa Laval (two production sites), Electrolux (two production sites) and Volvo (six subsidiaries or joint-ventures).

Sweden is therefore particularly concerned by the phenomenon of globalization and it can be said that as a result of its size and its economic openness, it has been a pioneering country in this respect, which makes the attitudes of its inhabitants particularly interesting to analyse.

**2. THE REACTIONS OF YOUNG SWEDISH PEOPLE FACING GLOBALIZATION**

**2.1. Crisis of the early 1990s, a factor in evolving attitudes**

During the 1970s, Sweden experienced a continuous and exceptional growth period that enabled Swedish people to forget that just a hundred years earlier, Sweden was one of the poorest countries in the world from which millions of people emigrated at the beginning of the 20th century. The wealth of the country enabled development of a social welfare system that is practically unrivalled elsewhere. In this period, Swedish people became aware that economic growth and social welfare could go together.

The increase in petrol prices was probably when Swedish people really became aware that global events could impact their economy and living conditions. The textile industry and the shipyards were deeply affected without new industries being developed. Politically, this period, which spanned the end of the 1980s and the early 1990s, was first and foremost a refusal of the reality of the global market and Swedish people paid the price for this. The government allowed deficits develop in public finance and foreign trade, which lead to a policy of competitive devaluation that was in place until the early 1990s. Development of the public sector served to limit unemployment but Swedish growth suffered badly. The Swedish had been among the richest in Western Europe but several European countries caught up with and then overtook them in terms of purchasing power.

The shock of the early 1990s was particularly hard and forced Swedish people to become aware of their vulnerability on the global market. It was even thought at one point that
their banking system was going to collapse and the government saved Swedish banks in grave circumstances by guaranteeing their bonds. Unemployment soared (9.4% in 1994), the public deficit was over 11% and public debt went from 45% to 83% of GNP between 1989 and 1994.

At this point there was a swing of opinion in the country, attested by the choice of a right-wing government to replace the social democrats that had been in power since the end of the war. The idea that Sweden, on its own, had little influence on the market became very prominent in people’s minds and this affected the thinking of Swedish people and their government. This sudden awareness explains Sweden’s turnaround in joining into the EU. However, there still exists some nostalgia for the social democratic model of the 1980s, which explains the recent refusal of the Euro and hints that Sweden is still ambiguous with regard to Europe.

2.2. The ambiguity of Swedish positions on globalization

The debate surrounding globalization, which had already gripped Sweden in the early 1990s without the word actually being used, re-emerged in the early part of this decade as it did in the rest of Europe. A clear idea on opinions in Sweden at this time can be found in the results of a large survey conducted by the TEMO Institute on behalf of Swedish employers:

Results of the TEMO study, 2001

The main results are the following:

– Five out of ten Swedish people have a positive opinion of globalization, one in ten has a negative opinion and the remaining four are neutral or without opinion. Only 15% thought that globalization threatened the Swedish welfare state.
– 80% of Swedish people consider the development of the import and export markets a positive, 90% consider trade in goods to be very important. The free trade of services was a little less popular (75%).

The study conducted by TEMO is all the more interesting because one of the questions was asked in the same way as one asked previously in an international study by the Canadian survey institute, The Angus Reid Group for The Economist magazine (“Liberalism Lives”, The Economist, January 2nd 1999). This allowed for international comparison and showed that Swedish people were already among the most open to liberalization of trade and the least protectionist:

7. The question asked was “Which of the following two policies do you consider best for improving the economy and creating more jobs in our country: protect our companies with restrictions on imports or abolish restrictions on imports in order to increase our international trade?”
Table 1. Attitude towards liberalization of trade

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>% of people in favour of liberalization of trade</th>
<th>% of people in favour of restrictions on imports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>57 %</td>
<td>26 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>54 %</td>
<td>25 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>59 %</td>
<td>31 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>53 %</td>
<td>33 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>51 %</td>
<td>36 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>52 %</td>
<td>45 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>44 %</td>
<td>38 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>48 %</td>
<td>43 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>40 %</td>
<td>47 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>37 %</td>
<td>48 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>37 %</td>
<td>53 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>37 %</td>
<td>56 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>34 %</td>
<td>57 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>25 %</td>
<td>60 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This assessment of the TEMO study shows that from the sample, Sweden is the country that was most open to globalization at the beginning of this decade. More detailed analysis shows that Sweden was also, in the group of countries studied, the country with the highest number of people who declared themselves neither for nor against the liberalization of trade (21% as opposed to 3% in Thailand, 13% in France, 15% in Italy, 10% in UK or 9% in Austria). This seems to show either ignorance of or indifference to the phenomenon.

Results of the Eurobarometer survey, 2003

In October 2003, the European Commission published a Eurobarometer survey that gives a more recent and clear picture of Swedish attitudes to globalization:

- 82% of Swedish people had heard about globalization in contrast with a European average of 72%; the debate seems to have affected Swedish people to a lesser extent than the French (86%), Finnish (89%) and Italians (88%) but it is still a high score.
- 58% of Swedish people were, on a personal level, totally or quite in favour of globalization, which is less than the EU average (64%), than their Finnish neighbours (66%), Germany (70%), the Netherlands (78%) and even France (63%).
- Swedish scepticism is confirmed by the fact that Sweden, along with France, Spain, Greece, Germany and Austria were the countries that least trusted the United States to guarantee that globalization would go in the right direction.

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— 52% of Swedish people think that their country does not have enough influence on the evolution of globalization, but only 20% think that the EU does not have enough influence on European policy (European average: 34%); 27% even felt that the EU had too much influence on the evolution of globalization (European average: 21%).

— 31% of Swedish people demand more regulation (European average: 56%), while 19% demand less regulation (European average: 19%) to the extent that they are practically the most satisfied in Europe with the current level of regulation (29% where the average is 20%, only Finnish people are ahead at 42%).

— Sweden ranked first among countries that think globalization is an opportunity for their homegrown companies (65% to a European average of 56%), and only 24% see it as a threat to jobs and companies against a European average of 39% and 58% in Greece and France.

— The relative indifference of Swedish people to globalization is emphasized by the fact that only 49% think that growth in globalization would benefit their personal situation (European average was 52%). 17% think that nothing will change (European average was 10%) and the number of people who did not know was the highest in Europe (14%).

2.3. Analysis of the study by Kairos Future International on the attitude of Europeans facing globalization

Results of the Kairos study, 2006

Here we proceed to a qualitative analysis of the attitudes of Swedish people in a study on the lifestyles and values of young Europeans that was conducted by Kairos Future International in autumn 2006. The study was carried out by means of questionnaires distributed electronically to a panel of respondents in 15 European countries. Eight countries from the original fifteen became part of a specific study, Sweden was among these. It consisted of representative samples of the total population, with 1,000 respondents in the 16-29 year age bracket and 300 in the 30-50 year age bracket for each country. In the questionnaire, respondents gave their answers on a rating of 1 to 7. The reference group was comprised of young people from the 15 countries studied.

An important element is the general approach of young people to globalization. This is synopsized in the following table, with the questions combined for clarity.
Table 2. Kairos Globalization survey (the highest response indicates a preference for the proposition in question)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proposition</th>
<th>16-29 years (Reference group)</th>
<th>30-50 years (Reference group)</th>
<th>16-29 years (Swedish)</th>
<th>30-50 years (Swedish)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preference for protectionism/liberalism (1 = protectionism, 7 = liberalism)</td>
<td>3.764</td>
<td>3.937</td>
<td>3.205</td>
<td>3.346</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Globalization = cheaper goods and services</td>
<td>4.401</td>
<td>4.314</td>
<td>4.746</td>
<td>4.638</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Globalization = more opportunities for my country's homegrown companies</td>
<td>4.544</td>
<td>4.543</td>
<td>4.905</td>
<td>4.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Globalization = threat to employment in my country</td>
<td>3.818</td>
<td>3.948</td>
<td>3.584</td>
<td>3.817</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Globalization = more cultural exchange and understanding</td>
<td>4.636</td>
<td>4.678</td>
<td>4.596</td>
<td>4.712</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Globalization = more importance given to research and continuous training through life</td>
<td>4.651</td>
<td>4.652</td>
<td>4.447</td>
<td>4.678</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Globalization = greater mobility between EU countries</td>
<td>4.905</td>
<td>4.788</td>
<td>4.991</td>
<td>4.911</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Globalization = more business between countries</td>
<td>5.057</td>
<td>4.962</td>
<td>5.262</td>
<td>5.198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Globalization = common rules and regulations</td>
<td>4.409</td>
<td>4.410</td>
<td>4.204</td>
<td>4.162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Globalization = more opportunities for me</td>
<td>4.539</td>
<td>4.121</td>
<td>4.594</td>
<td>4.241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Globalization = more European solidarity</td>
<td>4.291</td>
<td>4.188</td>
<td>4.119</td>
<td>4.204</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Unsurprisingly, Swedish people are less protectionist than the reference sample. They believe more strongly that globalization will lead to cheaper goods and services, Swedish companies will be able to succeed where others may not and that international trade will continue to develop.
On the other hand, they, like the reference sample, believe that sense of national identity will become weaker, that globalization will lead to more cultural exchange and understanding and that there will be a convergence of social welfare systems.

Where the two age groups differ in opinions is an interesting source for analysis. On the subject of protectionism, the gap between Swedish people and the reference sample is almost as great among 16-29 year olds (0.559) as with 30-50 year olds (0.591). This may indicate that young people inherit attitudes or are at least influenced by the dominant ideas of the society in which they grow up. This analysis could be confirmed by the fact that for the reference population, the results of the 16-29 year group are very close to the 30-50 year group except on the question of what globalization offers, where young people are more optimistic than the older group.

Young Swedish people, therefore, share certain ideas with the older group but are markedly less concerned by threats to unemployment in their country than older Swedish people (3.584 to 3.817). This may be explained by the fact that they do not have personal experience of the crisis that took place in Sweden from 1989 to 1994.

Unlike the opinion of the older age group and the reference population, young Swedish people believe to a lesser extent that globalization is a factor pushing increased research and training even if they still score highly. It is true that they live in the country that spends most on research (3.98 of GNP to an OECD average of 2.2%) and that in the EU more 25-34 year old Swedish people reach a high level of university studies (according to the same source, 40.4% in Sweden, to an average in OECD countries of 29.5%; only Canada, South Korea and Japan are ahead of Sweden).

The study also shows breakdown of results according to sex. When questioned about an ideal future society, women of all ages in Sweden as well as in the sample group were shown to be more liberal. More Swedish women in the 30-50 year group declared themselves in favour of free trade than young people or women in the other countries. It is a slightly paradoxical situation because while less young Swedish women than young Swedish men see globalization as a positive influence on prices (4.651 to 4.827), young women fear unemployment more than men (3.655 to 3.524). A factor that may explain this is that more young women than young men think they can profit more from globalization (4.618 to 4.573). The situation is even more surprising for 30-50 year old Swedish women who do not even consider globalization an opportunity for them. This is probably a recent change that has come about due to job insecurity for Swedish women. This is probably the same concern that pushed Swedish people to elect a more liberal government than the previous social democrat government in September 2006, to much surprise.

The Kairos study shows breakdown according to sections of the population that have reached different levels of education (primary, secondary, third level). In theory, one might expect the better educated to consider globalization as an opportunity. In practice, the results are more subtle than that:

**Table 3. Degree of support for globalization according to level of education**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degree of support for the declaration: globalization brings new opportunities for me</th>
<th>16-29 years (Reference group)</th>
<th>30-50 years (Reference group)</th>
<th>16-29 years (Swedish)</th>
<th>30-50 years (Swedish)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>primary level</td>
<td>4.591</td>
<td>4.074</td>
<td>4.190</td>
<td>4.272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>second level</td>
<td>4.582</td>
<td>4.083</td>
<td>4.487</td>
<td>4.158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>third level</td>
<td>4.479</td>
<td>4.163</td>
<td>4.838</td>
<td>4.312</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the reference population, the results are the inverse of what one would expect: Young people with the lowest level of education are most optimistic. Among 30-50 year olds, the gap between those with primary and secondary education is not very significant, while those with university level education are more optimistic regarding their ability to take advantage of globalization.

Among young Swedish people, the situation is what you would expect with young graduates having most trust in globalization and by a significant margin. Among 30-50 year olds, the level of education has little effect on individual trust of globalization. To correctly interpret these results, it is necessary to take into account that a high proportion of Sweden’s workforce has completed second level education (more than 80%) while in many countries less than 60% would have reached the same level. This could partly explain the concerns of Swedish graduates who may feel that there are too many graduates for that to offer them any protection…

**2.4. Factors explaining Swedish attitudes towards globalization**

The study highlights the overall attitude to globalization, the results of which show that Swedish people are more open and optimistic about it for themselves and the economy of their country without being quite enthusiastic. However the enquiry allows us to identify factors that explain this attitude.

One way of approaching things is to look into certain values of society in Sweden that explain the openness of Swedish people to globalization. Among these cross-generational values, the American example could lead one to think that values such as independence for children, strong work ethic, a sense of responsibility or entrepreneurship would be prevalent in Swedish society.
Table 4. Values prioritized by young Swedish people in the education of children

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale of 1 to 7</th>
<th>16-29 years (Reference group)</th>
<th>30-50 years (Reference group)</th>
<th>16-29 years (Swedish)</th>
<th>30-50 years (Swedish)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Do you prioritize independence in the education of children?</td>
<td>5.582</td>
<td>5.766</td>
<td>5.818</td>
<td>6.159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you prioritize a strong work ethic (hard work) in the education of children?</td>
<td>5.472</td>
<td>5.603</td>
<td>4.715</td>
<td>4.662</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you prioritize entrepreneurship in the education of children?</td>
<td>4.810</td>
<td>5.010</td>
<td>4.003</td>
<td>4.132</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above results, which give an idea of the values that Swedish people want to pass on to their children, underlines the nuance that exists: independence for children is certainly more important to young Swedish people than the reference sample but Swedish people do not think that passing on a strong work ethic or entrepreneurship to children is important. These values are even less strongly felt among young Swedish people who are essentially not very concerned with competition.

The results of the study do not allow one to conclude that Swedish people have greater international experience at a personal level than the sample group either: admittedly, more of them travel abroad, slightly more study abroad and work abroad but this does not sufficiently explain their attitude towards globalization.

The Kairos Institute study highlights an interesting factor that, in our opinion, explains the attitude of Swedish people towards globalization:

Table 5. Satisfaction and trust

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale of 1 to 7</th>
<th>16-29 years (Reference group)</th>
<th>30-50 years (Reference group)</th>
<th>16-29 years (Swedish)</th>
<th>30-50 years (Swedish)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To what extent are you satisfied with your life?</td>
<td>4.878</td>
<td>4.889</td>
<td>5.009</td>
<td>5.201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To what extent are you satisfied with the general situation of your country?</td>
<td>3.424</td>
<td>3.282</td>
<td>4.502</td>
<td>4.321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you agree with the following statement: my future seems bright?</td>
<td>4.645</td>
<td>4.205</td>
<td>5.203</td>
<td>4.964</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The differences between Swedish people and the sample group are obvious here and the extent of the differences deserves further examination. Essentially, all these responses reflect a fundamental element, a catchword in Sweden: trust. Trust in yourself, in your future, in Sweden’s future, in its ability to improve its trade prospects, trust in the government, in the United Nations. It is clear that if doubt causes fear when facing globalization, trust enables one to imagine change and to think that you will benefit from it.

The origin of the trust among people in Sweden is deserving of more detailed analysis but here we can but put forward hypotheses. The first reason may be historical: Sweden along with Switzerland is one of the few European countries that has not been involved in a war for one hundred and fifty years. This may explain the feeling of security. Add to this the fact that this historical situation has enabled the accumulation of wealth, which in itself can create trust.

Another explanation may be the level and quality of the social welfare system. Taking unemployment benefit as an example, Swedish people benefit from a high level of benefit that is enough to support redundancies; these redundancies will have been negotiated at length between trade unions and employers. In addition to compensation, minimum social welfare covers 100% of housing, and benefits that are calculated to enable the family in question to live to a reasonable standard: the calculation of benefits takes into account the normal financial outgoings of a family from food to medical expenses that are not covered by the social welfare system, from spending on health to transport, from buying newspapers to leisure activities, from electricity to internet access.
Although these welfare benefits demand, to a stricter degree than in other countries, that one looks for work or participates in public interest projects, there is a strong possibility that Swedish people feel better protected than people in every other country except maybe Denmark, which has a welfare system that is at least as effective. It is easier to trust and accept globalization knowing that your family will always have a roof over its head and a dignified standard of living.

Trust in oneself, particularly on the job market, may stem from level of qualification, which determines one’s ability to find a job. In terms of basic qualifications, the number of young people leaving school without a qualification is among the lowest of all OECD countries (9% in Sweden to 30% in Spain according to the OECD\textsuperscript{10}). Furthermore, Sweden is one of the Nordic countries where the concept of life-long training was invented and ranks first among EU countries in terms of the number of adults involved in further training\textsuperscript{11}.

Table 6. Adult training

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage of adults (25-64 years) taking part in four weeks of lifelong learning activities in the EU in 2004</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Minimum Lisbon objective 12.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st place : Sweden 35.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd place : Denmark 27.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd place : Finland 24.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European average 9.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Another element must be considered in this analysis: the absence of trust in Sweden towards the European Union (table 5). Swedish people do not trust the response of the EU to globalization which is corroborated by the referendum that took place on September 14\textsuperscript{th} 2003 when Sweden refused to join the European currency. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that Sweden had agreed to join the EU in a referendum that took place on November 13 1994 at the height of the previously mentioned economic crisis. The crisis was probably a determining factor in the outcome of the referendum. 52.3% voted yes to 46.8% in the no camp and there were 0.9% blank votes. But Swedish people, for whom independence is a fundamental value as we have seen, like to be in control of their destiny. Also, the study that we are analysing here took place in 2006 at a point when it seemed that the larger EU countries (Germany and France) did not intend on putting their budgetary policies in order and respecting the Maastricht criteria meanwhile Sweden, since the end of the 1990s, has had a budgetary surplus and has been paying back its debt, which has decreased from 83.5% of GDP in 1994 to 62.5% in 2004 (source: OECD). The lack of trust is understandable...


\textsuperscript{11} European Commission (2005), \textit{Progress on the Lisbon objectives in education and training}, staff working paper SEC 419
2.5. An unambitious generation?

Beyond trust in oneself, it could be thought that the responses of Swedish people point to a certain nonchalance and a lack of ambition which could explain the trust they have in the future and their relative indifference to globalization.

We have already seen the extent to which people in Sweden are unconcerned by values such as a strong work ethic and entrepreneurship in comparison to the sample group. Other factors show the following tendencies:

Table 7. Results of the Kairos survey on the values of Swedish society

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale of 1 to 7</th>
<th>16-29 years (Reference group)</th>
<th>30-50 years (Reference group)</th>
<th>16-29 years (Swedish)</th>
<th>30-50 years (Swedish)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Do you agree with the following statement: what happens in the world does not in fact have much influence on my life?</td>
<td>3.364</td>
<td>3.122</td>
<td>3.278</td>
<td>3.020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you agree with the following statement: it is very important me to have a better lifestyle than my parents?</td>
<td>3.892</td>
<td>3.783</td>
<td>3.016</td>
<td>2.596</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you agree with the following statement: it is very important to me not to have a worse lifestyle than my parents?</td>
<td>4.195</td>
<td>3.833</td>
<td>3.817</td>
<td>3.291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Question on the importance of change to reach an ideal society as opposed to tradition and stability</td>
<td>4.206</td>
<td>3.844</td>
<td>4.211</td>
<td>3.907</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I think everyone should be obliged to keep themselves informed on questions of society</td>
<td>4.868</td>
<td>5.122</td>
<td>4.667</td>
<td>5.096</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Importance of job security</td>
<td>5.982</td>
<td>6.075</td>
<td>5.721</td>
<td>6.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I would like to live the majority of my life in the town where I live</td>
<td>3.916</td>
<td>4.478</td>
<td>3.719</td>
<td>4.651</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What level of interest do you have in politics?</td>
<td>3.482</td>
<td>3.460</td>
<td>3.556</td>
<td>3.306</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One of the specific areas where Swedish people differ is their response to the question about their lifestyle compared to that of their parents: both 16-29 year olds and 30-50 year olds are significantly less ambitious than the respective sample groups.

One possible hypothesis to explain these responses would be that young people in Sweden believe that their parents have lived through in a kind of golden age and that today’s society and the way their parents live in terms of lifestyle represent a sort of ideal that they wish to achieve without necessarily surpassing it. Like people in other countries, people in Sweden sometimes have a reputation among neighbouring countries of
considering the society of their country as ideal and setting themselves as an example to be followed. This could explain the relative lack of ambition among young people and the fact that they think it is enough to equal the older generation.

In this society that is still fundamentally social democratic despite the results of the last election, there is also a tendency to idealise the 1960s still considered a golden age when Sweden was probably the most advanced country in the world in terms of wealth, social welfare equality with a model that was a source of inspiration to the rest of the world. There is a desire to relive this era, to equal this mythical past.

Another explanation is embedded in the culture. There is an untranslatable Swedish term: *lagom*. This concept means “fair” and “balanced”. The origin of this is a Viking tradition where a drinking cup was passed around the table with every person taking what they needed but not too much so there was enough for everyone. This term is used often. Whether this concept is truly felt or just paid lip-service, this balance can lead young people to conclude that, all things considered, they will have enough if they equal their parents.

For the other questions, it is noted that the responses from Swedish people do not differ fundamentally from the responses of the sample reference group with some interesting points with regard to young people: Compared to the older group and to the 16-29 year sample group, young people in Sweden consider job security less important, they are more prepared to leave their towns and they are more interested in politics. These factors suggest an evolution to come in Sweden over the next few years, all the more so because as we have already seen, they trust the EU more than the 30-50 year age group.

2.6. The fears of young Swedish people facing globalization

Swedish people are relatively more open to globalization than the reference group. The fact remains that they share the same concerns as this group with a few nuances that merit further analysis.

**Table 8. The fears of young Swedish people**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question : what are the greatest threats to society in the future (scale of 1 to 7)</th>
<th>16-29 years (Reference group)</th>
<th>30-50 years (Reference group)</th>
<th>16-29 years (Swedish)</th>
<th>30-50 years (Swedish)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Environmental pollution ?</td>
<td>5.920</td>
<td>6.056</td>
<td>5.851</td>
<td>6.017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty and famine ?</td>
<td>5.304</td>
<td>5.511</td>
<td>4.842</td>
<td>5.102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorism ?</td>
<td>5.493</td>
<td>5.784</td>
<td>4.855</td>
<td>5.588</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIDS and pandemics ?</td>
<td>5.154</td>
<td>5.098</td>
<td>4.794</td>
<td>4.843</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug abuse ?</td>
<td>4.703</td>
<td>4.978</td>
<td>4.112</td>
<td>4.440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War ?</td>
<td>5.519</td>
<td>5.650</td>
<td>4.956</td>
<td>5.281</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Swedish people facing globalization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question: what are the greatest threats to society in the future (scale of 1 to 7)</th>
<th>16-29 years (Reference group)</th>
<th>30-50 years (Reference group)</th>
<th>16-29 years (Swedish)</th>
<th>30-50 years (Swedish)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment?</td>
<td>4.968</td>
<td>5.033</td>
<td>4.564</td>
<td>4.619</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organized crime?</td>
<td>5.098</td>
<td>5.412</td>
<td>4.891</td>
<td>5.400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Breakdown of the international financial system?</td>
<td>4.705</td>
<td>4.857</td>
<td>4.270</td>
<td>4.578</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Generally, Swedish people are less worried than the reference group about future threats with the notable exception of the environment where the scores are close. This is probably explained by the fact that Sweden has more or less escaped certain scourges: war (Sweden has not suffered a war for 150 years and Swedish territory has not been invaded for more than 500 years), AIDS (the incidence of HIV-AIDS in Sweden is among the lowest in the European Union12) and unemployment (after Denmark, Sweden has the highest rate of employment (72.5% of 15-64 year olds to an EU average of 63.8%13). Concern for the environment is prevalent in political discourse as Sweden was one of the first countries to introduce environmental taxes and to get involved in sustainable development initiatives. For this reason, it is to be expected that, despite their general passiveness, young people in Sweden share the concerns of the reference sample.

However, in contrast to what you would expect from the citizens of a country that has high demands in ethical and environmental matters, people in Sweden have not adapted their individual behaviour on a daily basis to the principles of their collective public action. One possible hypothesis for this is that Swedish people are not militant in their daily lives and they rely on the public authorities to carry out their principles. In their daily lives, they are pragmatic and buy products that are cheapest or that are more to their taste.

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Table 9. Attitudes of consumption with regard to ethics and the environment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale of 1 to 7</th>
<th>16-29 years (Reference group)</th>
<th>30-50 years (Reference group)</th>
<th>16-29 years (Swedish)</th>
<th>30-50 years (Swedish)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I usually buy products from companies that respect the environment</td>
<td>3.345</td>
<td>3.526</td>
<td>2.829</td>
<td>2.609</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I buy products from ethical companies that are considerate of their social responsibility</td>
<td>3.261</td>
<td>3.350</td>
<td>2.777</td>
<td>2.451</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When analysing fears, it is interesting to compare the scores of men and women: they differ in all the samples but it is always women who have most fears. Yet there are some significant differentials between attitudes of Swedish people and the sample reference:

Table 10. The differential between men and women on fears facing global threats

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Male-female differential</th>
<th>16-29 years (Reference group)</th>
<th>Male-female differential</th>
<th>16-29 years (Swedish)</th>
<th>Male-female differential</th>
<th>30-50 years (Reference group)</th>
<th>Male-female differential</th>
<th>30-50 years (Swedish)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Environmental pollution</td>
<td>0.188</td>
<td>0.478</td>
<td>0.197</td>
<td>0.691</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty and family</td>
<td>0.374</td>
<td>0.726</td>
<td>0.401</td>
<td>0.701</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorism</td>
<td>0.518</td>
<td>0.865</td>
<td>0.382</td>
<td>0.334</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIDS and pandemics</td>
<td>0.414</td>
<td>0.665</td>
<td>0.460</td>
<td>0.579</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug abuse</td>
<td>0.446</td>
<td>0.672</td>
<td>0.495</td>
<td>0.475</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War</td>
<td>0.400</td>
<td>0.813</td>
<td>0.402</td>
<td>0.722</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>0.395</td>
<td>0.582</td>
<td>0.405</td>
<td>0.438</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organized crime</td>
<td>0.363</td>
<td>0.507</td>
<td>0.276</td>
<td>0.524</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Breakdown of the international financial system</td>
<td>0.220</td>
<td>0.397</td>
<td>0.268</td>
<td>0.101</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note that Swedish people have similar results to the reference group (women are more worried than men), but the gap is more significant on the subjects of pollution, poverty, war and organized crime. With regard to terrorism, young Swedish women are more worried than men but also more worried than older Swedish women. The same differences are noticeable on the subjects of AIDS and drugs.

As a result, our general analysis of the fears of Swedish people needs to be qualified. In all areas without exception, Swedish men have fewer fears than their counterparts in the reference group. Swedish women aged 16-29 are more worried about environmental
Swedish people facing globalization

pollution and organized crime than the women in the sample group but, generally, their scores are similar in the other areas.

These results incorporate characteristics of Swedish society, and particularly the fact that it is a society where relations between men and women are different to the norms in non-Nordic parts of Europe. The idea of equality between men and women has become a major part of the Nordic model, and in particular the Swedish model. One of the consequences is the distribution of power between men and women: while the political arena has practically become a female domain where women are taking more and more high level political positions, men hold the majority of power in the private sector and industry. For example, there are four times more women on the boards of directors of French companies than Swedish companies. As a result, we could conclude that it is normal for Swedish women to be more concerned with protection against factors that are regulated within the political arena (the environment, protection against poverty etc.).

2.7. Who can regulate globalization?

The survey conducted by the Kairos Institute also allows us to analyse perceptions of the role that stakeholders can play in regulating globalization:

Table 11. The role of the different stakeholders in regulating globalization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question: Of the following stakeholders, who has most influence on globalization? (Scale of 1 to 7)</th>
<th>16-29 years (Reference group)</th>
<th>30-50 years (Reference group)</th>
<th>16-29 years (Swedish)</th>
<th>30-50 years (Swedish)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Your national government</td>
<td>3.926</td>
<td>3.753</td>
<td>3.805</td>
<td>3.599</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The media</td>
<td>4.430</td>
<td>4.325</td>
<td>4.205</td>
<td>3.962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multinational companies</td>
<td>5.011</td>
<td>5.088</td>
<td>5.030</td>
<td>5.084</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-governmental organizations</td>
<td>3.537</td>
<td>3.436</td>
<td>3.291</td>
<td>3.054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People in general</td>
<td>4.022</td>
<td>3.906</td>
<td>3.857</td>
<td>3.722</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police and the Legal System</td>
<td>3.208</td>
<td>3.166</td>
<td>3.096</td>
<td>3.093</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The United Nations</td>
<td>4.537</td>
<td>4.280</td>
<td>4.399</td>
<td>4.461</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The European Union</td>
<td>4.960</td>
<td>4.758</td>
<td>4.964</td>
<td>4.710</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These results show that Swedish people in both age groups essentially have the same attitudes as the reference groups. There are a few nuances, for example the fact that they attach less importance to almost all the stakeholders except multinational companies to which both groups attach primary importance, the United Nations to which Swedish people in the 30-50 age group attach great importance, and the European Union to
which young Swedish people and the reference group attach practically the same level of importance.

It is nonetheless interesting to pay particular attention to this last point. It is a little unexpected insofar as Swedish people are, as previously seen, eurosceptics relative to other EU countries. As a result, one might have expected them to consider the EU to have minimal influence on globalization.

In reality, young Swedish people consider that after multinationals, the European Union is the main stakeholder with regards to globalization. There are two possible interpretations of this: either the European Union is held responsible for the problems linked to globalization or it is the main organization believed capable of combating the negative effects. The first hypothesis would be consistent with opinions often espoused particularly from people who live in the North of the country where there are many eurosceptics. This area is most affected by unemployment but there is a high number of middle aged people there. The second hypothesis could be affirmed by the fact that Sweden joined the European Union at a time when the country was in serious difficulty and observers all noted that accession to the EU was the result of a defensive reflex: young Swedish people do not have faith in the current leadership of the European Union but yet they expect protection in times of difficulty. It is also possible that the importance that Swedish people attach to the European Union on the subject of globalization is a result of both these reasons.

In every instance, decision-makers must take into account the following factor: While Swedish people think that the EU plays a major role in globalization, this means that they rely on the Union to ensure that the process of globalization goes well…

3. THE POSITION OF SWEDISH SOCIAL PARTNERS ON GLOBALIZATION

We have just studied in detail the attitudes of young Swedish people to globalization, their values as well as their fears, and their estimation of the roles of the different stakeholders. It is useful to turn our attention to the positions of the different political and social stakeholders in Sweden. This will give us a greater understanding particularly of why young Swedish people who live in a country that is open to the world market and subject to a high number of relocations, seem less concerned by the situation of globalization than young people in the other countries studied.

But before we closely analyse the position of Swedish groups to globalization, it is necessary to present the general context in which these groups operate. On the one hand, this relates to the framework of the relationship between the government, the employers and the trade unions, and on the other hand, the contract, both implicit and explicit, that links the different groups.
3.1. The Swedish model

Understanding the balances that govern Swedish society and the behaviour of the groups involved, particularly facing globalization, needs to be analysed in the context of the general workings of the Swedish model.

There are many descriptions of the characteristics of Nordic models. If we take the work of some of the experts, for example Mikko Kautto and Matti Heikkilä of STAKES14 (Finnish National Research and Development Centre for Welfare and Health), the definition of typologies of social welfare and the mention of a Nordic model goes back to the 1950s. But it was not until the end of the 1980s that a more precise analysis started to emerge although most authors on the topic were extremely cautious in outlining typologies due to their reductive nature. These authors identify the Nordic model as having the following characteristics:

– the field of public and social politics is wide-ranging;
– State intervention is important in all policies;
– The system is based on universalism, that is that all citizens have the same right to benefits regardless of their situation on the labour market;
– A high proportion of the GDP goes on social expenditure and there is a high level of wealth redistribution;
– Local democracy is important with well-developed social and sanitation services being run by local bodies;
– Distribution of income is quite equal, inequality is less prominent than in other countries and poverty is less common;
– Equality between men and women is a fundamental principle – all social measures are aimed at the individual and not at the family, which gives women a greater degree of independence.

These elements are comprised of characteristics concerning both the inputs and the results observed in the model. The authors refined their analysis in a later publication in which they established a typology of measurable characteristics that allowed them to classify and compare countries to determine if they belong to the Nordic model. The inputs of the model include a high level of public spending, a high proportion of social spending in the GDP and a high tax burden. The ideal Nordic model yields results such as equality in wealth distribution, low level of poverty and equality of lifestyle between men and women.

Other researchers, such as Peter Abrahamson from Sweden, have added other factors such as a certain homogeneity in society, continuity of policies, a high level of organization, the tradition of consensus and low levels of corruption. Abrahamson made this assertion at a conference organized in Copenhagen in September 1998 on the theme, “Comparison of social welfare systems in Northern Europe and France”15.

The majority of these views come from Nordic observers who are absorbed in these societies and deeply immersed in their culture. An external observer might remark that all these characteristics are based on a societal contract that can be synopsized as follows: the productive private sector benefits from a high degree of freedom in its workings, and labour laws are relatively liberal even taking into account collective labour agreements negotiated by the trade unions; in exchange for this, the productive sector accepts a high level of social security taxes that guarantee that nobody will be excluded from society as a result of unemployment.

The consequences of such a social pact can be witnessed in the workings of the country and the attitudes of its citizens: the freedom attributed to companies is a good base for economic development in the context of globalization, and the high level of social welfare means that Swedish people are confident of their own personal future as they feel quite sheltered from economic shocks. We can see why Swedish people, even social democrats, accept globalization.

3.2. The attitudes of social partners

In order to understand the attitude of Swedish social partners to globalization, it is necessary to look back on social history in Sweden. The beginning of the 20th century was a period in which there were many violent clashes between employers and trade unions with many strikes that improved welfare rights. The employers retaliated by means of lockouts. However, from 1921, faced with the employers’ counter-offensive that followed the post-war strikes, the Swedish trade union movement favoured electoral means and a social democrat leadership periodically led the government, alternating with the other parties. In 1931, the Adalen strike, which resulted in five deaths, marked the return to power of the Social Democratic Party and they have hardly been out of power since.

LO, the main congress of trade unions, used this situation to isolate communist and anarchist elements that existed within its organization and the government launched tripartite negotiations in 1936 that reached an end in December 1938. On completion of these talks, a certain number of laws on right of association and bargaining rights were adopted. It was the Saltsjöbaden agreement, which by establishing a collective procedure for resolution of conflicts, launched Swedish social democracy.

Elements that determine the current attitude of Swedish trade unions in the context of globalization are quite clearly represented in this agreement. Employers realized that they were unlikely to win in the conflicts and therefore accepted the compromise in order to preserve the right to run their companies freely including the organization and determination of manpower. In exchange, LO, the congress of trade unions, gained the recognition that trade unions were in a partnership with employers and they gained the right to regulate the collective nature of labour conflicts. This paved the way for the launch of collective labour agreements that guaranteed both industrial peace and a fair share of the rewards of economic progress for employees.
In a general sense, these collective labour agreements establish the idea of cooperation for the promotion of revenue growth, which took over from the ideology of obtaining welfare rights through class conflict. The State manages an excellent social welfare system and leaves the social partners to take care of regulating the workings of the social democracy. Thus the majority of welfare rights do not come from the justice system but from collective labour agreements.

It is clear that this framework is well adapted to the globalization context. The system of collective regulation of labour conflict, which goes all the way up to congress level if there is failure at local level, has led to industrial peace that is unequalled in non-Nordic countries and this situation favours competitiveness. Sharing the rewards of growth in a fair manner motivates partners who conform to a policy of growth from which everyone benefits. In short, the system of rules being determined by collective labour agreements is much more flexible than the legal system and this allows for the economy to adapt more quickly to the challenges of globalization.

The position of the main Swedish congress of trade unions, LO, were presented by its president Wanja Lundby-Wedin at an international conference on globalization that took place in Stockholm on November 25th 2005:

“The Swedish trade union movement, because of its experience, is and always has been an advocate of free trade insofar as it increases wealth for redistribution. But when globalization of trade does not manage to guarantee suitable working conditions and as a consequence workers are exploited, then it is time to do something […].

Sweden ranks very highly in terms of competitiveness according to the World Economic Forum. But Sweden was also in the lead last year in an ILO study entitled ‘Economic security for a better world’ that measured the quality of the working world.

The fact that Sweden has been capable thus far of managing globalization is clearly linked to our system of universal social welfare and to our labour market policies that take care of those affected by economic restructuring.

The high number of employees who are members of trade unions gives workers a say in the process, and good management and flexibility of the labour market are guaranteed by the generalized reliance on collective labour agreements.

However, the picture is not all rosy. We have also been affected negatively by globalization. In a recent study by the LO, we could clearly see in Sweden a tendency of rapid progression to precarious and atypical forms of work.

The growth in the number of young female workers forced to work on call against their wishes is particularly worrying. Furthermore, many of our members working part-time are unable to get full-time work – this phenomenon also affects women in particular.”
The point is clear, the LO that represents blue collar workers and could be considered farthest left on the political spectrum, considers globalization to be a good thing on condition that universal social welfare can be conserved. It is also worried about recent changes particularly the growth in precarious employment types.

A recent article by Gunnar Wetterberg, head of the policy department in SACO\(^{16}\) (Swedish Confederation of Professional Associations), which represents graduate professions, also advances the idea that globalization is a good thing for Sweden and that the country must make the most of the advantage it already has on the world markets. Wetterberg’s thesis merits further development.

In his opinion, globalization in its current guise is similar to that of the end of the 19\(^{th}\) century with the following difference – in the past it was about the products of industrial production whereas today it is services. He believes that debate on globalization has led to exaggerations and misunderstandings with newspapers and employers announcing that hundreds of thousands of jobs will be under threat if Swedish people do not accept wage decreases. But according to Wetterberg, all is not lost because the size of Sweden means that it can rapidly adapt to new technical developments which gives the country great flexibility. In addition, the Swedish market with its specific language and characteristics, makes outsourcing all production for the local market difficult. This is a factor that protects local production as much as the fact that competition on the Swedish market is predominantly European and therefore comes from countries where production costs are comparable to those in Sweden.

According to Wetterberg, relocations very often occur when products that are conceived of and developed in Sweden are manufactured close to the large markets which in fact brings more wealth to Sweden. All the more because enrichment of the Chinese or Indian populations will lead them to buy more Swedish products – Volvo cars, Saab lorries or Ericsson telephones. He reminds us that new and unexpected markets have opened up with the development of music exports for example (Sweden is now second in the world in terms of exports).

He considers that the key to success is openness and that it is necessary to not close the borders but, on the contrary, to open them and share the benefits of external markets. Moreover, this will enable Swedish people to acquire new ideas abroad. For this reason, he criticizes the protectionist tendencies of the European Union, particularly with regard to agriculture where billions of euros are spent without any visible effectiveness. He is arguing for Sweden to take a strong stance in favour of free trade at the heart of the European Union.

He also insists upon the need to teach foreign languages to children other than English, which is insufficient when facing the new markets. He recommends that Swedish people live and work in other countries reminding us that this was how, in the past, many Swedish people acquired their ideas for the creation of profitable business developments. Conversely, he asks that universities and Swedish companies open up more to welcome foreign students, researchers and employees so that they may be encouraged to stay in Sweden.

Wetterburg also puts emphasis on the labour input which is becoming more and more important as a result of globalization. This means that there is room for improvement with regard to training and education and a need to do what it takes to reduce strikes and absenteeism – particularly for illness. This type of absenteeism is a serious problem in Sweden. According to Wetterburg, companies will set up in countries where the workforce is well-trained and trustworthy and where the management is flexible and close to the workers. This is the case in Sweden. He calls for greater effort with regard to R&D, which he sees as a key to future business.

Wetterburg is of the opinion that essentially international competition, in terms of low wages, will diminish in a few years due to the development of the countries that are currently benefitting from this and also the aging populations in these countries which will increase their internal requirements and limit the workforce. Therefore, he asks that Sweden not yield to the fear of globalization but to see the opportunities that it brings.

In Sweden, we are a long way from the defensive positions that proliferate within trade unions in other countries and it is understood that as a result of these conditions, Swedish people are less worried than the average European.

3.3. The position of the Swedish employers’ association (Svensk Näringsliv)

The position of the Swedish employers’ association is, first and foremost, unsurprising. They defend the free market and use the risk of relocation to China or India to again question certain aspects of the social welfare system in general and particularly the protection that Swedish people have against redundancies: “A major obstacle to job creation is the law of job security (LAS). The underlying idea is that employees should be protected from redundancies. In practice however, the law has transformed the hiring of extra personnel as a risk activity to the financial plan. Also, because the decision to hire another staff member represents a slightly greater risk to small companies that large ones, the LAS law is inclined to penalize small companies, and particularly new companies. As a consequence, many companies have become needlessly cautious in their recruitment of new personnel which damages employment.”

It is significant however, that those in charge of the employers’ association and Swedish companies remain in a liberal mindset and do not ask for specific assistance to artificially maintain companies, sectors or jobs which are failing because of the market. In Sweden
there are no subsidies for companies in trouble, no efforts to artificially prolong the lifespan of non-competitive companies and no wavering of social security contributions. The subsidies demanded by the employers’ association and trade unions relate to the employment service and aim to put in place more efficient training and career-change assistance.

It is noteworthy that the Swedish employers’ association was in favour of the initial directive on services based on the principles of country of origin. In 2004, it took the side of a Latvian construction company, Laval&Partneri Baltic Bygg, in a conflict with Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet (the Swedish building workers’ union), by supporting the idea that it is the rules fixed by the collective labour agreements of the country of origin that apply, even on a Swedish building site. The issue was brought before the European Court of Justice.

But on August 30th 2005, in a joint press conference with the congress of trade unions, LO, Svensk Näringsliv announced an agreement with the trade unions to apply Swedish collective labour agreements to foreign companies where salaries, work hours and working conditions were in question. This is an example of the flexibility of the Swedish employers’ association which was concerned about shaking the industrial peace that is one of the reasons for the success of Swedish companies.

4. THE ROLE OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN GLOBALIZATION

4.1. Policies of the Swedish government

With regard to globalization, there is clear common ground between the Social Democratic government of Mr. Göran Persson, in power until September 2006, and the current centre-right government of Mr. Fredrik Reinfeldt: the latter emphasizes consistently that the future of Sweden in a globalized world, its wealth and the level of its social welfare system depends on the performance of its companies on the world market.

It is observed that the Swedish government very rarely intervenes to help or save a company. However, it does not miss an occasion to criticize the attitude of certain countries that do not have the same respect for competition and particularly those that use EU structural funds to attract companies from non-European countries.

This does not mean that the Swedish government is inactive in the face of globalization and foreign relocations or even that it is helpless in the matter. On the contrary, the government does not hesitate to get involved: thus, the ministers concerned (mainly industry and commerce) are increasingly going abroad on trips to promote the Swedish business scene but also to step up dialogue with the directors of multinational companies that have bases in Sweden in order to get information about their projects and potential requirements. This is an opportunity to take preventative action and to negotiate the development of business
Swedish people facing globalization

on Swedish territory. This is particularly the case in the automobile sector, which is a strategic sector for Sweden.

The Swedish state is also fortunate to have at its disposal an anti-relocation tool: a law voted in on July 1st 2003 which authorizes tax cuts for holding companies in order to put an end to tax evasion and to make Sweden a more attractive business destination. From now on, companies incorporated under Swedish law are exempt from taxes on capital gain from transfer of shares held in companies abroad, regardless of their investment if they are non-listed companies, and subject to minimal investment if they are listed companies. If the company is listed, the company must have owned the shares being sold for at least one year.

To encourage top-ranking foreign executives to come to Sweden, they may be given a tax allowance. The idea behind this is to compensate for the loss of Swedish executives. Specifically, it would be an allowance of 25% on basic tax calculation. The advantage of this is limited as the criteria are strict, probably because Swedish people do not really like favouring some people over others: in 2006 only 255 people benefited from this allowance.

An advantage that Sweden has over many other countries is the simplicity of the administrative processes involved in the creation and management of companies. Furthermore, the relatively unbureaucratic and transparent working of the State gives direct access to the decision-making authorities. The independence, albeit partial, of the Swedish Civil Service gives greater visibility of how it is organized. Also, the current Swedish government has made the policy of simplifying company administration a priority, all the more because Sweden benefits from a high level of electronic administration.

For a long time, Sweden has made great use of “golden shares” or “preferential voting rights” which have allowed the State or Swedish consortia to maintain control of their companies even if the majority of the capital is in the hands of foreign shareholders. This has allowed companies to access foreign markets without loss of control. This period seems to be ending because of changes to EU legislation and recent decisions made by the European Court of Justice to the Netherlands and Spain. Sweden has already started to limit the possibility of multiple votes with the same share.

But this practice of differentials in voting rights still affects 55% of Swedish companies quoted on the stock market in Stockholm. Thus, the real power at the centre of large Swedish companies belongs, in a large part, to historical shareholding families that have regrouped into holding companies.

Interestingly, the government elected in September 2006 has just created a national council for globalization with the aim of better adapting Sweden to changes in the world market. It is chaired by an academic and includes two government representatives (one of which is the Minister for Education), social partners and representatives from the civil
service and universities. On setting the council up, the Swedish Minister for Education, Mr. Lars Leijonborg stated, “While China wants to be the factory of the world and India the office of the world, the Swedish niche is to have the best laboratories in the world and the best design studios.”

4.2. Opposition from Social Democrats

The Social Democratic Party (PSD) described in 2001 its analysis of the new economic order in its agenda\textsuperscript{17}. The following is an extract from this document.

“As happened in the past with the arrival on the world scene of modern mechanized technologies and industrial modes of production, society as a whole is being transformed today with scientific and technical developments that are changing production conditions, the world of work and the world of business: industry still represents an important part of national product but a decreasing number of jobs, the growing services sector is playing an increasingly important part on the labour market but the jobs being offered and the organization of work reveal significant variations. An important part of the world of work demands that capacity is always advancing. Large companies globalize and small companies multiply.

All these changes create new working conditions and at the same time transform society: modern information technologies eliminate the problems of geographical distance and national borders. It brings new possibilities for trade and economic coordination. Money moves quickly around the entire world, and one company’s production section can be easily coordinated between different areas within one country or even between different countries. New efficient channels are opening for the exchange of expertise and economic transactions. Totally new types of companies and professions are emerging while at the same time, traditional professions and work methods are evolving.

This evolution of the economy, of techniques and the world of work create new social relationships and pose new challenges to politics. New opportunities to move towards more justice and equality are appearing but also new injustices and new social problems. Globalization of the economy necessitates a globalization of policies and of the work of trade unions. It presumes new political and trade union methods and brings new challenges to democracy.”

In fact, this analysis by the PSD is relatively neutral – it is the assessment of an evolution – but note that there is no questioning in the assessment and no desire to block the process. It just makes references to “new challenges to politics” and to the fact that globalization of the economy imposes “a globalization of policies and of the work of trade unions”.

\textsuperscript{17} Complete versions of the two documents of the Social Democratic Party can be found on its website at the following address: http://www.socialdemokraterna.se/Templates/Page____7428.aspx
It is interesting to analyse a second document – the electoral manifesto of the PSD for the election on September 17th 2006 (which they lost). A section of this document is titled, “A competitive Sweden with modern jobs” and shows how the PSD sees the integration of globalization into national policies.

The document starts by affirming that Sweden wants its companies to become world leaders: “Swedish companies should be world leaders. We intend on investing to a large extent in future capabilities and new technologies” (with particular emphasis on advancing research). Further, “Swedish core industries must be treated preferentially”, particularly with competitive prices for energy, which does not indicate a complete openness to competition although the energy markets are mostly open in Sweden.

Following the affirmation that Sweden will fight for a position on the grounds of its capabilities and not by lowering wages, they state that this will be via improving the level of education with the aim of having 50% of college level students going on to university studies with improved financial help if necessary.

The PSD also proposed developing secure jobs, in modern workplaces where creativity is encouraged. It emphasizes the importance of the collective labour agreement system.

The following is more original for a left-wing party: it aimed to develop Swedish companies in all countries through improved accessibility and venture capital, supporting exports, research and development for SMBs and improving infrastructure for companies including the development of broadband networks.

We can see thus that the biggest opposition party in Sweden, a left-wing party, does not question globalization but, on the contrary, proposes ways for Sweden to adapt to this new opportunity. In total, the parties that have adopted this attitude represent almost 90% of Swedish MPs. They were elected through proportional representation so this also represents more than 80% of Swedish voters.

4.3. Groups opposed to globalization

There is opposition to globalization in Sweden at both political and community level. Here, we will quickly run through some of the opposing parties without going into detail, as they are marginal groups.

– The Left Party, a party that includes former communists and certain groups from the extreme left that holds 22 seats in parliament (5.85% of votes) and the Green Party (19 seats, 5.24% of votes) are both opposed to certain aspects of globalization but have voted continuously with the Social Democrats for about 12 years.

– ATTAC (Association for the Taxation of Financial Transactions for the Aid of Citizens) has obviously grown from the French movement and has 14 local groups but demonstrations are only occasional and rarely boast more than about one hundred people.
– There are also activities linked to the World Social Forum, conducted by, amongst others, an agency called the Network Institute for Global Democratization which also has local social forums that are held every year with decreasing attendance (1,000-2,000 people). There are groups mainly in Uppsala and Stockholm. Activity has been relatively limited and mostly driven by Finnish people who are apparently much more involved. There are also research and conference activities.

– There are violent anticapitalist groups in Sweden such as the Invisible Party (Osynliga Partiet), which was apparently dissolved in 2006 after a few demonstrations that turned violent on occasion. They recommended rebellion and active disobedience in order to erode capitalism. One of its last public acts was to destroy the headquarters of the Centre Party when this party considered proposing a First Employment Contract “in the French model”. This was after they attacked participants of a meeting of people opposed to property taxes in July 2006 with shouts of “better care, more taxes”.

– The Pirate Party (Piratpartiet in Swedish) also deserves a mention despite it being rather a proglobalization movement. They obtained almost 1% of votes in the elections by proposing a rather libertarian plan with, in particular, propositions for the reform of intellectual property legislation dealing with copyright and invention patents. This movement is one of the groups that support open source software and is fighting for the protection of privacy both on the Internet and in daily life. This party is starting to expand in several countries.

In short, it is noted that in the European study carried out by the Karios Institute which has been commented on above, Swedish people are shown to be more sceptical than the reference group regarding the influence that non-governmental organizations can have on regulating globalization (on a scale of 1 to 7, the score is .291 for Swedish people aged 16 to 29 compared to .57 for the reference group, and .05 for Swedish people aged 0 to 50 compared to 3.436 for the reference group).

5. CONCLUSION

What can we learn from this study? Firstly, despite the importance of the effects of globalization on Sweden, it must be noted that the attitude of young Swedish people facing globalization is particularly positive with a high degree of optimism, trust in their future and also a lack of excessive ambitions. They do not have a large amount of fears which can be explained by both cultural factors and by the existence of the implicit social contract in the organization of society, which means that in exchange for companies getting a certain freedom, people in difficulty are well taken care of.

The second lesson is that young Swedish people are, unlike the older generation, close to other European young people in terms of their attitude to the EU. We saw that for the older age group the UN substituted the EU as the organization that plays the most important role in regulating globalization.
Moreover, trade unions and political parties from other European countries, confronted with Swedish success and especially the optimism of young Swedish people can look with interest at the way in which their Swedish neighbours have played the globalization game without sacrificing their own interests.

As in all studies, there are some grey areas. For example, is there really a lack of ambition among young Swedish people or is that rather an expression of social pressure? Do Swedish people really feel that they are well protected and do they really think that the profit from globalization is being fairly distributed? Given the already noticeable narrowing of the gap between young people in Sweden and Europeans compared to the older generation, what can be expected in the future?
CONCLUSION

Globalization is frequently considered to be a system. Yet the phenomenon does not produce predictable, mechanical or consistent effects. It would be more accurate to describe it as a set of processes in interaction (transformation of the world capitalist system and of interstate relations, reconfiguration of the boundaries between the public and the private sectors, new inequalities of redistribution and the ensuing political and social tensions, etc.).

A “positive” conception of the current phenomenon would amount to concluding that globalization is “a historic process involving the redistribution of wealth and of power to regions of the world that have been deprived of them for at least two centuries.” In this sense, the West’s prosperity, which developed during the first two phases of globalization is now being challenged by the development of new powers. It is not the disappearance of the West or of its socio-economic model which are at stake, but a new balance of power in a more open and tougher competitive framework.

What, then, will become of the European Union under the various globalization development scenarios now being contemplated? What insight do we have in determining how these interactions will evolve?

1. TWO CONFLICTING ECONOMIC FORECASTING MODELS LINKED TO GLOBALIZATION CAN BE IDENTIFIED

The first comes down to the “flat earth” concept, an expression used by Thomas L. Friedman. According to this model, commerce would become more and more “atomized” and independent of the major regulatory structures and large groups. Any individual economic actor could, thanks to the development of means of communication and transport, design, produce and market a product in any corners of the globe. Within this perspective, economic blocs such as the EU would no longer serve a purpose. Gordon Brown provided the political repercussion of this by explaining why a European Common Market can be obsolete while the market is global and homogeneous.

The second model relies instead on a historic continuity in the globalization process. We are said to be witnessing the emergence and structuring of large and competitive economic

blobs: a super-potent Asia, thanks to Chinese, Japanese and Indonesian potential; an Indian group which may eventually include Central Asia and Iran; a Russian continental group in ongoing competition with the two previously cited groups, particularly as concerns the natural resources of Central Asia; a North American continent in which the United States is said to have agglomerated Canada and Mexico; a South American continent in which Brazil and Argentina have supposedly federated the country of MERCOSUR; perhaps an African group, led into the south by South Africa and into the north by Morocco, and, in conclusion, a European group, which has supposedly managed to federate itself in order to resist the intersecting pressures of its neighbours.

We shall accept the second hypothesis, which also encompasses the first (since the atomized trades can take place by the intra- and inter-bloc flows), while relying upon historic precedent. It can therefore be assumed that the current phase of globalization is the third in a historic development which began with the conquest of America in the 16th century (Spanish, Portuguese and Dutch globalization), and then continued until the end of the 19th, and beginning of the 20th century (British, French and later American globalization) with the establishment of colonial settlements, the Industrial Revolution and the revolution in communications. We are therefore said to be witnessing the formation of regional blocs and a decline of the "flat" globalization (the WTO type) with which we are currently familiar. This model is said to have been replaced by an intra- and inter-bloc trade. We might also note that there has been a major trade breakthrough for low-end consumer products in all sectors, whether manufactured goods (mainly from Asia) or agricultural goods (from countries such as Brazil). These products are supposedly being progressively imposed upon developing countries through South-South Cooperation agreements and the presence of Chinese and Latin-American investments. From this, it could then be forecasted that if this type of substitute products could take the place of Western agricultural produce (Europe, United States, Japan) it would cause serious consequences for the trading systems of the developing countries, inasmuch as they are accustomed to a guaranteed income, obtained as a result of their political power.

We are undoubtedly at a turning point for globalization. Although it is reducing inequalities between countries, globalization tends to widen the gaps between those who manage to are profiting from the process and those who cannot manage to do so. These gaps apply to all countries. And if the extremely high growth rate resulting from the intensification of trade were to only allow a small minority of individuals to increase their standard of living, this trend could also very well lead to a democratic rejection of the process by populations not profiting from that growth.

The historic perspective has shown us that armed conflicts have abruptly cut short the preceding phases of globalization. Hardening attitudes, backtracking and violence thus cannot be ruled out. Globalization is causing tension worldwide.

Yet to believe that the present phase of globalization is doomed to end in the deadlock of even more aggressive excesses would be tantamount to arbitrarily excluding all possibility of regulation.

European citizens are not resigned to this. The survey highlights the need which they—and particularly young people—are experiencing to reinvent a new logic of solidarity in order to meet the challenges of globalization.

2. THE THorny ISSUE OF PROTECTIONISM

Coupled with the purely economic issues—inasmuch as everything relates to them—is the question of identity. If economic protectionism is unreliable, we can deduce that, culturally, it is justifiable to protect the identities and values which are the components of social cohesion. It is not a matter here of preserving some kind of fanciful “ethnic unity,” but of preserving the components that comprise the identity of peoples and of individuals as shaped by the history of nation-states. It is a question of language, of culture and of the historic structure of thought, of the “habits and customs” which create the daily life of a community.8

At another level, globalization changes models of thinking, because individuals and peoples realize that their individual destinies from that point on linked to the emergence of new collective challenges, such as those related to climate and the environment, as well as to issues such as migrations and health.

While these planetary threats may arouse in some individuals reflexes labelled “protectionist,”9 can there be some form of “good protectionism” among them?

In terms of trade and economics, the concept is invalidated by the incompatibility of a strategy designed to both protect itself and gain new markets. Protection means that of everyone used against everybody. If the French, the Europeans, and the Americans, or today, the Chinese, protect themselves, the others will do so, too, and everybody would lose in terms of growth and efforts aimed at reducing poverty.

9. This trend, singularly active in France, can be specifically monitored on the Internet website http://www.protectionnisme.eu/
Imagine for a moment that a consensus could be reached, initially at the European level and then among “Western” partners (EU, the United States, Japan, and Canada). We might consider “freezing” certain rules which promote “unfettered free trade.” This initiative, supported by Western powers determined to protect their respective strategic interests, would naturally come up against a united front of emerging economic powers and developing countries that would view any restriction of trade as an aggression against their economic development.

Would protectionism be any more feasible at the European level? This would mean rethinking our production method by devising a development perspective which would preserve sufficient economic activity sufficient to ensure the coherence of the European social model, translated as the “société du vivre-ensemble.” From an ethical and political viewpoint, that implies taking into account a slowdown in global trade, which will automatically penalize developing countries.

The adoption of protectionism presupposes the existence of the collective acceptance of a slight decline in the standard of living in order to preserve the “co-habitable” goal. This is much more feasible in Europe, whose countries share the same values based on solidarity and the redistribution of wealth, than in the United States, where inequality and individualism are more prominent, or in emerging countries which justifiably aspire to a level of economic development that is at least equal to half that of the West.

In practice, however, the comparative study that we have just completed shows that there is no sign of the emergence of a European consensus on protectionism as an option. Some countries opt for globalization because of their comparative advantages, such as Germany (industry) or the United Kingdom (finance). Others, the top rankings of which includes France, feel that globalization is placing them at a disadvantage and are trying to identify ways to “reduce” globalization. One may well wonder whether the former are indulging in some sort of circumstantial optimism subject to the vagaries of the marketplace, and the latter are not wrongfully attributing their problems to competition from low-wage countries, while in reality their top competitors are their European and Western counterparts.

Nonetheless, globalization and the manner in which Europe will approach global trade will be the focus of its political future. The other countries (emerging powers as well as developing countries) are waiting for a clear signal on this issue from Europe.

Three options may be considered:
1. Fully opening the country to global flows without additional regulation.
2. Closing the country as soon as possible by raising trade barriers.

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3. Striking a balance between an economic opening and preservation of the European social model, by advocating stronger regulations.

If Europe cannot find ways to establish a consensus around one of these three options, it runs the risk of being politically split between at least three groups of countries.\(^{11}\) The debates now underway in France are focused mainly on the third option choice and practical methods for its implementation. How can France, and Europe along with it, defend themselves against a collective preference that is opposed to a downward adjustment of their social dimension?

As Bruno Cautrès points out in his study, France is not immobile; it is “being transformed.”\(^{12}\) However, in large measure, the French problem stems from its citizens’ limited confidence in the ability of their social, political and economic elites to anticipate and support these transformations associated with globalization and to identify some clear options.

These debates on political options reveal the strong specific cultural nature of the treatment of globalization, although we cannot dwell on the more caricatural positions relating to the perception of globalization: Central European and Eastern countries are not all “neo-liberal” extremists, the British are not as enthusiastic about globalization as may be commonly thought, the Swedish do not believe that an extremely “massive” social system is a handicap, but rather an advantage in global competition.

Yet beyond these national specificities, all European express the same concern about the ability of the political leaders to regulate globalization. Aside from the protectionism options, what do they suggest be done to avoid levelling down our systems of social protection and to favour the promotion of human capital by strengthening the capacity of individuals to adapt?

This uneasiness is that much more perceptible inasmuch as the civil society of the states surveyed is mobilizing on these issues without having ever challenged established authority. At best, in its capacity to rally and inform public opinion, civil society is taking initiatives which merely complement the actions of those in power. Engaging in a public debate on globalization within civil society is not being done in most of the countries.

European civil society—to the extent that it is being represented by Brussels’ NGOs within committees such as the Social Platform—and European social dialogue, are unquestionably playing a more consequential role at the national level. Their involvement in the European Commission’s consultation procedures, and their lobbying work with European institutions, are now key to policy-making at the community level. Perhaps this model should be considered at the national level if the civil society has the authority to become a source of proposals and influence concerning the challenges of globalization.

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3. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE MARKET AND DEMOCRACY

The political treatment of the globalization process constitutes the key to its more or less harmonious development, because globalization in itself is neither fair nor unfair. Everything depends upon the regulation in effect. From this perspective, globalization is undoubtedly the phenomenon which is having the strongest influence upon current policy development; it may even be described as the primary challenge—in view of the magnitude and speed of the changes it will be bringing about—for the policies and transformation of our societies during the decades to come.

The sceptics point out the risk of seeing the market monopolize all of the state functions, as privatization continues to permeate education, health, the courts, defence and foreign policy. The market is by nature global and has no borders (geographical or skill-based). Conversely, the concept of territory is fundamental to democracy.

For their part, the “voluntarists” object to the prospect of a progressive privatization of all sectors and argue in favour of a balanced approach. The issue is to know, once foreign operators have been accepted on the market, whether or not, and how, the latter can be placed under the same regulatory constraints as the country’s own operators.

The normative issue is essential in the policy management of globalization. At this level, the European Union and the West generally have an undeniable comparative advantage, because they still have the authority to set trade, health, social and environmental norms, notably through the normative production of the WTO. Emerging countries and developing countries, moreover, do not hesitate to protest against the brake disguised as competition constituted by the utilization of these norms in global relations. Norm-building allows the West, and first and foremost the European Union, to impose its collective values on the rest of the world. Moreover, this strengthens the hypothesis of the blocs at the expense of “uncontrolled economic growth.” But most importantly, the normative question is a sensitive one and not without ambiguity. What still needs to be done is to devise a prescriptive relationship which could include all global actors, and find some means of compromise that would both preserve the high living standards of Westerners, and the desire of the rest of the world to attain them.

However, globalization can only function well after a balance has been established between the market, which is the best system for efficient allocation of the world’s resources,

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and democracy, which is the best system for a fair allocation of those resources. If the market becomes global and democracy remains local, an efficient allocation may be achieved, but it will be an increasingly unfair one. We would then run the risk of concentrating an extraordinary amount of wealth in a “superior” globalized class, and increasing the numbers of the poor, with the consequent political ramifications.17

The development of a global regulatory framework18 based on democratic principles (similar to the initiatives implemented to reinforce the democratic community-based institutions which facilitated the formation of a single European market) would therefore be all the more necessary as the global market continues to expand. If this cannot be achieved, secular, religious or even ecological totalitarians could well take the lead.19 Therefore it is all the more urgent for us to endow ourselves with regulatory instruments, inasmuch as the accumulative effects of globalization in future years could lead to an even greater rejection of the latter.

We have been trying to build global regulatory institutions for fifty years now. Democracy’s reference territory is still the nation-state,20 which is totally sovereign in terms of the choices it makes. But it is finding it ever harder to function with the norms imposed by globalization.21 European citizens are perceiving these challenges and expressing them, as has been seen, by demanding European and global regulation.

The European experience is the only innovation in the world striving to create a democratic space outside of the Westphalian system.22 Yet it is obvious how many difficulties that is causing: setting up a quasi-government and a supranational legislature does not automatically mean that it will work.23

Europe is encountering its present problems because it is unaware that it may be a remedy for the fears inspired by globalization. To the contrary, it is often perceived and experienced as a fear. The challenge for Member States—and some have already begun to do it—is to manage to find a method of regulation which can be combined with a European solidarity.

19. A forecast often made by Jacques Attali on his Internet blog (http://blogs.lexpress.fr/attali/).
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