ISLAMIST TERRORIST ATTACKS IN THE WORLD 1979-2021
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The main lessons of the study

1. Between 1979 and May 2021, we counted 48,035 Islamist terrorist attacks around the world, which have resulted in the deaths of at least 210,138 people.
   - 1979-2000: 2,194 attacks and 6,817 deaths.
   - 2001-2012: 8,265 attacks and 38,186 deaths.
   - 2013-May 2021: 37,576 attacks and 165,135 deaths.

2. On average, an Islamist terrorist attack caused the deaths of 4.4 people.
   - 2001-2012: an attack killed an average of 4.6 people.
   - 2013-May 2021: an attack killed 4.4 people.

3. Explosives were the most used weapon (43.9% in 21,082 attacks), followed by firearms (16,649 attacks), melee weapons such as knives or machetes (2,120 attacks), and incendiary weapons (960 attacks).
   - 1979-2000: firearms (911), explosives (856), melee weapons (124), incendiary weapons (68).
   - 2001-2012: explosives (4,516), firearms (2,572), incendiary weapons (234), melee weapons (198).
   - 2013-May 2021: explosives (15,710), firearms (13,166), melee weapons (1,798), incendiary weapons (658).

4. The Middle East and North Africa, South Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa accounted for 95.7% of Islamist terrorist attacks between 1979 and May 2021.
   - South Asia: 40.1% of attacks, 38.2% of deaths.
   - Middle East and North Africa: 32.4% of attacks, 36.5% of deaths.
   - Sub-Saharan Africa: 23.2% of attacks, 21.7% of deaths.
   - Southeast Asia: 3.5% of attacks, 1.2% of deaths.
   - Europe: 0.6% of attacks, 0.8% of deaths.
   - North America: 0.1% of attacks, 1.5% of deaths.
   - Oceania: 0.02% of attacks, 0.01% of deaths.
   - South America: 0.01% of attacks, 0.1% of deaths.

5. Afghanistan was the country most affected by Islamist terrorism, ahead of Iraq and Somalia.
   The countries most affected by Islamist terrorism are Afghanistan (15,874 attacks), Iraq (7,469 attacks), Somalia (5,265 attacks), Nigeria (2,938 attacks), Pakistan (2,299 attacks), Syria (1,654 attacks), Algeria (1,386 attacks), Yemen (1,289 attacks), Egypt (1,211 attacks), the Philippines (1,163 attacks), India (898 attacks), and Libya (736 attacks).
   In these twelve countries, 187,284 deaths were caused by Islamist terrorist attacks, representing 89.1% of the total number of deaths worldwide.
6. France was the country most affected by Islamist terrorism in the European Union, with 82 attacks committed on its soil between 1979 and May 2021. At least 332 people were killed in these attacks.

- 2001-2012: 8 attacks, 7 deaths.
- 2013-May 2021: 50 attacks, 293 deaths.

7. The indirect confrontation in Afghanistan between the American and Soviet powers is one of the major causes of Islamist violence of the 21st century.

The United States and Russia have also been hit by jihadist terrorism. During the period 1979-2021, there were 58 attacks in the United States and 3,121 deaths, and 85 attacks in Russia, resulting in 844 deaths.

8. The military is the main target (31.7%) of Islamist terrorists, ahead of civilians (25.0%) and police forces (18.3%).

- 1979-2000: civilians (425 attacks, 19.4%), military (343 attacks, 15.6%), police (408 attacks, 18.6%).
- 2001-2012: civilians (2,169 attacks, 26.2%), military (1,411 attacks, 17.1%), police (1,427 attacks, 17.3%).
- 2013-May 2021: military (13,476 attacks, 35.9%), civilians (9,420 attacks, 25.1%), police (6,937 attacks, 18.5%).

9. Most (89.5%) of Islamist terrorist attacks have occurred in Muslim countries. Similarly, the vast majority of deaths from Islamist terrorist attacks (91.7%) occurred in Muslim countries.

- Number of Islamist terrorist attacks in Muslim countries: 43,002 attacks (89.5% of Islamist terrorist attacks worldwide).
- Number of deaths caused by Islamist terrorist attacks in Muslim countries: 192,782 deaths (91.7% of deaths caused by Islamist terrorist attacks worldwide).

It should be noted that these figures underestimate the reality since they do not take into account the Islamist terrorist attacks perpetrated in countries with a non-Muslim majority where Muslim populations are concentrated in certain provinces. This is the case, for example, in southern Thailand, where Muslims are in the majority in the provinces of Satun, Yala, Pattani and Narathiwat, but also in the Philippines, in the region of Mindanao; in India, in the province of Jammu and Kashmir; and in China, in the Uyghur autonomous region of Xinjiang.

10. Over the entire period of time studied here, the Taliban was the deadliest group. Its terrorist actions resulted in the deaths of 69,303 people.

The deadliest terrorist organisations, taking into account their various offshoots, were the Taliban (69,303 deaths), the Islamic State group (58,632 deaths), Boko Haram (25,719 deaths), and al Qaeda (14,359 deaths). These four terrorist groups were responsible for more than three-quarters (80.0%) of the victims of Islamist terrorist attacks between 1979 and May 2021.

1. Muslim countries: Afghanistan, Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burkina Faso, Djibouti, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, West Bank and Gaza Strip and Yemen.
An evaluation of Islamist violence in the world (1979-May 2021)

Dominique Reynié, Executive Director of the Fondation pour l’innovation politique

Following its first edition published in 2019, this is the updated version of our study on Islamist terrorist attacks around the world since 1979. The revival of this important work echoes the commemoration of the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States. The twentieth anniversary of that tragedy coincides with President Biden’s announcement of the U.S.’ withdrawal from Afghanistan, the Taliban takeover of Kabul on 15 August 2021, and the withdrawal of the last U.S. troops on Afghan soil on 31 August 2021. According to the U.S. President, “The threat has metastasized across the world, well beyond Afghanistan. We face threats from Al Shabab in Somalia, Al Qaeda affiliates in Syria and the Arabian Peninsula, and ISIS attempting to create a caliphate in Syria and Iraq and establishing affiliates across Africa and Asia”.

The series of attacks of on 9/11 was the deadliest in the history of terrorism, with 3,001 deaths and 16,493 injured. In Europe (excluding Russia), since 1979, there have been 197 attacks and 789 deaths. In France, the European country most affected by Islamist terrorism over the same period, there have been 82 Islamist terrorist acts resulting in the deaths of 332 people. In addition to France, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom have been hit, sometimes several times. It is, however, outside the Western world that countries have suffered from Islamist violence more often and more severely.

1. 1979, the critical year

We asked ourselves whether it was possible to truly know the extent of Islamist violence in the world, to make a database of it and to share the results with interested audiences in the form of a database accompanied by this study. To carry out such work, it was necessary first to determine the starting point of the database, to identify the most reliable sources, examine and validate them, then process the data collected, present the main lessons learned and, lastly, make the information collected available to the public.

We decided to start collecting data from 1979 onwards. This year was chosen by most specialists because it reflects the historical failure of Arab nationalism competing with the movements of Islamisation and the affirmation of jihadism. That same year, a number of events precipitated this development: the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan, the Iranian revolution, the signing of the Camp David agreements and the hostage-taking of the Great Mosque of Mecca by a group of Islamist fundamentalists in November-December 1979. For Gilles Kepel, what was happening that year was the result of “the fierce struggle between the Saudi monarchy and Khomeini’s Iran” but at the same time it was the time of a new indirect confrontation between the USSR and the United States: “The jihad financed in this country [Afghanistan] by the oil-monarchies of the Arabian Peninsula and the CIA is explicitly aimed at inflicting on the Soviet Union [...] a ‘Vietnam’ that precipitates its fall. At the Islamic level, its function is also to divert radical militants around the world”.

2. While 6,291 people were injured on the day of the attacks, thousands more reported physical injuries related to the attacks of 9/11, such as respiratory diseases or cancers, in the years following these events, as evidenced by the World Trade Center Health Registry (www1.nyc.gov/site/911health/about/addressing-the-health-impacts-of-9-11.page).
4. In his report for the Institut Montaigne, Hakim El Karoui presents the reasons why, in his opinion, it is possible to consider that the empowerment of jihadism has taken shape in Afghanistan, namely “the emergence of several Islamic groups united by the Afghan conflict, the Afghan Mujahideen’s financial autonomy, thanks to American and Saudi funding, the effective implementation of jihad for the first time since the end of the 19th century and its theorisation by Muslim Brother Abdullah Azzam” (The Islamism Factory, Institut Montaigne, September 2018, p.19,https://www.institutmontaigne.org/ressources/pdfs/publications/Short%20Version%2090%20Pages.pdf).
the world from the struggle against the American
Great Satan - to which Khomeini incites them - and
to channel them against the USSR. Afghan jihad has
a cardinal importance in the evolution of the Islamist
movement around the world. It became the ultimate
cause, with which all militants, moderate or radical,
identify themselves. It superseded, in the Arab
imagination, the Palestinian cause and symbolises
the transition from nationalism to Islamism.6

2. Definition of terrorism

Like many concepts, terrorism is subject to contro-
versial definitions. In this study, we define “terro-
rism” as political acts that meet the principle and
criteria of the National Consortium for the Study
of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START).
In this context, a terrorist act is presented as “the
threat of the effective use or use of unlawful force
and violence by a non-state actor in order to achieve
political, economic, religious or social objectives,
through fear, coercion or intimidation.” This defi-
nition is extended to the enumeration of a set of
characteristics specifying the nature of the terrorist
act:
– it must be intentional and result from a conscious
calculation by the perpetrator;
– it must include some level of violence or threat of
imminent violence, whether physical or material;
– the perpetrators of the incident must be non-state
actors.8

To be included in the database, an event must also
meet at least two of the following criteria:
– the violent act must have a political, economic,
religious or social objective;
– the act must result from an intention of coercion,
imimidation, or be motivated by the desire to
spread an economic, political, religious or social
message to a wider audience than that repre-
sented by the immediate victims; what matters is
the intention of those who planned the attack or
those who made the decision to carry it out;
– the action must be distinct from activities consi-
dered legitimate in time of war. The act must
violate the framework defined by international
humanitarian rules, in particular those concerning
the prohibition of intentionally targeting civilians
or non-combatants.

Our contribution focuses specifically on terrorist
acts carried out by organisations or individuals
claiming to be Islamists. The criterion defining a
terrorist action and according to which “the violent
act must pursue a political, economic, religious or
social objective” must therefore be specified. It is
considered essential to our database and focuses
on attacks that have been the subject of an Islamist
claim or about which the available information indi-
cates that it has been planned, decided and carried
out in the name of Islamism.

3. Definition of Islamism

For historians, “Islamism” is a term “used at the
end of the nineteenth century to designate Islam
as a religion and civilisation, but which has recently
taken a new meaning of militant fundamentalist,
traditionalist and proselyte Islam”. Islamism now
refers to “a trend demanding the strict application
of the prescriptions of religious or Shari’a law, some
of which have been abandoned, as well as the prin-
ciples of faith, by various modern governments in
Muslim countries, particularly under the influence
of European countries, Western ideologies and refor-
mist movements”10. As a result of this evolution,
the defenders of such a conception of Islam, the
“Islamists”, advocate for a jihad that is “on the one
hand, in their own country against ‘bad’ Muslims
and corrupt rulers in order to establish, if necessary,
a purely Islamic state, and on the other hand, more
generally, against the secular values that dominate
the non-Muslim world”11. The same authors consider
that Islamism has many analogies with the Muslim
Brotherhood movement12.

There are many other definitions of Islamism, often
very detailed. To complete without unduly complic-
ating matters, one can refer in particular to the
definition proposed by Edward Walker, because of
its relative clarity and conciseness: “By ‘Islamism’,
I mean the normative political ideology that has as its
core program the establishment of Islam as a state
religion and the implementation of Islamic law (sha-
ri’a). Militant Islamism, then, is any form of Islamism
that advocates the use of violence to achieve Islamist
objectives. This same distinction is made by Islamists
themselves, who refer to ‘Parties of the Islamic Call’,
or al-da’wa al Islamiyya (i.e., Islamist groups that do

6. Ibid.
7. “The threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious,
 or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation” (Global Terrorism Database, National Consortium for the Study of
Terrorism (START), University of Maryland, Codebook: Inclusion Criteria and Variables, July 2017, p. 10, www.start.umd.edu/
8. According to this definition, acts of State terrorism are not included in our database.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid. See Mehdi Mozaffari, “What is Islamism? History and Definition of a Concept”, Totalitarian Movements and Political
Religions, vol. 8, no 1, March 2007, p. 21.
not advocate violence) on the one hand, and ‘Parties of the Muslim Revolution’, or al-thawra al-Islamiyya (i.e., Islamist groups that do not advocate violence) on the other hand. Acknowledging that there are no universally accepted definitions of Islamism and terrorism, some researchers characterise it as an ideology whose key tenets include:

- Belief that Islam is not only a religion, but also a holistic sociopolitical system;
- Advocacy of Sharia (Islamic) law as divine state law;
- Belief that a transnational Muslim community, known as the Ummah, should unite as a political bloc;
- Advocacy of an ‘Islamic’ state, or Caliphate, within which sovereignty belongs to God.

4. A global database of Islamist terrorist attacks from 1979 to May 2021

It is within the framework of these definitions that we have conceived this work and that we propose here the result in the form of a database listing the Islamist terrorist attacks perpetrated in the world since 27 December 1979. The data included in our database does not extend beyond 31 May 2021, given the time required to validate and process the information collected. Indeed, while the attacks in Western countries have considerable visibility, due to the greater impact that violence can have in more peaceful societies, their ability to produce reliable data quickly and a particularly dense media presence, the same cannot be said for attacks that take place, much more often, in other parts of the world where all identification and intelligence processes become longer but cannot be as effective. Therefore, the validation and classification of relevant events requires work that goes beyond the time we had to define in order to make this publication possible.

To carry out our research, we used three types of sources: the collection of information on attacks since 1979 via search engines, the cross-referencing of existing databases and academic research. There are indeed various databases on terrorist attacks in general and Islamist attacks in particular.

13. “By ‘Islamism’, I mean the normative political ideology that has as its core program the establishment of Islam as a state religion and the implementation of Islamic law (shari’a). Militant Islamism, then, is any form of Islamism that advocates the use of violence to achieve Islamist objectives. This same distinction is made by Islamists themselves, who refer to ‘Parties of the Islamic Call’, or al-da’wa al Islamiyya (i.e. Islamist groups that do not advocate violence) on the one hand, and ‘Parties of the Muslim Revolution’, or al-thawra al-Islamiyya (i.e. Islamist groups that do advocate violence)”.


15. On 28 April 2019, the German newspaper Welt am Sonntag published a list of Islamist terrorist attacks. This list covers a shorter period, from 11 September 2001 to 28 April 2019. Until 2017, the data are extracted from the Global Terrorism Database. For the years 2018 and 2019, the newspaper constructed its own database. Our data differ from those of the Welt am Sonntag in at least three respects: first, we cover a period of forty years instead of eighteen years, which allows us to follow the evolution of Islamist terrorism, in particular by showcasing a phenomenon of globalisation; second, Welt am Sonntag has chosen to count only attacks that have killed at least twelve people, while we have recorded all identifiable attacks; thirdly, Welt am Sonntag focused on attacks by the main terrorist groups (Abdullah-Azzam Brigade, Asaib Ahl ab-Haqq, Abu Sayyaf, Ansar al-Din, Allied Democratic Forces, Algerian jihadists, Ahhrar al-Sham, Ansar al-Islam, Al-Ittihad al-Islami, Al-Islah Party, Aisha-Brigade, Al-Aksa Martyrs’ Brigade, Al-Muqawamah-Biddam Brigade, Ansar-Al-Din-Front, Al-Qaeda, Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army, Ansar al-Sunna, al-Shabaab, Ansar al-Sharia, Ansar al-Tawhid, Ansar ul-Islam, Boko Haram, Sunni Jihadist Movement of Iran, Deccan Mujahideen, Religious Guardians, Armed Islamic Group, Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, Hezbollah, Hizb-i-Islami, Harkatul Jihad-e-Islami, Hakkani Network, Halqa-e-Mehsud, Hisb-ul Mujahideen, Hamas, Houthis, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, Islamic Jihad of Uzbekistan, Islamic Front, Indian Mujahideen, Islamic Party of Turkestan, Jaish al-Adl, Jaish-al-Islam, Jamaat al-Tawhid wal-Jihad, Jaish-e-Mohammad, Jaish al-Fatah, Jaish-i-Islam, Jemaah Islamiyyah, Jund al-Khilafah, Jamiat ul-Mujahedin, Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin, Jundullah, Jundalilab Pakistan, Jaihal Army, Kataib Hezbollah, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Lashkar-e-Omar, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Lashkar-e-Islam, Mujahideen Ansar, Mahaz-e-e-Inquilab, Moro Islamic Liberation Front, Moro National Liberation Front, Movement for Tawheed and Jihad in West Africa, Mujahadeen Shura Council, Mukhtar Army, Front al Nosrah, Students Islamic Movement of India, Sipah-i-Mohammed, Salafi Jihadia, Shura of the Derna Mujahideen, Special Purpose Islamic Regiment, Shura of the Bengazi Revolutionaries, Taliban, Tehrik-e-Taliban Islam, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, United Jihad Council); while our database lists all Islamist terrorist attacks as accurately as possible. Thus, in addition to attacks by the best-known groups, we also take into account attacks by individuals or small groups claiming to be Islamists without belonging to a particularly well-known organisation. See “18 Jahre Terror”, Welt am Sonntag, n°. 17, 28 April 2019, pp. 12-14.
All the databases in circulation were useful to us in confirming or enriching the work we were completing\textsuperscript{16}. However, most of the databases available are very incomplete or unevenly documented. In some cases, information may be abundant about a country, region, year or period, usually very short, then very little or non-existent for another year or country. This can be seen on Wikipedia, where data by year or theme are available but very incomplete, fragmented and in a form that does not allow statistical processing.

For the first edition of *Islamist terrorist attacks in the World. 1979-2019*, our initial source was the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) produced by the University of Maryland in the United States. This gigantic database compiles terrorist attacks between 1970 and 2017. The value of this set is to identify terrorist attacks regardless of their motivation. This abundance was also the main challenge for us, since we had to extract Islamist terrorist attacks from the 172,944 attacks recorded in the world from 1979 to 2017. We therefore carried out a selection, verification and classification of the data contained in the GTD. We then had to supplement it with our own information, particularly for the year 1993\textsuperscript{17}. We worked without the GTD for the years 2018 and 2019 since data for these years were not provided\textsuperscript{18}.

**Additional information about the 2\textsuperscript{nd} edition of our study on Islamist terrorist attacks around the world. The years 2018 and 2019 have been consolidated and we have included new data for the period between January 2020 and May 2021.**

Since the first edition of our study in November 2019, the University of Maryland database has been updated through June 2020. Firstly, we were able to consolidate our data for the years 2018 and 2019. Secondly, by extracting Islamist-type attacks, we were able to identify relevant occurrences between 1 January 2020 and 30 June 2020.

For the period from July 2020 to May 2021, we used the database of the Armed Conflict and Event Data Project (ACLED). This American non-profit organisation specialises in collecting data and mapping all types of violent events around the world from 1997 to the present. We developed a filtering system, with three parameters, in order to retain only the Islamist terrorist attacks:

1. **The time period:** we exported the data for the period from 1 July 2020 to 31 May 2021;
2. **The type of events:** we then selected all terrorist attacks in the world;
3. **Islamist terrorist groups:** we have retained attacks perpetrated by an Islamist terrorist or by an Islamist terrorist group, 656 Islamist terrorist groups having been recorded from 1979 to the present.

We have excluded several types of events:
- Operations carried out at the initiative of a state force with the aim of preventatively weakening a terrorist group (ex: “On 12 March 2021, 3 Taliban were killed and 1 wounded in the Afghan military forces operation in the limits of Dih Yak district, Ghazni province. In addition, 4 Taliban planted IEDs were detected and defused in the district. Fatalities coded as 3”);
- Operations where the instigator is not clearly identifiable (ex: “On 14 October 2020, members of an Islamist militia from Mozambique clashed with the Tanzanian armed forces in Kitaya. At least 20 citizens were killed, and between 2 to 3 soldiers. The group of around 200 militiamen set several buildings on fire, including a cashew nut factory and a hospital; an armored personnel carrier was destroyed. The Islamic State claimed credit for the attack”).

For each Islamist terrorist attack in our database, we have provided the following information:
- the date;
- the location of the attack: country, city, and exact location when possible to identify it;
- the number of confirmed deaths and injuries, including attackers; it is important to note here that the number of people wounded is clearly very underestimated by the available information;
- the perpetrator(s) of the attack;

\textsuperscript{16} We can mention, for example, the database made available by the French newspaper Le Monde on the attacks committed by the Islamic State from 2014 to 2016 (www.leWorld.fr/les-decodeurs/visuel/2016/06/17/les-attacks-de-l-etat-islamique-ont-fait-plus-de-2-500-deaths-en-deux-ans_4952826_4355770.html) or the New York Times’ (www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/03/25/world/mapisis-attacks-around-the-world.html?mtrref=undefined&gwh=0EBB06650E2F0D8A452DE9BDAA12379&gwt=pay&assetType=REGIWALL).

\textsuperscript{17} Global Terrorism Database, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism (START), University of Maryland (www.start.umd.edu/gtd/).

\textsuperscript{18} The Global Terrorism Database previously did not provide data for the years 1993, 2018 and 2019.
– the type(s) of target(s); 
– the type(s) of attack(s) in question; 
– the type(s) of weapon(s) used.

For the period July 2020-May 2021, we analysed a total of 10,978 events, which represents an average of almost 1,000 terrorist acts per month. We have harmonised the taxonomy between the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) and the Armed Conflict and Event Data Project (ACLED) to build our own database. It is available as open data on our website data.fondapol.org. However, as the University of Maryland has changed its privacy settings since our first publication in November 2019, our contract with GTD for post-2017 data no longer allows us to provide public access, which we regret. However, data from 1979 to 2017 and from 1 July 2020 to 31 May 2021 can be found on our datafondapol.org platform.

5. The reasons why, however, our study underestimates the reality of Islamist violence

It is clearly impossible to claim to propose an exhaustive database of Islamist terrorist attacks committed in the world between 1979 and May 2021, for a number of reasons detailed below.

a/ A number of attacks have not been recorded. No matter the efforts made, it is certain that a significant number of attacks falling under the Islamist category could not be recorded.

b/ A number of attacks do not appear in our “retained estimate” when religious motivation is not clearly predominant in a combination involving another determination. Islamist terrorism takes place in singular and complex contexts that sometimes make it difficult to collect reliable data. This is particularly the case in situations of war, civil or international, independentist or separatist struggles and territorial conflicts that persist over long periods of time, where causalities are shifting or inextricable, as in the case of the Palestinian conflict, while in a completely different context, in Thailand for example, a separatist movement has led a Muslim minority to get involved with weapons in the name of objectives that can achieve, beyond political demands, a religious dimension.

c/ Islamist motivation is not always identified. Available data do not always allow news agencies to attribute the attack to the Islamist cause, especially if the country affected by the attack is characterised by weak administrative structures. The absence of claim of responsibility can increase the likelihood that an attack will not even be recorded by agencies or that this information will not reach the press.

d/ The number of deferred deaths is practically unknown. However, it is certainly significant. Since victims who succumb to their injuries after an attack are almost never mentioned in the available information, it is impossible to know their exact number. It is therefore also impossible to integrate these deaths into our database in a reliable way. Thus, according to our database, we record at least 210,138 deaths and 172,109 people wounded, which is less than the number of deaths. However, if we consider three cases of attacks, each carried out with different means, in two countries where the quality of information is excellent, we observe a completely opposite ratio between the number of deaths and the number of people wounded: in the United States, there were five times as many people wounded (16,493) than killed (3,001) in the 9/11 attacks; in France, there were three times as many people wounded (413) than killed (137) in the 13 November 2015 attacks; in Nice, in the 14 July 2016 attack, there were five times as many people wounded (458) than killed (87). This information leads us to believe that the number of people wounded is much higher than that in our database. Certainly, developing countries, which are the countries where most attacks take place, do not have the same capacity to identify and care for people injured in an attack. Some of the injured are probably not even counted, while others die from their injuries after a certain period of time due to the inadequacy or fragility of relief systems and health institutions. If we applied the ratios of the three sample attacks to the number of casualties in our database (172,109), we would have to adjust this figure by multiplying it by three (516,327) or five (860,545).

e/ For these four reasons, we propose two types of quantification of Islamist violence, in the form of a “retained estimate” and a “possible estimate”. The “retained estimate” results from our database of attacks during the period 1979-May 2021, that were clearly motivated by an Islamist agenda. The “possible estimate” results from the identification of attacks that could be qualified as Islamist, including certain terrorist acts that are also based on separatist, political or social logic, which make it more difficult to attribute them to an exclusively or mainly Islamist motivation. In all cases, the number of victims, dead or injured, is significantly lower than a reality that cannot be more precisely known.
The Algerian “black decade”: only an estimate is possible

The Algerian case illustrates particularly well the difficulty of providing an exhaustive database. Algerians refer to the period between 1991 and 2002 as the “black decade”, when various Islamist groups, in particular the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) and the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), opposed the Algerian state in a violent civil war whose outcome is difficult to document. According to Fouad Ajami, “the precise number of Algerians who died in the civil war that broke out in 1992 will never be known. The Algerian leaders, who are not known for their loyalty to the truth and who have so much to hide, acknowledged in 1999 that 100,000 people were killed. More reliable estimates provided by Algerian civic organisations put the death toll at 200,000”. Indeed, President Abdelaziz Bouteflika first estimated the number of victims at 100,000 in 1999. Then, in February 2005, the Algerian president gave a speech in which he put the figure at 150,000 deaths. Fouad Ajami considers that the death toll could reach 200,000, arguing that it was in the interest of the Algerian government to minimise the losses. This figure, which has been used in various works on terrorism in Algeria, remains debated, particularly because it does not distinguish between victims who were members of the police or the army, terrorists and civilians. In a study published in 2008, Roman Hagelstein tried to distinguish between those killed in clashes between security forces and terrorists and those killed in massacres, bombings and assassinations. The study also distinguishes the number of missing persons, presumed to have been murdered in secret, with the author estimating the total number of victims at 44,000. Regarding the victims of Algerian Islamist terrorism in the period 1991-2002, the available estimates that can be considered reliable because of the sources, authors and types of publication thus vary between 44,000 and 200,000. In any case, for this country and for this period, there is no data available to provide information on the number of attacks, their date, the modalities of action, the group responsible or the profile of the victims. For our database, these major uncertainties have several consequences: firstly, due to the lack of information, it is not possible to further specify the situation of Islamist terrorism in Algeria during this decade. In keeping with our method, we therefore only include in the “retained data” of the cases that were reported. This choice leads to an undoubtedly significant underestimation of the number of attacks and victims in Algeria. On the other hand, we will include in the “possible estimate” category the indications concerning Algeria. Finally, as a consequence, this situation of great ignorance with regard to the Algerian case leads to an underestimation of the number of attacks and victims of Islamist terrorism in the world, both for the period after 1991 and for the period as a whole.

We have recorded 48,035 Islamist terrorist attacks that killed at least 210,138 people between 1979 and May 2021.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Islamist terrorist attacks</th>
<th>48,035</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of deaths</td>
<td>210,138</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This is an underestimate, since if we add those who died as a result of Islamist terrorism during the Algerian black decade, the number can rise from 254,000 to 410,000 deaths, depending on the sources used.

Our research started in spring 2018. It led to a first publication in 2019. The study we are publishing here is based on the database we have developed, which is available in open data on data.fondapol.org within the limits indicated above. The analyses that follow first present the evolution of Islamist terrorism from 1979 to the present day before proposing a presentation and reading of the data according to the regions of the world and the countries most affected by Islamist violence.

The accuracy of the figures does not imply such a detailed knowledge of the observed reality; the degree of accuracy results from the calculation operations applied to the database. We could only reproduce the exact result of these operations.

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19. This is an underestimate, since if we add those who died as a result of Islamist terrorism during the Algerian black decade, the number can rise from 254,000 to 410,000 deaths, depending on the sources used.

I. The beginnings of transnational Islamist terrorism (1979-2000)

This work does not aim to shed light on the foundations of Islamism or to discuss the origins and justifications, in the context of Islam, of the use of violence and violence of a terrorist nature in particular. In a different way, we consider that our contribution lies in the information that can be obtained from the exploitation of a consolidated database and the analyses to which it can give rise. However, in order to understand the value of the data shared here, it is necessary to briefly recall the developments in Islamist terrorism since 1979.

Until the mid-1970s, Islamism had little influence in the Middle East and North Africa. In the wake of decolonisation and the rejection of Western imperialism, the new States of the region affirm a nationalist and pan-Arab vision promoted by leaders such as Nasser or Boumediene and by movements such as Ba’ath, in Syria and Iraq, or the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) in Palestine. Islamist organisations are firmly contained or severely repressed, as Nasser did in Egypt with the Muslim Brotherhood. Founded in 1928 by Hassan el-Banna, the Muslim Brotherhood was established with the aim of restoring the political Islam that had disappeared with the abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate proclaimed by Atatürk in 1924.

At the end of the 1970s, the Islamist claim was strengthened. The increase in social inequalities and corruption of the elites were denounced. Islamist movements were trying to embody a political alternative to existing dictatorships or are engaging in violent actions, as in Syria, where the Muslim Brotherhood launched an armed struggle against the Baathist regime of Hafez el-Assad. These movements of Islamisation in Middle Eastern societies flourished all the more as Arab nationalism began to falter then collapsed. At the end of the decade, in 1979, a window of opportunity opened up for Islamists in the Middle East and North Africa.

1. The Soviet-Afghan war, “matrix of contemporary Islamist terrorism”

The year 1979 was a pivotal year, the scene of several important events, including the Iranian revolution and the invasion of Afghanistan by the USSR. The Russian military operation precipitated the emergence of a new Islamism. At the same time, in Iran, the opposition led by the Shiite clergy, due to the context of intense social protest, forced the Shah to flee the country (16 January 1979). On 1 February 1979, Ruhollah Khomeyni came to power. He initiated the transformation of Iran’s imperial regime, accused of “Westernisation”, into an Islamic republic. In the wake of the Iranian revolution, Shia groups advocating armed struggle were formed. Among them is the Lebanese Hezbollah, created in 1982. Shia ideology is affirmed in the context of the process of Islamisation of the Middle East where it competes with Sunni legitimacy.

In Afghanistan, the Soviet invasion initiates the conflict which will be considered the matrix of contemporary Islamist terrorism. Jihad is supported by Saudi Arabia, Algeria and Egypt. Jihadists who reach Afghanistan become “mujahideen”; they are seen as the liberators of a “land of Islam” (dar al-islam).

2. The 1980s and the emergence of Islamist terrorism

With 357 attacks, which cost the lives of 1,442 people, the 1980s are the least deadly years compared to the decades that followed. The emergence of Islamist terrorism is visible from the years 1980-1983 which correspond to the Muslim Brotherhood’s activism in Syria, in the midst of an uprising against the government of Hafez el-Assad.

From 1980 to 1982, there were 69 attacks on Syrian territory, representing nearly two-thirds (63.3%) of all Islamist terrorist attacks listed in the world during these three years. Attacks ceased after the repression of the Muslim Brotherhood movement, including during the Hama massacres by the Syrian army in 1982.

From 1980 to 1989, the country most affected by Islamist terrorism is Lebanon, with 133 attacks, which caused at least 515 deaths. In the grips of a civil war since 1975, the country has been experiencing the rise of small terrorist groups. This unstable national context and Israel’s invasion of southern Lebanon in 1982 promote, the same year, the emergence of Hezbollah. A year later, the Shia organisation triggered a series of attacks on foreign institutions. An Italian patrol was hit on 15 March 1983, although no lives were lost, but on 18 April a new attack hit the United States Embassy in Beirut, resulting in the deaths of 63 people. At the end of the same year, on 23 October, an American base and a French patrol were terribly hit by an attack in which 299 people lost their lives. Hezbollah’s terrorist activism is particularly intense in Lebanon, where it committed 276 attacks from 1983 to 2000, but it is not limited to this. In all, by integrating the other affected countries, Hezbollah is responsible for 339 attacks from 1983 to 2000, killing 1,105 people. Saudi Arabia, Argentina, Cyprus, Denmark, Egypt, Greece, Israel, Kuwait and Tunisia are among the affected countries.

In September 1986, Paris suffered a series of six attacks, including the one on 17 September, rue de Rennes, in front of a store, which killed 7 people and injured 55.

These attacks were claimed by the Solidarity Committee with Arab political prisoners and the Near East, on behalf of the Lebanese Hezbollah.

The Lebanese organisation is also considered responsible for the two attacks on the Israeli Embassy on 17 March 1992 in Buenos Aires (30 deaths, 220 wounded), as well as the attack of 18 July 1994 on a Jewish association, also in Buenos Aires (85 deaths, 236 injured). Over the whole 1979-May 2021 period, Argentina remains the only country in South America affected by Islamist terrorism, with three attacks.

Types of weapons used in Islamist attacks (1979-2000)

- Firearms (911): 41.5%
- Explosives (856): 39.0%
- Melee weapons (124): 5.7%
- Incendiary weapons (68): 3.1%

As the data for 1993 have to be consolidated, they are not included in this graph.
COUNTRIES AFFECTED BY ISLAMIST TERRORISM (1979-2000)

1 ALGERIA
604 attacks | 2,655 deaths

2 LEBANON
348 attacks | 737 deaths

3 EGYPT
311 attacks | 551 deaths

4 PHILIPPINES
195 attacks | 516 deaths

5 INDIA
104 attacks | 339 deaths

6 WEST BANK AND THE GAZA STRIP
87 attacks | 99 deaths

7 SYRIA
72 attacks | 422 deaths

8 IRAN
66 attacks | 24 deaths

9 ISRAEL
62 attacks | 176 deaths

10 INDONESIA
44 attacks | 26 deaths

11 PAKISTAN
32 attacks | 160 deaths

12 THAILAND
27 attacks | 24 deaths

13 TURKEY
26 attacks | 69 deaths

14 BANGLADESH
25 attacks | 33 deaths

15 FRANCE
24 attacks | 32 deaths

16 IRAQ
21 attacks | 139 deaths

17 AFGHANISTAN
19 attacks | 29 deaths

18 KUWAIT
16 attacks | 16 deaths

19 UNITED STATES
10 attacks | 7 deaths

20 CYPRUS
8 attacks | 1 death

21 YEMEN
7 attacks | 27 deaths

22 SAUDI ARABIA
6 attacks | 90 deaths

23 MOROCCO
6 attacks | 5 deaths

24 JORDAN
6 attacks | 0 deaths

25 NIGER
5 attacks | 178 deaths

26 SPAIN
5 attacks | 20 deaths

27 TUNISIA
5 attacks | 7 deaths

28 KENYA
4 attacks | 224 deaths

29 SOMALIA
4 attacks | 5 deaths

30 UNITED KINGDOM
4 attacks | 3 deaths

31 ARGENTINA
3 attacks | 115 deaths

32 ETHIOPIA
3 attacks | 7 deaths

1979-2000
2,194 attacks
6,817 deaths
Average number of deaths per attack: 3.1
33 TAJIKISTAN
3 attacks | 3 deaths

34 GERMANY
3 attacks | 0 death

35 SUDAN
2 attacks | 22 deaths

36 GREECE
2 attacks | 11 deaths

37 RUSSIA
2 attacks | 2 deaths

38 BELGIUM
2 attacks | 1 death

39 DENMARK
2 attacks | 1 death

40 ITALY
2 attacks | 1 death

41 KYRGYZSTAN
2 attacks | 1 death

42 BAHRAIN
2 attacks | 0 deaths

43 MALAYSIA
2 attacks | 0 deaths

44 MALI
1 attack | 14 deaths

45 TANZANIA
1 attack | 11 deaths

46 BURMA
1 attack | 8 deaths

47 LIBYA
1 attack | 2 deaths

48 SOUTH AFRICA
1 attack | 1 death

49 CROATIA
1 attack | 1 death

50 NEPAL
1 attack | 1 death

51 SWITZERLAND
1 attack | 1 death

52 AUSTRIA
1 attack | 0 deaths

53 NIGERIA
1 attack | 0 deaths

54 NORWAY
1 attack | 0 deaths
3. The 1990s and the spread of Islamist terrorism in the Middle East and North Africa

The withdrawal of the Red Army from Kabul on 5 February 1989 galvanised Islamist mobilisation, already stimulated in 1987 by the creation of Al-Qaeda, by Abdullah Azzam and Osama bin Laden. The globalisation of the jihadist struggle began then. The discourse is mainly based on the idea of a unified Muslim community (ummah) claiming autonomy from the ethnic, national and cultural specificities of each nationality. The objective is to establish the Caliphate and the exemplary prophetic city, which must also be extended to non-Muslim countries. The empowerment of the jihadist discourse in relation to classical, nationalist and political referents is not the hallmark of Al-Qaeda. It is taken up by all Muslims who came to Afghanistan to take part in the violent action. Following the Soviet withdrawal, these mujahideen returned to their countries of origin and spread the ideas of Jihadist Salafism there. Thus, in the 1990s, an increasing number of countries, particularly in the Middle East, were directly affected by Islamist violence.

In Algeria, a number of jihadists gathered in militant groups since the beginning of the 1991-2002 civil war. The victory of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in the 1990 municipal elections and the 1991 parliamentary elections, followed by the cancellation of these elections by the Algerian army and the resignation of President Chadli Bendjedid, triggered a “black decade”. Military and Islamist groups engaged in a terrifying struggle for power. The confrontation devastated the country. From 1990 to 1999, Algeria was the country that was hit the hardest by Islamist terrorism. There were 542 attacks, or more than a third (34.6%) of the attacks recorded worldwide during this decade by our database; there were at least 2,390 deaths, representing more than half (51.4%) of the victims of Islamist terrorism in the world between 1990 and 1999. The violence reached its peak in 1997: 967 people were killed following the parliamentary elections won by the Rassemblement national démocratique (RDN), supported by the army.

In Egypt, on the eve of the 2000s, the Islamist landscape was structured by two movements: al-Jihad and al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya. The objective of these two organisations was the establishment of an Islamic State, and the means to achieve this was terrorism. In the 1990s, al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya launched 257 insurgent attacks against the government, killing 489 people.

3. Due to a lack of information, it is not possible to specify the situation of Islamist terrorism in Algeria during this decade. In keeping with our method, we therefore only include in the “retained data” the cases that were reported. This choice leads to an undoubtedly significant underestimation of the number of attacks and victims in Algeria.

In the Middle East, the 1990s were marked by the Islamisation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. A transfer of power of sorts took place to the benefit of Hamas, a Palestinian Islamist movement born in 1987 at the beginning of the first Intifada, and to the detriment of the PLO, which came from the Arab nationalist movement. This evolution led to a change in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In 1992, 417 leaders and activists of Hamas were arrested and taken to southern Lebanon, in the village of Marj al-Zuhur, after the assassination of an Israeli officer. A resolution of the Council of UN security necessitated their repatriation. This event is analysed by Gilles Kepel as “the transition which gave Hamas parity with the PLO, if not primacy, for the incarnation of the Palestinian cause, and consequently the Islamisation of its Arab and universal image”.

Beyond the political vicissitudes on Palestinian territory, “the increase in suicide attacks - in the face of the hardening of successive governments of Mr. Netanyahu and the intensification of colonisation - can be considered as the model for the mirror of which the international jihadism of Al-Qaeda would develop its preferred mode of action”.

In our database, we clearly observe an increase in the number of attacks affecting the Israeli and Palestinian territories from the beginning of the 1990s. Terrorist attacks are largely incriminating to Hamas but also to the Palestinian Islamic Jihad Group (PIJ). Between 1979 and 2000, of the 62 attacks recorded on the ground, 29 were claimed by Hamas and 13 by the PIJ. Out of 86 attacks in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 65 were claimed by Hamas and 12 by the PIJ.

Types of attacks in Israel (1979-2000)

- Explosions (35): 56.5%
- Assassinations (18): 29.0%
- Armed assaults (6): 9.7%
- Hostage takings/Kidnappings (1): 1.6%
- Others (2): 3.2%

4. The export of jihad

Islamist violence has been on the rise in the Middle East and in North Africa from the 1980s onwards, and other regions of the world are also becoming hosts to this jihad, particularly Southeast Asia (Philippines), South Asia (India) and Europe.

Islamist violence in the world (1979-2000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Number of attacks</th>
<th>Number of deaths</th>
<th>Average number of deaths per attack</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td>2,194</td>
<td>6,817</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East and North Africa</td>
<td>1,646</td>
<td>5,019</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeast Asia</td>
<td>269</td>
<td>574</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>562</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>462</td>
<td>21.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Rapid empowerment and the increasing power of Islamism eventually raise fears of countries that have nevertheless worked for this movement or who used it for domestic political reasons or international relations. Thus, in the face of the Islamist threat, Saudi Arabia and Algeria have engaged in relentless repression. This is also the case for Egypt and Syria. In a decade, Salafists have changed categories: firstly admired as “freedom fighters”, they were then denounced as “fugitives”.

5. Gilles Kepel, Sortir du chaos..., op. cit., p. 102.
7. See Dominique Thomas, Le Londonistan. La voix du djihad, Michalon, 2003, p. 70.
This regional context forced many jihadists into exile: some, having returned from Afghanistan, became political refugees, often with the aim of exporting their Islamist struggle to new territories, including those that are not predominantly Muslim. They sought asylum in Europe. In the 1990s, these territories of settlement and conquest were first England and France. London thus became a hub for Salafo Jihadist activism in Europe. Between July and October 1995, France was hit by a wave of Islamist terrorist attacks related to the Algerian context: on 25 July 1995 an attack in the Parisian metro resulted in the deaths of 7 people and 86 people wounded.

Asia was also hit hard between 1979 and 2000, particularly in the south and southeast. According to our database, we record the first Islamist terrorist attacks in India in 1986. The phenomenon remained sporadic until 1990. In that year, 12 attacks were carried out under the leadership of the Hizbul Mujahideen (HM) group and its supporters. The action of this Islamist group was rooted in the conflict between India and Pakistan over the border region of Jammu and Kashmir, but if the group wanted the region to be integrated into Pakistan, it was also campaigning for the establishment of a caliphate in the world.

The landscape of Islamist terrorism in India is fragmented: a number of groups revolve around the issue of independence, including Allah’s Tigers (“Tigers of Allah”), the Muslim Brotherhood, Harkat ul-Ansar and Jamaat-e-Islami. Between 1979 and 2000, most attacks (78.8%) were concentrated in Jammu and Kashmir. Since 2000 and the creation of the terrorist group Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), attacks have been both more numerous and more deadly (25 attacks and 126 deaths in 2000, 42 attacks and 200 deaths in 2001). These years also saw the Pakistani Taliban (Lashkar-e-Taiba) conducting terrorist campaigns in India.

In the Philippines, Islamist terrorism is deployed as part of the separatist struggle of the Moro people, a Muslim minority in the south of the country. One of the main terrorist groups in the region, the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), founded in 1991 by Abdurajak Abubakar Janjalani, drew its inspiration from Islamist movements in the Middle East. The first demonstration of this terrorist movement occurred on 7 September 1986, when the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) attacked a Catholic church and a marriage ceremony in Salvador, on the island of Mindanao, killing 20 people and injuring 186. The group launched an attack on 15 January 1987 in the Manila metro, the capital, killing 8 people. In 1994, after an eclipse of sorts, the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) carried out 7 attacks in the south of the country. It later became one of the main actors of Islamist terrorism in the Philippines in the following decades.

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The many faces of terrorism

Singular political violence that some authors trace back to Antiquity1, terrorism finds in the changes of the late nineteenth century new resources capable of multiplying power tenfold: ideology favours the recruitment of terrorists and their determination to act, technological developments provide increasingly powerful means of destruction, at the same time more manageable and easier to hide, and the advent of the newspaper and photography ensures visibility that gives terrorist actions a new impact.

At the end of the 19th century, terrorism was dominated by secular causes: revolutionaries, anarchists and socialists, nationalists and separatists constituted the bulk of terrorist troops. Some attacks seem to be part of greater history, such as the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to the Austro-Hungarian Empire, on 28 June 1914 in Sarajevo. For a century, until the end of the 1980s, tens of thousands of attacks overflowed the news, taking place in the context of conflicts that were part of nationalist or revolutionary logic, sometimes both. Examples include: the attacks in Algeria or France by the National Liberation Front (FLN) and the OAS; around the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, those carried out by the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) or the Black September Organisation, responsible in particular for the massacre of members of the Israeli sports delegation on 5 September 1972 during the Munich Olympic Games; those of Irish paramilitary organisations, in particular the Irish Republican Army (IRA); those of independentists, Catalans, Basques, Corsicans or Bretons; the actions of the Red Brigades in Italy, including the kidnapping and murder in 1978 of former Council President Aldo Moro, or, two years later, in 1980, the attack on Bologna railway station (85 deaths, 200 wounded) attributed to an extreme right-wing organisation, the Revolutionary Armed Nuclei (NAR); the murders in Germany of the Red Army Faction, found responsible for the deaths of 34 people between 1970 and 1998; the attacks and kidnappings in France of the Action Directe group, which claimed more than 80 attacks between 1979 and 1987, including the assassination of industrialist Georges Besse in 19862; the actions of the Japanese Red Army (JRA); the guerrilla actions of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia People’s Army (FARC-EP) or the Peruvian organisation Shining Path; the massacres of the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka between 1976 and 2009...

Secular causes dominated terrorism until the late 1980s. After that date, there has been an increase in the power of Islamic-inspired terrorism. For several years now, Islamism has become the main motivation for terrorism3. According to our data, between January 2013 and June 2020, Islamist terrorist attacks (29,528) accounted for 32.1% of all attacks (91,994) worldwide but accounted for 145,225 deaths (65.3%) out of a total of 222,341 people killed.

3. Data on all terrorist attacks worldwide is only available on the University of Maryland’s database, which has been updated through June 2020.
Extract from our database, freely accessible on data.fondapol.org.
II. The turning point of 9/11 (2001-2012)

The attacks of 9/11 2001 perpetrated by Al-Qaeda on U.S. soil were the deadliest terrorist attacks in history, with a total of 3,001 deaths and 16,493 wounded. On that day, two hijacked airliners were launched against the towers of the World Trade Center in New York. A third aircraft had been directed at the Pentagon in Washington. On board the fourth hijacked aircraft, it was a passenger revolt that defeated the terrorists’ plan, as the aircraft crashed in the countryside in Pennsylvania. The live and global broadcasting of this dramatic and spectacular event also marked the beginning of a new era in the media coverage of terrorism. In addition to the deferred information intended for specific audiences, immediate and comprehensive information is now available. This new public space profoundly affects the work of traditional media (television, press and radio). The advent of social media and smartphones is opening its doors of mass communication to countless new players, starting with terrorist organisations.

Islamism and populism: a relentless dialectic

Terrorist violence mainly affects civilians. It reaches them at the heart of their ordinary lives, a world where no one has any reason to be on guard. Anytime, anywhere, anyone. Death due to terrorism creates an unbearable sense of permanent vulnerability. For a few days, a few weeks and sometimes longer, peace looks like war. People in the democratic world are more traumatised by terrorist violence because they have inherited an irenic culture, a logical consequence of the decline of inter state violence. But democracies are also more helpless because they represent a soft political order based on freedom and human rights. Inevitably, in the face of terrorist violence and a war imposed on all, democracies feel defenseless. Stupor, despondency and fear upset political demands. A desire for repression, control, surveillance, expulsion and border closure is expressed in the open. It creates a culture of security, even paranoia, which is perpetuated by the inevitable measures designed to reassure much more than to prevent. Democracies are populated by countless systems of control to access public places and shops, gates and guards appear everywhere, street bins carry transparent bags. From now on, taking a plane requires heavy control and search procedures, going on the subway requires travellers to be vigilant, strategic locations are worrying and video surveillance is spreading, while the fight against terrorist networks intensifies police vigilance: files, wiretaps, tracking on the Web and social media, on video game forums, etc.

Through the violence of jihadists, Islam and Muslims are raising irrepressible and growing fears. Fear of the other splits societies, and they end up opposing themselves: a propensity for violence, xenophobia, identity conflicts, and authoritarianism are the result. The common law is considered argumentative, cumbersome and cowardly. A growing proportion of public opinion believes it is represented and reassured by leaders who promise to change the rule of law. When fear passes through the ballot boxes that democracy makes available, it becomes that force that undoes and rebuilds the law. The promise of illiberal democracy increases the attractiveness of populist programs. Islamism and populism respond to and understand each other without having to talk to each other. They grow together and egg each other on.

3. In the 28 countries of the European Union, a large majority (57%) of respondents answered that they could “not welcome more refugees because they increase the risk of terrorism in our country”. In the eleven countries of the former communist bloc that are now members of the European Union, this response concerns 72% of respondents (see Dominique Reynié, “The challenge of migration in the light of the refugee issue”, in Dominique Reynié (dir.), op. cit., vol. I, pp. 52-56.)
5. Opinion in favour of an authoritarian form of government is reaching levels that exceed the electoral scores of populist parties. The level is higher the younger respondents are (see Dominique Reynié, “The ghosts of authoritarianism”, in Dominque Reynié (dir.), op. cit., vol. I, pp. 39-40.

1. 9/11 and the war on terror

The attacks of 9/11 have had a significant impact that changed the geopolitics of the Middle East. Qualified by George W. Bush’s administration as the “war on terror”, the American response was brisk. On 7 October 2001, the United States launched a major offensive against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, accused of having supported Al-Qaeda. A year and a half later, on 20 March 2003, the American army invaded Iraq, in order to overthrow Saddam Hussein’s regime in the prospect of “democratising the Middle East”. Despite overwhelming military victories, the United States is failing to restore peace, or to eradicate Islamism. Confronted with the machine of American war in the long term, Islamists organised themselves, by acquiring an international dimension that keeps being reaffirmed. Between 2001 and 2012, the number of attacks and victims have increased in a spectacular way, notably due to the attacks perpetrated by Taliban fundamentalists.

Their movement has been spreading in Afghanistan and in Pakistan since 1994. Two years later, they overthrew the government in place when Kabul was taken over. They established the regime of the Islamic Emirate from Afghanistan, headed by Mohammad Omar. In the years that followed, the Taliban persecuted minorities, established a well-founded regime on the strict application of Sharia law and welcomed numerous wanted jihadis, including the leader of Al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden. In a few years, Afghanistan became a home for Islamic extremists from all over the world.

After the attacks of 9/11, the Taliban were driven out of power by an international coalition led by the Americans. From this moment on, there was an exponential increase the number of attacks and the number of victims, in particular among international forces or members of the Afghan government. We went from 4 attacks and 153 deaths in the country in 2001 to 829 attacks and 2,604 deaths in 2012. In total, between 2001 and 2012, 2,536 attacks took place on Afghan soil, killing at least 8,054 people. This represents 30.7% of the total number of Islamist terrorist attacks worldwide between 2001 and 2012. The Taliban were responsible for most (95.2%) of these attacks.

The Talibans’ targets in Afghanistan (2001-2012)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of target</th>
<th>Number of attacks</th>
<th>Breakdown by target (in %)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>592</td>
<td>23.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilians</td>
<td>488</td>
<td>19.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>452</td>
<td>17.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>388</td>
<td>15.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diplomacy</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious institutions</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Islamist terrorist attacks in Afghanistan (2001-2012)

2. According to a survey conducted by the Fondation pour l’innovation politique and the Fondation pour la Mémoire de la Shoah, of the seventeen events proposed, half of the young people surveyed (47%) cite the attacks of 9/11 as one of the three most significant events (see Future Memories, Fondation pour l’innovation politique and the Fondation pour la Mémoire de la Shoah, January 2015, www.fondapol.org/en/polls-en/future-memories_a-survey-presented-by-dominique-reynie/).
In Pakistan, we also witnessed the rise of groups multiplying terrorist acts between 2001 and 2012, with 1,010 attacks and 4,997 deaths. Very present in this country, the Taliban organised themselves from 2007 under the name Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP); they were responsible for nearly three-quarters of the (71.1%) of the terrorist violence over this period (2001-2012). Other Islamist groups are also active, such as Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (56 attacks, 386 deaths) or Lashkar-e-Islam (64 attacks, 115 deaths). In 2007, two terrorist attacks led by Al-Qaeda and its allies left their mark on the landscape of the country’s politics: on 18 October, an attack against a crowd gathered to welcome the former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, returning from exile, caused the death of 141 people and wounded 250. On 27 December, she was murdered in turn, victim of a suicide attack that killed 20 people and wounded more than a hundred.

Between 2001 and 2012, Iraq was the third largest country most affected by Islamist terrorism, with 914 attacks. Particularly violent, these attacks caused the deaths of 8,534 people, with an average 9.3 people killed per terrorist action. By comparison, in the world during the same period, an attack killed an average of 4.6 people. The fight against foreign interference is a key reason for violence by Islamists. From the moment on 19 August 2003, the car bomb attack against the Canal Hotel, UN headquarters in Baghdad, killed 22 people. The year 2004 saw a series of terrorist attacks targeting coalition member countries in Iraq, with 9 attacks against personnel at military bases, checkpoints and patrols of the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I). At the same time, the development of hostage takings/kidnappings became more common to terrorist actions: while we do not record any hostage takings or kidnappings in 2001, 2002 and 2003, there were 27 in 2004, largely aimed at civilians from countries militarily deployed in Iraq (5 Americans, 4 Japanese, 3 South Koreans, 1 Bulgarian, 1 Canadian, and 1 Italian). Among the countries involved in the war, the United States was greatly affected: between 2001 and 2012, in Iraq, 34 attacks targeted Americans, including 15 during the year 2004.
COUNTRIES AFFECTED BY ISLAMIST TERRORISM (2001-2012)

1 AFGHANISTAN
2,536 attacks | 8,054 deaths

2 PAKISTAN
1,009 attacks | 4,997 deaths

3 IRAQ
914 attacks | 8,534 deaths

4 ALGERIA
749 attacks | 2,007 deaths

5 NIGERIA
581 attacks | 2,044 deaths

6 SOMALIA
520 attacks | 1,540 deaths

7 PHILIPPINES
387 attacks | 806 deaths

8 YEMEN
347 attacks | 1,618 deaths

9 INDIA
275 attacks | 1,661 deaths

10 ISRAEL
233 attacks | 551 deaths

11 WEST BANK AND THE GAZA STRIP
161 attacks | 274 deaths

12 THAILAND
111 attacks | 91 deaths

13 KENYA
99 attacks | 142 deaths

14 INDONESIA
37 attacks | 302 deaths

15 BANGLADESH
35 attacks | 82 deaths

16 SYRIA
29 attacks | 356 deaths

17 RUSSIA
26 attacks | 724 deaths

18 LEBANON
26 attacks | 78 deaths

19 SAUDI ARABIA
19 attacks | 119 deaths

20 IRAN
18 attacks | 176 deaths

21 UNITED STATES
16 attacks | 3,016 deaths

22 MALI
16 attacks | 37 deaths

23 MAURITANIA
12 attacks | 43 deaths

24 UNITED KINGDOM
11 attacks | 57 deaths

25 NIGER
10 attacks | 16 deaths

26 EGYPT
9 attacks | 192 deaths
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number of Attacks</th>
<th>Deaths</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia-Herzegovina</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2. Globalisation of Islamist terrorist attacks

Between 2001 and 2012, an increase in Islamist terrorist attacks is observable in several geographical areas in the world. Compared to the previous period (1979-2000), there was a sharp increase in the number of terrorist attacks, with 8,265 attacks (compared to a total of 2,194 between 1979 and 2000) and 38,186 deaths (compared to a total of 6,817 between 1979 and 2000). This dramatic increase is partly due to the globalisation of jihad, facilitated by the acceleration of the circulation of people and ideas.

Since 2004, Europe has been confronted with a wave of attacks of a new magnitude. On 11 March, in Madrid, four trains exploded almost simultaneously. Claimed by Al-Qaeda, these attacks killed 191 people. On 7 July 2005, four explosions hit public transportation in London, killing 56 people and wounding 784. Though Al-Qaeda claimed responsibility for these attacks, the terrorists, unlike those of 9/11, were natives of the United Kingdom. Gilles Kepel sees this as a change in the implementation of Islamist terrorist attacks, which now rely on “a human resource specific to the Western country targeted”.

In addition, many Islamist movements are intensifying their inter-regional collaborations, such as in Asia. The 9/11 attacks on the ground claimed by Al-Qaeda and then the intervention in Afghanistan by American troops helped further the link between Osama bin Laden and various South Asian groups, examples of which are Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) in Indonesia. The difficulty is to examine, in each context, the way in which people and violent groups combine local elements, regional and global within the referents, the objectives and the operating methods they mobilise and implement. Trends then appear to be oscillating between unrelated ethno-nationalism with global jihad and a transnational religious referent. The situation in Thailand during this period takes part in this dynamic. From 2004 onwards, in the context of a separatist insurgency, the south of the country where a Muslim minority lives is crossed by violent activism. The two main groups Runda Kumpulan Kecil (RKK) and the Patani United Liberation Organisation (PULO), are then organised around a jihadist discourse. For a number of attacks occurring at this time, the Islamist character is sometimes found intertwined with ethno-nationalist claims.


Fondation pour l’innovation politique
Our database offers the reader the possibility to keep these events or not when counting the Islamist terrorist attacks. According to our estimate between 2001 and 2012, we identify 111 attacks and 91 deaths in Thailand. According to the possible estimate, we count 146 attacks and 121 deaths over the same period. In the latter we also take into account the actions of terrorists accused of being Muslim separatist extremists.

**Number of terrorist attacks by province in Thailand (2001-2012)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Number of attacks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Narathiwat</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yala</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pattani</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Songkhla</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The rise of Islamist terrorism can also be explained by the development of Al-Qaeda’s ramifications, such as that of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQPA) or Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).

**The ramifications of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQPA) and of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ramifications</th>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Number of attacks</th>
<th>Number of deaths</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQPA)</td>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>1,533</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)</td>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>585</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These different branches develop a capacity to hit hard abroad, as shown by the three successive attacks of 9 November 2002 by Al-Qaeda in Iraq, at the Grand Hyatt Hotel in Amman, which caused the deaths of at least 61 people, and the one on 28 November 2005 at the Paradise Hotel in Mombasa, Kenya, killing 16 people.

Relatively spared until then, sub-Saharan Africa became a target of Islamist terrorism in the second half of the 2000s. The creation and expansion of the Al Shabaab group, formerly the armed wing of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), in Somalia in 2006 was central. Pursuing the objective of overthrowing the Somali government in order to establish a regime founded on Sharia law, Al Shabaab has been cultivating close links with Al-Qaeda, thus forming part of the global jihadist movement. The group’s activity goes beyond the borders of Somalia, where the group has committed 459 attacks and killed 1,396 people, to reach Kenya, where it attacked 97 times (126 deaths), and Ethiopia, where it struck twice, including the devastating attack (100 deaths) on 2 November 2007 against Ethiopian soldiers in a hotel in Dolo.

**Al-Shabaab’s targets in Somalia (2001-2012)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of target</th>
<th>Number of attacks</th>
<th>Breakdown by target (in %)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>28.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilians</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>26.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>17.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorist groups and militias</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diplomacy</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sub-Saharan Africa was also the first to suffer acts of violence by Boko Haram, which have been recorded in Nigeria since 2009. The considerable scale of its attacks between 2010 and 2012 (566 attacks, 1,655 deaths) foreshadowed its power of destruction over the next decade.

**Types of weapons used in Islamist terrorist attacks (2001-2012)**

- Explosives (4,516): 54.6%
- Firearms (2,572): 31.1%
- Incendiary weapons (234): 2.8%
- Melee weapons (198): 2.4%

3. Terrorist migration to social media

The Internet obviously plays a key role in globalisation of Islamist terrorism. It turns out to be a powerful propaganda and recruitment tool. The emergence of social media allows Islamist groups to interact effectively and often anonymously, to share documents and information, but also to establish a community of interconnected individuals. According to Evan Kohlmann, “90% of terrorist activity on the Internet takes place using social networking tools. These forums serve as a virtual firewall to help safeguard the identities of those who participate, and they offer subscribers a chance to make direct contact with terrorist representatives [...]”.

Furthermore, cyber-terrorism is also a modality of attack for Islamist groups which thus multiplies their capacity for action.

The impact of terrorist violence in a global public space within the reach of the individual media

From the mid-1990s onwards, access to visibility took on unprecedented proportions. The digital public space increased the impact of terrorist actions tenfold. The coupling of the Web with continuous news channels amplified the effects of Islamist violence. Al Jazeera, the Qatari channel launched in 1996, broadcasts in some 30 countries and develops information websites in the few languages that can be used to reach most residents of the planet. Social media and other secure messaging applications offer the most modest of these terrorist groups the tools of global action: communication, propaganda, organisation, recruitment... The smartphone extends to the end of the chain, i.e. the individual, the mastery of these powerful tools and access to all networks. Media coverage of the attacks always goes through the traditional media (agencies, television, radio and the press) but it no longer depends on them. In the universal public space, production information is absolutely disseminated. The Web and the smartphone give the human multitude the powers of a news agency with 2.8 billion correspondents and the influence capabilities of numerous media. Islamic terrorism thrives in the age of the individual media. The depth of the network, the strength of the images, and the play of algorithms mean that any attack can become a global event in a matter of minutes.

7. David Thomson, Les Français jihadistes, Paris, Les Arènes, 2014, “young people who discover hadiths on the Internet are completely deaf to all those who, at the mosque, can try to explain that the meaning of prophecies is part of a context: for them, who have come to sacred texts alone or with jihadist propaganda, the historical or figurative interpretation is an ‘innovation’, that is, the worst thing since it distort and biases the meaning they think is original”.

Emergence of d’Instagram.

May: creation of a Twitter account by the Taliban (@alemarahweb, @emirateweb) to send several daily messages, mostly in Pashtun, the language of Afghanistan’s largest ethnic group.

7 December: the Twitter account of Al Shabaab (a terrorist group based in Somalia) is discovered under the pseudonym @HSMPress. Very quickly, it gathered tens of thousands of followers.

25 December: In Nigeria, Boko Haram claims a series of attacks on Christmas Day in a video on YouTube and then on Twitter.

14 August: Creation of the Telegram encrypted messaging application.

May: The Islamic State launches al-Hayat Media to recruit non-Arabic-speaking and Western jihadists.

13 June: A campaign entitled “One Billion Muslims to Support the ISIS” is launched by the Twitter user @a_jzra. The tweets were shared hundreds of times an hour.

20 June: The Twitter #AllEyesOnISIS campaign launched by the Islamic State announces an imminent invasion of northern Iraq. This type of communication allows the Islamic State to attract foreign jihadists.

19 August: The Islamic State publishes a video of the beheading of journalist James Foley.

September-December: At least 46,000 Twitter accounts are used by supporters of the Islamic State.

2 September: The Islamic State publishes a beheading video of journalist Steven Sotloff, an American-Israeli journalist.

13 September: The Islamic State publishes a beheading video of David Cawthorne Haines, a member of a British humanitarian organisation.

16 November: The Islamic State publishes a video of the beheading of Peter Kassig, a U.S. Army ranger.

January: In a video, Amedy Coulibaly claims to have committed the attacks of 8 and 9 January, in Montrouge and at the Hyper Cacher store at the gate of Vincennes, in Paris, on behalf of the Islamic State.

14 January: In a video posted online, Nasser Ben Ali Al-Anassi claims responsibility for Charlie Hebdo’s attack on behalf of Al-Qaeda.

The Islamic State organisation uses Telegram, with the hashtag #KhilafahNews, to attract new supporters, often blocked on Facebook and Twitter. The Islamic State plans 19 of its 38 attacks in Western Europe from 2014 to 2016 via Telegram.

Emergence of Snapchat.

8 March-8 June: 1,348 videos of the Islamic State are uploaded to YouTube and generate 163,391 views; 76% of these videos remained on YouTube for less than two hours but were viewed 14,801 times; 278 accounts uploaded 1,348 of these videos to YouTube; 60% of the accounts remained online after deleting the uploaded videos for content violations.

May: Twitter announces the removal of 360,000 accounts of Islamic State supporters.

11 May: The Islamic State bypasses Instagram’s security controls to promote the killings of kafir (unbelievers) with decapitation images.

13 August: Indian authorities thwart several attacks in the country by following the discussions of groups of young Indian and Afghan Islamist militants on Telegram.

III. The irruption of the Islamic State and Boko Haram (2013-May 2021)

On 17 December 2010, the immolation of the young street vendor Mohamed Bouazizi, in the Sidi Bouzid region of Tunisia, led to the flare-up of the Arab Spring. After some time raising hopes of democratization, these events led, in the first half of the 2010’s, to electoral victories for parties close to the Muslim Brotherhood. While they occasionally failed to retain power, they are “supported by increasingly conservative societies, also as a result of the spread of Salafism imported from Saudi Arabia”.

In this new context, jihadism is developing regionally, based in particular on the proclamation by the Islamic State (IS) of the Caliphate in Mosul in 2014. It is during this period that Islamist terrorism is the most deadly. There has been an unprecedented increase of the number of attacks worldwide. The rise of IS and Boko Haram is facilitated by chaotic geopolitical contexts that offer terrorists many opportunities for expansion.

1. The Islamic State and the “management of savagery”

The group Islamic State emerged and then settled during the Iraqi civil war, between 2003 and 2011. The organisation was created in 2006 and, three times, its name change accompanied its expansion outside its Iraqi hub: first as an Islamic State in Iraq (ISI, 2006-2013), then as an Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, 2013-2014) and finally as an Islamic State (IS, from 2014).

Theorised in the 2000s, the strategy of the IS is to promote chaos, the “management of savagery”, and to globalise jihad. Its objective is to cultivate religion in the minds of the masses, to make Islam the only political and social order, and to train young people in order to establish a militarised society. The IS operates in several ways. The terrorist group may incite...
individuals to act alone. These are the “lone wolves”. Popularised in the 1990s, this expression has been used by the IS through different publications. A lone wolf becomes radicalised, plans and executes an attack on their own, without being affiliated with a particular terrorist group, even if they can claim the attack on behalf of the IS. It should be noted that failed attacks are generally not claimed by the Islamic State. The Iraqi-Syrian “parent company” directly claims responsibility for the most deadly attacks. For example, the attack on the Bardo Museum, Tunisia, on 18 March 2015, or the attacks of 13 November 2015 in France, were claimed the next day by the IS.

As it gains momentum, the IS extends its battlefield. According to our database, it is from 2013 onwards that the organisation has multiplied the number of its terrorist attacks. For that year, we count nearly thirty-one times more attacks by the IS compared to the previous year (374 attacks in 2013, 12 in 2012).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deaths</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>933</td>
<td>1,288</td>
<td>2,028</td>
<td>2,186</td>
<td>3,077</td>
<td>1,846</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attacks</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>11,007</td>
<td>13,746</td>
<td>637</td>
<td>1,365</td>
<td>843</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

58,621 deaths from the 11,175 attacks perpetrated by the various branches of the Islamic State organisation (2006-May 2021)


4. For example, the attempted attacks in Villejuif on 19 April 2015 and on the Thalys train on 21 August 2015.
FRANCE

NUMBER OF ATTACKS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number of attacks</th>
<th>Retained estimate</th>
<th>Possible estimate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>93</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NUMBER OF DEATHS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number of deaths</th>
<th>Retained estimate</th>
<th>Possible estimate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>332</td>
<td>335</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

MAIN TARGETS

- **18.3% Police**
  - 15 attacks
- **17.1% Civilians**
  - 14 attacks
- **12.2% Military**
  - 10 attacks
- **4.9% Government**
  - 4 attacks

THE TYPE OF ATTACKS

- Armed assaults (38)
- Explosions (28)
- Hostage takings/ Kidnappings (9)
- Assassinations (7)

最受影响的省份

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Number of attacks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Île-de-France</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midi-Pyrénées</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auvergne-Rhône-Alpes</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

41.3% of those who died in Islamist terrorist attacks in France were killed during the attacks of 13 November 2015.

67.1% of Islamist terrorist attacks in France took place between 2012 and May 2021.

49.0% of those who died in Islamist terrorist attacks in Europe were killed in France.

DEADLIEST TERRORIST GROUP

Islamic State

Responsible for 44.0% of deaths caused by Islamist terrorist attacks in France

146 deaths

AVG. NUMBER OF DEATHS PER ATTACK

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>World</th>
<th>European Union</th>
<th>France</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fondation pour l’innovation politique
1979-2000
24 attacks
32 deaths
Average number of deaths per attack: 1.3

2001-10 March 2012
3 attacks
0 deaths
Average number of deaths per attack: 0

11 March 2012-31 May 2021
55 attacks
300 deaths
Average number of deaths per attack: 5.5

On 23 April 2021, an attack took place in front of the police station of Rambouillet in the Paris suburbs. In an armed assault, a policewoman was murdered. The murderer was shot to death. However, according to the rules that governed the realisation of our work, we cannot retain in the recognised information of our database on Islamist violence neither this attack, nor the number of victims, since we do not have the conclusions of the investigation at the time of the completion of this study.

Fondation pour l’innovation politique
It should be noted that Boko Haram is not included here, although this group pledged allegiance to the IS in March 2015. We dedicated the following section to this terrorist group in order to highlight its uniqueness. Nevertheless, by adding the terrorist acts of Boko Haram committed since 2015 to the number of attacks perpetrated by the IS and its various branches since its creation in 2006, we obtain the figure of 13,559 attacks that caused the deaths of 73,456 people.

Following the proclamation of the “Caliphate” in June 2014, a multitude of small Islamist groups joined the IS banner. This expansion strategy allows the organisation to establish itself throughout Africa and the Middle East by drawing on the support of local jihadist groups. In 2016, the IS murdered 13,746 people. This was the deadliest year recorded over the entire 1979-May 2021. The number of the IS’ victims has increased ninefold in three years (1,458 deaths in 2013, 13,746 deaths in 2016). The graph on page 35 shows the evolution of the number of attacks committed by the various branches of the Islamic State since its inception through May 2021.

The territories most affected are the places where the IS has been historically established, namely Iraq and Syria. The wars that affect these states have facilitated its development by allowing it to conquer several cities and provinces, and to establish a totalitarian order driven by the objective of restoring an “Abbasid caliphate”. IS terrorists are most destructive in Iraq, where they carried out 6,539 attacks, killing 35,401 people. This means that of the 42,790 people killed in Iraq as a result of Islamist terrorism since 1979, 82.7% were victims of the Islamic State between 2006 and May 2021.

Islamic State’s targets in Iraq (2013-May 2021)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of targets</th>
<th>Number of attacks</th>
<th>Breakdown by target (in %)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civilians</td>
<td>2,468</td>
<td>37.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>1,785</td>
<td>27.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>878</td>
<td>13.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious institutions</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Syria, between 2013 and May 2021, the Islamic State’s attacks have been very deadly, with 996 attacks costing the lives of 9,612 people; on average, in the country, the IS causes the death of 10 people each time it attacks. Some neighbouring countries are affected by the intrusion of the IS, through its ramifications, particularly from 2014 onwards. Here again, these interferences are facilitated by destabilisation contexts which, in turn, favour the influence of the terrorist organisation on these territories which the IS considers its “new provinces” since 2013: Libya (571 attacks, 1,160 deaths), Egypt (733 attacks, 2,253 deaths), Yemen (115 attacks, 997 deaths), but also Afghanistan (482 attacks, 3,133 deaths) and Pakistan (113 attacks, 768 deaths).

The attacks perpetrated by the Islamic State in Europe (2013-May 2021)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number of attacks</th>
<th>Number of deaths</th>
<th>Average number of deaths per attack</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>70</strong></td>
<td><strong>326</strong></td>
<td><strong>4.7</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

With the exception of South America, countries on other continents are targeted by the IS in attacks on their territory as well as against their nationals abroad. Several European Union countries are severely affected, and France, with 13 attacks and 146 deaths caused by the IS, is the most bruised European Union country.

“I know this letter will hurt you. Yet I’m going to tell you how much I love you. Dad, I asked you for permission to spend a few days at Aunt Safia’s. I didn’t go there. Forgive me: I lied to you. The day before last night, I arrived in Iraq to join my husband. We met on the Internet. He’s a wonderful man. I’m sure you’ll like him. He is a regional head of the Islamic State.”

Translated from Rachid Benzine, Lettres à Nour, Points, 2019.

2. The Lake Chad region against Boko Haram’s mass terrorism

In the Hausa language, boko haram can be translated as “Western education is a sin”. The Boko Haram movement was founded by Nigerian preacher Mohamed Yusuf in 2002 in Maiduguri, capital of Borno State, Nigeria. From an Islamist sect to an armed struggle movement in 2009, the organisation advocates a Jihadist Salafist Islam hostile to any Western influence. Its objective is to create a caliphate, governed by Sharia law, just like the IS, to which it pledged allegiance in March 2015 by being referred to as the Islamic State in West Africa.

Islamist terrorist attacks perpetrated by Boko Haram (2009-May 2021)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of attacks</th>
<th>Number of deaths</th>
<th>Average number of deaths per attack</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>382</td>
<td>31.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>327</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>424</td>
<td>1,256</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>1,729</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>495</td>
<td>7,118</td>
<td>14.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>540</td>
<td>6,510</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>1,470</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>333</td>
<td>1,544</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>1,327</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>345</td>
<td>1,929</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>495</td>
<td>1,809</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3,691</td>
<td>25,719</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The group amplified its terrorist activism from 2009 onwards, leading an insurgency for the creation of a caliphate in Nigeria. In 2013, Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan declared a state of emergency and the Nigerian army launched an offensive throughout the country. Despite this, Boko Haram is taking control of new areas, including Borno State, where 68.5% of its attacks are concentrated (1,902 of the 2,777 Boko Haram attacks in Nigeria). As of 2014, the Islamist group’s theatre of operation extends to the countries bordering Lake Chad, in northern Cameroon, in Niger and in Chad.

Islamist terrorist attacks perpetrated by Boko Haram (2009-May 2021)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number of attacks</th>
<th>Number of deaths</th>
<th>Average number of deaths per attack</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>2,777</td>
<td>20,512</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>671</td>
<td>2,857</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>1,479</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>870</td>
<td>12.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3,687</td>
<td>25,718</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Between 2009 and May 2021, Boko Haram was responsible for 3,691 attacks. The human toll (25,719 deaths) is particularly cruel. A significant number of refugees have fled their cities or even their countries. Women and children have even been kidnapped to serve the terrorist organisation, as was the case in April 2014 when 276 high school girls where kidnapped in Chibok, Nigeria.

Boko Haram’s targets (2009-May 2021)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of target</th>
<th>Number of attacks</th>
<th>Breakdown by target (in %)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civilians</td>
<td>1,903</td>
<td>51.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>675</td>
<td>18.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious institutions</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational institutions</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Almost all of the victims were civilians, particularly in schools where education is considered too westernised: between 2009 and May 2021, 92 educational institutions suffered from these terrorist attacks. The soldiers who fight against Boko Haram are also targets; as are the villagers who try to defend themselves by creating a self-defence militia, and who are most often massacred. With regard to its modus operandi, it should be noted that Boko Haram uses suicide bombing on a massive scale.
On 23 March 2019, thanks to Arab-Kurdish forces supported by the United States, the IS was defeated. The end of the self-proclaimed caliphate is official with the taking of the last Syrian territory held by the jihadist organisation. However, deprived of its Iraqi-Syrian stronghold, the IS does not lose all its capacity to cause disturbance and decentralise its activism to its subsidiaries. From the data we have collected, we record 3,825 attacks (10,824 deaths) by the IS between 2018 and the end of May 2021 (5,095 attacks and 16,135 deaths including Boko Haram). This list may be incomplete, but these figures nevertheless illustrate the persistence of the terrorist action of the IS, as reflected by the deadly attacks of 21 April 2019 in Sri Lanka on Easter Sunday, as well as, on the same day, the attacks against three police officers in Saudi Arabia.

### 3. The suicide attack, the “martyr” and the terror

It was first during the Iran-Iraq conflict (1980-1988) that we began talking about “suicide attacks”. It was then a question of tactical warfare. On 30 October 1980, Mohammad Hossein Fahmideh, a 13 year-old fanatical Shiite, committed suicide by throwing himself, grenade in hand, under a tank. In total, there were several thousand Iranian children under the age of 16 years old who would rush onto minefields in order to trigger the explosions and allow troops to pass in order to fight on behalf of the Islamic Republic of Khomeyni. It was then in the context of the Lebanon War that the first “suicide attacks” were perpetrated. In Beirut, on 23 October 1983, two suicide attacks orchestrated by Hezbollah target the American and French contingents of the Multinational Force of security. The first resulted in the death of 241 American soldiers, the second in the death of 58 people, including French paratroopers and the Lebanese family of a building guard. A total of 19 suicide attacks will be committed between 1979 and 2000. They represent 0.9% of the 2,194 acts of Islamist violence in the world.

Suicide attacks require few resources, produce considerable damage and are susceptible to have maximum media impact. Indeed, it profoundly modifies the narrative of the act. It is no longer an attack perpetrated by a terrorist who does not expose themselves or their life to any risk; they are a “martyr” who accept and lead their own “sacrifice” for a cause. Its impact is further increased by the use of the new media order that allows the “martyr” to display their death by filming himself using their smartphone connected to the Web.

#### Islamic suicide attacks in the world (1979-2000)

Between 2001 and 2012, the use of suicide attacks increased significantly (679), to then represent 8.2% of all Islamic attacks (8,265). The story of the jihadist martyr is carefully crafted and maintained by radical Islamists; their efforts are focused on the religious valorisation of the terrorist gesture. The “terrorist” must consider himself as a *shahid* (martyr). Thus, for these men and women who, in most cases, are under 30 years-old, the act to kill by taking your own life is no longer perceived as a suicide - considered a sin - but it is supposed, on the contrary, to bear witness to great piety to the extent that it harms non-Muslims.

If, in Western public opinion, the author of a suicide attack is more often associated with the idea of a fanatical, of a miserable or psychologically unbalanced person, a number of studies seem to contrast this portrait by highlighting the relatively high socio-cultural level of a majority of terrorists killed in suicide attacks.

This is the case, for example, within Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad Movement, whose terrorists that resort to suicide bombing are generally identified as university graduates and middle-class people. 

Over the period 2013-2019, 1,879 attacks have been identified as suicides, representing 6.8% of the 27,811 Islamist terrorist attacks. Among the attacks carried out by the Islamic State and by Boko Haram, the suicide attack is frequently used. It reflects the culture of death maintained and developed among young jihadists. For Boko Haram, we have identified 459 suicide attacks from 2013 to 2019, representing 18.9% of the total number of all attacks attributable to this group, while they represent 9.4% (1,614) of the total attacks by the IS. To carry out its suicide attacks, Boko Haram indoctrinates, manipulates, recruits or coerces women, teenagers and very young children in particular.

### Islamist suicide attacks in the world (1979-2019)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Attacks</th>
<th>Number of Deaths</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>981</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>981</td>
<td>35</td>
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<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>26</td>
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<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>38</td>
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<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>981</td>
<td>35</td>
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<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>26</td>
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<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>981</td>
<td>35</td>
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<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>38</td>
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<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>981</td>
<td>35</td>
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<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>981</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>981</td>
<td>35</td>
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<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>981</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>981</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>26</td>
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<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>981</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>981</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>981</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>981</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### From (individual) fear to (collective) terror

“Different types of terrorism use all resources (tactical, media, technological, etc.) to plunge public opinion into stupor. Beyond their differences, what they have in common is they trigger and spread a specific individual and collective emotional state: extreme fear and a sense of generalised vulnerability. In this perspective, terror is a superlative fear [...]. The sources of fear cease to be precisely circumscribed. And fear becomes more enduring and persistent. Moreover, if the fear is individual, the terror is collective: the attack aims to plunge an entire community into a certain state of mind. The increase in the number of victims serves this dynamic and leads to “hyper-terrorism”, according to the formula forged by François Heisbourg. The attacks of 9/11 marked a rupture because they sought to kill a number of people of a different order than the previous attacks. The goal is then terror on a global scale.”

Translated from Cyrille Bret, *Qu’est-ce que le terrorisme ?*, Vrin, 2018, p. 52-53.

12. For the years 2020 and 2021, suicide attacks are not identifiable in the Armed Conflict and Event Data Project (ACLED) database.
COUNTRIES AFFECTED BY ISLAMIST TERRORISM (2013-MAY 2021)

1 AFGHANISTAN
13,319 attacks | 58,579 deaths

2 IRAQ
6,534 attacks | 34,117 deaths

3 SOMALIA
4,741 attacks | 10,342 deaths

4 NIGERIA
2,356 attacks | 19,127 deaths

5 SYRIA
1,553 attacks | 14,469 deaths

6 PAKISTAN
1,258 attacks | 5,299 deaths

7 YEMEN
935 attacks | 3,216 deaths

8 EGYPT
891 attacks | 2,572 deaths

9 LIBYA
733 attacks | 1,511 deaths

10 CAMEROON
675 attacks | 2,857 deaths

11 PHILIPPINES
581 attacks | 583 deaths

12 INDIA
519 attacks | 683 deaths

13 KENYA
473 attacks | 1,066 deaths

14 MALI
401 attacks | 1,463 deaths

15 NIGER
362 attacks | 2,336 deaths

16 BURKINA FASO
299 attacks | 864 deaths

17 MOZAMBIQUE
286 attacks | 1,027 deaths

18 ISRAEL
215 attacks | 66 deaths

19 THAILAND
189 attacks | 58 deaths

20 DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO
172 attacks | 847 deaths

21 LEBANON
140 attacks | 292 deaths

22 BANGLADESH
138 attacks | 143 deaths

23 WEST BANK AND THE GAZA STRIP
90 attacks | 101 deaths

24 CHAD
83 attacks | 973 deaths

25 TURKEY
83 attacks | 418 deaths

26 TUNISIA
61 attacks | 241 deaths

27 INDONESIA
60 attacks | 99 deaths

28 RUSSIA
57 attacks | 118 deaths

29 FRANCE
50 attacks | 293 deaths

30 SAUDI ARABIA
41 attacks | 115 deaths

31 ALGERIA
33 attacks | 128 deaths

32 UNITED STATES
32 attacks | 98 deaths

33 MALAYSIA
28 attacks | 12 deaths

34 IRAN
27 attacks | 136 deaths

35 GERMANY
17 attacks | 17 deaths

36 UNITED KINGDOM
12 attacks | 50 deaths

37 BELGIUM
11 attacks | 49 deaths

38 TANZANIA
11 attacks | 14 deaths

39 SRI LANKA
9 attacks | 266 deaths

Average number of deaths per attack: 4.4
40 AUSTRALIA
9 attacks | 11 deaths

41 CANADA
9 attacks | 9 deaths

42 TAJIKISTAN
8 attacks | 84 deaths

43 SOUTH AFRICA
8 attacks | 3 deaths

44 JORDAN
7 attacks | 34 deaths

45 BAHRAIN
7 attacks | 4 deaths

46 SPAIN
5 attacks | 21 deaths

47 CHINA
4 attacks | 104 deaths

48 MYANMAR
4 attacks | 20 deaths

49 ETHIOPIA
4 attacks | 13 deaths

50 AUSTRIA
3 attacks | 7 deaths

51 SWEDEN
3 attacks | 5 deaths

52 DENMARK
3 attacks | 3 deaths

53 UGANDA
3 attacks | 2 deaths

54 SOUTH SUDAN
2 attacks | 84 deaths

55 IVORY COAST
2 attacks | 37 deaths

56 KUWAIT
2 attacks | 28 deaths

57 NETHERLANDS
2 attacks | 4 deaths

58 SUDAN
2 attacks | 2 deaths

59 ITALY
2 attacks | 1 death

60 KYRGYZSTAN
2 attacks | 1 death

61 NORWAY
2 attacks | 0 deaths

62 DJIBOUTI
1 attack | 5 deaths

63 TURKMENISTAN
1 attack | 3 deaths

64 FINLAND
1 attack | 2 deaths

65 MOROCCO
1 attack | 2 deaths

66 GEORGIA
1 attack | 1 death

67 AZERBAIJAN
1 attack | 0 deaths

68 BENIN
1 attack | 0 deaths

69 KAZAKHSTAN
1 attack | 0 deaths

Number of attacks
- Between 1 and 10
- Between 11 and 50
- Between 51 and 100
- Between 101 and 500
- Between 501 and 1,000
- More than 1,000
Russia

Islamist terrorism in Russia is linked to the conflict between the central state and separatist rebels from Muslim territories in the North Caucasus region, particularly in Chechnya and Dagestan. Following several centuries of conflict with the central government, Chechen separatists declared their independence at the end of the USSR in 1991. The first Chechen war broke out in 1994 and resulted in a failure of the Russian army, which was forced to withdraw from the territory. However, on 3 October 1998, in the Republic of Ingushetia, in the North Caucasus, the Wolves of Islam group murdered a member of the Russian government whom they accused of collaborating with the FSB services and, on 2 February 1999, the Sword of Islam group attacked the Ministry of Energy in Grozny. A few months later, in the context of the second Chechen war, Moscow intervened again from August 1999 to April 2000, this time succeeding in establishing a government favourable to the central power. 9/11 allows the Russian authorities to intensify the fight against Chechen insurgents. This is followed by a period of violent Islamist radicalisation of the separatist struggle, which extends its demands to the creation of an Islamic state in the North Caucasus. On average, from 2001 to 2012, Islamist terrorism killed 60 people per year. Among the 26 attacks that struck the country during this period, two terrorist actions had a particularly strong impact on public opinion. On 23 October 2002, members of the Chechen jihadist group of the Special Purpose Islamic Regiment (SPIR) entered the Dubrovka Theatre in Moscow and took 912 civilians hostage. Two years later, on 1 September 2004, a group of terrorists attacked a school: 344 people, many of them children, were killed and at least 727 injured. This attack is claimed by the Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion of Chechen Martyrs, which uses suicide bombing. Between 2013 and May 2021, the number of terrorist acts increased, with 57 attacks and 118 deaths, 20 of which occurred in the Republic of Dagestan. Russia even saw the Islamic State gain influence on its territory with the emergence of the Caucasus Province of the Islamic State, which claimed responsibility for 29 attacks over the period.


China

For several decades, China has faced the terrorist threat of separatist militants from the Uyghur community, an ethnic Turkish-speaking Muslim group living mainly in the northwestern province of Xinjiang. Islamic militants exist among them, including in their demands the creation of an Islamic state of East Turkestan. The radicalisation of the conflict between the Uyghurs and the Chinese central government dates back to April 1990, when Uyghurs demonstrated massively in Akto district to denounce the Chinese authorities’ refusal to allow the construction of a mosque there. The Chinese government carried out a severe repression killing more than 60 people. In 1996, the Chinese authorities launched the “Hit hard” campaign, arresting 10,000 people in Xinjiang province. In February 1997, a revolt saw several hundred young Uyghurs protesting in the streets for the release of religious dignitaries arrested by the police in Guldja. The repression caused 167 deaths. Since 2001 and the attacks of 9/11, the Chinese government has taken up the concept of “war on terror” and used it to strengthen its anti-terrorist and repressive measures against separatist militants from the Uyghurs minority. Faced with repression, many Uyghurs fled their country to Turkey or joined jihadist camps in Indonesia or Pakistan. According to researcher Marc Julienne, “today, Uyghurs “Islamic-nationalist” militants are present and connected to other networks in Central and Southeast Asia, on the Pakistan-Afghan border, as well as in Turkey and Syria”. Between 2001 and May 2021, according to our estimate, the Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP), a Uyghurs jihadist group close to Al-Qaeda since the 1990s, carried out 6 attacks, killing 107 people. These terrorist actions include the double attack of 28 July 2014 in Xinjiang province against Chinese government offices, and a police station in Elixku as well as against civilians in Huangdi. The terrorist acts of the TIP are the only ones we have considered to be clearly motivated by an Islamist agenda in the Chinese context. However, with reference to what we propose as a “possible” estimate, there are 97 attacks and 513 deaths, counting all the attacks perpetrated by Uyghurs separatists, whose religious dimension, beyond the political claim, is not clearly predominant.

4. Afghanistan, the country most affected by Islamist terrorism in the world

In June 2017, Donald Trump called for a military withdrawal from Afghanistan, but the United States then sent nearly 4,000 additional troops to contain the Taliban advance. In October 2017, Afghan forces still controlled 56% of the country. On 20 February 2020, an agreement was reached between the U.S. and the Taliban to allow the departure of U.S. forces. On 14 April 2021, Joe Biden officially set the withdrawal of troops for 11 September 2021, in order to end a “war without end.” By the beginning of July 2021, the Taliban claimed to hold 85% of the territory. Kabul fell on 15 August 2021. The Taliban are back in power, twenty years after the U.S.’ declaration of war. The updated edition of our database on the occasion of the commemoration of the twentieth anniversary of 9/11 shows that, since 1979, Afghanistan has been the country most affected by Islamist terrorism, both in terms of the number of attacks (15,874) and the number of victims (66,662). The number of deaths doubled between 2014 (4,209) and 2020 (10,734), reflecting a surge in violence that foreshadows the speed with which the Taliban have reclaimed territory up to the capital on 15 August 2021. Attacks on civilian and military targets have increased. Between 2017 and 2021, we counted 4,517 attacks against military targets, 2,423 against police targets, 979 against civilians and 578 against government targets. In the first edition of this study, in October 2019, our work showed that the Islamic State was the deadliest group (52,619 deaths) between 1979 and 2019, ahead of the Taliban (39,733) and Boko Haram (22,287). After consolidating the 2018-2019 data and including 2020 and the first five months of 2021, the Taliban is the deadliest group with 69,303 deaths, followed by the Islamic State (58,632) and Boko Haram (25,719).


5. In 2021, sub-Saharan Africa remains an epicenter of Islamist terrorism

Our data indicate that between 2019 and May 2021, sub-Saharan Africa remained an important epicenter of Islamist terrorism: 862 attacks and 3,893 deaths in 2019, 2,005 attacks and 5,099 deaths in 2020, 1,962 deaths and 1,229 attacks between January and May 2021. Between 2019 and May 2021, Boko Haram remained the most active and deadliest Islamist group in the region, with 1,028 attacks (25.1% of all Islamist terrorist attacks in sub-Saharan Africa), resulting in 3,984 deaths (36.4% of all Islamist terrorism deaths in sub-Saharan Africa). Al-Shabaab, with 489 attacks and 1,282 deaths in total over the period, is the second most deadly group. The most affected countries are mainly located around the Lake Chad region: Nigeria (3,057 deaths), Niger (1,268 deaths), Burkina Faso (708 deaths), Cameroon (662 deaths), Democratic Republic of Congo (630 deaths), Mali (629 deaths) and Chad (484 deaths). In the east, Somalia has a large number of victims of Islamist terrorism (2,420 deaths), as does Mozambique (911 deaths).
IV. The territories of Islamist terrorism (1979-May 2021)

The globalisation of Islamist terrorism can refer to the global visibility that digital technology provides to their attacks, but it can also designate a geographical reality: more or less, all the regions of the world have been hit. Of course, the damage caused vary considerably depending on the parts of the world. On the number of attacks since 1979, almost all of them (95.7%, or 45,973 attacks) took place in the countries of the Middle East and North Africa, South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa.

With regard to the 210,138 deaths, a considerable proportion (96.4% or 202,490 deaths) was also recorded in these three regions. Undeniably, the Western world is less affected. However, Europe and the United States have faced an increasing and changing threat, with particulary murderous attacks, such as in the United States in 2001, in Spain in 2004, in the United Kingdom in 2005, in France in 2015 and 2016. A multifold of tragedies that remain present in our collective memories.

WORLD

NUMBER OF ATTACKS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year Range</th>
<th>Number of Attacks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1979-2000</td>
<td>2,194 attacks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001-2012</td>
<td>8,265 attacks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013-May 2021</td>
<td>37,576 attacks</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NUMBER OF DEATHS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year Range</th>
<th>Number of Deaths</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1979-2000</td>
<td>6,817 deaths</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001-2012</td>
<td>38,186 deaths</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013-May 2021</td>
<td>165,135 deaths</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Since the data for 1993 has to be consolidated, it is not included in this graph.
**DEADLIEST TERRORIST GROUPS IN THE WORLD**
As a% of the number of victims of attacks worldwide between 1979 and May 2021

- **Taliban**: 69,303 deaths
- **Islamic State**: 58,632 deaths
- **Boko Haram**: 25,719 deaths
- **Al-Qaeda**: 14,359 deaths
- **Al Shabaab**: 13,029 deaths
- **Al-Nusra Front**: 2,978 deaths
- **Hezbollah**: 1,333 deaths
- **Hamas**: 908 deaths
- **Others**: 23,877 deaths

**TYPE OF ATTACKS**

- Explosions: 39.9% (19,189)
- Armed assaults: 32.1% (15,396)
- Hostage takings/Kidnappings: 8.9% (4,281)
- Assassinations: 5.9% (2,838)

**Main targets**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main targets</th>
<th>Number of attacks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>15,230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilians</td>
<td>12,021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>8,772</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>3,495</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business</td>
<td>1,872</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorist groups and militias</td>
<td>1,243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>1,147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious institutions</td>
<td>993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational institutions</td>
<td>776</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>657</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diplomacy</td>
<td>447</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journalists and Media</td>
<td>328</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

"The war on terror has been going on for over seven thousand days. The technological and military superiority of the West against the jihadists is even more obvious than in 1991 against the Iraqi army. Yet the jihadists did not remain spectators to their defeat. They ingeniously practised the fencing of strategy and learned to dodge, tire, feign and break as much as to attack and threaten. They have not, however, managed to repeat an attack as spectacular as that of 9/11, nor to maintain for more than a few years a territorial base comparable to that which they enjoyed in Afghanistan before 2001."

**MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA**

**NUMBER OF ATTACKS**
- **15,544** retained estimate
- **16,889** possible estimate

**NUMBER OF DEATHS**
- **76,640** retained estimate
- **78,813** possible estimate

**ISLAMIST TERRORISM IN THE REGION COMPARED TO THE WORLD**

```
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Attacks</th>
<th>Deaths</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td>32.4%</td>
<td>36.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East and North Africa</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
```

**AVERAGE NUMBER OF DEATHS PER ATTACK**
- **World**: 4.4
- **Middle East and North Africa**: 4.9
- **Yemen**: 3.8
- **Iraq**: 5.7
- **Syria**: 9.2

---

**MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA**

Since the data for 1993 has to be consolidated, it is not included in this graph.

---

**DEADLIEST TERRORIST GROUPS**

- **Islamic State**: responsible for **65.6%** of deaths caused by Islamist terrorist attacks in the region (9,180 attacks, 50,258 deaths)
- **Al-Qaeda**: responsible for **13.1%** of deaths caused by Islamist terrorist attacks in the region (1,995 attacks, 10,067 deaths)
- **Al-Nusra Front**: responsible for **3.9%** of deaths caused by Islamist terrorist attacks in the region (277 attacks, 2,978 deaths)
- **Others**: responsible for **17.4%** of deaths caused by Islamist terrorist attacks in the region (4,092 attacks, 13,337 deaths)
**Ongoing conflicts**

- Yemeni civil war since July 2014
- Second Libyan civil war since May 2014
- Sinai insurgency in Egypt since February 2011
- Syrian civil war since March 2011
- Sahel War since January 2003
- Israeli-Palestinian conflict since 1948

---

**Number of attacks (1979-May 2021)**

- Between 1 and 10
- Between 11 and 50
- Between 51 and 100
- Between 101 and 500
- More than 1,000

---

**Main Targets**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Attacks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civilians</td>
<td>4,895</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>4,340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>2,229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>757</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Type of Attacks**

- Explosions: 8,637 (55.6%)
- Armed Assaults: 2,805 (18.0%)
- Hostage takings/Kidnappings: 1,344 (8.6%)
- Assassinations: 1,081 (7.0%)
SOUTH ASIA

NUMBER OF ATTACKS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attacks</th>
<th>Deaths</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>19,879 possible estimate</td>
<td>19,279 retained estimate</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NUMBER OF DEATHS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>World</th>
<th>South Asia</th>
<th>India</th>
<th>Afghanistan</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>82,006 possible estimate</td>
<td>80,326 retained estimate</td>
<td>4,246</td>
<td>6,377</td>
<td>62,457</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ISLAMIST TERRORISM IN THE REGION COMPARED TO THE WORLD

AVERAGE NUMBER OF DEATHS PER ATTACK

Since the data for 1993 has to be consolidated, it is not included in this graph.

DEADLIEST TERRORIST GROUPS

- **Taliban**: responsible for **77.8%** of all deaths caused by the Islamist terrorist attacks in the region (15,173 attacks, 62,457 deaths)
- **Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)**: responsible for **7.9%** of all deaths caused by Islamist terrorist attacks in the region (1,497 attacks, 6,377 deaths)
- **Islamic State**: responsible for **5.3%** of all deaths caused by Islamist terrorist attacks in the region (684 attacks, 4,246 deaths)
- **Others**: responsible for **13.2%** of deaths caused by Islamist terrorist attacks in the region (2,181 attacks, 10,623 deaths)
Ongoing conflicts

- Armed conflict in northwest Pakistan since March 2004
- Insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir since July 1989

98.9% of attacks in the region are concentrated in three countries: Afghanistan, Pakistan and India

Number of attacks (1979-May 2021)

- Between 1 and 10
- Between 11 and 50
- Between 51 and 100
- Between 101 and 500
- More than 1,000

MAIN TARGETS

- 35.5% Military
  6,449 attacks
- 15.8% Civilians
  3,040 attacks
- 8.9% Government
  1,717 attacks
- 4.0% Business
  469 attacks

TYPE OF ATTACKS

- Armed Assaults (7,371): 38.2%
- Hostage takings/ Kidnappings (1,478): 7.7%
- Assassinations (1,061): 5.5%
- Sabotages/ Lootings (453): 2.3%
**SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA**

**NUMBER OF ATTACKS**

- Retained estimate: 11,148
- Possible estimate: 11,415

**NUMBER OF DEATHS**

- Retained estimate: 45,521
- Possible estimate: 46,673

**ISLAMIST TERRORISM IN THE REGION COMPARED TO THE WORLD**

- Attacks: 23.2%
- Deaths: 21.7%

**AVERAGE NUMBER OF DEATHS PER ATTACK**

- World: 4.4
- Sub-Saharan Africa: 4.1
- Somalia: 2.3
- Mali: 3.6
- Nigeria: 7.2

Since the data for 1993 has to be consolidated, it is not included in this graph.

**DEADLIEST TERRORIST GROUPS**

- **Boko Haram:** responsible for 56.5% of all deaths caused by Islamist terrorist attacks in the region (3,691 attacks, 25,719 deaths)
- **Al-Shabaab:** responsible for 25.8% of all deaths caused by Islamist terrorist attacks in the region (4,259 attacks, 11,744 deaths)
- **Al-Qaeda:** responsible for 1.3% of all deaths caused by Islamist terrorist attacks in the region (85 attacks, 609 deaths)
- **Others:** responsible for 16.4% of deaths caused by Islamist terrorist attacks in the region (3,113 attacks, 7,449 deaths)
Ongoing conflicts

- Ansar al-Sunna insurgency in Mozambique since 2017
- Mali War since January 2012
- Boko Haram insurgency since July 2009
- Al-Shabaab insurgency in Somalia since 2006
- Crisis in the Niger Delta since 2004
- Sahel War since January 2003

7.0 people are killed on average per attack committed by Boko Haram in the region.

Number of attacks (1979-May 2021)

- Between 1 and 10
- Between 11 and 50
- Between 51 and 100
- Between 101 and 500
- More than 1,000

MAIN TARGETS

- **36.9%** Military
  - 4 118 attacks
- **32.2%** Civilians
  - 3 591 attacks
- **7.9%** Government
  - 880 attacks
- **7.8%** Police
  - 866 attacks

TYPE OF ATTACKS

- **41.6%** Armed Assaults (4,633)
- **29.8%** Explosions (3,319)
- **9.5%** Hostage takings/ Kidnappings (1,060)
- **5.7%** Assassinations (631)
EUROPE AND RUSSIA

NUMBER OF ATTACKS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Number of Attacks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Al-Qaeda</td>
<td>22.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic State</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hezbollah</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>54.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NUMBER OF DEATHS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Number of Deaths</th>
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<tr>
<td>Islamic State</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hezbollah</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>54.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ISLAMIST TERRORISM IN THE REGION COMPARED TO THE WORLD

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Number of Deaths</th>
<th>Number of Attacks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td>1,633 retained estimate</td>
<td>282 retained estimate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe and Russia</td>
<td>1,696 possible estimate</td>
<td>346 possible estimate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>651 deaths</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

AVERAGE NUMBER OF DEATHS PER ATTACK

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Average Deaths</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe and Russia</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Since the data for 1993 has to be consolidated, it is not included in this graph.

ISLAMIST TERRORIST ATTACKS IN THE WORLD

DEADLIEST TERRORIST GROUPS

- Al-Qaeda: responsible for 22.8% of all deaths caused by Islamist terrorist attacks in the region (25 attacks, 373 deaths)
- Islamic State: responsible for 20.0% of all deaths caused by Islamist terrorist attacks in the region (70 attacks, 326 deaths)
- Hezbollah: responsible for 2.9% of all deaths caused by Islamist terrorist attacks in the region (18 attacks, 48 deaths)
- Others: responsible for 54.1% of deaths caused by Islamist terrorist attacks in the region (167 attacks, 883 deaths)
51.7% of those who died in Islamist terrorist attacks in Europe were killed in Russia.

Ongoing conflicts
- Donbas War since March 2014
- Guerilla in Ciscaucasia since April 2009

MAIN TARGETS
- 25.5% Police
  72 attacks
- 17.0% Civilians
  48 attacks
- 11.3% Business
  33 attacks
- 8.5% Government
  24 attacks

TYPE OF ATTACKS
- Armed Assaults (125): 44.3%
- Explosions (100): 35.5%
- Assassinations (26): 9.2%
- Hostage takings/Kidnapings (3): 1.1%

Number of attacks (1979-May 2021)
- Between 1 and 10
- Between 11 and 50
- Between 51 and 100
- Between 101 and 500
- More than 1,000
DEADLIEST TERRORIST GROUPS

- **Islamic State**: responsible for 31.8% of deaths caused by Islamist terrorist attacks in the EU (27 attacks, 215 deaths)
- **Al-Qaeda**: responsible for 30.3% of deaths caused by Islamist terrorist attacks in the EU (11 attacks, 205 deaths)
- **Hezbollah**: responsible for 7.1% of deaths caused by Islamist terrorist attacks in the EU (18 attacks, 48 deaths)
- **Others**: responsible for 30.9% of deaths caused by Islamist terrorist attacks in the EU (109 attacks, 209 deaths)

* In the first edition of this study, published in 2019, Islamist terrorist attacks in the United Kingdom were included in the European Union record. This is no longer the case in this second edition, following the effective exit of the from the European Union on 31 January 2020.

Fondation pour l’innovation politique
48.1% of the attacks claimed by the Islamic State in the European Union took place in France.

8.0 deaths on average per attack perpetrated by the Islamic State in the European Union.

70.3% of Islamist terrorist attacks in the European Union took place between 2013 and May 2021.

The United Kingdom has been removed from the map and calculations for the EU due to the effectiveness of the Brexit on 31 January 2020.
Over the period studied, 81 countries were affected by at least one Islamist terrorist attack. Among these countries, 18 are European countries (19 including Russia), 14 of which are members of the European Union. Of the 81 countries, 30 are democracies. It is also observed that countries most affected by Islamist terrorist attacks in the last forty years are those who have experienced periods of war: Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia... Most of the 81 countries affected by Islamist violence are developing countries.

Finally, it should be noted that the vast majority (89.5%) of Islamist terrorist attacks have been committed in Muslim countries. As a result, most of them deaths caused by Islamist terrorist attacks (91.7%) are also recorded in Muslim countries. These figures underestimate the reality since they do not take into account the attacks Islamists perpetrated in countries with a majority of non-Muslim where Muslim populations are concentrated in certain provinces. Most of the lives lost are therefore Muslim lives.

### The 81 countries affected by Islamist terrorism in the world (1979-May 2021)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number of attacks</th>
<th>Number of deaths</th>
<th>Average number of deaths per attack</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>15,874</td>
<td>66,662</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>7,469</td>
<td>42,790</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>5,265</td>
<td>11,887</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>2,938</td>
<td>21,171</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>2,299</td>
<td>10,456</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>1,654</td>
<td>15,247</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>1,386</td>
<td>4,790</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>1,259</td>
<td>4,861</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>1,211</td>
<td>3,315</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>1,163</td>
<td>1,905</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>898</td>
<td>2,683</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>736</td>
<td>1,517</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>675</td>
<td>2,857</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>576</td>
<td>1,432</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>514</td>
<td>1,107</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>510</td>
<td>793</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>418</td>
<td>1,514</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>377</td>
<td>2,530</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Bank and the Gaza strip</td>
<td>338</td>
<td>474</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>327</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>299</td>
<td>864</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>1,027</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>847</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>427</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>584</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>336</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>844</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>973</td>
<td>11.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>332</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>324</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>3,121</td>
<td>53.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>22</td>
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<td>Morocco</td>
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<td>73</td>
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AFGHANISTAN

**NUMBER OF ATTACKS**

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td></td>
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<td>Retained estimate</td>
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**NUMBER OF DEATHS**

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Since the data for 1993 has to be consolidated, it is not included in this graph.

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<td>1979</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TYPE OF ATTACKS**

- **Armed assaults (39.4%)**
  - 6,247
- **Explosions (29.9%)**
  - 4,746
- **Hostage takings/ Kidnappings (7.4%)**
  - 1,180
- **Assassinations (4.9%)**
  - 781
- **Others (18.4%)**
  - 2,920

**MAIN TARGETS**

- **36.4% Military**
  - 5,776 attacks
- **29.4% Police**
  - 4,667 attacks
- **14.3% Civilians**
  - 5,776 attacks
- **9.2% Government**
  - 1,454 attacks

**MOST AFFECTED PROVINCES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Number of attacks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Helmand</td>
<td>1,245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kandahar</td>
<td>1,132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghazni</td>
<td>1,041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nangarhar</td>
<td>966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kunduz</td>
<td>877</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**DEADLIEST TERRORIST GROUP**

**Taliban**

Responsible for **93.7%** of deaths caused by Islamist terrorist attacks in Afghanistan

**AVERAGE NUMBER OF DEATHS PER ATTACK**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>World</th>
<th>South Asia</th>
<th>Afghanistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

91.8% of those who died in Islamist terrorist attacks in Afghanistan were killed between 2012 and May 2021.

82.3% of Islamist terrorist attacks in South Asia occurred in Afghanistan.

31.7% of those who died in Islamist terrorist attacks in the world were killed in Afghanistan.
Baghdad is the city in the world most affected by Islamist terrorist attacks, with 1,119 attacks and 7,282 deaths. Iraq’s portion of the total number of deaths from Islamist terrorism declined from 30.3% in the 2015-2017 period to 4.3% for the 2018-2020 period. 55.8% of people killed in Islamist terrorist attacks in the Middle East and North Africa were killed in Iraq.

### Main Targets
- **38.1% Civilians**
  - 2,846 attacks
- **25.9% Military**
  - 1,938 attacks
- **14.3% Police**
  - 1,066 attacks
- **4.3% Government**
  - 318 attacks

### Type of Attacks
- 4,686 Explosions (62.7%)
- 944 Armed assaults (12.6%)
- 628 Hostage takings/ Kidnappings (8.4%)
- 228 Assassinations (3.1%)
- 983 Others (13.2%)

### Deadliest Terrorist Group
**Islamic State**
Responsible for 82.7% of deaths caused by Islamist terrorist attacks in Iraq.

### Average Number of Deaths Per Attack
- **World**: 4.4
- **Middle East and North Africa**: 4.9
- **Iraq**: 5.7
SOMALIA

NUMBER OF ATTACKS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of attacks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5,265 retained estimate</td>
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<tr>
<td>5,275 possible estimate</td>
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</table>

NUMBER OF DEATHS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of deaths</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11,887 retained estimate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11,935 possible estimate</td>
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</table>

Since the data for 1993 has to be consolidated, it is not included in this graph.

Al-Shabaab insurgency in Somalia (since 2006)

MAIN TARGETS

- **55.1% Military** 2,903 attacks
- **15.5% Civilians** 816 attacks
- **12.5% Government** 656 attacks

MOST AFFECTED PROVINCES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Number of attacks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Banaadir</td>
<td>1,556</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Shabelle (Shabeellaha Hoose)</td>
<td>1,282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Juba (Jubbada Hoose)</td>
<td>505</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bay</td>
<td>419</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hiiraan</td>
<td>365</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TYPE OF ATTACKS

- **2,125 Armed assaults** (40.4%)
- **1,777 Explosions** (33.8%)
- **474 Assassinations** (9.0%)
- **361 Hostage takings/Kidnappings** (6.9%)
- **528 Others** (10.0%)

DEADLIEST TERRORIST GROUP

**Al-Shabaab**

Responsible for **87.5%** of deaths caused by Islamist terrorist attacks in Somalia

AVERAGE NUMBER OF DEATHS PER ATTACK

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>World</th>
<th>Sub-Saharan Africa</th>
<th>Somalia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

23.8% of Islamist terrorist attacks in Somalia occurred in Mogadishu, the country's capital (1,254).

2017 is the year in which Islamist terrorism was the deadliest in Somalia (506 attacks, 1,808 deaths).

26.1% of those who died in Islamist terrorist attacks in sub-Saharan Africa were killed in Somalia.
**NIGERIA**

**NUMBER OF ATTACKS**
- 2,938 retained estimate
- 2,952 possible estimate

**NUMBER OF DEATHS**
- 21,171 retained estimate
- 21,242 possible estimate

Since the data for 1993 has to be consolidated, it is not included in this graph.

**MAIN TARGETS**
- **44.4% Civilians**
  - 1,305 attacks
- **21.5% Military**
  - 633 attacks
- **8.4% Police**
  - 246 attacks
- **5.8% Religious institutions**
  - 171 attacks

**TYPE OF ATTACKS**
- 1,346 Armed assaults (45.8%)
- 904 Explosions (30.8%)
- 271 Hostage takings / Kidnappings (9.2%)
- 65 Assassinations (2.2%)
- 352 Others (12.0%)

**MOST AFFECTED PROVINCES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Number of attacks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Borno</td>
<td>2,040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yobe</td>
<td>287</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adamawa</td>
<td>208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kano</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plateau</td>
<td>33</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**DEADLIEST TERRORIST GROUP**

**Boko Haram**

- Responsible for **96.9%** of deaths caused by Islamist terrorist attacks in Nigeria

- **21,171 deaths**

**AVERAGE NUMBER OF DEATHS PER ATTACK**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>World</th>
<th>Sub-Saharan Africa</th>
<th>Nigeria</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>4.4</strong></td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>7.2</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**69.4%** of Islamist terrorist attacks in Nigeria are concentrated in Borno State (2,040 attacks).

**7.2** people on average die in a terrorist attack committed by Boko Haram in Nigeria.

**46.5%** of those who died in Islamist terrorist attacks in sub-Saharan Africa were killed in Nigeria.
ISLAMIST TERRORIST ATTACKS IN THE WORLD

PAKISTAN

NUMBER OF ATTACKS

- 2,299 retained estimate
- 2,409 possible estimate

NUMBER OF DEATHS

- 10,456 retained estimate
- 10,836 possible estimate

Since the data for 1993 has to be consolidated, it is not included in this graph.

MAIN TARGETS

- **24.1% Civilians**
  - 553 attacks
- **21.7% Military**
  - 500 attacks
- **18.2% Police**
  - 419 attacks
- **6.4% Government**
  - 147 attacks

MOST AFFECTED PROVINCES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Number of attacks</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Khyber Pakhtunkhwa</td>
<td>1,529</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balochistan</td>
<td>281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sindh</td>
<td>270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punjab</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamabad Capital Territory</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9.9% of Islamist terrorist attacks in Pakistan were suicide attacks between 1979 and May 2021.

13.0% of those who died in Islamist terrorist attacks in South Asia were killed in Pakistan.

DEADLIEST TERRORIST GROUP

**Tehrik-i-Taliban**

Responsible for 60.6% of deaths caused by Islamist terrorist attacks in Pakistan

AVERAGE NUMBER OF DEATHS PER ATTACK

- **World**: 4.4 deaths
- **South Asia**: 4.2 deaths
- **Pakistan**: 4.5 deaths

Fondation pour l’innovation politique
**TYPE OF ATTACKS**
- 943 Explosions (57.0%)
- 220 Armed assaults (13.3%)
- 218 Hostage takings/ Kidnappings (13.2%)
- 97 Assassinations (5.9%)
- 176 Others (10.6%)

**DEADLIEST TERRORIST GROUP**
Islamic State
- Responsible for 63.0% of deaths caused by Islamist terrorist attacks in Syria
- 9,612 deaths

**MAIN TARGETS**
- **38.3%** Military
  - 633 attacks
- **33.7%** Civilians
  - 558 attacks
- **8.6%** Terrorist groups and militias
  - 142 attacks
- **3.2%** Government
  - 53 attacks

**MOST AFFECTED PROVINCES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Number of attacks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aleppo</td>
<td>416</td>
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<tr>
<td>Deir ez-Zor</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homs</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Idlib</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Damascus</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NUMBER OF ATTACKS**
- **1,654** retained estimate
- **1,730** possible estimate

**NUMBER OF DEATHS**
- **15,247** retained estimate
- **15,517** possible estimate

**DEADLIEST**

- 14.9% of Islamist terrorist attacks in Syria are committed by the Al-Nusra Front (247 attacks, 2,926 deaths).
- 10.6% of Islamist terrorist attacks in the Middle East and North Africa occurred in Syria.
- 66.7% of all hostage takings and kidnappings in Syria were committed by the Islamic State.

**AVERAGE NUMBER OF DEATHS PER ATTACK**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Average Number of Deaths Per Attack</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>4.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Middle East and North Africa</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ALGERIA*

NUMBER OF ATTACKS

1,386 retained estimate
1,527 possible estimate

NUMBER OF DEATHS

4,790 retained estimate
5,500 possible estimate

Since the data for 1993 has to be consolidated, it is not included in this graph

MAIN TARGETS

- **26.6% Civilians**
  - 368 attacks

- **26.0% Police**
  - 361 attacks

- **18.3% Military**
  - 254 attacks

- **6.0% Government**
  - 83 attacks

TYPE OF ATTACKS

- 544 Explosions (39.2%)
- 460 Armed assaults (33.2%)
- 219 Assassinations (15.8%)
- 54 Hostage takings/ Kidnappings (3.9%)
- 109 Others (7.9%)

MOST AFFECTED PROVINCES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Number of attacks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algiers</td>
<td>226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boumerdès</td>
<td>213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tizi Ouzou</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blida</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bouira</td>
<td>79</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

3 of the 5 provinces most affected by the Islamist terrorist attacks in Algeria are located in Kabylia, a mountainous territory of Berber tradition.

8.9% of Islamist terrorist attacks in the Middle East and North Africa occurred in Algeria.

DEADLIEST TERRORIST GROUP

**Armed Islamic Group**

Responsible for 30.5% of deaths caused by Islamist terrorist attacks in Algeria.

1,459 deaths

AVERAGE NUMBER OF DEATHS PER ATTACK

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th>Middle East and North Africa</th>
<th>Algeria</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The fact sheet for this country does not take into account the estimates of the black decade from 1991 to 2002, which according to sources vary between 44,000 and 200,000 deaths from Islamist terrorism.
**Yemen**

**Number of attacks**
- 1,289 retained estimate
- 1,337 possible estimate

**Number of deaths**
- 4,861 retained estimate
- 4,975 possible estimate

Since the data for 1993 has to be consolidated, it is not included in this graph.

**Main targets**
- 42.2% Military
  - 544 attacks
- 12.9% Government
  - 166 attacks
- 11.0% Police
  - 142 attacks
- 9.3% Civilians
  - 120 attacks

**Most affected provinces**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Number of attacks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hadramaut</td>
<td>255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abyan</td>
<td>255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aden</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amanat Al Asimah (Sana’a city)</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Bayda</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8.3% of Islamist terrorist attacks in the Middle East and North Africa took place in Yemen.

65% of deaths caused by Islamist terrorist attacks in Yemen are recorded since the beginning of the civil war in 2015.

**Deadliest terrorist group**
- Al-Qaeda

77.4% of deaths caused by Islamist terrorist attacks in Yemen

**Average number of deaths per attack**
- World: 4.4
- Middle East and North Africa: 4.9
- Yemen: 3.8

Fondation pour l’innovation politique
EGYPT

NUMBER OF ATTACKS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Number of Attacks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Explosions</td>
<td>485 (40.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed Assaults</td>
<td>380 (31.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assassinations</td>
<td>195 (16.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hostage Takings</td>
<td>80 (6.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>71 (5.9%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NUMBER OF DEATHS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Number of Deaths</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Explosions</td>
<td>1,211 (40.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed Assaults</td>
<td>766 (31.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assassinations</td>
<td>766 (16.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hostage Takings</td>
<td>680 (6.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>680 (5.9%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Since the data for 1993 has to be consolidated, it is not included in this graph.

MAIN TARGETS

- **36.1% Police**
  - 437 attacks
- **28.3% Military**
  - 343 attacks
- **14.3% Civilians**
  - 173 attacks

TYPE OF ATTACKS

- 485 Explosions (40.0%)
- 380 Armed Assaults (31.4%)
- 195 Assassinations (16.1%)
- 80 Hostage Takings/ Kidnappings (6.6%)
- 71 Others (5.9%)

MOST AFFECTED PROVINCES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Number of Attacks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North Sinai</td>
<td>728</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minya</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cairo</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asyut</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giza</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

100% of Islamist terrorist attacks in North Sinai province occurred between 2011 and May 2021.

93.8% of Islamist terrorist attacks in North Sinai Province have been claimed by the Islamic State.

37 attacks were claimed by the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt between 1979 and 2021.

DEADLIEST TERRORIST GROUP

Islamic State

Responsible for 68.0% of deaths caused by Islamist terrorist attacks in Egypt

AVG NUMBER OF DEATHS PER ATTACK

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Number of Deaths</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East and North Africa</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fondation pour l’innovation politique
PHILIPPINES

**NUMBER OF ATTACKS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Attack</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Explosions</td>
<td>535</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed assaults</td>
<td>308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hostage takings/Kidnappings</td>
<td>229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assassinations</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NUMBER OF DEATHS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Attack</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Explosions</td>
<td>1,905</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed assaults</td>
<td>2,156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hostage takings/Kidnappings</td>
<td>224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assassinations</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**MAIN TARGETS**

- **27.0% Civilians**
  - 314 attacks
- **22.2% Military**
  - 258 attacks
- **11.0% Business**
  - 128 attacks
- **7.8% Government**
  - 91 attacks

**TYPE OF ATTACKS**

- 535 Explosions (46.0%)
- 308 Armed assaults (26.5%)
- 229 Hostage takings/Kidnappings (19.7%)
- 25 Assassinations (2.1%)
- 66 Others (5.7%)

**DEADLIEST TERRORIST GROUP**

**Abu Sayyaf**

Responsible for 43.8% of deaths caused by Islamist terrorist attacks in the Philippines

**MORO INSURRECTION**

(1969-February 2019)

**MOST AFFECTED PROVINCES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Number of attacks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basilan</td>
<td>236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sulu</td>
<td>215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maguindanao</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Cotabato</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lanao Del Sur</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**2000** was the year in which Islamist terrorism was the deadliest in the Philippines (96 attacks, 224 deaths).

**74.8%** of those killed in Islamist terrorist attacks in Southeast Asia were killed in the Philippines.

**AVERAGE NUMBER OF DEATHS PER ATTACK**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Average Number of Deaths per Attack</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeast Asia</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fondation pour l’innovation politique
**TYPE OF ATTACKS**

- 358 Armed assaults (39.9%)
- 350 Explosions (39.0%)
- 100 Hostage takings/ Kidnappings (11.1%)
- 47 Assassinations (5.2%)
- 43 Others (4.8%)

**MAIN TARGETS**

- **33.4% Police**
  - 300 attacks
- **19.3% Military**
  - 173 attacks
- **18.8% Civilians**
  - 169 attacks
- **10.0% Government**
  - 90 attacks

**MOST AFFECTED PROVINCES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Number of attacks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jammu &amp; Kashmir</td>
<td>741</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delhi</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maharashtra</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gujarat</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bihar</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

82.5% of Islamist terrorist attacks in India have occurred in Jammu and Kashmir province.

2008 was the year in which Islamist terrorism was the deadliest in India (51 attacks, 474 deaths).

**DEADLIEST TERRORIST GROUP**

**Lashkar-e-Taiba**

Responsible for 38.2% of deaths caused by Islamist terrorist attacks in India

**AVERAGE NUMBER OF DEATHS PER ATTACK**

- **World**: 4.4
- **South Asia**: 4.2
- **India**: 3.0
**LIBYA**

**NUMBER OF ATTACKS**
- **736** retained estimate
- **852** possible estimate

**NUMBER OF DEATHS**
- **1,517** retained estimate
- **1,586** possible estimate

Since the data for 1993 has to be consolidated, it is not included in this graph.

**MAIN TARGETS**
- **36.5%** Civilians
- **269** attacks
- **24.2%** Military
- **178** attacks
- **6.9%** Terrorist groups and militias
- **51** attacks
- **6.9%** Police
- **51** attacks

**TYPE OF ATTACKS**
- **292** Explosions (39.7%)
- **186** Hostage takings/ Kidnappings (25.3%)
- **102** Armed assaults (13.9%)
- **29** Assassinations (3.9%)
- **127** Others (17.3%)

**MOST AFFECTED PROVINCES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Number of attacks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sirte</td>
<td>284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benghazi</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Derna</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tripoli</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Misrata</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**DEADLIEST TERRORIST GROUP**
- Islamic State
  - Responsible for **76.5%** of deaths caused by Islamist terrorist attacks in Libya

**AVERAGE NUMBER OF DEATHS PER ATTACK**
- **4.4** World
- **4.9** Middle East and North Africa
- **2.1** Libya

**40.6%** of Islamist terrorist attacks in Libya took place in Sirte Province.

**15 Islamist terrorist attacks** have targeted diplomatic institutions in Libya.
LES ATTENTATS ISLAMISTES DANS LE MONDE 1979-2021

Nouvelle édition
Données collectées jusqu’au 31 mai 2021

SEPTEMBRE 2021
As an extension of our study on Islamist terrorism, we published an interactive map of the 33,769 Islamist terrorist attacks recorded between 1979 and 2019, freely available on fondapol.org. This interactive map was produced in 2020 and is therefore based on the database of the first edition of the study.
WHAT NEXT FOR DEMOCRACY?
AN INTERNATIONAL SURVEY BY THE FONDATION POUR L'INNOVATION POLITIQUE

Edited by Dominique Reynié

OÙ VA LA DÉMOCRATIE?
UNE ENQUÊTE INTERNATIONALE DE LA FONDATION POUR L'INNOVATION POLITIQUE

Sous la direction de Dominique Reynié
Created in 2004, the Fondation pour l'innovation politique has an economically liberal, progressive and European perspective. Through its work, it has two objectives: to contribute to a pluralist and informed debate, and to inspire public decision-making.

As a state-recognised organisation, the website fondapol.org provides public access to all the Foundation's work. Anyone can access and use all the data gathered for the various surveys via the ‘data fondapol’ platform, made available in accordance with a government policy desiring the sharing of public data. Moreover, when it comes to international surveys, the data are available in the different languages of the questionnaire; for example, in 33 languages for the Democracies Under Pressure survey, conducted in 42 countries.

Furthermore, reflecting the Foundation's editorial policy, our blog ‘Anthropotechnie’ aims to explore new avenues prompted by human enhancement, reproductive cloning, human/machine hybridisation, genetic engineering and germline manipulation. It contributes to thinking and debate on transhumanism. ‘Anthropotechnie’ offers articles tackling ethical, philosophical and political issues associated with the expansion of technological innovations relating to the enhancement of human bodies and abilities.

The Fondation pour l’innovation politique is independent and receives no financial support from any political party. Its funding comes from both public and private sources.
Public debate needs the Foundation and the Foundation needs you!

In order to remain independent and work effectively in the public interest, the Fondation pour l’innovation politique, a civil society institution, needs the support of businesses and individuals. Every year, donors are invited to attend the General Convention at which the organisation’s priorities are set out. The Fondation pour l’innovation politique moreover regularly provides donors with opportunities to meet its staff and advisers, discuss its work before anyone else, and attend its events.

The Fondation pour l’innovation politique is a state-recognised organisation pursuant to the decree of 14 April 2004 and as such is entitled to receive donations and legacies from individuals and businesses.

☐ I would like to support the Fondation pour l’innovation politique
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☐ On behalf of the company: ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................

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By bank transfer dated:
To the account of the Fondation pour l’innovation politique at the Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations:
IBAN : FR77 4003 1000 0100 0029 9345 Z16
BIC : CDCGFRPPXXX

anne.flambert@fondapol.org
The period between the invasion of Afghanistan by the Red Army in 1979 and the capture of Kabul by the Taliban on 15 August 2021 corresponds to a rise in Islamist terrorism. As attacks have multiplied, they have struck all over the world, reaching into the heart of Western countries - New York, Madrid, London, Paris, Moscow... - exacerbating feelings of fear, mistrust and suspicion of Muslims, and even of anti-Muslim sentiment. In democracies, Islamist terrorism fosters both rejection of Islam and demands for authoritarianism.

Despite its importance, the reality of this violence has not been accurately measured. The Fondation pour l’innovation politique wanted to contribute to this assessment by quantifying Islamist terrorism, identifying the forms it has taken over the decades, listing the acts it may have inspired or initiated, estimating the number of its victims, and identifying the most deadly organisations and the countries most affected. This pioneering work was published in November 2019 in a report entitled *Islamist Terrorist Attacks in the World. 1979-2019*, available online at fondapol.org, in French, English and Arabic. To do this, we collected a huge amount of information, to the point of building a voluminous database available in open data on our website data.fondapol.org.

Two years later, we offer readers an update of our database, which has become indispensable for the description and understanding of a new and singularly problematic political reality. The update of the study proposed here extends through May 2021. The revival of this important work echoes the commemoration of the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States. The twentieth anniversary of this tragedy coincides with President Biden’s announcement of the U.S.’ withdrawal from Afghanistan, the Taliban takeover of Kabul on 15 August 2021, and the withdrawal of the last U.S. troops from Afghanistan on 31 August 2021.

We believe that the mass of information gathered sheds new light on the phenomenon of Islamist violence. It makes it possible to better describe it, to better understand it, to document its severity. Thus, by way of illustration, we can establish that between 1979 and May 2021, at least 48,035 Islamist terrorist attacks took place worldwide. They caused the deaths of at least 210,138 people. On average, an Islamist terrorist attack has resulted in the death of around 4.4 people. We identify and quantify the modus operandi and targets. Explosives are the most common type of weapon used (43.9%), while the military is the main target (31.7%), ahead of civilians (25.0%) and police forces (18.3%). The picture of this phenomenon is becoming clearer. Afghanistan was the country most affected by Islamist terrorism, ahead of Iraq and Somalia. Within the European Union, France was the country most affected, with at least 82 Islamist terrorist attacks and 332 deaths. We also show that the majority of Islamist terrorist attacks (89.5%) were in Muslim countries and that the victims were mainly Muslims, in the same proportions.